ML20207H843
| ML20207H843 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/06/1999 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-64FR36291, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-72 PR-990706, NUDOCS 9907290018 | |
| Download: ML20207H843 (18) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ -- - - - - - - - - - - 36291 Pr.oposed Rules ad=> =+r Vol. 64 No.128 Tuesday, July 6,1999 This secuon of the FEDERAL REGISTER be accessed by selecting "RulamnHng Section 50.73 has also been in effect, contains nonces to the pubile of the proposed Forum." This site provides the ability to with minor modification, since 1983. Its issuance of rules and regulaties. The upload comments as files (any format), pwpose d these nouces se to g's interested essential purpose is to identify "* *
- persms an oppo% to Ato en N if your web bmwser supports that the types of mactor events and problems mis mahng ph to the adoph N the Snel function. Forinformation about the that are believed to be significant and
' interactive rulemmH ng website, contact useful to the NRC in its effort to identify Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905; e- and resolve threats to public safety. It is mail CAG@nrc. gov. '
designed to provide the information NUCLEAR REGULATORY Certain documents related to this necessary for engineering studies of COMMISSION lemaking,inclueng comments operational anomalies and trends and received, the transcripts of public patterns analysis of operational 10 CFR Parts 50 and72 meetings held, the drafiregulatory occurrences. The same information can M 3150-AF9s analysis and the drafi report NUREG- be used for other anal c procedures 1022 Revision 2 may be examined at that will aid in iden accident the NRC Public Document Room,2120 hpomng %,W Muckw p, % L Street, NW, (Lower Level), precursors." (48 FR 33851; July 26, 1983). Washington, DC. These same documents AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory also may be viewed and downloaded IL RulemakingInitiation Commission. electronically via the interactive Experience has shown a need for ACTION: Proposed rule. rulemaking web site established by NRC change in several areas. On July 23. for this rulemaking. 1998 (63 FR 39522) the NRC published
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing to amend the FoR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
in the Federal ReS ister an advance Dennis P. Allison. Office of Nuclear notice of proposed rulamahng (ANPR) event reporting requirements for nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington. DC to announce a contemplated rulemaking power reactors: to update the current 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-1178, that would modify reporting rules, including reducing or eliminating, e-me,L1 dpa@nrc. gov. requirements for nuclear power reactors. the reporting burden associated with SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Among other things, the ANPR events of little or no safety significance: and to better align the rules with the Contents requested ublic mmmants on whether the NRC should proceed with NRC's needs for information to carry out 1. Background its safety mission, including revising rulomnHng to modify the event II. Rulemaking Initiation reporting requirements betsd on UL Analysis of Comments reporting requirements in to CFR 50.72, importance to risk and extending the W. Escussion "Immediate notification requirements required re rtin times consistent with n' for operating nuclear power reactors," the timeit e n ed for prompt NRC [ {*cy,",f Pmg p, os p . nts and 50.73," Licensee event report
- 3. Revisions to Reporting Guidelines in system," and several concrete propoa.ls action. Also, a draft report, N NUREG-1022 were provided for comment.
1022, Revision 2,is being made 4. Reactor oversight available for public comment A public meeting was held to discuss S. Reporting of111storical Problems concurrratly with the proposed the ANPR at NRC Headquartcrs on 6.Re rtin8 of Component Problems amsudments. 7.En orcement August 21,1998. The ANPR was also th other topics, at a DATES: Submit comments on or before September 20,1999. Comments received [ u
- 10. State Input 8 Porting discud alo@he public meeting on t role ofindustry in nuclear regulation in Rosemont, after this date will be considered if it is v. Environmental Impact: Categorical Illinois on September 1,1998. The practical to do so, but the Commission Exclusion public comment period on the ANPR is able to ensure consideration only for VI.Backfit Analysis closed on September 21,1998. A comments received on or before this VU. Regulatory Ane i ysis date. VIU. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement comment from the Nuclear Energy
" Institute (NEI) proposed conducting ADDRESSES: Mail comments to: flrpu. Sula '
A nn ts " table top exercises" early in the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory development and review process to test Commission, Washington, DC 20555- L Background key parts of the requirements and 0001. ATTN: Rulemakings and Section 50.72 has been in effect, with guidance for clarity and constatency. I Adjudications Staff. minor modifications, since 1983. Its That comment was accepted and a third l Dehver comments to:11555 Rockville essential purpose is "* *
- to provide public meeting was held on November Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 the Commission with immediate 13,1998 to discuss issuet; of clarity and . .
a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays, re arting of * *
- significant events consistency in the contemplated Electronic comments may be provided w ere immediate Commission action to approach. Transcripts of these meetings (
via the NRC's lateractive rulemaking protect the public he'alth and safety may are available for inspection in the NRC website through the NRC home page be required or where the Commission Public Document Room or they may be l (http://www.nrc. gov). From the home needs timely and accurate information r' ! viewed and downloaded electronically J page, select "Rulemaking" from the tool to nespond to heightoned public via the interactive rulamaHng web site I'Q~ bar at the bottom of the page. The concern." (48 FR 39039; August 29, established by NRC for this rulemaking, interactive rulemaHng website can then 1983), as discussed above under the heading en... , ,g ) 9907290018 990706 !' i "y PDR PR , I 50 64FR36291 PDR
1 00292 Federal Register /VI1. 64 No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/Prcposed Rules I ADDRE9sts. Single copies may be approach would result in substantial comment will be specifically invited on obtained from the contact listed above implementation problems, and several alternatives to the proposed rule. under the heading FOR FUAER recommended continuing to rely on the Comment 6:Several comments DeFORetATION CONTACT. narrative description which provides opposed changing the criteria in to CFR HL Analysis emments adequate information. One comment 50.72 and 50.73 which require reporting opposed the idea of a check the box any event or condition that alone could The comment period for the ANPR approach on the grounds that it would have prevented the fulfillment of the expired September 21,1998. Twenly. make LERs more difficult for the general safety function of structures or one comment letters were moelved, public to understand. A few comments systems * * *. The change proposed in representing comments from sixteen supported the check the box approach. the ANPR would have substituted the tuclear power plant licensees (utilities), Response:The intent of the check the phrase "alone orin combination with two organizations of utilities, two States box approach war to reduce the effort other existing conditions" for the word and one public interest group. A list of required in reporting; however, the "alone" in this criterion. The comments comment letters is provided below. The majority of comments indicate this indicated that this would add comment letters expressed support for wnuld not be the case. Accordingly, the confusion, the rule as currently worded amending the rules along the general proposed rule does not reflect adoption is sufficiently clear, and the need to hnes of the objectives discussed in the of a check the box approach. consider other existing plant conditions ANPR. Most of the letters also provided Comment 4:Several comments in evalua reportability is understood specific recommendations for changes opposed codifying the current and unifo y implemented. They 1 12 the contemplated amendments guidelines for reporting human recommended leaving the rule ! discussed in the ANPR. In addition to performance information in LERs (i.e., unchanged in this regard. the wdtten comments received, the adding the detailed guidelines to the Response:The comments are partially j ANPR has been the subject of three rule, as was proposed in the ANPR). accepted. The requirement would not be public m as discussed above ney recommended leaving the rule changed by substituting the phrase under the hoa BACKGROUND, and unchanged in this regard, indicating "alone or in combination with other comments made at those meetings have that sufficient information is being existing conditions" for the word also been considered. provided under the current rule and "alone" in this criterion (as proposed in The resolution of comments is guidelines. the ANPRI. sn=ma*ad below. his summary Response:The comments are partially However, the proposed amendments ! addresses the principal comments (i.e., accepted. The proposed rule would not would change the rules by deleting the ! comments other than those that are: codify the reporting guidehner,(as ward "alone," so that they would mm,w or editorial in nature; supportive Proposed in the ANPR) for the reasons require reporting "any event or { of the approach described in the ANPR, stated above. condition that could have prevented or applicable to another area or activity However, the proposed rule would fulfillment of the safety function of cutside the scope of sections 50.72 and simphfy the requiremen*. It is not structures or systems * * *." This 50.73). necessary to specify the level of detail would simplify the wordin6, rather than Comment 2:Several comments Provided in the current rule. making it more complicated. It is not recommended amending to CFR 50.73 Accordingly, the amended paragraph intended to change the meaning of the to allow 60 days (instead of the current would simply require a discussion of requirement,but to make the meaning 30 days) for submittal of Licensee Event the causes and circumstances for any more apparent in the wording of the Reports (LERs). They indicated that this human performance related problems rule. The following points, which are would allow a more reasonable time to that contributed to the event. Details relevant to this question, would determine the root causes of events and would continue to be provided in the continue to be made clear in the l lead to fewer amended reports. reporting guidelines, as indicated in reporting guidehnes. See section 3.2.7 of Response:The comments are accepted section 5.2.1 of the draft of Revision 2 the draft of Revision 2 to NUREG-1022, for the reason stated above. The to NUREG-1022. This draft reportis which is being made available for public ptoposed rule would change the time being made available forpublic comment concurrently with the limit to 60 days. comment concurrently with the proposed rule, as discussed below-Comment 2:Two comments suggested proposed rule, es discussed below under the heading " Revisions to o need to establish starting points for under the headmg" Revisions to Reporting Guidelines in NUREG-1022." reporting time clocks that are clear and Reporting Guidelines in NUREG-1022." (1)It is not necessary to assume an not sub}ect to varied interpretations. Comment 5:Several comments additional random single failure in Response:The reporting guidehnes'in opposed codifying a list of specific evaluating reportability. (If such an this area have been reviewed for clarity. systems for which actuation must be assumption were necessary, Some editorial clarifications are reported (by mmhg the systems in 10 inoperability of a single train would proposed in section 2.5 of the draft of CFR 50.72 and 50.73, as was proposed generally be reportable under this Revision 2 to NUREG-1022, which is in the ANPR). They indicated that a criterion.) being made available for puhuc system's contribution to risk can vary (2)It is necessary to consider other comment concurrently with the widely from plant to plant, which exist conditions in determining proposed rule, as discussed below precludes constmetion of a valid re ility. (For example, if Train A under the heading" Revisions to universal list. Rey recommended that, falls at a time when Train B is out of Re rting Guidelines in NUREG-1022." instead, actuation be 2eported only for service for maintenance, the event is ent 3:Many comments opposed those systems that are specified to be reportable.) adopting a dock the box approach for engineered safety features (ESFs) in the (3) The event is reportable regardless human perform-* and other final safety analysis report (FSAR). of whether or not a system was called information in LERs (as was proposed in Response:The proposed rule would upon to perform its safety function. (For the ANFR,with the objective of include a list of systems for which example,if an emergency core cooling reducing reporting burden). They actuation would be reported. However, system (ECCS] was incapable of indicated that adopting a check the box the concern is recognized and public performing its specified safety
Federal Register /V 1. 64, N,.128/Tuosday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36293 functions, the event is reportable even if encompasses at least one operating discussed below under the heading there was no call for the ECCS function.) cycle. Considerable resources are "Significantly degraded components." (4) The event is reportable regardless expended when it is necessary to search Comment 20:Several comments of whether or not a different systen, was historical records older than this to recommended changing 10 CFR 50.72 papable of perio the safety make past operability determinations, and 50.73 to exclude reporting of an function. (For ,if the onsite and this is not warranted by the lesser unnnalyzed condition that significantly power system fall , the event is significance of historical events older compromised plant safety on the basis reportabh even if the offsite power than two years, that it is redundant to other reporting system was available and capable of Response:The comments are partially criteria. performing its safety functions.) accepted, for the reasons stated above. Response:The comment is not Comment 7:Several comments That is, under the proposed rules, en accepted. Several types of worthwhile recommended changing 10 CFR 50.72 event or condition that could have reports have been identified that could and 50.73 to exclude reporting an prevented the fulfilhnent of the safety not readily be captured by other criteria invalid actuation of an ESF. (An invalid function of structures or as discussed further below under the actuation is one that does not result systems * *
- would be reported by heading " Condition that is outside the from a plant condition that warrants telephone under to CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) design basis of the plant."
VF initiation.) only ifit exists at the time of discovery. Comment 22:Several comments Response:The comments are partially An event or condition that could have recommended amending 10 CFR 50.72 f accepted.The proposed amendrnents prevented the fulfillment of the safety and 50.73 to exclude reporting of a would eliminate the requirement for function of structures or seriously degraded principal safety telephone notification of an invalid barrier on the basis that it is redun.lant actuation under 10 CFR 50.72. Invalid systems written LER*under
*
- would 10 CFRbe reported by(v) to other reporting criteria.
50.73(a)(2) actuations are generally less significant only ifit existed within the previous Response:The comments are not than valid actuations because they do three years. accepted. This criterion captures some not involve plant conditions (e.g., low in addition, although not worthwhile reports that would not be reactor coolant system pressure) recommended in the comments, under captured by other criteria, such as conditions that would warrant system the proposed rule an operation or significant welding or material defects actuation. Instead, they result from condition prohibited by the plant's in the primary coolant system. However, other causes such as a dropped Technical Specifications would be some clarifications are proposed in electricallead during testing). reported under 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) only if it Section 3.2.4 of the draft reporting However, the proposed amendments existed within the previous three years. guidelines, to better indicate which would not eliminate the requirement for For this criterion as well, considerable events are serious enough to qualify for a written report of an in alid actuation resources are expended when it is reporting undar this criterion. under 10 CFR 50.73.There is still a necessary to search historical records Comment 22:One comment need for reporting ofinvalid actuations older than three years to make past recommended that,with regard to a because they are needed to make operability determinations, and this is omdition or operation prohibited by the estimates of equipmant reliability not warranted by the lesser significance Pl ant's Technical Specifications, parameters, which in turn are needed to of historical events older than three repwting should be eliminated for support the Commission's move years. violation of all ariministrative Technical towards risk-informed regulation. This Three years is proposed, rather than Specifications. is discussed further in a May 7,1997 two years as suggested in the comments, Response:The comment is partially Commission paper, SECY-97-101, because the NRC staff trends plant acce ted. The proposed rule would "Propcsed Rule,10 CFR 50.76, performance indicators over a period of e . ate reportingfor Technical R_ eporting Ralf ability and Availability three years to ensure inclusion of SPecifications that are administrative in Inrormation for Risk-si ficant Systems Periods of both shut down and nature. The reporting guidelines would and Equipment " At ent 3. oPeratim. not change. As stated in the current Comment 8:Several comments Comment 9: Several comments reporting guidelines in NUREG-1022, recommended changing 10 CFR 50.72 Opposed using the term risk.significant Revision 1, failure to meet and 50.73 to limit certain reports to (or significant) in the absence of a clear administrative Technical Specifications current events and conditions. That is, definition. requirements is reportable only ifit they recommended that an event or Response:The term "significant" resulta in violations of equipment condition that could have prevented the would be used in two criteria in the operability requirements, or had a fulfillment of the safety function of proposed rules. In the first criterion, similar detrimental effect on a licensee's structures or systems * *
- be sectic. s 50.72 and 50.73 would require ability to safely operate the plant. For reported. reporting an unanalyzed condition that example, operation with less than the (1) By telephone under 10 CFR significantly affects plant safety. In this required number of people on shift 50.72(b)(2)(iii) only if it currently exists, context the term "significant" would be would constitute operation prohibited l and defined by examples, Sve of which are by the Technical Specifications.
I (2) By written LER under 10 CFR discussed below under the heading However, a change in the plant's 50.73(a)(2)(v) only if it existed within " Condition that is outside the design organizational structure that has not yet the previous two years. basis of the plant."In the second been approved as a Technical For a " historical" event or condition criterion, section 50.73 would require S fication change would not. An of this type (i.e., one which might have reporting when a component's ability to a inistrative procedure violation or been significant at one time but has perform its safety function is failure to implement a procedure, such since been corrected) there is less significantly degraded and the condition as failure to lock a high radiation area significance than there is for a current could reasonably be expected to affect door, that does not have a direct impact event and, thus, immediate notification other similar components in the plant. on the safe operation of the plant,is j under 50.72(b)(2)(lii)is not warranted. Again, the term "significant" would be generally not reportable under this With rerd to 50.73(a)(2)(v), two years defined by examples, six of which are criterion.
y 38304 Federal Register /Vcl. 64, Ns.'128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules sh==gt 23:One comment promptly reviewed.This includes aci , safety barriers,being seriously
=an===== dad 10 CFR 50.73 to notinmeian of the NRC Headquarters require that12Rs . (1) How Emergency OfBoers and the Regional t IF:Some comments -
many opportunities to detect the Duty UrBoer and consideration of r=====ndad that the NRC use psobless west saissed and (2) corrective whether to activate NRCincident enform==nt discretion during the actions to prevent future misses, response procedures. Written LERs, rule == king process to provide early Response:No changes are proposed. If when required, are needed to ensure relief with regard to re a missed
^ '^"
- me id=*in=d and that events can be systematically condition outside the es ofthe are signl8 cant to the event, they should reviewed for safety signiacance. plant and/or a late survei test be captured by the current y Comment 27: Some ca===nts (condition or operation prohibited by to peevide a -
- 've $ *'- = opposed ===nding 10 CFR 50.73 to
_ T=cl=ical Sperinn=*lons). of the event and to describe corrective require additionalinformation regarding itssponse:The current rules will actions if they are =igniA==* to the equipament avait=hility for shutdown continue to apply until analrevised event. events (as proposed in the ANPR) to rules are issued and become effective. r%====* 2e with regard to design support staff ' "H=Hc risk Howeverin dispositioning any issues, one -===* -- -M --*= htAs).They indicated that violation, the risk-end safety ll be an includies language in the rules or their it is rare that s=nica==* information is significance of the violation wi statsuments of-id==*ia=s not avail =hl= in an LER. important considesation." ^ "" -
'=5 an smoouseglas avoi report under to Response:& proposed rule would interim enforcement discretion policy - CPR 50.9 for a newly require such information. y, would involve the same critical issue whichis not otherwise e when shutdown events are su ed to elements as developing the revised rule at the plant whose that discovesed a probabilistic risk analysis,it s and guidance including a provision for (because the effected can still -ry to callthe plant to determine public m==ent. This would complicate perform their safety functions) the status of systems and pment. the rulesnaking process, and essentially but whidi have a signiacant The rule would e to constitute a prediction ofits Anal impact on generic design issues et other m o that need. outcome, which may or may not turn plants. Comment 28:Several n====nts out to be correct.
- A c eme===ad r=ar==== dad deleting to CFR Comment 20:Several ca====t letters
. of voluntaryIEts is 50.72(bM2Xi),"Any event d wh#e opposed the idea of tying enforc===t in the guidale=== In addition, the sooctorJe shut down, , had it criteria (i.e., violation severity levels) to the wouldindicate that any been found while the reactor was in reporting criteria. They indicated this dayadation that could operation, would have resulted in the could have en unintended adverse e5 set reasonablybe expected to assat nuclear plant, including its on reporting and the resources multiple sissiler -pa==*= in the safety barriere,being seriously consumed because in matching an event plant should be reported. or beingin an unanalysed with a reporting criterion, a lima ==
r%===* 15: Several an===ts conditionthat signincantly would essentially be forced to make a opposed a condition,related to counpromises lentsafety."The --J:.-- :==j determination of severity noe. compliance, on the -===ts in =*=d that because the Pl ant would be shutdown,there is no bl.. j me==*8a= of reporting oflate Response:The comments are not I servalliance tests (as proposed in the need for i===di=*= NRC action. accepted. The proposed changes to the ANF5t)under to CFR 50.73.The Response:The requirement for enfoscement criteria, are discussed na=d868a= would be burd===a== telephone would not be below under the heading beamuse Hn===== would need to track entirel all=in=* because,if a " Enforcement." I instemess of unissed surv=ill=== tests in safety barrier is signifkantly Comment 22:As aquested by the ) given tinie periods. or a condition that ANPR, a number of comments identified
- 'Ihe rule does not signiScantly =N=r*= plant safety exists: reactor reporting requirmnants other this Reporting for the the event may be significant enough that than sections 50.72 and 50.73 where purpose ofidentifying sys*===*ic non. the NRC would need to initiate actions changes are warranted.
= is not needed because NRC isuch as contacting the plant to better Response: Comments regarding resident inspectose routinely review understand the event and/or initiating a changes to reactor reporting plant psoblems lists, and thus would be special inspection or investigation) requirements other than sections 50.72 i cwee of any systematic non casaplianc= within about a day even if the plantis and 50.73 willbe addressed in a j in this ssuaifit occurs, shutdown. separate action. A rhn=ission paper on assessant se:One comasat However,in the rule this that subject was submitted on January
- =a===== dad the rules to speciSc criterion dbe combined 20,1999, SBCY-9c 022, "Rn1===1 ring allowliosaseos to on =ndiAa=*ta== with to CFR 50.72(bM1Xii),"Any event to Modify Repuing Requirements for seeds to sesidset ' . - .which or condition during plant operation that Power Reactore" and the r%==i= ton
' could ethainste the need to make a results in the condition of sne nuclear issued a Staff R.q i. - - -ts
*=lapha== =aeta=*ia= via tta power plant, including its principal ' Memorandum on March 19,1999
==*4A=*aa= (ENS) safety barriere,being seriously directing the staff to proceed with and/or a written etleset for or * * * " Also, the term " yued p1=nning and sched'u ling.
someesentseraa= diet 'igey condition that algniAm=*ly Comment 22:One === set i=da- a=d ser manple, tids should be compromises plant safety"would be recomunended changing the required , adequate whose the event is a dana =laa d=l=*=t in an=id== tion with other initial reporting time for some events to j isimmeanow senesse. changes,this would usultin tlw "* *
- within a hours orbyt1m j
- No changu me .
criterion for telephone offlw swat businses day," j
*ia.=*i = to inn notiAm -Any e,ent or condaion insiend shapiy s,ecif ,
opastions center,when mquired, are that usults in the conRition of the within a houm." Tim an=ying ====t ~ = = . needed to ensum that the event cim be nuclear poww plant, including its indin=*,d k dom not appear that the
Federal Regieter/Vgl. 64, N2.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36295 NRC takes action on these events during site * * *. This will cause reporting radiation releases from a site regardless non-business hours. confusion during an event at a time of the source or quantity, Response:N comment is not when clarity is necessary,bse six Timeliness is also important for items accepted.b NRC needs these reports events should all be reported as of obvious public interest. News of in time to call the plant to find out more emergency 4 vents, not non-emergency seemi y small events spreads quickly, about the event and/or initiate a special events. EAL thresholds in licensee parti ly in local communities inspection or an investigation,if emergency plans should be required to around the power plants. Delayed warranted, within a day. Sometimes refleci them clearly. All of these events reporting of such events means that we these actions are taken during non- would affect the State of Blinois- will be unprepared to respond to business hours. response and our emergency plans. NRC queries from local ofBcials, or the Comment 23:One comment must reconsider the categories of non. media, with a resultant loss of public l recommended that an event or emergency events in the context of the confidence. Therefore, we also oppose condition that could have prevented current guidance to licensees for any reduction in notification fulallment of the safety function of classifying EALs to ensure there is a ents for newsworthy events." structuws or systems. * *
- should be clear distinction between emergency esPonse: la the interest oT simplicity, reportable only when the time limits of re the pm osed amendments would the TS are exceeded. It indicated that ifS and non-emeNn Response: 72 has been "*i"'"p" justevents."
sh.ortable three basic levels of the time limits are not exceeded the reviewed, and appears to be clear in this required sporting times in 10 CFR event is not significant enough to regard. It indicates the following: 50.72 and 50.73 (1 hour,8 hours, and warrant reporting. (1) Any declaration of an Emergency 60 days). However.the concern is Response:b conunent is not Class is reportable pursuant to to CFR recognized and public comment is accepted. Generally, standard TS 50.72(a)(1)(1) and (a)(3), 8Pecifically invited on the question of requiss commencement of shutdown (2) The conditions listed in paragraph whether additionallevels should be within one hour if an important system. (b)(1),"One-hour reports," are introduced to better correspond to such as emergency ac power,is reportable pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) Particular types of events, as discussed inoperable. However, the stated reason ifnot repoited os a declamtion of an below under the heading " Required for allowing one hour before EmergencyClass underpamgmph (a), Initial Reporting Times." Also,ifin a commencing the shutdown is to provide and final rule the NRC should relax the time time to prepare for an orderly (3) The conditions listed in paragraph limit to 8 hours, a State would not be shutdown. Also, the condition might (b)(2),"Eight hou /eports,are Precluded from obtaining mports earlier have lasted much longer than one hour reportable pursuant to paragraph (b)(2), than 8 hours. before it was discovend. Finally, an ifnotteported anderpangmphs(a)or Comment 27:Two comment 1ettera event that results in a safety system (b)(fl. addressed coordination with States. The failure (orinability to perform its Commoni 2ti:One comment letter, comment letter from Florida Power & function) is generally significant enough imm 6e State ofIllinois, opposed Light Company stated "The NRC's to warrant NRC review. rebxing the required initial reporting Public worlshop on August 21,1998 Comment 2d:One comment from the time from 4 hours to 8 hours for the touched on a number of examples where State of Ohio recommended that, following types of events: opportunities exist to reduce reporting although rule changes are not necessary, (1) Airborne radioactive release that burdens. Anindustryrepresentative emphasis should be placed on positive results in concentrations over 20 times commented that licensees sometimes notification of State and local agencies alloweble levels in an unrestricted area; have to report the same event to state of emergency conditions before calling (ii) Liquid effluent in excess of 20 agencies and the NRC provided one the NRC. times allowable concentrations released such example. FPL concurs with the Response:The comment is accepted. to an unrestricted area: recommendation that the time It arose from a weakness in the NRC's (iii) Radioactively contaminated requirement for reporting an event-to response to an event at the Davis-Besse person transported to an offsite medical the NRC and to the state should be plant. Because there were considerable facility for treatment; consistent wherever practical and dif!!culties in establishing telephone (iv) News release or other government possibly in some cases eliminated." communications with the plant at the agency notification related to the health The comment letter from Northeast time of the event, NRC Operations and safety of the public or onsite Nuclear Energy Company stated Center personnel requested that the personnel, or protection of the " Northeast Nuclear Energy Company licensee remain on the line and said that environment. agrees with extending the non-the NRC would notify the State. The comment further indicated: "It is emergency prompt notifications to eight However, the NRC did not do so in a of paramount importance that those hours. This would help to eliminate timely manner. Training and procedure charged with regulating and monitoring unnecessary reports and retractions. I' changes havebeen implemented to the public impact of radiological However,it is necessary to have the ensure this type of problem will not releases are being kept informed of individual states closely involved with reoccur, unplanned releases in a timely manner. the rule change since they may have Comment 25:One comment letter, Blinois law requires that we perform requirements that are more restrictive or from the State of Blinois, stated the independent assessments, decide what conflict with the proposed rulemaking. following:"In section 50.72 of the actions may be necessary to protect the For example, in Connecticut all to CFR advance notice of proposed rulemaking, public, and assist in informing the 50.72 reports require notification of the seven non-emergency events listed as public regarding any radiological risk. state within one hour." (!), are proposed to be reported in eight Should follow-up action to a release be Response:The ANPR specifically hours instead of one hour. Of those necessary, then the less time that has requested State input. In addition, a seven events, six (suc=11y, (ii), (111), elspeed, the better the state is able to letter requesting input was sent to each (iv), (v). (vi), and (vil)) would probably respond in a timely and appropriate State. Written comments were received ( be classified as emergency events under manner, We oppose any reduction in from the State of Ohio and the State of ) existing emergency plans at an Hlinois notification requirements for unplanned Elinois. In addition, representatives
38398 Federal Essister/W1. 64, NA 128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules , ham sevesel States metanAnd w of the Response:No are proposed operating history for similar events and public meetings on the ANPL & NRC for sections 50.72 50.73, which initiates a generic study, as appropriate, willcontinue to =1tch Stato ut as identify reporting requinenents. to focus upon b nature, cadse, *
- the rulessaking process . It is not ble or appropriate to consequences and possible corrective da===d as: One c====a address the speciSc reporting actions for the particular situatica or
- =aa==== dad = lima ==eing two of the .
. - " contained in individual concern.
requherments for i===di=*= followup licenses in this format. W NRC staff uses the information
==esamesa= during the couros of an The ofissuing a c reported in LERs in na=8-ia=
event, sootion 50.72(cM2Xi), the rueults amami=l=Han to requests for licensing bases, studyin of ensulag evaluations-or -=a*= of lin=== ===d-ts will be addressed generic safety problems,g potentially plant aa-dies- and section (along with other co==w e= on trends and patterns of opered so.72(cM2Xii),the e5sotiveness of NPadng # -ts bqand the experience, monitoring performance, reopense or protective measures taken. ' 8coPo of sections 50.72 and 50.73)in a identifying precursors of more no comument indi=*=A that the - sqarete action. signiScant events, and provi - T f- continue to apply aSer the Caounent 32:One comment operadonal saporience to b in ustry. event and that require =na=== dad that in secdon 50.72(bX1Xv), the word "o5 site" be & NRC determines whether events even H,fu ,the ofa meet the criteria for reporting asan furtheranalysis not cLange the added beim "canmunication' AbnormalOccurrence Report to initialsupost. 0*Pahility to make it clear that what Congrou or fu repordng to b [*"""""'I'g,"" unicati udinternal plant rammunications Nide esencies, fucleat Enugy Agency followup reporting apply only during binformation fromI2Rsis widely the couros of the event. Followup systant ram
- t is usul within die nuclear industry, bMh reposts are === dad while the event is Pons ,;
. g, r e die wod nationahy and internationally.%
ongoing. For mounple, if an analysis is an'=pt=*=d during an ongoing event, and would Qddd. Industry's Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INPO) use LERs as a beste it comarms an earlier esdmets of how Comment 33(Several comments that b NRC should define its f#Pmi o tional safety long it will take to uncover the reactor experience ek data to individual reladve to b infamadon case if electric power is ad restored, provided in IRRs utilities through such documents as thatinformation snay my well be Response:The essential of signiScent operating experianos reports, useful for the purpose of evaluating the the LER rule is toidentify " type of signiScant event reports, signlAc=* need for protective menemos reactor events and problans that are events rmtiScations, and operations and 1
- (evacuation). believed to be "AH and useful to maintenance :==indars. U.S. vendors l Cr=====# as:One -===t the NRCin its e8 art toidendfy and and nuclear steam system suppliers, as m==d=d the reportin( resolve threats to public safety. The rule well as other countries and laternational for identined Dy is designed to provide b informadon organintions, use LER data as a source
. NdC inspectors. nan =====y for - -- ' t- studies of of Operational experience data.
Assponse:No changes are operational anainaltes an'id trends, and Comment 3C Some comments
%e current reporting guidal patterns analysis of operadonal indicated that the licensing basis should inchade a makingit clear that occurrences. To this end, b be denned.
an event raust reported via telephone information required in 12Rs is Response:No changes are proposed, noHA=nn= and/or writtaa LER, as generally === dad to understand the %e term " licensing basis"is not requhed, regardless of whether it had event,its signiar===, and its causes in explicitly used in the event reporting been diaran==d with NRC staff order to determine whether generic or rules or the draft reporting guidelines. it parecenalorwasidentitledby NRC plant c action is needed to can come into play, via Generic 14tter parecenal. pract recurrence.Some further (GL) 91-18. "Information to T.fr===ees Comunent 30:Several -==*= spectSc functions are diar ====d below. Regarding two NRCInspection Manual r=aa==== dad changing the it is ==n====ry to identify and analyse Sections on Resolution of Degraded and requiremnants in 50.4e(aXiiiX2) for events and conditions that are Nanconforming Conditions and on eurers in or con =rtia= to precursors to potential severe core Operability,"in determining what b emelyses. . damess, to discover emerging trends or "specified safety function" of a system Response:Dese m==*= will be patterns of potential safety signincan=, 1s. This relates to whether an event is addressed in a separate actica (along to identify events that are im tto reportable as an event or condition that with other comumente ce reporting safety and their ===actated could have prevented the fulAll=ani of _. other then =rei- 50.72 concerns and root causes, to determine the seisty function of structures or sol 30.73). Camunent si:Some -==*= raised the to addm ZTof corrective actionsand safety concerns, taken to systems condition * *prohibited
- and/or an operation by the plant's or lesmos agending plant specific reporting assoas the generic applicability of technical Scotion (TS). However, mquhussemos ar=d=8==d in Tarh=i=1 essets. any details regarding exactly apmaa==es=== (or other parts of the b NRC staffreviews each12R to which ar==ltments are included in the licones).One sensation was identify those individual events or licensing beels (for example because of 10 50.72 and 50.73 should be pseeric sit ==*ian= that warrant dissrences between the Annaitions in to address theseleones. additional analysis and evaluation. N GL 01-18 and 10 CPR 54.3) are not of sugnetton was that a Generic staff id=*iA== repetitive events and a nature that would change the Letter be lesund i= din =Har that the NRC failures and situaticos where the deter-i==tia= of whether or not a wouldbe to for frequency or the combined signiscence system te le of performing its llaumes to of reported events aqbe cause for speciSed functions (i.e.,
spord8cmpesting _" concern.The NRC sensr reviews past operable).
Federal Register /Vcl. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36297 Comment 35:Several comments are needed in the assenment process supplying these programs would result ro6ommenited conducting tabletop should not be eliminated. In the reduction in the currency and amcises (public meetings) early in the vala f easeindi aton to senior draMng process, lavolving licensees, 2. Section bySection Discussion of managers. With respect to the Accident inspectors, and headquarters personnel PmposedAmendments Sequence Pacursor program, the to discuss the draft amendments and - Geneinf regulaments(section additional 30 days will add a associated and guidance. 50.72(o)(5)). The requirement to inform commensurate amount of time to each Response:The Commission agrees. the NRC of the type of report being individual event assessment since The recommended public meeting was made (i.e., emergency class declared, Licensee Event Reports (LERs) are the held on November 13,1998. non-emergency 1-hour report, or non- main source of data for these analyces. Comment 36:Several comments emergency 8-hour report) would be The delivery date for the annual recommended conducting a workshop revised to refer to paragraph (a)(1) Accident Sequence Procursor mport (public meeting) early during the pub'lic instead of referring to paragraph (a)(3) to would also slip accordingly. The NRC comment period to discuss the proposed cornct a typo 6raphical error, staff would have to make more rulmi draA guidance. Requnedbutmlsporting times extensive use ofimmediate Resp 2nse:The Commission s. (sections 50.72(a)(5), (b)(1), (b){2), and Notifications (10 CFR 50.72) and event The rer.ommended workshop h been secti ns 50.73(o)(2)and(d)). In the followup to compensate in part for the added to the schedule. Proposed amendments, declaration of Licensee Event Report (LER) reporting Con ment 37:Several comments an emergency class would continue to extension. recommended that the reporting be reported immediately aher In the interest of simplicity, the 8 muBcation of appmpriate State or local proposed amendments would maintain h-{rlines ,, be revised concurrently with agencies not later than 1-hour after just three basic levels ofrequired Hesponse:The Commission agrees. declaration. This includes declaration of reporting times in to CFR 50.72 and Draft guidelines are being made an Unusual Event, the lowest emergency 50.73 (1 hour,8 hours, and 60 days). available for comment concurmnt with clase. However public comment is specifically to osedrules Deviations from technical invited on the uestion of whether the C bmfnent sa: Several comment letters 8Pecincanons authorized pursuant to 10 additionalleve should be recommended reviewing enforcement CFR 50.54(x) would continue to be to bettor correspond or particular types criteria at the same time the rule is NPorted as swn as practical and in all of events. For example,20 CFR 50.72 being developed to ensure consistent cases within 1 hour of occurrence- currently requires reporting within 4 lication These two criteria capture those events hours for events that involve low levels apbesponse:of enforcement The enmment to reporting. where there may be a need is acupted. for of radioactive releases, and events The Enforcement Policy is being immediate action by the NRC. related to safety or environmental reviewed concurrently with Non-emergency events that are protection thet involve a press release or development of the tule. FePortable b telephone under 10 CFR notiacation of another government 50.72 woul be reportable as soon as agency. These types of events could be W. Discussion practical and in all cases within 8 hours maintained at 4 hours so that 2 Objectives ofPioposed Amendments tinstead of within 1 hour or 4 hours as information is available on a more is currently required).This would timely basis to respond to heightened The purpose of sections 50.72 and reduce tha burden of rapid reporting, 50.73 would remain the same because public concern about such events. In while still capturing those events where another example, events related to the basic needs remain the same. The there may be a need for the NRC to objectives of the pro environmental protection are sometimes would be as follows: posed ameodments contact the plant to find out more about reportable to another agency, which is the event and/or initiate a special the lead agency for the matter, with a (1)To better align the reporting inspection or investigation within about different time limit, such as 12 hours. requirements with the NRC's current a day. reporting needs. An example is These types of events could be reported Written LERs would be due within 60 to the NRC at approximately the same extending the required initial reporting days after discovery of a reportable times for some events, consistent with time as they are reported to the other event or condition (instead of within 30 ag cy. the need for timely NRC action. Another days as is currently required). Changing emtion orcondition pmhibited by example is changing the criteria for the time limit from 30 days to 60 days TS reporting system actuations, to obtain on 50.73(a#2XIXBJJ.The term does not imply that licensees should "during the previous three years" would reporting that is more consistent with take longer than they previously did to the risk-significance of the systems be added to eliminate written LERs for develop and implement corrective conditions that have not existed during Involved, actions. They should continue to do so the previous three years. Such a (2) To reduce the reporting burden, on a time scale commensurate with the consistent with the NRC's reporting historical event would now have less safety significance of theissue. significance, and assessing reportability needs. An example is eliminating the liowever, for those cases where it does for earlier times can consume reporting of design and analysis defects take longer than thirty days to complete considerable resources. For example, and deviations of little or no risk-or a root cause analysis, this change would assume that a procedure is found to be safety-significance. result in fewer LERs that require unclear and, as a result, a question is (3)To clarify the reporting amendment (by submittal of an raised as to whether the plant was ever requirements where needed. An additional report). operated in a prohibited condition. lf example is clarifying the criteria for The Performance Indicator (PI) operation in the prohibited condition is reporting design or analysis defects or program and the future risk-based deviations. likely, the answer should be reasonably i performanco indicator program provide appannt based on the knowledge and } (4) To maintain consistency with NRC valued input to regulatory decisions experience of the plant's operators and/ actions to improve integrated plant (e.g. Seafor Management Meetings). or a review of operating records for the assessments. For example, reports that Adding 30 days to the delivery of data past three years. The very considerable
38380 Federal Engister/ Val. 64, Ns.128/ Tuesday, July 8,1999/ Proposed Rules asortrequhed toreview aH receeds would refer to a condition that Earthquake (SSE) the event would be older than thsee years,'in order to rule reportable. out the pessibutty..would not be th.en-----; efects that a condition plant safety rather signiacantly Or, for example,ifit is found that s' warmated. compromises plant safety. 'lide is an loss of ofsite power could cause a loss in addleta= this criterion would be . editorial change in e== dad to better of instrument air and, as a result, there madeA=d to ale em.m t - m l==a==- isrepor. tin.g if the
= =i=e.ed,e reRect ca,,dt,hem mnature,,of s ou ,, th,e e e c,esrite.rion,.
,,r, k r===<==hle doubt about the abilitr of tann**~d to warzant"%;;"r;t,y s"?Rx'fxilLc"""' ss ;$' '@""m?"5'J Q* ,
not been considsme 50.7s(o#2###8)). This criterion would s=h= lee =1 of an LER, and since 1983 be deleted. However, a condition une keeks, h "'at h
' when the rule was issued the staffs outside the design basis of the plant NPataWo.
has excluded almost would still be ifitis signi5 cant if a condition outside the basis cases suuh his change enough to q under one or more of of the plant (or any other would snake the wording of the the following criteria, condition)is sige1Acant enough , as rule n===8=a==e that guidssos. If a design or snel defect or a result, plant safety is signiacantly
,e criterica would be deviation (or any event or e5seted, the condition would be mad to =14=i==a= reporting if the condition) is signiacent enough that, as reportable under sections event aa==l=ead solely of a case of a late a result, a structure or system would not 50.72(b)(2Xil)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(li)(B) surveulance test where the oversight is be capable of performing its specified li.e., an unanal condition that conected, the test is performed, and the safety functions, the condition would be ai= alae ==tly s plant safety).
' puent is found to be functional. reportable under sections 50.72(b)(2)(v) As was previously indicated in the of event has not proven to be and 50.73(a)(2)(v) (i.e., an event or 1983 Statements of Considerations for boomuse the equipsnent condition that could have prevented the 10 CPR 50.72 and 50.73, with regard to remained f==s*ia==1. fulAllment of the safety function of an unanalyzed condition that Conditics, of the nuclear lont, structures or systems that are needed to: signine==tly compromises plant safety, includityits , (A) Shut down * * *). "The Co==i== ion recognises that the For ====pla, during testing of 480 Hoensee may um ===i-
-- Judgment so. 1#14)and(b#2Xf), volt safety-related breakers, one henker and aperknoe 2 h~-wheher a repleosd by new section 80.72(b#2Xfi), .would not trip electricauy. The cau" unanalysed condition existed. it is not c.;sd section 80.73(a#2##1). Currently, was a loose ca===reion, due to a lug that intended est &ls apply to
'10 CFR 50.72(bM1Xii) and (bM2Xi) - was too large for a connecting wire. minor veladons in vidual provide the fauowing dissI=ctian a Other safety related breakers did not qualifying evoet or aandteia= during malfunction,but they had the same p.,,g,,,Es,,
lec ofg p,,y ui , ,, ,,,, ,,g,g t For opssation is initiall mi===ech The event would be single
,,,,p [e, at anI thne or more hour; a aa=diesa= My2reporteWe while inreportable one because the incompatible -
u> shutdown that would have qualiBed if it hadit been discovesed during lugs and wirw could han caused one oranoes
",",,",(f G "*I.be"jf to fail to periman a fault that has not been OPmdesisimidau in four Geir funcdon(s). gay 3,g,g,3,g,g,g,T3,,,,,
g ,,,,, hours.Se new to 50.72(bX2)(ii) example as follows. An in performing survanit==n= tests could would t==a= the distinction because annual inspection indicated that some
-these would no longerbe separate 1 bearings wess h a situadon in which two m or cracked on both ,Paare often unrelated, safety-grade hour and 4-hour categories of non- smargency di generators (EDGs). ,,g ,,,3 assesgancy reports for& criterion. Although the EDGs were runnWor "
These would onlybe e-hour non- to the inspection, the event wouhibe T caHy, is ysed candition. However, these events for h criterim mportable baran== there was reasonable condition that doubt about the abuity of the EDGs to sh d onlyif eeyinnin g oPerste for an m e==A period of dine, theyal inc==tly com g 7ggy , 1 t and ==redaa 80.73(a#####4;reptocod if design or analysis defect or "" I* bynew escadon 80.72(b#2###8), and deviation (or any other event or "When applying =g- y ascelan so.Ta(af2Xil###. Currently,10 condition)is signiacant enough that, as judgment, and there is a doubt regarding CFR so.73(bM1XiiXA)and(bM2)(1) a result, one train of a multiple train whether to report or not, the psovide the foBowing d'=etaresa= a system controlled by the plant's TS is Cc===i= tan's policy is that lir==- quelliplag event a condition during not capable of perfarining its spectSed should make the report."8 oymation is initinHy sportehle in one safety functions, and thus the train is "Forexample, smaH volds in systens hour; a aamdies== disoneesed while inoperehlelonger than allowed the designed to remon best from the shutdown that would have q==liA=d if TS, the es=danan would be e reactor core which han been previously ithaditbeen disoevesed during under section 50.73(aX2XI te., en shown through analysis not to be safety opemason is initinny reportable in four operation or condition prohibited by signiacant need not be reported. hauss.De new to CFR so.72(bX2XiiXB) TS). However, the accumulation of voids that would eMusinses the dimet=r*ia= han==== For example,ifitis found that an could inhibit the ability to adequately these would nolongerbe separate 1 exciter panel for one EDG lacks remon best from the r== rear core, hear and 4 hour cassenries of non, ep seismic restraints because of particularly under natural circulation sepets fore a analysis or construction conditions,would constitute an would only s-imur inadequacy and, ase meult, there is reports for e atterion. muonehle doubt about the EDG's ability
- es FR samt. Augen m. ima s=d u FR sun, in the new to em toperformitsspecia d functions si, m, im.
so.73(b)(IX11)(3) and sc.73(eX2XiiXB) during and after a Safe Shu aos FR seosa, Ausust se.soss.
Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36299 unanalyzed condition and would be include a margin of 3.0 againstposs of conditions outside the design basis of rep'ortable." 8 failure or burst under normal plant the plant to the safety significant issues In addition, voiding in instrument operatirg conditions, including statup, while reducing the number of reports lines that results in an erroneous operation in the power range, hot under the current rules in order to indication causing the operstor to standby, and cooldown, and all minimize the reporting ofless misunderstand the true condition of the enticipated transients that are included significant issues. In particular, the plant is also an unanalyzed condition in the plant design specification. proposed amendments will help ensure and should be reported."* (2) The calculated potential primary- that significant safety problems that Furthermore, beyond the examples to-secondary leak rate is not consistent could reasonably be expected to be given in 1983, examples of reportable with the plant licensing basis. The applicable to similar components at the events would include discovery that a licensing basis accident analyses specific plant or at other plants will be system required to meet the single typically assume (for uccidents other identified and addressed although the failure criterion does not do so. than a steam generator tube rupture specific licensee might determine that In another example, if fire berriers are (SGTR)] a 1 gpm primary-to-secondary the system or structure remained found to be missing, such that the leak rate concurrent with the accident to operable, or that technical specification required degree of separation for demonstrate that the radiological reguirements were met. The proposed redundant safe shutdown trains is consequences satisfy to CFR Part 100 rules will provide that, consistent with lacking, the event would be reportable. and GDC-19. In these instances, the NRC's effort to obtain information On the other hand,if a fire wrap, to degradation which may lead to leakage for engineering studies of operational which the licensee has committed,is above 1 gpm under accident conditions, anomalies and trends and patterns missing from a safe shutdown train but other than a SGTR, would exceed the analysis of operational occurrences, the another safe shutdown train is available threshold. For r.,mo units, the staff has NRC would be able to monitor the in a different fire area, protected such approved accident leakages above 1 gpm capability of safety-related components that the required separation for safe subject to updating the licensing basis to perform their design-basis functions, shutdown trains is still provided, the accident analyses to reflect this amount Significantly degraded component (s) event would not be reportable. ofleakage and subject to risk (section 50.73(a)(2)(fi)(C)). This new if a condition outside the design basis implications being acceptable.o reporting :riterion would require of the plant (or any other event or (iv) Low temperature over pressure reporting tf a component is in a condition) is significant enough that, as transients where the pressure- degraded or non-conforming condition a result, a principal safety barrier is temperature relationship violates such that the ability of the component seriously degraded,it would be pressure-temperature limits derived to perform its e ed safety function reportable under sections from Appena1x G to 10 CFR Part 50 is sl6nificantly egraded and the 50.72(b)(2)(li)(A) and 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) (e.g., TS pressure-temperature curves). condition coul reasonably be expected (i.e., any event or condition that results (v) Loss of containment function or to apply to other similar components in in the condition of the nuclear power integrity, including containment leak the plant. It would be added to ensure plant, iceluding its principal safety rate tests where the total containment that design basis or other discrepancies barriers, being seriously degraded). This as-found, minimum-pathway leak rate would continue to be reported if the reporting criterion applies to material exceeds the limiting condition for capability to perform a specified safety (e.g., metallurgical or chemical) Operation (LCO) in the facility's TS. function is significantly degraded and problems that cause abnormal Finally, a condition outside the the conditica has generic implications. degradation of or stress upon the design basis of the plan:(or any other on the other hand,if the degradations principal safety barriers (i.e., the fuel event or condition) would be reportable are not significant or the condition does cladding, reactor coolant system if a component is in a degraded or non- not have generic implications, reporting pressure boundary, or the containment) ceforming c nditie such that the would not be required under this such as: ability of a component to perform its enterion. (i) Fuel cladding failures in the specified safety function is significantly For example, at one plant several reactor, or in th storage pool, that degraded and the condition could normally open valves,in the low exceed expected values, or that are reasonably be expected to apply to other Pressure safety injection system were unique or widespread, or that are similar components in the plant. This routinely closed to support quarterly caused by unexpected factors. new criterion is contained in section surveillance testing of the system. In (ii) Welding or material defects in the 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(C) as discussed below. reviewing the design basis and primary coolant system which cannot be As a result, these proposed associated calculations,it was found acceptable under ASME Section amendments would focus the reporting determined that the capability of the XI IWB-3600, " Analytical Evaluation of valves to o break loss pen in the event of a large Flaws" or ASME Section XL Table a in addition, if the extent or desredation is great oftoolant accident (LOCA) IWB-3410-1 " Acceptance Standards." tre, u many tuba am desmded or derudut a combined with degraded grid voltage (ggi) Steam generator tube degradation i.lephone notification and a written tIR should be during a surveillance test was degraded. pronded. The plant a Ts typically provide specific in the following circumstances: regwromants maicatins when reportins is required T!ie 1icensee conc 1uded that the va1ves (;) The severity of degradation (based on the number of tubes desreded or detective would still be able to reopen under the
'" '*""' "P'"*"'"'pected") and th =*
corropzds to failure to maintain Postulated conditions and considered
'*9 uld
- uad i dotarmme them operable.1-lowever, that structural safety factors. The structural r p%aTI$tsa safety factors implicit in the licensing aThe tr$typicauy .n ploys ta, which is defined c nclusion could not be supported basis are those described in Regulatory in Appendia iio to CPR Part 50 es the maxunum using the conservative standards Guide 1.121. These safety factors anowable emamme lak ret at pressure Pa. the established by Generic Letter 89-10.
calculated puk containment mternal pruauro Pending detentiination of final related to the desisn basis acxadent. Minimum- corrective action, administrative
,to FR 39042, August 29,19s3 and 4e FR 33s56 pathway leak rate means the mmimum look rete July se,19ss. that can be attributed to a stradon Inkage path; Procedures were implemented to
*4s FR 39042, August 29,19a3 and es FR 33s56, for example, the smaller o ther the mboard or Preclude closing the valves. The event July 18,19s3. outboard valve's indinduallook rates. Would be reportable beCause the
38300 Federal Register /Vcl. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules of a ==pa==d to perform its At one plant the switch on the radio bre would only be 8-hour non-f==ceta== was transmitter for the auxiliary building emergency reports for this afterion. y and the same crane was used to h==dl= a spent fuel The new section 50.72(b)(2Miv) would
==dieta= hly be expeded cask while two protective featuras had ell =in=*= telephone reporting for to apply to other similar components. been d=8== tad by wiring errors. A new invalid anta== tic actuation or In another example, ^'
during a routine radio controltransmitter had been unintentional manual actuation. Nee periodic" , =. jussper wires in the procured and placed in service. Because events are not signiScant and thus valve operators for three valves were the new controller was wired differently telephone reporting is not needed. found a=d==i==*=d with yeese which than the old one,the drum overspeed However, the proposed amendments was lealdag Born the lindt switch seer protection and spent fuel pool roof slot would not eliminate the requirement for bon.The conne was ofthe lhmit switch were inadvertently a written report of an invalid actuation grease bon, as a result of a d=8==*=d While the crane was found to under 10 CFR 50.73.Thereis still a
==i=*===== procedure. be outsideits design basis,this need for reporting of these events resulted in cone ==inatia= and condition would not be reportable because they are used in ==WF '. ^' of the electrical because the switch wiring deficiency estimates of egulpment reliability ==pa==*= which were not qualified could not reasonably be expected to parameters, wmch la turn are needed to for exposure to paese. This could result affect any other components at the support the Comml== ion's move in valve malin=ctia=(s), h conditions plant. towards risk-informed regulation. (See were corrected and the ==i=*-=c= Condition not covered by theplort's SECY-97-101, May 7,1997," Proposed ' procedures were changed.The event opemeing and emagencyprocedures Rule, to CPR 50.76, Reporting would be reportable because the leection 50.72(bg2###C), and section Reliability and Availability Information capability or several similar components 50.73(oX2XHXC)). This criterion would for Risk-significent Systems and i ta perform their specified safety be deleted because it does not result in Equipment," Attachment 3).
functions could be signiacantly worthwhile reports aside from those The term "any en ' degraded. that wouldbe captured by other feature (ESP), inclu ginacredIhe reactor safety In a further examgle, whileprocessing reporting criteria such as: Protection system (Rh )," which calculatic .e it was S 2 that four it) An unanalyzed condition that currently defines the systems for which motor operated valves within the reactor significantly affects plant safety; actuation must be reported in section building were la=*=d below the (2) An event or condition that could 50.72(b)(2)(iv) and section manid-t flood level and were not have prevented the fulfillment of the 50.73(a)(2)(iv), would be replaced by a qualiaad for that condition. Pending safety function of structures or systems specific list of systems. The current repI====t with qualia=d pment, that are needed to: shut down the deAnition has led to confusion and the licensee detenmined that ofthe reactor and maintain it in a safe variability in reporting because there are valves had sufBelently short opening shutdown condition; remove residual varying deSnitions of what constitutes time that their safety inactian would be heat; control the release of radioactive an ESF, For example, at some plants latedbeforetheywere ' --i material; or mitigate the consequences systems that are known to have high The valve was normall and of an accident; risk significance, such as emergency ac could reunain open. After S , valve (3) An event or condition that results power, auxiliary feedwater, and reactor positionindication could be lost, in the condition of the nuclear power core isolation cooling are not considered
. valve position could be est=hii=had plant, including its principal safety ESFs. Furthermore,in many cases indirectly using process parameter barriers, being seriously d ded; systems with much lower levels of risk indic=* tons.% event would be (4) An operation or tion significance, such as control room reportable because the capability of pmhibited by the plant's TS; ventilation systems, os considered to be
. sey,rel =Imilar == ts to perform (5) An event or condition that results ESFs. their speciSed functions could be in actuation of any of the systems listed la the proposed amendments significant] in the rules, as amended; actuation would be reportable for the An an event that would (6) An event that poses an actual specific syrtems named in sections not be reportable is as follows. The threat to the safety of the nuclear power 50.72(b)(2)(iv) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv). This motor on a motor-operated valve (MOV) plant or significantly hampers site would result in consistent reporting of burned out after repeated cycling for personnelin the performance of duties events that result in actuation of these testing.'Ihis event would not be na-y for the safe operation of the highlyrisk-significant systems.
%, -- ' - h=a=== it is a single nuclear power plant. Reasonable consistency in ing M failure, and while there Manualorautomatic actuation of any actuation of risk-s cant might be =i=ilar MOVs in the plant, engineered safetyfeature ESFIcunent systems is to support estimating there is not a ht= basis to think sections 50.72(b#2Xiv) and (bX2Xil), equipment rollability ' ., which that other MOVs would be affected by repload bynew sections 50.72(bX2Xiv), is hnportant to aspects of the this same condition. On the other hand, and section 50.73(o#2Xiv)J. Currently, move towards more risk-informed if severalMOVs had been repeatedly sections 50.72(b)(1)(iv) and (b)(2)(li) regulation, including more risk-cycled and than stor somme extended Provide the following distinction: an informed monitoring of plant of thee one of the MOVs was event that results or should have 5,.Jorman=.
or signiA==*ly resulted in ECCS diacha go into the The specificlist of oms in the dayaded of that cycling,then reactor coolant system is initially proposed rule would aliminate the a.=atela= would be 4r ' reportable within 1 hour; other ESF reporting for events oflesser Minor switch *-- ^ - ^ on MOVs actuations are initially reportable within swia~an=, such as actuation of would act
- be reported where they do 4 hours. The new to CPR 50.72(b)(2)(iv) ointrolroosa ventilation systems.
not . --h assot the" q'- of the would eliminate this distinction
^
The specificlist of systems in the MOV to outits " . because there would no longer be proposed rule is similar to the list of function the cause ofthe separate 2-hour and 4-hour categories of systems currently provided in the
"," ^ is not ageneric concern. non-emergency reports for this criterion. reporting guidelines in NUREG-1022,
' Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36301 Revision 1, with some minor revisions. ventilation systems, are considered to be years,in order to rule out the It is based on systems for which ESFs. possibility, would not be warranted.
actuation is frequently reportod, and Event orcondition tirat couldhave A new paragraph, section systems with relatively high risk- parentedfulfillment ofthe safety 50.72(b)(2)(vi) would be added to clarify significance based on a sampling of function ofstructures or systems that section 50.72.The new paragraph plant-specific PGAs (see Draft * * *(curantsections50.72(b#2)(ii) would explicitly state that telephone Regulatory Guide DG-1046," Guidelines and (b#2XI), replaced by new sections 3* porting is not required under section for Reporting Reliability and 50.72(bX2)(v) and (vi), and sections 50.72(b)(2)(v) for smgle failures if Avellability Information for Risk- 50.7J(a#2)(v)and(vi))The phrase redadant equipment in the same Significant Systems and Equipment in " event or condition that alone could system was operable and available to Nuclear Power Plants," particularly have prevented the fnmi1==t of the Perfen the mquired safety function. Tables C-1 through G-5). safety function of structures or That is, althoug~ h one tmin of a system This proposal to list the systems in systems.* * * " would be clarified by may be incapable of performing its the rule is controversial and public deleting the word "alone". This clarifles safety factim, reporting is not required comment is specifically invited in this the requirements by more clearly under this criterion if that system is still area. In particular, thme principal reflecting the principle that it is capable of performing the safety alternr.tives to the proposed rule have necessary to consider other existing function. This is the same principle that been identified for comment: plant conditions in determining the is currently stated explicitly in section (1) Maintain the status quo. Under 50.73(a)(2)(vi) with regard to written this alternatiu, the rule would continue reportability of an event or condition under this criterion. For example, if one LERs. to requin reporting for actuation of M" # train of a two train system is inca able capa[W.1 ss ofemergencyassessaient "any ESF." The guidance would y, offsitemponse capab##7, or of performing its safety function rone continue to indicate that reporting c mmunication capability (cumnt reasca, and the other train is incapable shouldinclude as a minimum the section 50. (b)(2)(v), newsection of erfwning its safety function for a sy(stem on the list, dikerent reason, the event is reportable. 50.72(b)(2)(xiil]). The new section risk-informed list. Unker this2) RequireThe useterm of a,atlant-specific, the thne of discovery', would be modified b adding the word "offsite"in front of the term alternative, the list of systems would be w uld be added to section 50.72(b)(2)(v) risk-informed, and plant s liic. t eliminate telephone notification for a "connudcada capabihty" to make it clear that the ulrement does not Licensees would develop t list based condition that no longer exists, or no longer has an effect on required safety apply to int plant communication on exi PRA analyses. lud ent. systems. ands el t would functima. For example,it might be Airborne rudioactive release * *
- discovered that some time ago both b p)rovided bant design. No the rule.
(3 Raturn to the pre-1998 situation trains of a two train system were andliquideffluentnlease * * * (secdon 50.72(b)(2)(viii) and sections (i.e., before publication of the reporting incapable of performing their safety 50.73(a)(2)(viii) and 50.73(a)(2)(fz)). The guidance in NUREG-1C'2, Revision 1). function,but the condition was statement indicating reporting under Under inis alternative, the rule would subsequently corrected and no longer exists. In another example, widle the section 50.72(b)(2)(viii) satisfies the continue to requhe reporting for requirements of section 20.2202 would actuation of"any ESF." The guidacce plant is shutdown,it might be be removed because it would not be wouti indicate that reporting sheuld discovered that during a previous correct. For example, some events include those systems identified as Period of operation a system was captured by section 20.2202 would not ESF's for each particular plant (e.g., in incapable of performing its safety be captured by section 50.72(b)(2)(viii). ths FSAR). function, but the system is not currently Also, the statement indicating that With regard to this third alternative, required to be operable. These events reporting under section 50.73(a)(2)(viii) it may be noted that tbis approach ha9 are considered significant, and an LER satisfies the requirements of section thz advantage of clarity and shnplicity. would be required, but thero would be 20.2203(a)(3) would be deleted because There would be no need to develop a no need for telephone notification, it would not be correct. Some events new list, and this is the practice that The phrase " occurring within three captured by section 20.2203(a)(3) would was followed from 1984-1997 without creating majcr problems. However, the years added to ofsection the date of discovery") 50.73(a)(2)(v to would be not be captured by soction lists of ESFs are not based on risk-50.73(a)(2)(viii). eliminate written LERs for conditions The proposed extension of reporting that have not existed during the deadunes to a hours in section 50.72 significance. diesel generatorsFor examp)le, (EDGs are known etonergency previous three years. Such a historical and 60 days in section 50.73 raises be highly risk-significant; however, at event would now have lors significance, questions about whether similar six plants, the EDGs are not considered and assessing reportability for earlier changes should be made to Parts 20,30, to be ESFs. Similarly, auxiliary times can consume considerable 40,70,72 and 76. The merits of such feedwater (AFW), systems at resources. For example, assume that changes, which may vary for different prassurized water reactors (PWRs) are during a design review a discrepancy is types of licensees, will be addressed in k a wn to be highly risk-si cant; found that affects the ability of a system separate actions. however, at a number of p ts these to perform its safety function in a given systems are not considered to be ESFs. Contents ofLERs (ractions specific configuration. Ifit is likely that 50.73(b)(2)(ill(F) and 50.73(b)(2)(fi)(f)). Also, reactor core isolation cooling tne safety function could have been Paragraph (F) would be revised to (RCIC) systems at boiling water reactors prevented, the answer should be correct the address of the NRC Library. (BWRs) are known to be highly ria reasonably apparent based on the Paragraph (I) currently requires that significant; however, at a number of knowledge and experience of the plant's the narrative section include the plants these systems are not considered operators and/or a review of operating following specificinformation as to be ESFs. In contrast, at many plants, records for the past three years. The s stims with much lower levels of risk very considerable effort required to app'(ropriate
- 1) Operatorfor the particular actions that affectedevent:
the t icance, such as control room review all records older than three course of the event, including operator l
36302 Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules errors, procedural deficiencies, or both, consequences and implications of the 5. Reporting ofHistoricalProblems that contributed to the event. event. This assessment must include the (2)For each personnel error, the As discussed above, provisions would availability of other systems or licensee shall diseass: components that could have performed be added to sections 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) (i) Whether the error was a cognitive and 50.73(a)(2)(v) to eliminate reporting the same function as the components of a condition or event that did not error (e.g., failure to recognize the actual and systems that failed during the event. occur within three years of the date of plant condition, failure to realize which It would be modified by adding a discovery. (See the respanse to systems should be function , failure to recognize the true natum o the event) requirement to also include the status of Comment 8, the discussion under the
" components and systems that "are heading " Operation or cordition (li eth tbr was contrary to included in emergency or o erating prohibited by TS " and the discussion roved procedure, was a direct Pmcedures and could have n used to under the hsading " Event or condition an aft of an error in an approved resu rec ver fr m the event in case of an that could have prevented fulfillment of procedure, or was associated with an additional failure in the systems the safety function of structures or activity or task that was not covered by actually used for acovery." This systems that * * * ") Pubhc comment is roved procedure, information is needed to better support invited on whether such historical an( kAny unusual characteristics of the the NRC's assessment of the risk- events and conditions should be work location (e.g., heat, noise) that significance of reported events. reported (rather than being excluded directly contributed to the error; and Exemptions (section 50.73(f)). This fr m mp rting, as proposed). Public (iv) The type of personnelinvolved provision would be deleted because the comment is also invited on whether the (i.e., contre.ctor personnel, utility- exemption provisions in section 50.12 three year exclusion of such historical licensed operator, utility non-licensed provide for granting of exemptions as events and connitions should be erator, other utility personnel)." warranted. Thus, including another, extended to all written reports required op'Ib roposed P amendment would section-specific exemption provision in by section 50.73(a) (rather than being section 50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)i limited to these two specific repozting simp y require that the licensee discuss section 50.73 adds unnecessary C'Ii"' 88 Proposed).
compisxity to the rules. the causes and circumstances for each human performance related problem 3. Revisions to Reporting Guidelines in 6 R*PordngofComponentPmb1 ems that contributed to the event. It is not NUREG.-1022 As discussed above, a new repeating necessary to specify the level of detail criterion would be added to require provided in the current rule, which is A draft report, NURECr1022, reportin6if a component is in a more appropriate for guidance. Details Revision 2," Event Reporting degraded or non-conforming condition would continue to be provided in the Guidelines, to CFR 50.72 and 50.73,"is such that the abilit of the component reporting guidelines, as indicated in being made available for public to performits a ed safety function section 5.2.1 of the drafi of Revision 2 comment concurrently with the niScantly egraded and the to NUREG-1022.This draft mport is Proposed amendments to 10 CFR 50.72 is cona sigition could reasonably be expected being made available for public and 50.73. The draft report is available to apply to other similar components in comment concurrently with the for inspection in the NRC Public the plant. (See the response to Comment proposed rule, as discussed below Document Room or it may be viewed 14 and the discussion under the heading under the heading " Revisions to and downloaded doctronically via the "Significantly degraded component (s) Reporting Guidelines in NUREG-1022." interactive rulemaking web site [section 50.73(a)(2)(li)(C)].") Public Spentfuelstomge casipmblems established by NRC for this rulemaking, comment is invited on whether this (curmnt sections 50.72(b)(2)(vill and as discussed above under the heeding Proposed new criterion would 72.26(a)(!), (a)(2), (b) and (c)). Section ADORES 8ES. Single copies may be accomplish its stated purpose-to 50.72(b)(2)(vil) would be deleted obtained from the contact listed above ensure that design basis or other because these reporting criteria are under the heading "For Further discrepancies would continue to be redundant to the mporting criteria Information Contact."In the draft reported if the espability to perform a contained in sections 72.216(a)(1), report, guidance that is considered to be 8Pecified safety function is significantly (a)(2), and (b). Repetition of the same new or different is a mean'ngful way, degraded and the condition has generic reporting criteria in different sections of relative to that provided in NUREG- implications. Public comment is also the rules adds unnecessary complexity 1022, Revision 1,is indicated by invited on whether the proposed new and is inconsistent with the current reMining the appropriate text. criteri n would be subject to varying practice in other areas, such as reporting interpretations by licensees and of safeguards events as required by 4. Becctor Oversight inspectors
,e arming amendment would C is developing revisions to 7. Enforcement I
' be made to section 72.216. This is . -
. >r oversight r.f operating The NRC intends to modify its
- s necessary because section 72.216(a) ncluding inspection, existing enforcement policy in currently relies on section i. ant and enforcement processes. connection with the proposed 50.72(b)(2)(vii), which would he in connection with this effort, the NRC amendments to sections 50.72 and deleted, to establish the time limit for has censidered the kinds of event 50.73. The philosophy of the proposed initial notification. The amended reports that would be elimir.ated by the changes is to base the significance of the section 72.216 would refer to sections PmPosed rules and believes that the reperting violation on: (1) The reporting 72.74 and 72.75 for initial notification unc ce o would not have a deleterious requirement, which will require and followup reporting requirements. effect on the oversight process. Public reprting within time frames more Assessment of Safety Consequences comment is invited on wheth'er or not commensurate with the significance of (section 50.73(b)(3)/. This section _ this is the case. In particular,it is the underlyingissues than the current currently requires that an IIR include requested that if any examples to the rule; and (2) the impact that a late report an assessment of the safety contrary are known they be identified, may have on the ability of the NRC to
7 Federal Register /Vol. 84 Ns.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36303 fulRllits obligations of fully (IJIR)would not be reduced to a minor aquirements are frequently triggered by issues that aro seguired violation. NRC mporting requir===nta. to be
- l'aordertoaccomplishits in accordance with Appendix C of the Adh !y,the NRC seeks State public and safety =i=ta= which Enforcement Policy,"laterim comment on issues related to the in osses involves reacting to Enforcement Po for Severity Level proposed amendments to power reactor issues or events. As such,the IV Violations Inv Activities of reporting .,- ' - : ts.
intends to novise the Enfos====* Power Reactor Lin======." the failum'to
, NUREG-1000, Rev.1 as follows: Ale a 80-day IJIR would normally be U" I#88"8' (1) B,Su 1===* LC- tioned as a Non-Cited Vial =Han The President's Memorandum dated ofSeverity - IH V). ve failures to makeIJtR June 1,1998, entitled," Plain reports I tr=*ive of a lir=na='s in Govermaant Writies," that
- (a) Example 14 would be revised to inahm*y to secognise aportable the Federal y,- --
^'s writing be in read as R _ A failure to conditions, such that it is not liaely that plainlanguage.The NRC requests seguised one hour tolf = provide the the NRC will be made swam of 'v====ts on this proposed ule notifloation of an - y action operational, design and conaguration s;- 88""Ily with respect to the clarity taken to 10 CPR 50 54(x . issues damnad reportable pursuant to 10 and e5sctiveness of the language used.
(b) additi mat ===pl= be CPR 50.73, will be ===ld-ed for rammants should be sont to the address added that would read as foUowe-A '- ^5n at SeverityinvolIH.This listed above. 5-hour non .","'I*"'"****hn es V. Envir====*=8 lampact:Catsgerical
) bei le wobb d O' I"IAU
- Chas determined that this added that would reed as followe-A proposed rogulationis the ofaction late s-hout notiBation that a.ElectronicReporting described in categorical usion to
=h=*=adally impacts agency res .
The NRC is i.arrently planning to CPR 51.22(c)(3)(Lil). Therefore neither (2) Appendix B,SupplementI implement an electmaic document an environmentalimpact statement nor Examples of Severity invelIV management and reporting program, an envimnmental assessment has been bple 4, would be revised to n wn as se Agencpwi e ont p# Ms p# @h read as followe-A failure to provide a Ac one and Management System VI. BackSt Analysis required so-day written 1.ER pursuant to the provide og NRC has determined that the to CPR 50.73. backSt rule,10 CFR 50.109, does not h in the Enforconnent
,,N including 3 IE.Rs' effort to prokde apply to information coHoction and P111cy,would consistent with the forf, ,,s,u,M,pg, dmh reporting requirements such as those overeII objectim of the rule change of catempland. contained better aligning the reporting Therefore, ainbackthet kreposed analysis has rule.
not
-ts with the NRC's reporting 9. Schedule been prepared. However, as dim- :I
_'e_ds.The ne Enforonment Policy below, the NRC hasp wmld omrelese &e SeverhyInni the N current schedule is as foHows: a anal infr=neta== with the relative importance 08/99- Conductpublicworksho to e, which ==ysis forcosts t proposed of the infonnation needed by the NRC. diacuss rulead d beneSts of the
=inas the reposed and requirements in SectionIV.D of the Enforcement . to nonce Pohey provides that the Severity invol { y "** is b this rule. & ommianian regulatory analysh as a discipuned agards tlw anM *o*ntheindivi]ually NPat ma WuM August 5,1=" Nblic co===nts due Process for assessing information to OMB collection and requirements to ciromastances. In deciding whethat the imposed is Severi September 7' 1999-Receive OMB determine that the unet==gy Invol should be
- 1. hour or 6-bour non-reduced for an ,pp,,3 jusuSed in light of the potential safety
-- - 20 1999-Pubhc <===ane. signiMrant= of the information to be emergency soport the Isapact that the " g^ g,*NRC coUected.
ob or I*h k ,gy" .andMag VIL L ^# A**lI ' ' example,if a delayed s-hour reportable The Commission has repared a draft event impassed the timin f regulatory analysis on t[ils proposed ia=i=*i- that was d===g =. ==-a-y, 9 a loDowup 11Q r.Wde Baalrub and ma. The analysis ===i=== the costs guidelines to the formal concurrence than the Severity Inval would not chain and benents of the alternatives normany be reduced. Similarly, a late 01/14/00-provide Anal rule and considered by tlw Canmissim. & aatin'=H= that delayed the NRC's guidelines to CRGR and ACRS drah analysis is available for inspectim ability to perform en n'- --'a* - 02/11/00-Complete briefings of CRGR in the NRC PubHc Document Room or analysts of a condition to determine if and ACRS it may be viewed and downloaded add'Hanal reguletary action was 03/10/06-Provide final rule and electronically via the interactive noosesar guidelines to Commission rulam web site established by NRC
<==ald=y would genereHy not be ed for ^-- M= at a reduced eq707/00-Publish Analrule and for this rn =naking. as discussed above SeverityInvel. Additionally, late guidelines under the heading ana===nen Single 88 Ports Aled in anses where the NRC copies may be obtained from the contact had to prosopt the licensee to report 3R Starteinput ushd above under de handing For would generally not be subject to Many States (Agreement States and Further Information Contact."
-- - "'= at reduced Severity Invol Non-Agreement States) have agreements The Co==l= ion requests public andthe SeverityInvelfor falhus to with power reactors to inform the States na== mat on this dren anal .
subudt a thnely Ile==- Event Report of plant issues. State reporting Comments on the draA ysis may be C
36304 Federal Register /Vz1. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules se m i++ad to the NRC as discussed PublicPmtecfjon Notffication (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.13, 50.54(D.D.). above under the heading ADDRESSES. d 501 i The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, $t,9jg .nYed USI21 . VIIL Paperwork Reduction Act and a person is not required to respond sections 50.23,50.35. 50.55, and 50.50 also Statement to, an information collection unless it issued under pec.185, sa stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. displays a currently valid OMB control 2235). Sections 50.33a,50.55a and Appendix This proposed rule would amend number. Q also issued uider sec.102, Pub. L 91-190 Information collection requirements that 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 are subject to the Paperwork Reduction IX. Regulatory Flexibility Certification and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, as stat. Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seg.). In accordance with the Regulatory 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58,50.91, This rule has been submitted to the Flaxibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L 97-415, Office of Management and Bodget for Commission certifies that this rule will os stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec.184,88 Stat. 954, as review and approval of the information not,if promulgated, have a significant "" collection requirements. economic impact on a substantial Pen sued ar e7, 9$5 2U C. The public reporting burden for the number of small entitles. This proposed 2237). currently existing reporting rule affects only the licensing and requirements in 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 l 2. Section 50.72 is amended by is estimated to average about 790 hours operation companies of nuclear that power own these p ts bants. The Paragraphs (a) and (b) to read do not r8vi8ing Per response (i.e., per commercial fall within the scope of the definition of as foHows: nuclear power reactor per year) "small entities" set forth in the $ 50.72 immodate nouncation including the time for reviewing Regulatory Flexibility Act or the sir.e requirements for operaung nuclear power instructions, searching existing data standards established by the NRC (10 reactors. sources, gathering and main +=ining the CFR 2.810). (a) Genemlmquirements? (1) Each data needed, and completing and nuclear power reactor licensee licensed reviewine the information collection. It X ProPwed Amendments under $ 50.21(b) or S 50.22 of this part is estimated that the proposed List of Subjects shall notify the NRC Operations Center amendments would impose a one time via the Emergency Notification System implementation burden of about 200 20 CFR Part 50 og; hours per reactor, after which there Antitrust, Classified information, (1) The declaration of any of the would be a recurring annualburden Criminal penalties. Fire prevention. Emerrency Classes specified in the reduction of about 200 hours per reactor latergovernmental relations, Nuclear licedee's approved Emergency Plan; 8 per year,The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Power plants and reactors, Radiation g, Commission is seeking public comment Protection, Reactor siting criteria * (11) Of those non-Emergency events on the potentialimpact of the Reporting and recordkeeping specified in paragraph (b) of this information collection contained in the requirements. section. Proposed rule and on the followin8 20 CFR Part 72 (2)If the Emegency Notification issues: System is inoperative, the licensee shall is the proposed information collection C8minal penalties, Manpower make the required notifications via necessary for the prope; ormance of training pmgrams, Nuclear materials, commercial telephone service, other the NRC, including w erthe Occupational safety and health' dedicated telephone system, or any information will have practical utilityt Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, and other method which will ensure that a Is the estimate of burden accuratet report is made as soon as practical to the Is there a v sy to enhance the quality, SPent fuel. NRC Operations Center.',20 utility, and clarity of the information to For the reasons set out in the (3) The licensee shall notify the NRC be coheted? Preamble and under the authority of the How can the burden of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and information collection be minimiq the Energy Reorganizatio:2 Act of 1974, not later than one hour after the time the including the use of automated as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC licensee declares one of the Emergency collect'on techniquest 18 Pm{osing to adopt the following Classes. Send comments on any aspect of this amen ents to 10 CFR part 50 and to (4) The licensee shall activate the proposed information collection, CFR part 72. Emergency Response Data System including suggestions for reducing this (ERDS) u as soon as possible but not burden, to the Information and Records PART 50-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF later than one hour after declaring an PRODUCTION AND UT1UZAT10N ass of aled, & ama Management Branch (T-5 F33), U.S. emergen FACli.fTIES Nuclear Regulatory Commission, emergency, or general emergency. The Washington, DC 20555-0001 or by 1. The authority citation for part 50 ERDS may also be activated by the Internet electronic mail to continues to read as follows: licensee during emergency drills or BISteNRC. GOV; and to the Doak Authority: Secs. 102,103,104,105,161, exercises if the licensee's computer Officer. Office ofInformation and 182,183,180,189, es Stat. 938,937,938. Regulatory Affairs. NEOB-10202, 948,953,954,955,956, as amended, sec. 'Other requirement. for unmediate notiScation of (3150AF98), Office of Management and 234,83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. th* NRC by lican.ed operating nuclear power Budget Washington, DC 20503. 2132,2133,2134,2135,2201,2232,2233, 'g* '(*,h*y%*o$"3o'*[2NP Comments to OMB on the information 2236,2239,2282); secs. 201, as amended- and 73.71. 202,20s, as Stat.1242, as amended.1244-collections or on the above issues 48(4 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 584O
*These Emergency cle e. are addre. ed in
' should be submitted by 5*1999 Appendix E of this pen. gmments received after Sectios 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95- eCommercial telephone number of the NRC date will ' 601, sec.10,92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Opernuona center is (301) st o-s100. be considered if it is practical to do so, Section 50.10 also issued under secs.101, arne.orveel but consideration cannot be ensured for 185, es Stat. 955 as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, na utrements forsnos re addre edin comments received after this date. 2235), sec.102, Pub. l., 91-190,83 Stat. 853 Ap x E, Section VL
l Federn! Register /Vcl. 64, Nr. I2a/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 38305 systsen has the capability to transmit the coolantinjection system; (B) Any liquid effluent please that, ensacise data, coolant injection system; low when averaged over a time of1 hour, (s) When making a repost under . pressure injection function of the exceeds 20 times the soplicable h(aM1) of this section, the residual heat removal system; and concentration speciRed in appendix B shallidentify: autcomtic depressunsation system to part 20, table 2, column 2, at the (i) h Emergency Class declared; or (4) BWRisolation condenser system pomt of entry into the receiving waters (ii) Either paragraph (bM1), "One-Hour and ress: tor core isolation cooling (i.e., unrestricted area) for all RePost " or paragraph (bX2) "Eight-Hour system. radionuclides except tritium and Report " as the paragrap's of this section (s) PWR auxiliary feedwater system. dissolved noble gases. requiring notineation of the Non- ' (6) Con *=in===t systems including: (1x) Any event that poses an actual Essesg?_ancy Event nantai====* and reactor vesselisolation threat to the of the nuclear power (b). _ yevente--(t) One- contain===iisolation plant or y hampers site F Hoursoports.li not reported as a numerous valves and in the j, i- -- of duties darl=='ian of the Ihnesysncy Class main steam valve (MSIV) -ry for the safe operation of the under pengmph (a) of uns section, the . closure signals in BWRs) and nuclear power plant including fires, licenses shall notify the NBC as soon as contain-t heat removal and toxic gas.re1====, or radioactive and in all cases within one " , M uan systems, including releases. of the occurrence of any devi=*ian contala===t sprey and fan cooler (x) Any event requiring the transport
- 6ess the plant's Tachale=1 systesus. of a radioactively cont ==inated person Aparine=*8a== autherleed pursuant to (7) ac electrical power to an offsite medical facility for 6 50.54(x) of this part. systems,inclu . emergency diesel treatment.
(2) Eight-hourso orts. If not reported y_=% (EDGs) and their associated (xi) Any event or situation, related to under paragraphs a (p) or (b)(1) of this support systems; hydroelectric facilities the health and safety of the public or
==rtian t!. iconsee shall notify the used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee onsite personnel, or protection of the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases Station; safety related gas turbine environment, for which a news release within eight hours of the occurrence of generators: BWR dedicated Division 3 la planned or notincation to other government agencies has been or will be any)of the following:f (1 hinitiation o any nuclear systems; plant EDGs and blackout and station their associated diesel support made.Such an event may include an shutdown required by the plant's senerators (and black-start gas turbines onsite fatality or inadvertent solesse of Technical SpeciRestions. that serve a st=Ilar purpose) which are radioactively cont ==inated materials.
(11) Any event or condition that results started from the control room and (xii) Any event that results in a major in included in the plant's operating and loss of emergency assessment ca ility. (A) b condition of the nuclear emergency procedures. offsite response capability, or o Power plant, including its principal (8) Anticipated tran=lant without communications capability (e.g., barriers,being seriously scram (ATWS) miti ystems. signiacent portion of controlroom
;cr (9)Servicewater stan emergency indication, Emergency Notiacation
)b nuclear power plant being in service water s System, or offsite notiScation system).
an unanalyasd condition that normally run).ystems that a not * * * *
- significantly assets glant safety. (v) Any event or condition that at the 3. Section 50.73 is ===adad by (iii) Any natumi p ana===a s or other time of discovery could have prevented revis sections (a),(b)(2)(iiXF),
external condition that poses an actual the fulBilment of the safety function of (b)(2)(il ,(b)(3),(d), and (e) and by threat to the safety of the nucl==r power structures or systems that are needed to: removing and reserving paragraph (f) to plant or signina==*1y hampersaits (A) Shut down the reactor and read as follows: personnelinthei i- -- = of duties maintain it in a safe shutdown necessary for the safe operation of the condition: 9so.7s usenses event report ersess. plant. (B) Remove residual heat: (a) Reportable events. (1) The holder (ivXA) Any event or condition that (C) Control the release of radia=ctive of an operating license for a nuclear results in intentional manual actuation material, or power plant (licensee) shall submit a or valid au*a== tic actuation of any of (D) Mitigste the consequences of an 1.icensee Event Report (LER) for any the systems listed in paragraph accident. event of the type described in this (bX2Xiv)(B) of this section, except when (vi) Events covered in paragraph paragraph within 60 days aAer the the actuation results from and is part of (b)(2)(v) of this section may include one discovery of the event. Ualens otherwise a pre planned sequence during testing or more procedural errors, equipment spectaed in this section, the licensee or reactor operation. failures, and/or discovery of design, shall report an event regardless of the (B)b systems to which the
' ^
analysis, fabrication, construction, and/ plant mode or power level, and of paragraph (bX2)(iv)(A) or procedural inadequacies. However, regardless of tl.a significance of the I of
. 'this - section apply are: Individual component failures need not structure, system, or component that (1) Reactor protection system (reactor be reported pursuant to this paragraph isitiated the event.
scrum, reactor trip). Ifreaundant equipment in the same (2)b licensee shallreport: (2) Emergency core cooling systems system was operable and available to (l?(A) The completion of any nuclear (BOCS) for - - - - . f water reactors perform the required safety function. plant shutdown required by the plant's (PWRs) including: high-head. (vii)(Reserved] Technical Specillations, later=adiata-head, and low-head (viliXA) Any airborne radioactive (B) Any operation or condition in)setion systems and the low pressure release that, when averaged over a time occurring within three years of the date injection function of residual (decay) period of 1 hour, results in of discovery which was prohibited by best rosnoval . -trations in an unrestricted area the plant's Technical SpeciScations, (3) BOCS for iling water reactors that exceed 20 times the applicable except when: (BWRs) including: high-pressure and concentration specified in appendix B (2) b *animical specification is low-pressure core sprey systems: high- to part 20, table 2, column 1. administrative in nature; or
36308 Federal Register /Vgl. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules (2) The event canaints solely of a case (6) Containment systems including: (viii)(A) Any airborne radioactive of a late surveillanna test where the containment and reactor vessel isolation release that, when averagbd over d time oversight is m.m.1 1, the test is systems (general containment isolation period of 1 hour, resulted in airborne performed, and the equipment is found signals affecting numerous valves and radionuclide concentrations in an to be capable of performing its specified main steam isolation valve (MSIV) unrestricted area that exceeded 20 times safety functions. closure signals in BWRs) and the applicable concentration limits (C) Any deviation from the plant's containment heat removal and specified in appendix B to part 20, table Technical Specifications authorized depressurization systems, including 2, column 1. pursuant to 6 50.54(x) of this part. containment spray and fan cooler (B) Any liquid efnuent release that, (11) Any event or condition that systems. when averaged over a time period of1 resulted in: (7) Emergency ac electrical power hour, exceeds 20 times the applicable (A)The condition of the nuclear systems, including: emergency diesel concentrations specified in appendix B power plant, including its principal generators (EDGs) and their associated to part 20, table 2, column 2, at the safety' barriers, baing seriously support systems; hydroelectric facilities point of entry into the receiving waters degras sd; used inlieu of EDGE at the Oconee (i.e., unrestricted area) for all ('B) Ti e nuclear power plant being in Station; safety related gas turbine radionuclides except tritium and an unanalyzed condition that generators; BWR dedicated Division 3 dissolved noble gases. significantly affects plant safety; or EDGs and their associated support (ix) Any event that posed an actual (C) A component bemg in a degraded systems; and station blackout diesel threat to the safety of the nuclear power or non-conforming condition such that generators (and black-start gas turbines plant or significantly hampered site the ability of the component to perform that serve a similar purpose) which are personnel in the performance of duties its specified edety functim is started from the control room and necessary for the safe operation of the significantly degraded and the condition included in the plant's o nuclear power plant including fires, could reasonably be expected to affect emergency procedures. peratingtoxic andgas releases, or radioactive other similar components in the plant. (s) Anticipated transient without releases. (lill Any natural phenomenon or other scram (ATWS) mitigating systems. (b) * *
- external dondition that posed an actual (9) Service water (standby emergency (2) * *
- threat to the safety of the nuclesr power service water systems that do not plant or slanmcandy hampered site (ii)...
normally run). Personnelin the performance of duties (v) Any event or condition occurring necessary im the safe operation of the Id at c within three years of the date of n Sgstem c mP nont "I v d the ch mpone t r sy t erred to v y ev i or condition that m *$uld hav f resulted in manual or automatic t are needed to-(1) The Energy Industry Identification actuation of any of the systems listed in t j systems ud System is defined in: IEEE Std 803-1983 paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, m tainitin sa e a t (May 16,1983) Reco==aadad Practice estco twhen: c ndition; ( The actuation resulted from and for Unique Identification in Power was part of a pre-planned sequence (B) Remove residual heat: Plants and Related Facilities-during testing or reactor operation; or (C) ControMe release of radioactive Principles and Definitions. (2) The actuation was invalid and; material; or (11)IEEE Std 803-1983 has been (I) Occurred while the system was (D) Mitigate the consequences of an properly removed from service; or accident. approved for of incoboration by reference by the Director e Federal Register. (li) Occurred after the safety function (vi) Events covered.i i pangraph (2) A notice of any changes made to had been already completed. (a)(2)(v) of this section ma or more procedural erm,y the material incorporated b reference include one (B)The systems to which the equipment willbe published in the Febral raquirements of paragraph (e)(2)(iv)(A) failures, and/or discovery of design, of this section apply are: analjsis, fabrication, coce ruction, and/ Registerioples may be obtained from (1) Reactor protection system (reactor roceduralinadequacien However. thmsmuk of EbcM ud scram, reactor trip). apividual component frilures need not Electronica Fngneers,345 East 47th In Street, New York, NY 10017. IEEE Std (2) Emergency core cooling systems be orted pursuant to this paragraph if undant equipment in the same 803-1983 is available for inspection at (ECCS) for preesurized water reactors the NRC's Technical Library, which is IPWRs) including: high-head, system was operable and available t intermediate-head, and low-head Perform the required safety function. located in the Two White Flint North (vii) Any event where uingle cause building,11545 Rockville Pike injection systems and the low pressure Rockville, Maryland; and at the Office of injection function of residual (decay) or condition caused at least one heat removal systems. Independent train or channel to become the Federal Register,1100 L Street' NW' Washington, DC. (J)ECCS forboiling water reactors inoperable in multiple systems or two , , , , , (BWRs) including: high-pressure and independent trains or channels to low-pressure core spray systems; high. become inoperable in a single system (J) For each human performance pressure coolant injection system; designed to: related problem that contributed to the feedwater coolant injection system; low (A) Shut down the reactor and event, the licensee shall discuss the pressure injection function of the maintain it in a safe shutdown cause(s) and cirmmmaces. residual heat removal system; and condition; * * * *
- automatic depressurization system. (B) Remove residual heat- (3) An assessment of the safety (d) BWR isolation condenser system (C) Control the release of' radioactive consequences and implications of the and reactor core isolation cooling material; or event. This assessment must include the system. (D) Mitigate the consequences of an availability of systems or components (5) FWR auxiliary feedwater system. accident, that:
Federal Register /Vol. 64, N2.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36307 (i) Ccald have performed the same 5. Section 72.216 is revised to read as function as the components and systems follows: that in11ed'during the event, or (11) Are included in emergency or 5 72.21s % operating procedures and could have (a)(Reserved] been used to recover from the event in (b)(Reserved] case of an additional failure in the (c)The generallicensee shall make systems actually used for recovery. Initial and written reports in accordance
. . . . . with $$ 72.74 and 72.75.
(d) Submission ofreports. Licensee Dated at Rockville Maryland, thia 25th day Event Reports must be prepared on ofJune,1999. Form NRC 366 and submitted within 60 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commin'on. days of discovery of a reportable event Annette L Vietti4ook, or situation to the U.S. Nuclear . Secretaryofthe Communion. Ragulatory Commission, as specified in [FR Doc. 99-16934 Filed 7-2-49; 8:45 am)
$ 50.4. m,-
le)11eportlegibility. The reports and les thatlicensees are required to ,a t to the Commission under the provisions of this section must be of sufficient quality to permit legible reproduction and micrographic. Processing. (f)IReserved] PART 7$t-UCEN81NG REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR PUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WA8TE 4.The authority citation for part 72 continues to read as follows: Aathority: Sacs. 51,53,57,62,63,65,69, 81,161,182,183,184,186,189,68 Stat. 929, 930,932,933,934,935,954,955,as amended, sec. 234,83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.SE 2071,2073,2077,2092,2093, 2095.2099,2111,2201,2232,2233,2234, 2336,2237,2238,2282); sec. 274, Pub. L 86-373,73 Stat. 688. as amended (42 U.Sn 5841,5842,5846); Pub. L 95-601, sec.10,92 Stat. 2001 as amended by Pub. L 102-486, sec. 7902,106 Stat. 3123 (42 U SC 5851); sec.102, Pub. L 91-19o,83 Stat. 853 (42 U.SC 4332); seca.131,132,133,135,137, 141. Pub. L 97-425,96 Stat. 2229,2230, 2232, 2241, sec.148, Pub. L 100-203,101 Stat.1330-235 (42 U.SE 10151,10152, 10f53,10155,10157,10161,10168). Section 72,44(g) also inued under secs.142(b) and 148(c), (d), Pub. L 200-203,101 Stat.1330-232,1330-236 (42 U.S.C.10162(b),10168(c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec.189,68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec.134, Pub. L 97-425,96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec.145(g), Pub. L 100-203,101 Stat.1330-235 (42 U.S.C.10165( Subpart J also issued under2(2), secs.g)). 2(15),2(19),117(a),141(h), Pub. L 97-425,96 Stat. 2202,2203,2204,2222, 2224, (42 U.S.C.10101,10137(a), 10161(h)). Subparts K and L are also lasued under sec.133,98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C.10153) and sec. 218(a),96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C.10198).
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