05000321/FIN-2012008-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Provide Appropriate Acceptance Criteria for EDG Air-Start System Check Valves |
| Description | The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to follow Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, Station Blackout, guidance for testing and test control for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start system check valves. The testing deficiency was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition reports 490288 and 490210. The failure to implement the guidance in RG 1.155, to which the licensee was committed in the stations Final Safety Analysis Report, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the capability of the EDGs to start following a station blackout coping period was not ensured by the licensees test acceptance criteria for the air start check valves. The team used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined a detailed risk evaluation was required, because the finding represented an actual loss of function of a non-Technical Specification train of equipment designated as high safety significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than twenty-four hours. A regional senior reactor analyst performed an analysis to determine the risk associated with the finding. An actual loss of EDG function following a station blackout would require all of the Unit 1 EDGs to fail to start, because if any Unit 1 EDG ran and was connected to either emergency bus, even for a relatively short time, an air compressor would partially or fully recharge the 1A EDGs air start tank. The calculation showed that the portion of plant risk that came from common cause fail to start of the Unit 1 EDGs, and of the sites EDGs was less than the threshold for greater than green for conditional core damage frequency or large early release frequency in the SDP. Therefore, the finding is Green. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the performance deficiency is not indicative of current licensee performance due to the age of the established test acceptance criteria for the check valve leakage. |
| Site: | Hatch  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000321/2012008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Rivera-Ortiz G Ottenberg M Yeminy S Sandal R Nease J Heath N Childs M Riley P Wagner |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2012008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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