05000275/FIN-2008008-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Identify and Correct Violations of the Seismically Induced Systems Interaction Program |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to properly implement housekeeping procedures to prevent seismically-induced system interactions. Specifically, the team identified two instances during a plant walk down where transient equipment was staged in the vicinity of safety-related equipment identified as seismically-induced system interaction targets. This transient equipment had not been analyzed to assess the risk to these safety-related components. Following identification by the team, licensee staff secured and analyzed the transient equipment. Licensee staff entered this finding into the corrective action program as Notifications 50084856 and 50084761. The failure of plant personnel to follow the requirements to properly secure or analyze equipment in close proximity to sensitive equipment was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports Appendix E, Example 3.j., in that it was indicative of a significant programmatic deficiency in the licensees Seismically- Induced System Interactions Program that could lead to worse errors if uncorrected. Specifically, a change in program ownership in 2006 resulted in a degradation of the sensitivity of plant personnel to the risk of seismically-induced system interactions due to transient materials, insufficient training of plant personnel on the program, and an absence of quality records over an approximately two-year period. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in an actual loss of a system safety function, did not result in a loss of a single train of safety equipment for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event, and did not involve the total loss of any safety function that contributes to an external event initiated core damage accident sequence. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices area component because the licensee failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel failed to follow procedures H.4(b) (Section 4OA2.a.3(a)) |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2008008 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Brown M Runyan E Ruesch M Baquera G Tutak |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2008008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
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