ML20216H324

Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking PRM-50-67, Requesting That NRC Amend Regulations to Require That Nuclear Facilities Ensure Availability of Backup Power Sources to Power Safety Sys in Event of Y2K

ML20216H324
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/23/1999
From:	NRC
To:
References
FRN-64FR45911, RULE-PRM-50-67 NUDOCS 9910010353
Download: ML20216H324 (9)

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Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.162/ Monday August 23,1999/ Proposed Rules 45911

.) FOR FURTHER INFO %iATION CCNTACT:

l Matthew ChirameL Office of. Nuclear Reactor Regulation, US Nudear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0031, telephone 301-415-2845, E-mail address muArc. gov, or Gary W. Purdy, Of'lce of Nuclear N'JCLEAR REGULATORY MaterialSafetf and Safeguards US COMMISSION Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone 10 CFR Parts 50 and70 301-415-7897, E-mail address

" ARY INFORh4ATION:

Nuclearinktmation and Resourc* Background I " " "I NRC received three related petitions AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory for rulemaking (PRM-50-65, PEM Commission. 66, PRM-50-67), each dated December ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial 10,1998, submitted by the NIRS concenting various aspects of Y2K sueAAARY:The Nuclear Regulatory issues and nuclear safety. This petition Commission (NRC) is denying a petition (PRM-50-67) requested that NRC adopt for rulemaking (PRM-50-67) from the regulations that would require fadlities NuclearInformation and Resource licensed by NRC under 10 CFR parts 50 Service (NIRS). The petitioner requested and 70 to provide reliable sources of that the NRC amend its regulations to backup power. The first petition (PRM-require ' hat nuclear facilities ensure the 50-65) requested that NRC adopt availability of backup power sources to regulations that would require facilities power safety systems of reactors and licensed by NRC under 10 CFR parts 30 Other nuclear facilities in the event of a 40,50, and 70 to be Y2K compliant. The date sensitive, computer-related second petition (PRM-50-66) roguested incident resulting from a Year 2000 that NRC adopt regulations that would (Y2K) issue. The petitioner requested require facilities licensed by NRC under that NRC take this action to ensure that to CFR part 50 to develop and reliable backup sources of power are implement adequate contingency and available in the event of a Y2K incidcut. ethergency p!ms to addressfotential The Commission agrees that system fv11ures. Because of tne nature of maintaining reliable emergency power these petitions s# the date-specific is important and has considered the issues they addzas, the pet'tioner petitioners request as part ofits review requested that the petitions be of existing regulatory requirements and addressed on an expedited schedule.

licensee actions to assure reliable On January 25,1999.NRC published

f. emergency power during the Y2K - a notice of receipt of a petition for transition. Based on this review, the rulemaking in the Federal Register (64 Commission has determined that FR 3789). It was available on NRC's existing regulatory requirements, rulemaking website and in the NRC actions taken by the licensees to PublicIJocument Room. The notice of implement a systematic and structured receipt of a petition for rulemaking Y2K readiness program adequately invited interested persons to submit address Y2K issues, and NRC's comments by February 24,1999.

oversight of the licensees' The Petition implementation of these p ograms provide reasonable assurance of The petitioner requested that NRC adcquate p otection to public haalth and adopt the following text as a rule:

safety. Because the Commission has The Nuclear Regulatory Commission concluded that ex' sting Programs recognizes thra date-sensitive computer already address the petitioner 4 concern Pmgrams, embedded chips, and other electronic systems that perform a major role regarding avallability of eme:gency in distributing, allocating, and ensuring power, the petition is denfel electric power throughout the United States ADDROGES: Copies of the petition for may be prone to failure beginning on January rulemaking, the public comments 1,2000. Loss of all alternating current 7s-received, and NRC's letters to the electricity from both the offsite power grid U '[

and onsite emergency generators (commonly  ;

petitioners are arsilable for public known as " station blackout") long has been inspection or copyingin NRC Public Document Room. 2120 L Street, NW idened bye as among se most nt contributors to risk for atomic Qw ;;

P (Lower Level), Washington, DC, as well I000 H.1 as on NRC's ruiemaking web site at crl ro, ihese reasons. uaC requires of gari 50 and 70 licensees as of December 1,1999:

'http//ruleforum.llnl. gov.

9910010353 990823 con em U p)- h S0-6'7 PDR

45912 Fed:rd RegistIr/Vol. 64, No.162/ Monday, August 23,1999/ Proposed Rules (a) that all emergency diesel generators that EDGs can be relied on. Therefore, the required and, moreover, one of two provide backup power to nuclear licensees petitioner believes that NRC should diesel generators is often out of service, must be operational and remain operational: adopt regulations that require that Therefore, for Y2K, an additional source (b) that licensees that cannot demonstrate full licensees have all EDGs operational of backup power needs to be provided, i$s I enerNo usUclose unEsSch$me during the Y2K transition, that they and both EDGs should be operable with that fufi operational capabilities of have a 60-day supply of fuel a, of sufficient fuel on site to compensate for emergency diesel generators are attained: (c) December 1,1999, and that licensed fuel dehvery problems. ,

that all licensees must have a 60-day supply facilities that cannot meet these 2. In order to ensure that sufficient of fuel for emergency diesel generators. requirements be closed, electric power is available during an (2) Further, to ensure adequate protection The petitioner discussed the extended loss of offsite power to safely of public health and safety, NRC requires that likelihood and the potential shut dov, a nuclear plant and cool the all licensoes under these sections must consequences of a failure of all or a spent fuei pool, enough diesel fuel provide alternate means of backup power portion of the electric power grid in the should be available at the site for sufficient to assure safety. These may include, but are not limited to: solar power United States. The petitioner mcognized periods extending from 60 days to 160 els, wind turbines, hydroelectric power.

that the failure of all or a portion of the days to whatever the time period that electrical grid as a result of Y2K issues offsite power is not avai4ble.

ra e ec ity es a di onaj is well beyond the scope of NRC's 3. An additional powe. source or systems must provide electricity authority. However, the petitioner stated method should be available during y to the licensee rather than to the that the extended failure of all or a power failure to provide makeup water broader electrical grid. portion of the electrical grid would to the spent fuel pool.

(3) Irradiated fuel pools are to be place severe stress on the current EDG 4. On at least one occasion, a nuclear immediately classified as Class 1-E; backup system of backup power supply and that Power plant licensee falsified data power systems must be sufficient to provide the failure of EDGs at one or more relative to the reliability of EDGs. The cooling for such pools.1,1censees which concern is that other nuclear utiMties reactor sites could result in extended cannot demonstrate compliance with may not provide reliable data for their sections (1) and (2) must cease o erations as station blackouts and nuclear Ic rap tance with catastrophes. The petitioner asserted EDGs to NRC. These comments are

"[ns 'is i'n that this possibility is well within the addressed specifically in the discussion range of probabilities for which NRC of Reasons for Denial.

The petitioner acknowledged that routinely requires action by its Seventeen letters opposed the NRC has recognized the potential safety' licensees. The petitioner further Petition, including 4 from private and environmental problems that could asserted that reliance on unreliable citizens,3 from nuclear associated result if date-sensitive electronic EDGs is insufficient under these industries,and to from utilities.

systems fail to operate or provide false conditions. Therefore, the petitioner Comments opposing the petition stated information. The petitioner asserted that believes that it is essential that NRC take that onsite emergency electric power NRC has required its licensees of reactor the regulatory action suggested in this generators are already required to be and major fuel cycle facilities to report petition on an expeditu. basis. maintained in a state of readiness and by July 1,1999, on their programs to validated by periodic testing, fuel ensure compliance with Y2K issues. Public Comments on the Petition supplies are maintained at a level The petitioner discussed the In response to the petition, NRC adequate to facilitate appropriate

" availability of electricity to power received 73 comment letters, which response / recovery actions, and the atomic reactor and other nuclear facility included I letter signed by 25 citizens current regulations and license safety systems." The petitioner of the State of Michigan,3 letters from conditions are adequate to address the aplained that electricity is required to nuclear associated industries,10 letters issue. One commenter used a specific i

.i operate atomic reactor safety and from utilities,14 letters from private facility as an example to deinonstrate cooling systems and that this electricity organizations, and 45 letters from that in the highly unlikely event of a is provided by offsite sources (overall an private citizens. total loss of electrical power (meaning electrical grid). The petitioner Fifty-six letters supported the the loss of the electric grid and backup commented that NRC has long petition, of which 41 were from private power) the conditions at that facility recognized that the loss of all alternating citizens,14 were from private would not threaten public health and current from both onsite and offsite organizations, including 1 from the safety. Any potential adverse impacts systems, known generally as " station NIRS and 1 signed by 25 individuals. would be limited to work areas and blackout," is the most important The comments supporting the petition equipment within the facility, and there contributor to risk at most atomic addressed the concem that diesel would be no catastrophic or significant reactors. The petitioner correctly noted generators are unreliable and that a loss of control or containment of nuclear that NRC has required licensees to have reliable electric power grid is needed. material. That commenter indicated that backup sources of onsite emergency In some of the letters supporting the the provision of a tertiary (meaning a power, normally multiple emergency petition, the authors included the secondary backup) source of electric diesel generators, capable of supplying following additional comments that power to its fuel facility, which would the electricity necessary to operate provide information or requested action be independent of the broader electric essential safety systems. that was not contained in the petition. grid, as would be required under PRM-The petitioner asserted that the These comments noted that- 50-67, is an unreasonable requirement emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1. Y2K may increase the possibility of that would force shutdown of the l 1

used at atomic reactors have proven local, regional or widespread blackouts. facility on December 1,1999, in the unreliable and are often out of service. Losing all electric power to the station absence of any significant credible The petitioner claimed that the ir called station blackout. EDGs, each safety risk.

unprecedented condition posed by the capable of powering the entire plant, .

Y2K problem, coupled with the compensate for the loss of off-site Reasons for Dental demonstrated and ongoing failures of electric power. Reliability of diesel NRC is denying the petition because EDGs, constitutes reasonable doubt that generators is considerably lower than the Commission has determined that

l Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.162/ Monday, August 23,1999/ Proposed Rules 45913 current NRC regulations and license Y2K would significantly affect the and reliability values are tracked by conditions goveming power systems at probability or duration of a LOOP and/ each licensee in accordance with the part 50 and 70 facilities provide or a SBO from that otherwise assessed requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, the reasonable assurance of adequate in a licensee's coping analysis required maintenance rule, and associated protection to public health and safety, by 10 CFR 50.63. To demonstrate that industry guidance.

and licensees are taking appropriate their plants can cope with SBO. some In the resolution of Generic Safety actions to provide reasonable assurance licensees rely upon an alternate ac Issue B-56," Diesel Generator that Y2K problems will not adversely power source (s)(separate from the Reliability," one of the options affect the functioning of these power backup power system) that utilizes recommended by NRC staff was to systems.The NRC is reviewing the diesel generators or gas turbine revise the SBO rule to include specific licensees' implementation of these Y2K generators. requirements for demonstrating diesel activities and will have sufficient time generator reliability. However, in SECY-

1. EDG Reliability ts take appropriate regulatory action if 93-044, " Resolution of Generic Safety licensees' Y2K activities and programs NIRS claims that EDGs have proven to Issue B-56, Diesel Generator are not properly implemented in a be unreliable, such that licensees should Reliability," dated March 25,1993, the timely fashion. NIRS does not explain be required to demonstrate " full Commission disapproved the revision to why the licensees' Y2K activities and Operational capability" 8 of EDGs that the SBO rule on the basis of the real programs, and NRC's oversight of the Provide backup power. As previously progress made by the nuclear industry licensees

• implementation of these noted, backup onsite power is usually in improving the reliability of the diesel activities and programs, are inadequate Provided by diesel generators, which generators. NRC requirements and such that the rule proposed by NIRS is supply electric power to the plant safety industry activities have resulted in a necessary to provide reasonable systems upon a LOOP. NRC regulations very high diesel generator reliability. In assurance of adequate protection from require that onsite electric power 1993, the industry wide average Y2K-induced unavailability of onsite supplies and the onsite electric reliability of diesel generators was in power systems. distribution system have sufficient excess of 98 percent. An Idaho National NIRS proposed rule contained three independence, redundancy, and Engineering Laboratory study , NEL-xpcrate requirements for Part 50 and testability to perform their safety 95-0035, " Emergency Diesel Generator St 70 licensees:(1) Operational functions assuming a single failure. Power System Reliability: 1987-1993")

tanstration of EDGs and provision of Furthermore, in accordance with their of a number of nuclear power EDG a to-day diesel fuel supply; (2) alternate license conditions, all licensees are reliability concluded that those plants means of backup power;and (3) requimd to have backup electricity with a 0.950 reliability target goal were classification of fuel pools as Class 1-E. sources operational to supply safety- actually demonstrating 0.987, and the Facilities that cannot demonstrate related equipment at all times plants with a 0.975 reliability target goal compliance with these requirements by independent of circumstances such as were actually demonstrating 0.985. The December 1,1999, would De required to Y2K-induced LOOP.The operation and Commission stated that the industry shut down until they could demonstrate maintenance of diesel generators and should continue an aggressive program compliance. The proposed requirements ' other safety-related equipment of maintenance as well as root cause are addressed below for part 50 power necessary for the safe shutdown of the analysis that will continue to offer reactors, part 50 decommissioning reactor are controlled by the plant assurance that diesel generator reactors, part 50 non power reactors, technical specifications (TSs). The TSs reliability will be maintained at a satisfactory levelin the future.

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and part 70 licensees in Sections I, II, are intended to ensure that sufficient IIL and IV, respectively, power will be available to supply safety. Alllicensees have implemented a related equipment at all times regardless maintenance moritoring program L Part 50 Nuclear Power Plants of key Y2K dates. Moreover, the plant consistent with the maintenance rule, A. Diesel Generator Operational TSs require that immediate action be which became effective on July 10, Capability and Sixty-Doy fuel Supply taken to restore inoperable diesel 1996. Licensees are required to monitor generators to operable status. The plant the performance of diesel generators Nuclear power 1 ants must be against the established goals and to take against oss of offsite o er TSs require the diesel generators to be

) y prov n an onsite a up tested routinely in order to demonstrate appropriate corrective actions if the their operability and their ability to g als are not met. The maintenance rule power system by ei er 10 CFR part 50, requires that these goals be evaluated by Appendix A, General Design Criteria sgIy pger as nresent dd any information the licensees at least every refuelin (GDCs)17 and 18, or equh al requirements in the plant s h,entcensing demonstrating t at diesel enerators are thecycle, processnotestablishe to exceedby 2licensees dears. To to eva unte basis. Most licensees rely upon diesel unreliable such that the s ould not be relied upon to provide bckup power set goals and monitor them, and to generators to provide onsite backup verify tLt preventive maintenance has ower, although there is at least one on a LOOP. For each nuclear power ufant, selected target diesel eneratorbeen effective for systems and p

icensee that relies upon hydroelectric reliability values were estabfished for components under the maintenance power. All licensees have committed t rule, NRC staff conducted baseline provide an onsite supply of fuel t plant-specific coping analysis in accordance with the re uirements of to inspections of all nuclear plants during operate diesel generators; most 1996-1998. At several plants, diesel commitments are for a 7 day supply. In CFR 50.63, the SBO rule. Availability generators were among the systems and addition, nuclear power plants are Components reviewed to verify that 8 The NRC assumes that by " capability." NIRS required by to CFR 50.63 to have the actually means reliability" becaus. capability- goals were established and monitoring capability to withstand loss of all ac normally refers to the ability of the emersency and trending were being performed. For ower (generally referred to as " station pwer system to power safety related electrical pilot plants, diesel generators continue

- glackout" (SBO]) for an established d m to be inspected and evaluated using the

,$ *,$',gtjwhegas p e tabjig,n;y ,aM, .. i riod of time. As indicated in Section terms of availability, which is what NIRS addresses nsk informed, performance-based F.A.2 there is no reason to believe in itsthatpetition. inspection process, which is part of the

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45914 Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.162/ Monday, August 23,1999/ Proposed Rules NRC Oversight Baseline Inspection jeopardize public health and safety is Utilities Software Management Group Program. NRC staff will continue to acceptably low. (NEl/NUSMG) 98-07," Nuclear Utihty assess the reliability of diesel pnerators One of the public comments received Year 2000 Readiness Contingency i

at nuclear power plants to enure that by NRC in response to the petition Planning." dated August 1998, the reliability of diesel generators is indicated a concern regarding The capability of diesel generators maintained at levels specified by each falsification of EDG reliability data by and the adequacy of existing fuel licensee when f; performed its plant- licensees. This particular concern has supplies have been demonstrated at specific coping analyses for SBO. been investigated and resolved as numerous plants during weather-Additionally, the scope of licensees' documented in an NRC memorandum induced interruptions of the power grid Y2K programs, including contingency dated December 20,1993, from the and other cases of LOOP from the grid.

planning, covers the onsite power and Office of Investigations to the Region II An example is the Turkey Point nu&r other emergency power systems at the Regional Administrator,"Vogtle Electric plant LOOP event during the August plant. NRC audits and reviews of Generating Plant: Alleged False 1992 Hurricane Andrew when the diesel licensee Y2K program activities to date Statements Regarding Test Results on generators automatically picked up have verified licensee consideration of Emergency Diesel Generators fCase No. safety-related loads and maintained the these systems, and no associated Y2x 2-90-020R)." Falsification of EDG plant for an extended period (over 6 issue relating to onsite power systems '

failure data by licensees is not days) during the recovery until site have been identified. considered by NRC as an industry-wide, power was restored. NRC considers the The NRC does not believe, on 6 generic occurrence. Such incidents, current 7-day fuel capacity to be basis of current information fro.n the when identified, will continue to be sufficient to operate diesel generators North American Electric Reliability treated by NRC on a case-by-case basis for longer than the time that it takes to Council (NERC)? that availabilit of and appropriate actions will be taken in replenish the onsite supply from outside offsite power from the electrical grid is response. sources. Accordingly, a rule requiring likely to be significantly affected by 2. Sixty-day fuel supply Ucensees to maintain sufhnt M to Y2K-induced problems. In its most Operate their diesel generators for a 60-recent reports issued on January 11 and NIRS, proposed rule would require day period or longer is not necessary to April 30,1999. NERC states, each nuclear power pbnt licensee to provide reasonable assurance of

" Transmission outages are expected to have a 60-day onsite supply of fuel for adequate protection against Y2K-be m'nimal and outages that may occur diesel generators, as opposed to a 7-day induced LOOP events. The rquiation fuel SuPPl y to which most hcensees requires nuclear power olants to are enticipated to be mitigated by redtwed energy transfers established as have committed. However. NIRS withstand LOOP events regardless of part of the contingency planning Provided no technical basis wh ifsite whether the LOOP is due to Y2K or Power from the grid would not other causes. The petitioner has not process." Both reports indicate that the reestablished within the 7-day period demonstrated that Y2K would transition through critical Y2K rollover acc mm dated by exutmg onsite fuel significantly affect the probability or dates should have a minimalimpact on supphes. Nor did NIRS explain why, j ' g duration ofloss of all alternating current c,'Y,8)*tha should a LOOP continue for longer than power from that otherwise assumed in loss of the grid as a eresuft ea ong-erm of Y2K-7 days, a licensee would be unable to the licenwe's coping enalysis required F88uPPl y diesel fuel for a penod of 60 by 10 CFR 50.63, and the licensees

• induced events is not a credible days so that a 60-day fuel supply must coping analyses continue to be scenario. Therefore, there is no reason to be rnaintained onsite. Gmmenters on believe that Y2K would significantly applicable during the period that NIRS the NIRS petition who suggested a affect the robability or duration of a claims would present an increased J LOOP an /or a SBO from that otherwise $ble o tf10 days of assessed in the licensee's coping operation without resupply) also did not B. Additional Alternate Means of analysis required by to CFR 50.63. provide any technical bases for their Backup Power As discussed above, the diesel recommendations. As stated previously. MIKS' petition requests NRC to generators and associated onsite power the likelihood or duration of a LOOP is require alllicensees to provide an supply systems, being within ta scope not expected to be significantly affected alternate (second) means of backup oflicensees Y2K readiness progicms- by the Y2K issue. power, such as solar power panels, will be Y2K ready prior to the Y2K Furthermore, the NRC licensees are wind turbines, hydroelectric power, and transition, and no decrease in reliabi3ty taking appropriate actions to ensure that biomass power. The petition also of the diesel generators is expected. The their plants will be able to cope with requests NRC to require that the information provided by NERC Y2K-induced LOOP durations longer alternate backup power system provide indicates that the likelihood of a LOOP

, tre 7 days. As part of each plant's Y2K electricity directly to the licensee rather is not expected to increase significantly activities, each licensee is preparing a than to the broader electrical grid.

during Y2K transition. Based on these contingency plan, which includes .

considerations, plus the ability of the obtaining diesel fuel and other 1. Need for Additional Backup Power plants to cope with a station blackout, necessary supplies to cope with Y2K- Source the likelihood of an event that will induc.ed long-term LOOP events. As part As discussed in Section LA.1 above, of NRC's review of licensees' not only must licensees provide a 3 NERC is an electric industry organization made implementation of their Y2K programs, source of backup power upon a LOOP, for ne)rly eriu $icNppIhnDe'is"y NRC will confirm that licensee Y2K some licensees have provided an orsanization in the interconnections of North Programs address emergency power alternate ac power source in order to America. NERC and its Regional Reliability sources, arrangements for obtaining demonstrate that they are able to cope councils set operating and engineering standards critical commodities (e.g., EDG fuel oil) with a LOOP concurrent with a loss of rIc nNy# IDe enIof Enersy and other considerations for onsite backup power (an SBO) for a requested NERC to facilitate the electric industry's contingency planning identified in specified duration. Thus, these licensees

' Y2K effort. Nuclear Energy Institute / Nuclear have thne sources of power: (1) Offsite

Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.162/ Monday, August 23,1999/ Proposed Rules l 45915 power from two indaendent circuits:

(2) onsite backup power from distribution system events (e.g., a LOOP, locations in this sample in order to independent, redundant power grid instability and voltage fluctuations, obtain the necessary assurance that supplies; and (3) alternate ac power load tir:tuations and loss of grid control nuclear power industry Y2K readimss The NRC does not believe that the MRS' systems), loss of emergency plan programs are being effectively proposal for a fourth source of power equipment and services, loss of essential implemented and that licensees are on services, and depletion of consumables,

(" alternative backup power,"in the schedule to meet the readiness target words of NIRS) is necessary to provide The NRC considers the guidance in NEI/ date of July 1,1999, established in GL NUSMG 98-07, when properly 98-01.

reasonable assurance of adequate protection against Y2K-induced implemented, as an acceptable approach in late January 1999, NRC staff problems. to mitigate and manage Y2K-induced cornpleted the 12 audits. On the basis of The petitioner does not explain why events that could occur on Y2K-critical the audit observations, NRC staff has dates.

Y2K would affect diesel generators as a In GL 98-01, NRC requested that all concluded that licensees are effectively source of backup and/or alternate ac addressing Y2K issues and are power, sach that a source of power in operating nuclear power plant licensees undertaking the actions necessary to oddition to diesel generators is submit written responses regarding their achieve Y2K readiness in accordance necessary to address SBO. The scops of in facility-specific Y2K readiness order to obtain confirmation that programs- with the GL 98-01 target date, although the licensees' Y2K program covers both some plants will have some licensees are addressing the Y2K remediation, testing, and final the onsite backup and the alternate sc problem effectively. Alllicensees have certification scLxluled for the fall 1999 power systems at nuclear power plants. responded to GL 98-01, stating that they outage. NRC staff did not iden Since 1996, NRC has been working with have adopted plant-specific programs the nuclear industry and licensees of issues that would prevent these that are intended to make the plants licensees from achieving readiness.

operating nuclear power plants in order Y2K ready by July 1,1993. GL 98-01 to achieve Y2K readinesc at all nuclear The NRC staffis not aware of any Y2K power plants. NRC has issued also requests a written response, no later problems in nuclear power plant Information Notice (IN) 96-70," Year than July 1,1999, confirming that these systems tLt directly affect actuation of facilities are Y2K ready, including safety functions, including the 2000 Effect on Computer System contingency planning. Licensees who Sohware," on December 24,1996; emergency onsite power systems.

Generic Letter (GL) 9' -01, " Year 2000 are not Y2K ready by July 1,1999, must Moreover, NRC audit results to date Readiness of Computer Systems at provide a status report and schedule for have not identified any associated the remaining work to ensure timely residual Y2K problems with the Nuclear Power Plants," on May 11, Y2K readiness.

1998; and GL 98-01, Supplement 1, emergency onsite power system and As part ofits oversight oflicensee

" Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Y2K activities, the NRC staff conducted have confirmed the licensees' Systems at Nuclear Pnwer Plants," on sample audits of12 consideration of these systems. Also, the January 14,1999. readiness programs. plant-specific audits did not identify any Y2K problem Y2K The ob NRCissued IN 96-70 to alert nuclear the audits were as follows: jectives cf in safety-related activation systems.

power plant licensees of the Y2K Additionally, the NRC's regional staff problem. The information notice 1. To assess the effectiveness of reviewed Y2K activities at all operating licensee programs for achieving Y2K nuclear power plants to verify the status described the potential problems that nuclear power plant computer systems readiness and in addressing compliance oflicensee efforts to ensure that all with the terms and conditions of their plants will be able to function safely on and software may encounter during and license and NRC regulations and following the transition into the year January 1,2000, and beyond. These continued safe operation.

2000 and how the Y2K issue may affect 2. To evaluate program reviews:(1) Verified that all NRC NRC licensees. IN 96-70 encouraged licensees have implemented Y2K implementation activities to ensure that program activities; (2) evaluated the licensees to examine their uses of licensees are on schedtle to achieve computer systems and software well progress made to ensure that the Y2K readiness in accordance with GL licensees are on schedule to achieve before the year 2000 and suggested that 98-01 guidelines.

licensees consider appropriate actions Y2K readiness; and (3) assessed

3. To assess the licensee contingency for examining and evaluating their planning for addressing risks associated licensees

• contingency plans for computer systems for Y2K addressing Y2K-related issues. The vulnerabilities, with events resulting from Y2K problems. reviews were completed by July 1999.

In GL 98-01, NRC endorsed the The NRC staff audited the NRC staff determined that this contingency planning efforts of six guidancein the industry document approach was an appropriate means of issued by the NEI/NUSMG 97-07, oversight oflicensee Y2K readiness licensee facilities. The audits at these

" Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," facilities examined in detail backup efforts because:(1) Alllicensees had measures the utilities have in place to when properly augmented in the area of committed to the nuclear power risk management, contingency planning, industry Y2K readiness guidance (NEI/deal with possible Y2K problems, either and remediation of embedded systems, on site or off site, that might affect plant as one possible approach in NUSMG 97-07) in their first response to operations. The audits were conducted Implementing a plant-specific Y2K NRC GL 98-01: and (2) the audit would in May and June 1999.

verify that licensees were effectively readiner,s progren. In August 1998, NEI implementing the guidelines. The The reviews and audits will allow issued an industry document, NEI/ NRC staff to verify the progress of all sample of 12 licensees included large licensees and determine whether any NUSMG 99-07, which provided additicnal guidance in the area of utilities such as Commonwealth Edison regulatory action is needed. Information internal and external risk raanagement and Tennessee Valley Authority, as well from the reviews will be used in and contingency planning. Exte nal as small sir 3 1e-unit licensees such as conjunction with the status reports that North Atlantic Energy (Seabrook) and evano that should be considered for NRC has required its nuclear power Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating plant licensees to provide by July 1, flility-specific contingency planning faclude electric grid / transmission / Corporation. NRC staff selected a variety 1999. By July 1,1999, all licensees of types of plants of different ages and responded to GL 98-01, Supplement 1.

45916 Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.162/ Monday, August 23,1099/ Proposed Rules The responses indicated that 68 plants evaluation of the power system to QX the make-up water supply is provided susceptibility is necessary, which is by a plant safety system. Upon loss of are Y2K ready and 35 plants need to all ac power, make-up water from any complete work on computer systems or what licensees have committed to source, such as fire hoses supplied by devices after July 1,1999. implement. Thus,it is unclear how the diesel-driven fire pumps, can be used to NIRS presents no information or requested requirements in the NIRS maintain the required water levelin the argument why these actions by the petition would provide assurance that licensees, the nuclear industry, and Y2K problems will not prevent pool. In light of the substantial period electrical power systems from of time available for a licensee to take NRC are not sufficient to ensure that mitigative actions upon loss of spent onsite back up and alternate ac power performing their necessary safety fuel pool electrical power, the NRC systems will not be adversely affected functions. The NRC conciudes tnat a concludes that providing an additional by Y2K-induced problems. rule change is not necessary since licensees are already directly addressing backup source of power is not

2. Specific Backup Power Sources warranted at any operating nuclear spent fuel pool cooling as part of their Proposed by NIRS Y2K programs.

power plant.

The petitioner's proposed alternative Furthermore, the NRC does not agree II. Part 50 Decommissioning Nuclear backup power sources, such as solar and that a backup sourca of electrical power Power Plants wind, are not reliable backup power f r spent fuel cooling is necessary at There are 21 permanenti sources because of their nuclear power plants in order to provide nuclear power plants whick have been shutdown

. undependability under unpredictable reasonable assurance of adequate shut down for more than a year. Six of weather conditions or because they are these facilities have removed all spent Protection. At most operating nuclear limited by the amount of power they power P lants, the emergency onsite fuel from the site. Therefore, there are can generate. Additional comments Power system can directly supply only 15 decommissioning power plants received by the NRC in response to the electnc power to its spent fuel pool to which the proposed requirements in petition also suggested the requirement cooling systems. At those plants at the petition would potentially apply.

for attemate power. The petitioner does which the spent fuel cooling system is Spent fuel pool cooling and support not provide sufficient technical not directly connected to the emergency systems may be configured differently information to demonstrate that these onsite power system, the capability for decommissioning plants than for additional alternative backup power exists of connecting the cooling syeem operating reactors due to the reduced sources would add more reliability than to the emergency onsite power system. need for decay heat removal at current backup power sources. Requiring a backup (tertiary) source of decommissioning plants. As decay heat Therefore, most of the sources of loads drop, utilities are able under to electrical power is not justified in view alternative backup power that are of the length of time between loss of CFR 50.59 to remove equipment from included in NIRS* proposed rule would spent fuel cooling and the point at service once it no longer is needed to not constitute an acceptable alternative which there is a significant threat to provide its safety function. At some source of backup power with the same plants there is no need for forced integrity of the spent fuel rods. A level of availability and capability as licensee is required to keep the spent circulation to remove heat from the pool diesel generators. fuel pool filled to a level more than 23 as adequate heat loss to ambient keeps C. Spent Fuel Fool Class 1E feet above the top of the fuel rods and, the pool at an acceptable temperature.

Classification and Backup Power generally, the water temperature in the After a period of decay in the spent fuel .

poolis to be maintained below 140 'f. pool, the heat load from spent fuelis The proposed rule would require all significantly reduced as short lived part 50 licensees to immediately classify For a typical pool with a capacity of fission products decay. Consequently, irradiated (spent) fuel pools as Class 1- about 400.000 gallons and a worst case heat load causing 50 gpm of water loss the potential for boiling is reduced and E and provide sufficient backup power the time available for the licensee to as a result of evaporation,it would take to provide cooling to these pools. take mitigative action is greater. With Because Class 1-E is an electric system about 3 days for the poollevel to drop the exception of Zion and Big Rock classification, the NRC assumes triat the to the top of the fuel racks. This Point, more than three years has elapsed estimate does not include the heat-up petitioner intends the rule to require time of 3 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for the pool water since any fuel was irradiated in the that the backup power supply for spent reactor at any of the nuclear power fuel pool cooling systems be classified to increase from 140 'f to 212 'f. This scenario assumes a totalloss of all ac plants currently undergoing as Class 1-E. decommissioning.

The petitioner does not explain why electric power and that no corrective actions are taken for 3 days M response The reasons discussed in Section I.C classification of the electric power above regarding why electrical systems system for spent fuel pool cooling to the decreasing water leve m the spent fuel pool. For a typical heat load need not be classified Class 1 E for systems as Class 1-E is necessary to spent fuel pools at operating nuclear protect spent fuel pools against a Y2K- (non-refueling), the time to uncovering of the spent fuel pool would be around power plants also apply equally to induced LOOP. The Class 1-E decommissioning nuclear power plants.

classification addresses design and 2 weeks, again assuming that no make-quality assurance (QA) requirements for up water is added to the pool. sourceUpon of electrical loss power As previously is not noted, requiring manufacture and installation of of water shielding, the radiation levels above the pool would increase. justified in view of the length of time J electrical system components. Most of between loss of spent fuel cooling and these systems are based upon analog Assuming LOOP and failure of onsite emergency power sources, the only the point where there is a significant controls and, therefore, are not subject threat to integrity of the spent fuel rods.

to Y2K problems. Furthermore, simple action necessary would be to provide make-up water to the spent fuel pool. Upon loss of all ac power, make-up reclassification of the electrical power The existing plant operating / emergency water from any source, such as fire system by itself would not appear to hoses supplied by diesel-driven fire have any direct effect on minimizing procedures provide for initiation of make-up water to the pool upon pumps, can be used to maintain the Y2K-induced loss of power necessary required water levelin the pool.

detection oflow level. At many plants, i ,r spent fuel cooling. Rather, an

Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.162/ Monday, August 23,1999/ Proposed Rules 45917 In view of the long time period 1997, this NMSS Y2K Team visited a facility would be shut down. The available for the licensee to respond to cross-section of materials licensees and petitioner indicated these requirements loss of power to the spent fuel pool fuel cycle facilities and conducted Y2K are necessary to protect public health cooling system and the relative interviews. Each licensee or facility and safety. However, there are no part simplicity of mitigative actions, the visited by the team indicated that it was 70 licensees required to have EDGs in requirements proposed by NIRS with aware of the Y2K issue and was in order to provide backup power to respect to spent fuel pool electrical various stages of implementing its Y2K protect public health and safety. In the system reclassification and the readiness program. event of the loss of electric power in provision of altemative power are not On June 22,1998, the NRC staff put 70 facilities, processing stops and justified. '

Issued Generic Letter (GL) 98-03, there is no need fcr electric power to III, Part 50 Non-Power Reactor * "NMSS Licensees and Certificate maintain a safe condition. There are Ucensees Holders' Year 2000 Readiness some part 70 licensees who have Programs," requested major part 70 independent power sources in order to Non-power reactors operate at power licensees to inform NRC of the status of meet physical protection (PP) levels ranging from 250 KWt to 2 MWt, their Y2K readiness programs. In GL 98 ' requirements. These licensees are also and they operate at low temperatures. 03, the NRC staff requested all major required to have contingency plans for Any non-power reactor in operation on part 70 licensees to submit by PP (e.g., augmented guard force) in the January 1,2000, can be readily shut September 20,1998, written responses event ofloss ofindependent power.

down manually using emergency regarding their facility-specific Y2K Based on the above discussion, the 60-procedures and existing shutdown readiness program in order to confirm dsy fuel supply requirement is also not systems. These reactors have passive that they were addressing the Y2K needed for part 70 licensees to provide safety features and generally do not problem effectively Alllicensees reasonable assurance of adequate '

require power to shut down and responded to GL 98-03 by stating that protection to public health and safety.

dissipate decay heat. Accordingly, NRC they had adopted a facility-specific Y2K The petitioner does not provide

, regulations do not currently require part readiness program, and the scopei of the sufficient technical information to 50 non power reactors to provide a program included identifying and, demonstrate that part 70 licensees must backup power source. where appropriate, remediating shut down if they do not have EDGs NIRS did not present any information embedded systems, and provided for providing backup power or must have a or rationale why part 50 non power risk management and the development 60-day fuel supply for EDCs.

reactors must provide an " alternate" of contin ency plans. GL 98-03 also .

source of backup power to address Y2K requeste a written response, no later Additi nal Alternate Means of Backup losses of power. In particular, NIRS did than December 31,1998, which # "#

not address the fact that these facilities confirmed that these facilities were Y2K NIRS assened that NRC must require are not required to have a backup power ready or provided a status report of licensees to provide alternate means of source because power is not required to work remaining to be done to become backup power (e.g., solar power panels, shut down ard maintain these facilities Y2K ready, including completion wind turbines, hydroelectric power, in a safe-shutdown condition. In the schedules. Alllicensees provided a biomass power). As stated above,it is absence of any rationale in support of second response to GL 98-03, which not necessary for part 70 licensee; to the proposed requirement, the provided reports of work to be done, have backup power in order to Commission concludes that there is no including completion schedules. shutdown to a safe condition. Also, part basis for adopting the proposed Furthermore, following the second 70 licensees who are required to have requirement for pan 50 non-power response, NRC requested a third written independent power sources to meet PP reactor licensees. response, no later than July 1,1999, requirements have contingency plans to which would confirm that these meet the loss of the back up power.

IV. Part 70 Licensees facilities were Y2K ready or would Further, the petitioner does not provide To alert major pan 70 licensees of the provide an updated status report. sufficient technicalinformation to Y2K problem, NRC issued Information Between September 1997 and October demonstrate that these alternative back.

Notice (IN) 96-70 in December 1996i 1998, the major fuel cycle facilities were up power sources are needed to to and IN 98-30 in August 1998. In IN 96- also asked Y2K questions during other provide reasonable assurance of 70, NRC staff described the potential inspections. On the basis of these Y2K adequate protection to public health and Y2K problems, encouraged licensees to inspections, the licensees were aware of safety.

examine their uses of computer systems the Y2K problem and were adequately Back-up Power Supplyfor SpentFuel and software welll efore the year 2000, and suggested that licensees consider addressing Y2K issues. There have been Pool Cooling System no identified risk significant Y2K appropriate actions to examine and concerns for major part 70 licensees. The proposed rule in the NIRS svaluate their computer systems for Y2K NIRS presents no information or Petition requests NRC to require that all vulnerabilities. In IN 98-30, NRC staff argument why these above-mentioned licensees immediately classify provided definitions of"Y2K ready" actions by the licensees and NRC are not irradiated fuel pools as Class 1-E, and end "Y2K compliant," encouraged sufficient to address Y2K problems and Provide sufficient back-up power to licensees to contact vendors and test provide reasonable assurance of Provide cooling to these pools. Because their systems for Y2K problems, and adequate protection during the Class 1-E is an electric system described elements of a Y2K readiness transition from 1999 to 2000. classification, the NRC staff assumes rogram that the petitioner intends the rule to ,

In order to gatner Y2K information EDG Reliability and FuelSupply apply to the bac.k up power supply for <

regarding materials and major fuel cycle The requirements proposed in the spent fuel pool cooling systems, facilities, NRC formed a Y2K Team NIRS petition would require that: (1) All Although some part 70 licensees have within the Office of Nuclear Material EDGs that provide backup power be irradiated fuel at their facilities, these Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) in 1997. operational and (2) licensees have a 60- facilities do not store large quantities of From September through December day supply of fuel for EDGs or the irradiated fuel. The irradiated fuel is

~.. -

45918 Federal Register /Vcl. 64, N .162/ Monday, August 23,1999/ Proposed Rules used for research and development or educational .If theirradiated fuelis in a pool,the heat generated from the fuel would be minimal and would not require a pool em.

The aner provides no technical juni tion to support the proposal t!:st spent fuelpools beimmediately classin ed as Class 1-E. The regulatory action x;z 'd by NIRS is not required forpart 70 licensees.

em Existing NRC requirements, licensee

==mitments, and 11<=n== activities

i. and programs are sufBcient to cope with

! losses or power, incl those losses I ofoffsite r that be caused by Y2Kprob NIRS has not presented any information either that axisting requirements and licensee commitments are inadequate to address losses of I power due to Y2K problems, such that I the rwtuirements proposedin NIR3' petition are n-==ry to provide r===anable assurance of adequate protection to Accordingly,public the ro==ta= health andthesafety.

ion denies petition.

Deted at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of August,1990.

For the Nuclear Regulatory C==tanion.

Andrew L. Bates, Actingseaetaryofthe commission (FR Doc. 99-2t752 Filed 6-20-99; 8:45 am]

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