ML20197C447
| ML20197C447 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/31/1986 |
| From: | Jennifer Davis NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Simpson A SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197C372 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-49FR30726, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-73 AA36-2-009, AA36-2-9, AB17-2-09, AB17-2-9, NUDOCS 8611060174 | |
| Download: ML20197C447 (8) | |
Text
ifDL M%Q DISTRIBUTION:
NMSS r/f
. SGRT r/f & s/f g ! l 95 PDwyer JYardumian RBurnett
, DMausshardt j JDavis .
The Honorable Alan Simpson, Chairman 4
Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate Washington, DC 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Enclosed for the information of the Subcommittee are copies of a new amend-ment to 10 CFR Part 73 which is to be published in the Federal Register.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations to clarify requirements for searches of individuals at the entry portals of power reactor facilities. These search requirements are intended to provide protection against radiological sabotage. The Commission previously invited and received public comment on the proposed rule as part of the proposed Insider Safeguards Rules published for public comment on August 1, 1984. The revised search requirements have been designed to maintain the type of personnel search pro-gram presently practiced by most licensees. Under this amendment, licensees use explosive and firearm detection equipment to search for contraband under routine circumstances. Physical " pat-down" searches will be used when equip-ment fails or when the licensee has cause to suspect that contraband is being introduced into the facility.
Licensees will be required to submit changes to their security plans reflecting the new search requirements within 120 days following the effective date.
Licensees will implement the revised search procedures within 60 days after Commission approval of plan changes.
Sincerely,
8611060174 861104 PDR PR ' SIGNED) John G. N 50 49FR30726 PDR John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Enclosure:
Federal Register Notice cc: Senator Gary Hart
- Identical letters sent to: Representative Udall w/cc to Rep. Manuel Lujan Representative Markey w/cc to Rep. Carlos Moorhead )
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMkISSICN 10 CFR Part 73 Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: - Final rule.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its requirements for entry searches at power reactor facilities. This amendment is needed
. t'o clarify requirements for searches of individuals at these facilities.
This amencment requires equipment searches of all individLals seeking- '
access to protected areas, except on-duty law enforcement officers.
Additionally, pat-down searches will be recuired when detection equip-ment fails or caust to suspect exists. This amendment supports the {
Commission's goal of increased assurance that power reactors are ade-quately protected against sabotage by an insider.
EFFECTIVE DATE: Septerdaer 3, 1986 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Dwyer, Division of Safe-guards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear I Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 427-4773.
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to finalize requirements for personnel searches at protected area entry portals of power reactors. The Commission revised the rule in response i
- to public comment and tne recommendations made by the Committee to Review Safeguards Requirements at Power Reactors (Safety / Safeguards Committee).
This Committee had the overall task of studying power reactor safeguards requirements and practices to determine whether actual or potential con-flicts exist between plant safety and safeguards objectives.
On August 1, 1984, the proposed rule was again published for public comment (49 FR 30738) as part of the proposed Insider Safeguards Rules because of the interrelationship among the rules with regard to protec- -
tion against the insider threat. The original 120-day comment period on l 1
the Insider Safeguards Rules was extended an additional 90 days at I licensee request and expired on March 7, 1985. j
SUMMARY
OF PUBLIC COMMENT A total of 28 letters of comments was received from licensees, licensee groups, licensee contractors, and unions. A summary of the public comments follows:
- 1. Use of Pat-Down Searches. The proposed rule requires pat-down searches of all individuals requiring facility access, except on-duty law enforcement officers, when search equipment fails or cause to suspect exists. A broad range of comments was received on this issue. Some comment indicated full-time facility employees should never be pat-down searched because pat-down search of long standing, trusted employees is degrading. Other comment recommended a distinction be mace on pat-down search recuirements for individuals with unescorted versus escorted access.
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- i inclusion of a.rmed security force memcers within the search exemption.
The distinction has been made between law enforcement officers and memcers of a facility's security force because law officers for the most part will be under continual escort. This provides an increased degree of assurance of protection against a malevolent act. Security personnel on the other hand are for the most part provided unescorted access based
, upon screening. cecause the Commission's design basis threat includes an internal threat of an insider including an employee in any position, the J Commission believes the time to equipment search members of the security force is insignificant compared to the increased assurance against a .
malevolent insider gained by equipment search.
- 3. Time Lacse for Imolementation of Pat-Down. The proposed rule
, requires the licensee to immediately implement pat-down searches of all individuals, except on-duty law enforcement officers, requiring facility access when search equipment fails. Some comment indicated that immediate implementation of the pat-down search procedure was not necessary. These commenters recommended that a lapse rang'ing from 4 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> was accept-able prior to implementing pat-down searches. Justification for the time lapse included the fact that individuals being searched would be j unaware of equipment malfunction and that the majority of individuals being searched were long-time, trusted employees.' The Commission has rejected revising the rule in response to these comments because it main-4 tains the belief that contraband searches are necessary elements of a reactor security program and immediate pat-down searches are easily i
implemented.
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Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephor.e (301) 427-4773.
REGULATORY FLEXIEILITY CERTIFICATION i
l In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.
605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this revised rule, if promul-l gated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rule affects electric utilities that own ar;d operate' nuclear pdwer plants and are dominant in their respective service areas. These utilities do not fall within the definition of small busi- ,
nesses set forth in Section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Smal.1 Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121.
These regulations will affect some nuclear power industry contractors i
and vendors most of whom are large concerns who service the industry.
! BACKFIT ANALYSIS i
As required by 10 CFR 50.109 (50 FR 38097), the Commission has
[ completed a backfit analysis for this final rule. This analysis, which
, includes a summary regulatory analysis, follows.
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SUMMARY
REGULATORY ANALYSIS
- 1. Objective The objective of this rule is to clarify requirements for entry
{ searches of individuals at power reactor facilities to preclude the l introduction of contraband into protected areas at such facilities.
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- 3. Potential Change in Risk to the Peblic From Accidental Offsite
! Release of Radioactive Material
- Allowing unauthorized firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices to enter the protected area at power reactors creates significant poten-
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i tial for harm. To the extent that this program improves the licensees' i ability to prohibit the introduction of such contraband that would other-l wise be carried into the plant, the risk of radiological sabotage and i
j offsite release of radioactive material (risk to the public) is reduced. ,
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- 4. Potential Imcact on Radiological Excesure of Facility Emoloyees To the extent that the risk of radiological sabotage is reduced, the j potential impact on radiological exposure of facility employees would also be reduced. Otherwise, with respect to radiological exposure, 3
there is no impact on facility employees.
i 5. Installation anc Continuing Costs i
Implementation Cost Per Existing Site minimal
- (which consists of submittal of security i
plan amendments)
Implementation Cost Per New Site 516.4K Annual Operational Cost Per Site minimal l
l 6. Potential Safety Imoact of Changes in Plant or Ooerational 1 Comolexity - Not applicable l
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Prohibiting unauthori:ed firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices frem the facility througn use of. state-of-the-art eouicment search will significantly reduce the risk and potential for harm from malevolent acts involving such contraband. The NRC design basis threat against which the physical protection at nuclear power plants is targeted is designed to assure the protection of the public health and safety. The design basis threat includes acts of radiological sabotage." Unauthorized use of the contraband cevices previously cited could contribute significantly to the success of an attemeted act of radiological sabotage. If the poten-tial for successful completion of radiological sabotage can be cecreased, ,
the overall protection of the public health and safety would be increased.
Therefore, the significant decrease in the potential for successful com-pletion of radiological sabotage that will result from prohibiting unauthorized contraband onsite will result in a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety.
- 2. Cost Imolications
} The cost of tne Search Requirements associated with implementation i
j would be insignificant for existing sites (because licensees have at present implemented interim procedures requiring electronic search equipment) and $16.4K for future sites, with no significant annual operating cost.
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4 AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amenced, sac. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amenced, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).
Section'73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2273); SS 73.21, 73.37(g), and 73.55 are issued uncer sec. 161b, 68 Stat.
948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); SS 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and .
SS 73.20(c)(1), 73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f), 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2),
t j (3)(iii)(B) and (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(iii)(B), 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(c)).
- 2. In S 73.55, paragraph (d)(1) is revised to read as follows: ,
(c) Access Requirements. (1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identi-fication and search of all individuals unless otherwise provided herein must be made and authorization must be checked at these points. The l
search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of both firearms and ex-plosive detection equipment capable of detecting those devices. The licensee must subject all persons except bona fide Federal, State, and
- local law enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment <
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, searches upon entry into a protected area. When the licensee has cause ,
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