Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | On March 26, 2012, a licensee-identified violation of Unit 1 TS 3.4.3, was discovered. TS 3.4.3, requires 10 of 11 safety relief valves (SRVs) to be operable during Mode 1, 2, and 3. Contrary to this requirement it was identified during bench testing that eight SRVs failed to lift at the required TS setpoint, and therefore were inoperable when Unit 1 was in Mode 1, 2, and 3. The cause for the SRVs failing to lift within the required setpoint was due to corrosion induced bonding between the pilot disc and seating surface. Analysis showed that with the SRVs lifting at the asfound bench test setpoints, the SRVs still would have maintained reactor coolant system pressure below the TS safety limit requirements. Therefore, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This condition was documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 429368 and was documented in LER 05000321/2012-004. |
| Site: | Hatch  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000321/2012003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | F Ehrhardt P Higgins S Sandal G Gardner E Morris T Lighty D Hardage |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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