05000387/FIN-2012003-01
From kanterella
Revision as of 20:45, 20 February 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage Significant Condition Adverse to Quality |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for PPL\'s failure to prevent recurrence of a significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ) when secondary containment bypass leakage (SCBL) was in excess of its TS allowed value for two consecutive tests. In this case, the SCAQ, as defined by PPL procedure NDAP-QA-0702, Action Request (AR) and Condition Report (CR) Process, was the same condition as reported in LER 05000387/2010-001 and actions taken in 2010 to prevent recurrence were inadequate because they did not fully consider all the penetrations that account for SCBL. PPL subsequently entered the issue into the CAP as CR 1582747. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the structures, systems and components (SSCs) and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected its objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors assessed the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room, did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in containment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, because PPL did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, the decisions to not rework valve HV151F016B or perform work on valve 141818A when leakage was at a value that potentially challenged the SCBL limit was not based on conservative assumptions. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2012003 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Burns S Hansell P Finney R Rolph H Gray P Krohn J Greives A Bolger |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||