ML20214A571

Forwards Memo Rept Documenting Ofc of Inspector & Auditor Investigation Into Performance of Region III Personnel After Premature Criticality Occurred at Facility on 850701-02. Recommendations Discussed.W/Partially Deleted Related Info

ML20214A571
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	02/13/1986
From:	Edles G NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA)
Shared Package
ML20214A525	List: ML20214A523 ML20214A571 ML20214A609 ML20214A703
References
FOIA-86-245 NUDOCS 8705190501
Download: ML20214A571 (4)

Text

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1. p . ,'g UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$$ WASHINGTON. D. C. 20885 g***** ~

t, y February 13, 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Acting Executive Director for Operations FROM: Gary J. Edles f rector Office of In d Auditor

SUBJECT:

FERMI PREMA RE CF ITICALITY The attached Office of Inspector and Auditor (0IA) Memorandum Report documents an OIA investigation into the perfonnance of Region III personnel after premature criticality occurred at the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 (FERMI 2), on July 1-2, 1985. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III, advised OIA that FERMI 2 management claimed that Michael E.

Parker, NRC Resident Inspector, FERMI 2, attended a July 6,1985, staff meeting during which the premature criticality was discussed. However, the -

event was not brought to regional management's attention until July 15, 1985, five days after an NRC Comission meeting approving a full power authorization for FERMI 2.

Our investigation disclosed that at 11:59 p.m., July 1, 1985, FERMI 2 achieved o premature criticality as a result of an improper control rod withdrawal sequence. A Deviation Event Report (DER) was written by the licensee Detroit Edison Company, at 12:15 a.m., July 2,1985, concerning this event. The DER fndicated that reactor criticality did not occur. Parker was provided a copy of the DER at about 12:30 p.m., July.3,1985. At that time, a Detroit Edison official, Gregg Overbeck, informed Parker that on July 1,1985, there had been

. an operator error, f.e., an out of. sequence rod pull. Parker was also told I that there was some disagreement among the Detroit Edison staff concerning whether the plant had gone critical and that he would be informed when a definite finding was made.

During the course of this investigation, sworn statements made by Parker; Paul Byron, the NRC's Senior Resident Inspector at Fenni 2; and Nicholas J.

Chrissotimos Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects contained inconsistent recollections of the events concerning the premature criticality event. The OIA investigation did not establish which, if any, of these three statements was false. Nonetheless, the evidence reveals that l Overbeck was advised on July 4,1985, that the reactor had in fact achieved i

premature criticality on July 1,1985. He met with some of his staff

, concerning this detennination the following day and, thereafter, tried to call i Pa rker. He did not reach Parker and did not call anyone else at the NRC.

l Other than the single call, he made no other direct attempts to advise NRC of I

their finding until July 15, 1985, when he spoke with Byron. Overbeck also Freedom of Information/ Privacy Act (b)(5)(6)(7)(C) l e70519o5o1 870515 6-245 PDR EDO -- 0 0142 8 TE i  ;

UE@.IlSEON.Y announced the criticality finding at "the staff meeting . . . [on July 6] in which [he] thought Parker was present." Parker denied any knowledge of the criticality dhtermination prior to July 15, 1985, and denied being present at the July 6 staff meeting where the issue was discussed. A check of the security access records for that day indicates that Parker was not present on site where the meeting was held.

On January 17, 1986, this matter was referred to the Department of Justice (00J). After reviewing the report and discussing the results of the investigation, the 00J concluded that the matter lacks prosecutive merit and declined to initiate any criminal prosecution.

Conclusions and Recommendation

1. The facts of this investigation indicate that Parker was not informed of the premature criticality of FERMI 2 until July 15, 1985, when he was informed of the incident by Byron. Parker was not in attendance at the FERMI 2 staff meeting on July 6,1985, at which the licensee's finding of premature criticality was discussed.

2.

• In advance of the Commission's licensing decision, Parker discussed the r event with Chrissotimos and Byron. However, qualified and inconsistent f statements made by these three individuals to OIA do not permit a conclusive finding by OIA of exactly what was reported. Prior to July 15, 1985, no records of conversations or reports were prepared or maintained by Parker, Byron, or Chrissotimos concerning their discussions of the July 1-2, 1985, rod pull error, e

3. Parker did not follow up with FERMI 2 management regarding their review and evaluation of the July 1-2, 1985, incident despite the fact that the FERMI 2 DER indicated that the licensee's review would be complete by July 9, 1985.

[

4. / Procedures should be developed by the Executive Director for Operations s /' to document the reporting of similar events.

Attachment:

As Stated cc: Commission (5) w/o attach W. Magee, OCM, w/ attach

8. Hayes, 01, w/o attach

IV. Enrico EPrmi Unit 2 Project Quality Assurance Report received from

, Interview Manager of the SAFETEAM (Attachment 2). It is numbered 00674 and is a report which is filled out by the inter-viewer when a concern is brought to their attention. This document has a perforated attached perscnal identification section, which consists of name, ' phone number and address of the concernee. The lower portion of the document indicates the employer, organization

' title and duties of the concernee, with a concern area and an area for conrent by the interviewer.

V. Concern Report (Attachment 6), which is given to individuals exiting the plant who are unwilling to address a concern with the interviewer;

< however, who may feel that they could write their concern out ar.d mail it back to the SAFETEAM. According to the Interview Manager,

, each individual receives a postage paid envelope with a cocument referred to as a Concern Report, which can be mailed back to the DECO SAFETEAM.

VI. SAFETEAM Brochure (Attachment 7), which describes what the SAFETEAM will "do for you." The brochure indicates that savings as a result of the SAFETEAM at the Fermi 2 power plant alone are estimated at more than $30,000,000.

VII. SAFETEAM Investigator Duties (Attachment 8). This document indicates that the SAFETEAM Investigator is charged with the responsibility of resolving the concern of exiting employees by investigating all avenues of the concern and arriving at an equitable solution to the satisfaction of all parties involved. The parties involved are listed as follows:

1. Director, SAFETEAM Investigations

2. The SAFETEAM Steertig Conriittee, which includes:

T. A. Alessi - Director, Project Quality Assurance H. F. Heffner - Director, EF2 SAFETEAM P. A. Marquardt - Senior Attorney, Environmental and Nuclear Regulatory Affairs D. A. Wells - Manager, Quality Assurance Interviewee VIII. Personnel Job Descriptions and Critical Functions regarding the SAFETEAM Manager (Attachment 9). Approximate date of this document is June 12, 1984 In this category, it is indicated that the SAFETEAM Manager, in this case that wculd be Walt Kaczor, reports to the General Auditor (Benes). Regarding the job des-cription and critical functions, it is indicated that the manager works with site contractors, site operation, site security, and site engineering. It is also indicated that he works with the NRC on investigations and with the public and press on media contacts.

In regard to the manager's function, "freedce to act" is addressed.

"the SAFETEAM operation is a function outside the license of the hRC and concerns can be investigated without procedures reviewed h V

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freehm of Information

,, /:!, excmptions b

./ 7 F0lA- $ -M f __

The following documents were received from the SAFETEAM Director, Walt Kaczor in response to requests from 01 Region III:

1. SAFETEAM Operation Manual, Copyright 1984, Utility Technical Services, Inc. (Attachment 3). This document consists of seven sectiors, which encompass Program Berefits, SAFETEAM Overview, Getting Ready, Starting Up, Exit Ipterviewing, Investigation and Reporting, and Reports to Management.

II. Pemo dated January 2,1985 to Wayne H. Jens and Frank E. Agosti from W. J. Kaczor, Director of the DECO SAFETEAM (Attachments 1 and 4). The subject of this memo is: Normal and Emergency SAFETEAM

- Operation Criteria for Handling Nuclear Safety-Relatad " ' . . -

Only) . This document indicates the SAFETEAM classifications and evaluations of concerns into the following categories:

1. Related to specific items of equipment or systems.

2. Related to a procedure, test, process, QA standard, practice, etc.

3. A management problem, attitude, and general concern.

4 Industrial safety.

5. Miscellaneous.

A note ind % tes that QA Level I concerns that are classified as I or 2 shall be investigated first and have priority over class 3, 4 or 5.

A notation indicates that a " wrongdoing" allegation will be so stamped by the SAFETEAM Directo.r and sent to the NRC Inspector nn site (Paul Byron).

This me.o also addresses emergency SAFETEAM operation criteria for handling nuclear safety-related QA I only concerns during an emergency situation. The classification remains the same as the previously indicated criteria regarding normal SAFETEAM operation.

Memo dated November 29, 1984 to Mr. W. H. Jens from A. J. Benes regarding the subject of an Allegations Task Force. This memorandum alerts selected individuals that they may be called upon to assist the SAFETEAM. Those indicated personnel would, according to the meme, be called up in the event of a last minute surge of allegations from adversary groups.

III. . Fermi 2 SAFETEAM Paper Flowchart (Attachment 5). This document indicates the process by which a concern is addressed by the SAFETEAM from the interview stage to the concern being mailed to the concernee.

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