05000275/FIN-2008005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement Effective Actions to Correct an Adverse Trend |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding after Pacific Gas and Electric was ineffective in addressing an adverse trend in missed quality control inspection hold points. Licensee Procedure OM7, Corrective Action Program, required that the licensee evaluate problems commensurate with their significance, determine the cause, and conduct a proper evaluation and resolution of repeat occurrences. The procedure further required that corrective actions are completed in a timely manner consistent with the problem significance. On May 19, 2007, Pacific Gas and Electric identified an adverse trend of missing quality control inspection hold points and requested that an apparent cause evaluation be performed. On July 11, 2007, this adverse trend was also evaluated by the Quality Verification Department as part of an assessment of Refueling Outage 14 maintenance. In March 2008, the licensee completed the evaluations and corrective actions. During the subsequent Unit 2 refueling outage, the Quality Verification Department identified over 11 additional missing quality inspection hold points. The inspectors identified that the licensees corrective actions were ineffective to correct the adverse trend in missing quality control inspection hold points. Pacific Gas and Electric Company entered this finding into the corrective action program as Notification 50135175. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to perform inspections has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, to analyze the significance of this finding. The inspectors concluded that this finding was of very low safety significance because the uncorrected adverse trend did not represent a loss of system safety function, the loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the corrective action program component, because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the adverse trend and take corrective actions that addressed the cause and extent of condition P.1(c). (Section 4OA2.5.1 |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2008005 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson G Guerra M Brown M Peck P Elkmann V Gaddy M Runyan R Kellar A Fairbanks |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2008005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
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