05000275/FIN-2009008-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Safe Shutdown Procedure Not Consistent With Safe Shutdown Analysis |
| Description | An NRC-identified noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(4), Fire Protection, was identified in that post-fire safe shutdown Procedure CP M-10, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment, Revision 20, was not consistent with the calculation M-928, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis, for Fire Area 3-CC, containment penetration rooms. Specifically, certain time-critical operator manual actions identified in the safe shutdown analysis were not incorporated into Procedure CP M-10 such that there was assurance that the actions would be completed within the times assumed in the safe shutdown analysis. A fire in Fire Area 3-CC may cause a spurious actuation of Atmospheric Dump Valves PCV-19 and PCV-20. The safe shutdown analysis recommends failing closed Atmospheric Dump Valves PCV-19 and PCV-20 by manually isolating their air supply (instrument air, backup air, and nitrogen) and then venting the supply line to avoid excessive plant cooldown. Procedure CP M-10, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment, Revision 20, did not include the steps to perform these actions. The inspectors determined that failing to incorporate post-fire safe shutdown actions to prevent an excessive cooldown due to fire induced spurious opening of atmospheric dump valves in the post-fire safe shutdown operating procedure was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone attributes of protection against external events, (i.e., fire), and procedure quality. This finding was found to be of very low safety significance (Green) consistent with the guidance in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, and its attachments. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance area because the procedure was not complete and up to date in accordance with the safe shutdown analysis, H.2(c) |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
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| Report | IR 05000275/2009008 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Rodriguez D Livermore S Graves N O'Keefe J Mateychick Z Bailey S Marquez |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2009008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
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