ML20214A703
| ML20214A703 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1985 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Connelly S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214A525 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-245 NUDOCS 8705190557 | |
| Download: ML20214A703 (35) | |
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August 9, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Sharon R. Connelly, Director, Office of the Inspector and Auditor FROM:
James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III
SUBJECT:
FERMI CRTICALITY INCIDENT - REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION On July 2,1985, Fermi 2 achieved criticality using an improper control rod withdrawal sequence. This fact was not brought to Regional management's attention until July 15, 1985 --- five days after the Comission meeting approving a full power. authorization. The enclosed PN's sumarize this matter.
At my request, the Office of Investigation is investigating the circumstances associated with this incident to determine if any " wrongdoing" was involved on the part of the licensee.
On August 7, 1985 I learned from Detroit Edison Company that the Monroe County Board of Comissioners had voted to send separate letters to Detroit Edison, NRC, and Congressman Dingall expressing their displeasure over the perfonnance of the utility and NRC regarding this incident. The enclosed draft letters were picked up following a recent County Board meeting and are 4
expected to be signed out next week. Also, enclosed is a PN we just issued concerning this development.
In view of the questions raised concerning NRC's perfonnance, it is requested that OIA initiate an investigation into Region !!!'s performance related to this event, s_%f James G. Keppler Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1.
PNO-I!!-85-58 and PNO-III-85-58A 2.
Draft Letters from Monroe County Board of Comissioners 3.
PNO-III-85-70 cc w/ enclosures:
W. J. Dircks. E00 H. R. Denton, NRR f ' p' J. M. Taylor IE B. B. Hayes. 01 0705190557 870513
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... i U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ottice of insoector and Avaitor o....i,
....... August 14, 1985 Report of Interview James G. KEPPLER, Regional Administrator, Region III, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC), was interviewed regarding his request to the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) for an investigation concerning the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERMI 2) in Monroe, Michigan.
He stated essentially the following:
Mike PARKER was the Resident Inspector at FERMI 2 and Paul BYRON was the Senior Resident Inspector there at the time of the July 1,1985,-criti-cality. At the time he requested OIA to look into the matter, it appeared that PARKER had been informed about the incident of premature criticality prior to the Comission meeting.
FERMI 2 management representatives stated to him that PARKEP had attended a July 6,1985, staff meeting at which the criticality issue was discussed.
He was not told until after the July 10, 1985, Comission meeting about the cr'iticality.
If he had known of the July 1-2, 1985, criticality he would not have recomended the issuance of a license.
The Office of Investigations has looked at this incident from another perspective and it appears that PARKER was not told about the whole event.
4 PARKER was told by DETROIT EDISON that some rods were pulled out of sequence. He cannot judge what PARKER should have done.
PARKER was not given the whole story by DE7ROIT E0! SON.
PARKER may not have reacted with what he had.
Gregg OVERBECK, Assistant Plant Superintendent OETROIT EDISON, said that PARKER was told about the problem.
OVER8ECK told him that he discussed it with PARKER on July 3,1985. He (KEPPLER) would like to know what PARKER was told. He thinks that the criticality incident was covered up.
Deputy Regional Administrator A. Bert DAVIS was told by Nick CHRISSOTIMOS prior to the Comission hearing that rods were pulled out of sequence.
CHRISSOTIMOS received his information from PARKER.
No mention was made to his staff that the reactor had gone critical.
Paul BYRON was the first to mention that criticality had been achieved.
DETROIT EDISON's engineering staff had made a study that showed that the reactor had gone critical.
,,,,,,,,,, August 12, 1985
,, Glen Ellyn, Illinois 85-35 Edward T. Canpbell/Keith G. Iogan, OIA
,,,,, August 14, 1985 3,,,
7.,'s l[COM *[.$*/4ce'8/.'*".MNe'e'a'Ods,$8.7.":'o,'.7!s'$ OsS$N'*"Eo7w'"r'c?' ' '""""
ATTACHMENT 1
2 At the time of the criticality, PARKER was running a bunch of "SAFETEAM" issues. He (XEPPLER) wants to know if PARKER was so preoccupied with running down "SAFETEAM" leads that he just overlooked the big issue.
Everything hinges on what PARKER was told.
The records that PARKER received should be looked at.
Five to ten people would have,been in the control room at the time of the incident.
The whole affair probably took place over a few minutes.
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l 055 W W U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of smosetor and Auditor o n.. e.
....... _ August 23. 1985 Report of Interview A. Bert DAVIS, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region III, U.S. Nuclear Regu-latory Comission (NRC), was interviewed concerning his knowledge of what information had been reported to NRC management after the July 1,1985, criticality at the ENRICO FERMI fiUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERMI 2).
He stated essentially the following:
He has been employed at the NRC since June 1973. He has been in his present job since July 1981.
Paul M. 8YRON, Senior Resident Inspector at FERMI 2, told Nicholas J.
CHRISSOTIMOS, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, Division of Reactor Projects, about the July 1-2, 1985, criticality at FERMI 2 on July 15, 1985.
He was working on allegations presented to the "SAFETEAM" at the time of the event.
The "SAFETEAM" concept is one that was developed by the Itcensee to address allegations concerning on site health and safety problems and employee concerns.
He does not think that Michael E. PARKER was told that criticality was achieved until July 15, 1985.
He does not know what PARKER was told about the July 1-2, 1985, criticality or when he was actually inforvned.
s August 12, 1985 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 85-35 3-v i
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Edward T. Campbell /Keith G. Logan, OIA #
August 23, 1985
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August 22,'1985 o.... i,
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Report of Interview i
Gregg R. OVER8ECK, DETROIT EDIS0N COMPANY's (DETROIT EDISON) Superintendent of Operations - Nuclear Production for the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERMI 2), was interviewed concerning what infomation had been disseminated to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission (NRC) staff after the July 1,1985, criticality. He stated essentially the following:
i He has been with DETROIT EDISON for seven years and has been in his present position since August 1, 1985. At the time of the July 1, 1985, rod pull incident, he was the Assistant Superintendent - Nuclear Production.
He feels that the rod pull was a* case of significant operator irror. He spoke to Michael E. PARKER, NRC Resident Inspector, on July 3,1985, about it. They met in his office and Eugene PRESTON, a DETROIT EDISON operations engineer, was also in attendance.
He described the event to PARKER as' one involving serious or significant procedural noncompliance, an out of sequence rod pull. He showed him the i-Deviation Event Report that had been written on July 2,1985, regarding the incident. He told PARKER that there was disagreement among the i
DETROIT EDISON staff as to whether the plant had gone critical, but as of "now, we're saying it was not."
PARKER was to'be informed when a definitive finding had been made. He told PARKER that Paul M.-BYRON, 4'
Senior Resident Inspector at FERMI 2, had been looking for something to
" nail" DETROIT EDISON on (operator error / procedural non-compliance).
This operator error would be what BYRON needed.- He did not discuss any subsequent findings with PARKER prior to his July 15, 1985, discussion-with BYRON.
He had assigned the Reactor Engineering Section the responsibility of detemining the effect of the July 1,1985, event.
Although a computer predictability model had indicated that the reactor had gone critical, he wanted further infomation to determine if criticality had been achieved.
DETROIT EDISON's Corrective Action Review Board had determined on July 2, j
1985, at 12:30 p.m. that the rod pull was not a reportable event.
i Jon THORPE of his staff officially infomed him late on July 4,1985, that the plant had gone critical. He told THORPE that the matter would j
be discussed on the following day.
It was not brought up at the regular s
i August 14, 1985 Newport,jMJehigan 85-36 i
.W Edward T.
Campbell /Keith G.
- Logan, O I A,,,,,,,,,,
August 22, 1985 3
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ATTACHMENT 3
Inccrview/G.0varb:ck B/14/85
-2 8 a.m. staff meeting; however, it was discussed at a special meeting at 4 p.m. on July 5, 1985. He cannot remember if PARKER was at the earlier meeting. PARKER definitely was not at the 4 p.m. session.
He discussed their findings at the Saturday morning staff meeting (July 6, 1985). He believes PARKER was present at the meeting, but could not swear to it. The pattern is that someone from the NRC usually attends their staff meetings. He cannot recall if the issue was brought up at any subsequent meetings.
He had no further discussion with any NRC personnel on the rod pull until July 15, 1985, when he told BYRON about the plant going critical on July 1-2, 1985. BYRON appeared flabbergasted with this news. BYRON apparently knew that there had been an out of sequence rod pull; however, he did not know that the plant had gone critical.
There was enough information being distributed at the July 5 (4 p.m.) and
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6 (8 a.m.), 1985, meetings for PARKER to realize that criticality had been achieved.
In addition to what he and PRESTON told PARKER on July 3, 1985, it should have been enough to trigger something in him. He now feels that PARKER and BYRON should have had enough information to realize l
that the plant had gone critical. He thinks that BYRON should have known of the situation by July 10, 1985, the date of the FERMI 2 licensing.
hearings in Washington, D.C.
He realized now that there were problems on both sides. Possibly he could have more actively sought out PARKER to inform him after a criti-cality determination had been made. He did try to telephone him after the 8 a.m., July 6, 1985, staff meeting.
Because he was not able to reach him at this time, he forgot to pursue the matter. He dnes think o
that PARKER and/or BYRON should have attempted to contact him and see what the final DETROIT EDISON finding was.
OE01ALUEORY U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission Office of insoector and Auditor August 22, 1985 o,...n,.
Report of Interview Nicholas J. CHRISSOTIMOS, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No. 2 Division of Reactor Projects, Region III, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), was reinterviewed for the third time concerning what information had been reporetd to him after the July 1,1985, criticality at the ENRICO FERMI flVCLEAR POWER PLANT,' UNIT 2 (FERMI 2).
He stated essentially the following:
He initially received a call from Michael E. PARKER, Resident Inspector, FERMI 2,.on either. July 3 or July 5, 1985.
He was told that there had been a misminupulation of the rods.
The reactor operator reportedly did not follow the correct procedure.
Instead of pulling rods to position 04, he took them full out to position 48.
When the operator realized his error, the rods were returned to the zero setting.
PARKER had told him this was a procedural violation and the licensee was taking corrective action.
He asked PARKER f f he was satisfied with the action. He said, "I am satisfied."
PARKER probably told him that the rods that were pulled were in Group 3.
He wou,1d not be concerned about going critical in Group 3.
He was not concerned about a criticality issue.
At that time, the rod worth minimizer was not in effect until the rods in Group 4 were pulled.
If he knew there was a chance they went critical, he would have asked more questions.
If he (CHRIS50TIMOS) had any indication that the plant had gone critical, or was told that there was a faction among the DETROIT EDIS0fl staff who felt that criticality had been achieved, he would have reacted differently to the information that PARKER gave him.
He would have reacted differently if he heard that the computer model had indicated the reactor went critical. However, he would have put a lot of faith in a determination made by Gregg OVERBECK (DETROIT EDISON's Superintendent of Operations - Nuclear Production).
Based upon his questions and PARKER's responses, he had a " warm feeling" after his conversation and that there was nothing to be overly concerned about.
He was told nothing to lead him to believe that the situation was that serious.
/
He disagrees with PARKER's written statement wherein PARKER stated to hir that the ifcensee's reactor engineering group believed that the reactor might have gone critical.
Their belief was reportedly based on a computer predictability program.
Also, he was not told that OVER8ECK had gone on record as saying that he (OVER8ECK) had little faith in computer models, especially the one at the FERMI 2 site.
Furthermore, no mention was made to him that the ifcensee had assigned a group to study the 9 vent and would issue a finding through OVERBECK. Assuming that this August 16, 1985 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 85-36 a s.,
Edward T. Canpbell/Feith G. Iogan, OIA August 22, 1985 Er'siou*Ne'NIvTo'*SYeW"rMr **Ns*sioUs" rye'oYUc'aYs YsEe'toIaEo7voItc7 ' "
w er-w yy ATTAClefENT 5
IntGrvicw/J.Chrisectimos 8/16'85
-2 information had been given to him, then it appears that he " blew it."
He would not have had such a " warm feeling" if the issue of premature criticality had been raised based on a mismanipulation of rods. He knows from his own experience in similar situations that if PARKER had told him that OVERBECK would get back with him after a definitive finding had been reached, he would have pursued the matter further.
Regardless of when he spoke 'to PARKER, he did not tell DAVIS about the matter until July 5, 1985. He told DAVIS that there had been a mis-manipulation of rods; i.e., a procedural violation, and that the licensee had taken the corrective steps. DAVIS asked if he thought this problem should be mentioned in the July 10, 1985, licensing hearing in Washington, D.C.
He said, "No."
He was not officially notified until July 15, 1985, that the plant had gone critical on July 1, 1985. Th'is information was given to him by Senior Resident Inspector Paul M. BYRON.
BYRON had received his information from OVERBECK. He was very surprised when he was told that criticality had been achieved.
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INVESTIGATOR's NOTE: He feels at this point that the record should reflect that his conversation with PARKER had taken place over six weeks ago. Accordingly, his memory of exactly what was said might not be completely accurate.
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".."DLY 1, NICHOLAS J. CHRISS0TIMOS, hereby make the following statement to KEITH G.
LOGAN, SHARON C0NELLY, and EDWARD T. CAMPBELL who have identified themselves to me as Investigators with the Office Of Inspector and Auditor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to ne.
After being sworn in it was explained to me what it meant to be sworn in and that this investigation at this time was administrative in nature.
Additionally the following statement is a, reconstruction of the notes taken and not a verbatim transcription.
On July 22, 1985, I was promoted to Chief, Projects Branch 2, Olvision of Reactor Projects (DRP). On July 1, 1985, I was Section Chief, DRP. At that time I had responsibility for FERMI, Quad Cities, Dresden, and LaSalle.
I have had responsibility for FERMI since around March 1985.
After my conversation in August with OIA I wanted to reconstruct my activities of that week to place a perspective on the amount of work I was involved with on July 3 and 5. 1985.
I looked at the records regarding red phone calls (calls required by 10 CFR 50.72 of utilities when the calling criteria are met); Licensee Event Reports (LERs); Inspection Reports; and I asked my subordinates (other than Parker and Byron the Residents at Fermi) to go through their notes and tell me what other events occurred on July 1 and 2,1985 in which I would have been debriefed on either July 3 or July 5,1985.
I had been out of the office on July 1 and 2 and came in on July 3,1985.
I got a laundry list of items I was involved with on July 3 and 5 on FERMI; 5 to 6 red phone calls; I was briefed on Inspection Reports which were signed while I was out; I was briefed on a Dresden Inspection which was complex in nature and I was involved on a potential safety problem at LaSalle coupled with involvement in a Civil Penalty package which is time consuming.
With all this going on I also, with respect to Fenni, was dealing with Followup Items on the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) presentation that I gave on July 2,1985; I was preparing the Bert Davis presentation for the Comission Meeting, and I was following up on Comissioner Asselstine's coments made during his tour of Fermi on July 1,1985.
This information is provided to show that during this day an one-half (July 3 and July 5 until 12:00 p.m.) I was very busy and involved with facilities other than Fermi 2.
Y' D OMlV ATT wwnw A
Michael Parker told me on either Wednesday, July 3 or Friday July 5,1985 that there were some mispositioned rods at Femi.
I do not specifically recall what Mike Parker told me when he called but the major portion of the phere call probably centered on the status of his Safeteam assignment (this had to be completed prior to July 10, 1985 the day of the Commissioner briefing).
Based on my actions following the call, I did not treat Parkers call as anything other than one of the numerous routine phone calls I receive which probably lasted less than 5 minutes.
On July 5, 1985, I advised Bert DAVIS about the mispositioned rods.
I left the office around noon on Friday.
I don't recall what time I told DAVIS about the rods.
I informed DAVIS that there was a procedural violation in the rod movements; the utility found it; was concerned about it; and was putting on an independent second person to monitor future rod movements.
Based on my action, I didn't treat PARKER's call as anything other than a routine call.
Although I don't recall PARKER telling me the extent of the rod pull, I believe I did report to Bert DAVIS that the rods were pulled from 00 to 48..
I don't remember PARKER mentioning; what group the rods were in, criticality, the computer predictability model, or the dates the event took place.
I believe PARKER said he discussed the event with OVERBECK, but I don't recall if he said he discussed it with anyone else.
PARKER may have said a DER had been prepared, but I can't say this with any positive assurance.
Knowing PARKER, he probably told me the date of the event.
I don't remember PARKER telling me that the reactor group was reviewing the event; the rods were in Group 3; the computer predictability program may have indicated the reactor went critical; that the licensee was evaluating the event to see whether the reactor went critical; or that the SRM charts indicated the plant had not gone critical.
I had sufficient detail about the incident and treated it as a routine procedural error in that PARKER said there had been a mismanipulation of rods, the utility was concerned about it, and was jumping on the problem. The history of the utility in dealing with PARKER, BYRON, and me is that they always took action that was satisfactory to us.
I put a lot of faith in the inspectors, so if PARKER was satisfied after his review, I would have treated it as a nonnal phone call.
Information following our investigation which started on July 15, 1985 revealed that in this instance rods were pulled from full in position (00) to full out position (48) rod mismanipulations of various degrees occur frequently at Boiling Water Reactors.
There is no technical safety significance in this one single act of rod removal unless this act places the rod configuration of the entire core in a position that causes you to exceed the safety boundaries.
Based on our inspection starting July 15, 1985 the Fermi incident was within the safety boundaries.
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i Mr. LOGAN read and then showed me the Deviation Report (DER) concernir.g the l
event of July 1, 1985.
I had not seen or at least do not recall seeing the DER until this time. After the DER was read to me I had the following I
coments:
It doesn't mean much to me as an Engineer (13 years of Boiling Water Reactor experience) if I had been told 11 rods had been pulled from 00 to 48, or if the rods were in Group 3.
Unless I had been told something else besides the rods were pulled from 00 to 48 in group 3, such as for example a rod block occurred, I would not have been concerned.
I would want more information.
It would not have mattered if PARKER had read the DER to me.
In fact it would have lead me to believe further that this was not a significant event.
It merely says the operator was pulling the rods, and when he recognized he had i
pulled the rods to the wrong position; he put them back and started pulling rods again.
The DER also stated that the reactor had not gone critical.
If PARKER had read Parts G and F to me, I know or have to assume, as the DER is written, that at least one NRC licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) was aware of the event, he evaluated it, if nothing was found wrong, then he would start up again.
In fact the DER was signed by three SR0's (Shift Supervisor management; Operations,
management). This further supports the insignificance in that at that time 3 SR0's of the utility nanagement felt the reactor had not gone critical.
l If Parker read the DER to me and I don't recall that he did, but assuming he got the DER, he's doing his job in reading it to me.
I would say in my mind, PARKER did his job, someone signed off and there were added assurances, and it appears to be nothing but a procedural problem.
I would consider this nothing but a routine phone call and reaction by PARKER.
l I probably asked PARKER if he was satisfied with the action, since this l
1s what I usually do; whatever his response was, it was a normal con-l versation.
The information on the DER was not appropriate to brief the Comission.
It's not a reportable event in accordance with the regulations.
Its a procedural violation. Based on these factors, we would not brief the Comission. Comission briefings do not usually go into this much cetail. Procedural violations occur all the time unless there are regulation and/or technical specifications violations, the Comission is usually not briefed.
Unless there is a gross amount of procedural i
violations, the Comission would not be briefed (Comission briefing means at the presentation for full power authorization).
i l
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OFFICIAL !EE ORY
DVClAlllSE ONly The following coments with respect to PARKERS statements were made as a result of the investigators reading what they characterized as PARKERS stetements to me.
I have no knowledge with respect to the accuracy of PARKERS statements and or if these are the statements provided to 0IA in signed deposition to their office.
I.
With respect to PARKER's statement:
"We discussed the operator error issue.
I mentioned that the operator error could be sensitive to licensing since there had been no operator errors in the past." I don't recall discussions regarding the operator error. Minor procedural errors are usually not discussed at Commission briefings.
2.
With respect to PARKER's statement, "I told CHRISS0TIMOS about the differences in the computer predictability model and the SRM Charts.
I clearly stated to him that 0VERBECK had called a group together to evaluate the differences."
My past performgnce involving mispositioned rods (which has been out-standing) is indicative of how I would react to events of this nature.
My treatment of this incident based on the information I had at the time was normal in that I do not recall anything that may have been told to me to trigger a different reaction.
In fact, if PARKER told me the Source Range Monitor (SRM) charts indicated the reactor had not gone critict.1 the computer predictability model question becomes a mute point.
The SRM instruments are the legal documents that record reactor criticality. These instruments are periodically calibrated and functionally tested to ensure their accuracy.
The computers are not required to accomplish any of these tests for accuracy.
3.
With respect to PARKER's statement: I told CHRIS50TIMOS that based on the computer model, the reactor might have gone critical" I don't recall all the details.
I can only speculate that this was part of the conver-sation, and I can say with some confidence that I was having a busy day and I may have been destracted and not heard this.
Keep in mind my comments in number 2 above on the insignificance of a possible computer vs SRM chart difference.
Communication _s become less effective as they move up the reporting chain, I may not have heard the part about the computer model, and that it conflicted with the SRM. Remember the SRM is the binding legal document, and if I heard the SRM indicate that criticality had not happened, the possible computer inconsistency was irrelevant.
I feel that PARKER was comfortable; it was a normal routine phone call.
4.
With respect to PARKER's statement; "He was trying to caln me down; I was excited and felt this was a major event." I strongly disagree that he was i
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.. '. ' d '.. b excited or said it was a major event.
If PARKER had told me there was a question in the licensee's mind about premature criticality, I would have reacted differently. This puts the incident into a different degree of importance.
I would have recognized the sensitivity of the situation and would have reacted differently.
I don't recall any discussion with BYRON at all on this event.
I treated it as a normal call.
I passed on my reaction to DAVIS on Friday, July 5, 1985, that the rods were pulled out of order from 00 to 48, and that the licensee had discovered it and had had corrected the procedural error.
I don't remember telling DAVIS the number of rods or that they were in Group 3.
I probably saw DAVIS 10 times that day when I told him or the length of our conver,sation.but I don't remember exactly With respect to my conversation on July 5, 1985 with Bert DAVIS:
I don't remember DAVIS' question regarding whether we should bring it up at the Commission meeting. When I answered this question in my August 16, 1985, interview with OIA, I said DAVIS "may have" asked about raising the issue at the Comission meeting.
Regarding DAVIS' statement on July 10, 1985, I handed the note to DAVIS which said there had been only an operator error in the control room so far, since they have loaded fuel.
We only report significant errors at Commission briefings.
The context of DAVIS' statement was in reference to reportable events (in LER's or red phone calls).
Basic information about procedural violations would not have been reported to the Commission.
I knew of the mismanipulation of rods, and this didn't change DAVIS' speech. This event was not reportable on the LER system.
I first learned of the premature criticality at FERMI when Paul BYRON told me on July 15, 1985.
Based on what I know today--that the plant went prematurely critical before July 10,1985,--there would be a definite difference in DAVIS' presentation to the Comission.
This premature criticality event has no safety significance The event of premature criticality is not a reportable event in the 1.icensee Event Report system (10 CFR 50.73) or 10 CFR 50.72 system.
I would have no material gain from whether Fermi got a license July 10, 1985 or later like 1999, nor would my staff (Parker ana Byron) Davis, Greenman, etc. have anything to gain. No one in Region !!! has anything to gain on when the license gets issued.
At that time, this premature criticality event with the condition of that facility, had no safety significance.
4 '. 8.d I '. i
- lll gr,py I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statement is true and correct. Subscribed and sworn to one the Ti day of October, 1985, at T, 't Cr -.
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. Office of inspector and Auditor August 23, 1985 o,...,,...........
Report of Interview Michael E. PARKER, Resident Inspector, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission (NRC), currently assigned to the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERl412) was interviewed for the second time concerning what information he
.had reported to NRC mangement af ter the July 1,1985, criticality at FERMI 2.
He was accompanied by his union representative, Fred A. MAURA, of the National Treasury Employees Union, Local 208.
PARKER provided the following statement which is reproduced in its entirety:
On July 3,1985 about 1230, I was notified by Greg (sic) Overbeck and Gene PRESTON of the inadvertent rod pull on July 1,1985 After some preliminary research, I contacted Nick CHRISS0TIMOS, my Section Chief, of the event and informed him that on midnight on July 1, the reactor operator pulled 11 control rods in Group 3 out of sequence.
The correct sequence is from 00 to 04 and the operator completely withdrew the rods from 00 to 48.
The licensee subsequently reinsertcd the rods to the correct position, repulled the rods in the correct sequence and proceeded backup to 5% power.
I let him know, the operator realized he had problems when the SRM's were not responding as expected in this point of the pull, thus indicating he was following his nuclear instrumentation.
The operator evidently had a mindset, in that he was traired to pull this group of rods from 00 to 48.
He evidently was not paying attention to the rod pull sheet.
I also discussed with Nick that the ifcensees (sic) Reactor Engineering group believed, based on the computer predictability program, that the reactor might have went critical.
The licensees (sic) preliminary evaluation was that they did not go critical based on their review of the SRM charts in the control room and that Greg OVERBECK had little faith in the computer model.
It was discussed that the ifcensee had assigned operations, reactor engineering and the technical group responsibilities to review the event, and that if their preliminary evaluation changed Greg OVERBECK would get back to me.
I read to Nick a copy of the Deviation / Event Report, signed by the shift supervisor, stating that the reactor did not go critical. We discussed the ifcensees (sic) proposed corrective action and I informed him that I was comfortable with their actions, and that this was not believed to be a reportable event but could be sensitive to licensing.
August 15, 1985 Newport, Michigan 85-36
.........e.
alwald T. canpbell/Keith G. Iogan, OIA August 23, 1985 L's?.*C.'Tia1". 'o'."c.\\c'A"*, 'of1 '1202T7/.". 'o,'.7e* 'f, 'OsM'r *2~'oSl'"/c7. ' ' " '""'*""
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ATTACMENT 7
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'I Intarvicw/M. E. Perkar 8/15/85 l'y opinion of the event was that it was a Level IV or V violation, for failure to follow procedures and based on infornation to date, I was comfortable with the licensees (sic) actions.
! did indicate that the licensee expected an evaluation to be completed in about a week and that I wculd review the licensees (sic) evaluation.
Nick CHRISS0TIMOS appeared comfortable with my actions, did $ot believe it to be reportable and did not request any additional action of me.
On July 8 on a telephone conversation with Paul BYRON in Washington, I discussed the event in brief and let him know about the rod pull error.
I informed him that they pulled 11 rods cut of sequence and discussed how the events occured and what action the licensee was taking.
I discussed that based on their computer predictability program they might have gone critical and that they were evaluating the event.
I told him that this had all been discussed with Nick CHRISS0TIMOS and he could get more information from him, as they were both in Washington for the licensing meetings.
In both of my conversations, with Nick and Paul we discussed the operator error issue and its possible impact on licensing, as there had not been previous errors of this magnitude, by reactor operators.
It should be noted that the above information is based on my recollection of the, events and discussing (sic) that occured over six weeks ago.
Concerning my time from June 24 to July 6,1985 below is listed my hours worked:
Monday June 24 - 9 Sunday June 30 - 8 Tuesday June 25 - 9 Monday July 1 - 11 Wednesday June 26 - 9 Tuesday July 2 - 10 1/2 Thursday June 27 - 9 Wednesday July 3 - 9 1/2 Friday June 28 - 11 lhursday July 4 - 8 holiday Saturday June 29 - 8 Friday July 5 - 11 Saturday July 6 - no hours OL A U.:ORY
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Inspector and Auditor Report of Interview
- August 22, 1985 o m..i,.......
Paul M, BYRON, Senior Resident Inspector for the U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC) at the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2 (FERMI 2) was interviewed for the second time concerning what information had been reported to him after the July 1, 1985, criticality at FERMI 2.
He stated essentially the following:
He telephoned Michael E. PARKER, Resident Inspector at FERMI 2, on July 8,1985, in Bethesda, Maryland. This was his first day back from leave.
l He had gone on leave on July 3,1985, at 12 noen.
PARKER gave him a briefing about what had been happening at FERMI 2 during his absence.
PARKER spoke primarily about "SAFETEAM" concerns.
"SAFETEAM" is a. concept developed by the DETROIT EDISON COMPANY (DETROIT EDISON) to address problems identified by FERMI 2 employees.
PARKER had been devoting most of his duty time to researching the issues that had been raised.
During the course of their conversation, PARKER said that an operator had
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pulled rods out of sequence; however, the plant had not gone critical.
PARKER said that he had discussed this matter with Nicholas J.
CHRISSOTIMOS, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No. 2. Division of. Reactor Projects,NRC. PARKER indicated he had told CHRISS0TIMOS that criticality had not been achieved. He cumat" recall if PAPKER had told him.that there had been a difference of epinion among the DETROIT EDISON staff on whether crit 1cality had been rea'ched.
PARKER told him that on July 3,.1.W 5,' he had met with two DETROIT EDIS0N officials, Eugene PRESTON and Gregg'1. OVERBECK, in OVERBECK's office.
They discussed the out of sequence rod pull.
PARKER seemed satisfied with the explanation that OVERBECK had given him in that the event had primarily been a case of operator error.
He thinks that he had discussed the matter with CHRISSOTIMOS after his conversation with PARKER on July 8, 1985. He does not recall CHRISSOTIMOS being overly concerned.
They were both in Bethesda preparing for the FERMI 2 licensing hearings.
The next conversation he had about the rod mismanipulation was on July 15, 1985. OVERBECK told him that the reactor had gone critical on July 1, 1985. OVERBECK mentioned this after he had complimented OVERBECK on how proficient the reactor operators were. OVERBECK said that they were not as good as they claimed. OVERBECK then told him that they went August 15, 1985 Newport, Michigan 85-36
..,,....y,
.WV Edward T.
Campbell /Keith G.
Logan. OIA August.22, 1985.
3.
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i o!r's de#NeTe[aIv7[c5sYe7 rMu'esYv ssioNrYe'o[UceYs $sefe't oYd [of e
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Intervisw/P. M. Dyron
-.2-8/15/85 critical on July 1,1985 because of an out of sequence rod pull.
He then
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called Nicholas J. CHRIS50TIMOS at the Pegion and spoke with him. Then Edward G. GREENMAN, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III, NRC, called him. He does not recall if they discussed CHRISS0TIMOS' prior understanding of the incident.
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y.. u.$. NUCLEAR CEGULATCQY C4 _ ( OsiCN Of f.ce of Inspector and Auditor o,...i,.. September 26,1985 Report of Interview A. Bert DAVIS, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region III, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), was interviewed for the-second time concerning his knowledge of what information had been reported to NRC management after the July).1,1985, criticality at the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERHI 2 He stated essentially the following: He was informed of a rod withdrawal error at FERMI 2 by Nicholas J. CHRISS0TIMOS, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, Division of Reacter Projects. He is not sure of the date when CHRISS0TIMOS spoke to him. CHRISSOTIMOS told him on July 15, 1985, that he,had told him on July 5,1985, of.this e rror. He was advised by a colleague on July 19, 1985, to write down what he had been told and what he knew about the July 1-2, 1985, rod withdrawal incident. He went on vacation for two weeks after receiving' this advice. Upon returning, he proceeded to draft a statement which reflected his understanding of what had happened. (A photocopy of his statement is retained in the OIA files and retyped below.) There was never any mention of criticality until July 15, 1985. Also, he was not told of the extent of the operator error.; how far the rods had been pulled; or that they were in Group 3. If he had been given more information, he would have asked his staff to look into this matter. He had no knowledge of any Deviation Event Report or Licensee Event Reports being written on the event until July 15, 1985. He had been told that the incident involved an operator error, and that the operatcr had corrected his own mistake. He thinks that CHRISSOTIMOS said the event was not that significant. He does not recall asking CHRISS0TIMOS whether the event should have been discussed at the ifcensing hearing. If he was aware of a significant operator error, he would have looked into the matter before he went to the Commission meeting. He does not know who passed him the note at the July 10, 1985, Commission hearings. He did not even remember the July 1-2, 1985, operator error when he made his statement before the Comission. He only remembered the operator error that took place immediately before the hearing. At the time he made his statement to the Commission, he would not have lied to them. When CHRISS0TIMOS initially mentioned the operator error to him, he is sure that no mention was made of criticality. If it had been mentioned, it would have had an impact on him. Criticality is an important concept when one studies nuclear engineering. If CHRISSOTIMOS knew that the rods September 25, 1985 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 85-35 U ' Edward T. Campbell /Keith G. Logan, OIA September 26, 1985 4 3,,, y,,,,, Us [e#Ne'U[e[v"[o'4osYe7w"t$v'r =^ea'uSss 0@t. : oYUceS Ys[c'rI4EoYuoftoa ll
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Intcrvi2w/A. B. Davis 9/25/85 were pulled from notch setting 00 to notch setting 48, and had conveyed this information to him, it would have triggered something in him (DAVIS). CHRISS0TIMOS should have to?d him that the rods went from notch setting 00 to 48 notch setting. The fact that the rods were in Group 3 was a "no never mind." He did not ask CHRISS0TIMOS how much he had been briefed by Michael E. PARKER, Resident Inspector at FERMI 2. He did not perceive the July 1,1985, incident to be anything other than an operator error. The plant was using the FERMI 2 operating procedures at the tirre of the incident; however, the licensed reactor operator had been trained at the simulator using General Electric procedures. The operator mis-takenly used what he had been taught at the simulator when he was pulling rods at the reactor. The root cause of the error was that the reactor operator was not being properly supervised. The plant was at low power when criticality was achieved. DAVIS voluntarily submitted a written recollection of the event surrounding the criticality. It is reproduced as follows: I was informed by Chrissotimos of a rod withdrawal error at FERMI 2. I'm not sure of the date. Chrissotimos told me on July 15 that he thought he had informed me of this on July 5. The information I was given was that an operator had pullea rods using a GE procedure which he had been trained on instead of using the DECO procedure. He discovered his error and inserted the rods. I believe I was told that the OECo was very conservative and that the GE procedure was
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However, I may have just thought this in my own mind since it was my understanding from Byron and Chrissotimos that Deco was being very conservative in every operation they perform. On July 15 at 2:50 p.m. Chrissotimos came to my office and told me FERMI 2 had an inadvertent criticality on July 2. See notes in my notebook. I discussed this with JGK. Then called Hugh Thompson. Thompson called me back later that afternoon and told me the license was already issued. We discussed R III planned actions as a result of this event. During the conversation the question of licensee coverup came up (I believe Thompson raised it.) Then we discussed the appropriateness of bringing 01 into the matter ar:d I said I would do that. 7... - - - - ~
OmCIAL USE DEY U.S. NUCLE AR CECULATORY Cf!MMISSloN Office of Inspector and Auditor ~ o i... i, .u..... August 22, 1985 4 Report of Interview Hari 0. ARORA, Reactor Engineer for the DETROIT EDISON COMPANY (DETROIT EDISON), currently assigned to the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERMI 2), was interviewed concerning when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) staff at FERMI 2 had been informed of the July 1,1985, criticality. Thomas RANDAZZO. an attorney for DETROIT EDISON, was also present. ARORA stated essentially the following: He has been with DETROIT EDISON since 1976. He was not at the plant on July 1,1985; however, he did work on July 2, 1985. He was first informed that there had been a mismanipulation of rods when he read the Reactor EngineePs log. Barry MYERS, DETROIT EDISON's Midnight Shift Nuclear Engineer, had made an entry in this log about the July 1,1985, mismanipulation. On July 3, 1985, he was present at a meeting involving several DETROIT EDISON engineers (Bob LENART, Gregg OVERBECK, Dave WEHMEYER, Mel BATCH, Leo LESSOR, and Eugene PRESTON). The reactor charts were analyzed. The feeling was that the plant had not gone critical. His personal opinion of the event was 4 that it was a case of significant operator error. He received a telephone call from Michael E. PARKER, Resident Inspector = at FERMI 2, on July 3,1985, at approximately 5:00 p.m. PARKER asked hin if any further information'had been developed as to whether the plant had gone critical. He said that it had not. He does not remember telling PARKER that there had been a difference of opinion at the staff meeting as to whether the plant had gone critical. He did not mention that the following DETROIT EDISON officials felt that the reactor had achieved criticality; i.e., John DEWES, Shift Technical Advisor in Training; Jon THORPE, Engineer; and Leo LESSOR, Consultant. The next time he saw PARKER was en July 5,1985, in the plant cafeteria. He told him that a meeting would be held later in the day to discuss the criticality issue. He told him of the time and place of the meeting. PARKER did not attend. He did not speak to him further about the inci-dent. The next time he spoke to an NRC representative about the July 1, 1985, plant criticality was on July 15, 1985, when he was called by Senior Resident Inspector Paul M. BYRON. At this time, he told him that the plant had gone critical. Jon THORPE, a OETROIT EDIS0N engineer, had made a determination on July 4,1985, that the reactor had gone critical and had advised OVERBECK. This information, to the best of his knowledge, was not given to PARKER. i August 14, 1985 Newport, Michigan 85-36 W Edward T. Cainpbell/Keith C. Logan, O I A,,, y,,,,, August 22, 1985 3
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v.. b U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY cOMMisslON Office of Inspector and Auditor August 22, 1985 o...i,.......... REPORT OF INTERVIEW Leo C. LESSOR, a private consultant currently employed as an advisor to the DETROIT EDISON COMPANY's (OETROIT EDISON) Assistant Manager for Nuclear Production, was interviewed concerning when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission (NRC) staff was notified of the July 1,1985, criticality at the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERMI 2). He stated the following: He has been with DETROIT EDISON since June 1983. He was present at the CETPOIT ECISCN norning staff meetings on July 5 and 6, 1985. He thinks that NRC Resident Inspector Michael E. PARKER could have been at one of these meetings; he cannot be sure whether NRC Resident Inspector Paul M. BYRON was at either meeting. He cannot recall if DETROIT EDISON's Superintendent of Operations-Nuclear Production, Gregg R. OVERBECK, mentioned at either session that the plant had gone critical on July 1, 1985. He personally felt that unintentional criticality had been achieved. There was a consensus among the DETROIT EDISON staffers present at the July 5, 1985, 4:00 p.m. meeting that ' criticality had been achieved. This information was discussed at the July 6, 1985, 8:00 a.m. staff meeting, t August 14, 1985 Newport, M,1c h i g a n 85-36 W Edward T. Campbell /Keith G. Logan, OIA August 22, 1985 3,,,,,,,,,, Us c*e#Ne'N$Iv"Yo'a"caYe70 $v'r n'e'a'uissS$U ~r'"a 'oS's7 a'a YsSeEtoIa2oYuoIto ,m k Y
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$loN Of fice of inspector and Auditor on.......u,...... August 22 1985 REPORT OF INTERVIEW Wayne H. JENS, the DETROIT EDISON COMPANY's (DETROIT EDISON) Vice President - Nuclear Operations, was interviewed concerning when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) staff was notified of the July 1,1985, criticality at the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERMI 2). He stated essentially the following: He has been at DETROIT EDIS0N since 1964 He did not have any discussions with NRC personnel until July 15, 1985, concerning the July 1, 1985, criticality at FERMI 2. The first NRC person he spcke to about the incident was Edward G. GREENMAN, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III. He had not been told by his staff about the premature criticality until July 13, 1985. He was informed on this date by Leo C. LESSOR, a private consultant under contract to DETROIT EDISON. He had previously been told on July 3, 1985, by Robert LENART, his Assistant Manager for Nuclear Production, that the mishap that occurred on July 1,1985, was merely a rod pull. It did.not make much of an impression on him (JENS). He thinks that events such as this accidental criticality should have been reported sooner. He thought that his Superintendent of Operations-Nuclear Production, Gregg R. OVERBECK, had told Michael E. PARKER, NRC Resident Inspector at FERMI 2, about the criticality earlier. He does not know if anyone else in his organization discussed the event with the NRC. t August 15, 1985 Newport, Michigan 85-36 Edward T. Catopbell/Keit h G. Logan, OIA [ August 22, 1985 o...~,....
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t U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMtsSION Office of inspector and Auditor 0.i....,....... August 22, 1985 REPORT OF INTERVIEW Frank E. AGOSTI, the DETROIT EDISON COMPANY's (DETROIT EDISON) Manager-Nuclear Operations, was interviewed concerning when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) staff was notified of the July 1,1985, criticality at the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERMI 2). He stated essentially the following: He has been at DETROIT EDIS0N since 1958. He was informed of the July 1,1985, rod pull incident at FERMI 2 on July 3, 1985, by Michael E. PARKER, NRC Resident Inspector. He was working on the "SAFETEAM" with PARKER. He was not aware of the red pull incident until PARKER mentioned it to him. The next time he had any information on this event was on July 24, 1985. August 15, 1985 Newport, Michigan 85-36 W Edward T. Campbell /Keith G. Logan, OIA August 22, 1985 3,,,,,,,,,,, 0.es OE THE RECEeVeNG AGE NC Y W'TMOUT *E muss $'ON 08 Tat 05 5'CE O* 'NSpi'CTom A tom ." }
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nep U s. NUCLcAR REGULATORY COMMisslON Of fice of inspector and Auditor '~ 0.... i,...us.... August 23, 1985 REPORT OF INTERVIEW Edward G. GREENMAN, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC), was interviewed concerning his knowledge of what information had been reported to NRC management after the July 1,1985, criticality at the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWEP PLANT, UNIT 2 (FERMI 2). He stated essentially the following: He has been at the NRC since 1972. He has been in his present job since December 1984 The first time that he knew that there had been a problem at FERMI 2 was on July 15, 1985. He was informed o' the problem by Nicholas J. CHRISSOTIMOS, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III. CHRISSOTIMOS had just been informed by Paul M. BYRON, Senior Resident Inspector, FERMI 2. He and CHRISSOTIMOS then briefed Deputy Regional Administrator A. Bert DAVIS and other NRC officials about the incident. August 16. 1985 v Glen Ellyn. Illinois ..........a ..., = 85-36 Edward T. Campbell /Keith G. L OIA August 23, 1985 % S COCuuf NT s **O*E AT V Os NaC is LCANEO TO ANOfwEm AGENCY st ANJ sfS CONTENTS ARE NOT 'O 8E D .*S CE f* E mE JEe viNG AGE NC Y i ISUTEQ Wa f=Ovf *E AveSSION OF TaE O F 8'CE OF INSPECTOR AND AUDITOR 'I " ATTACINENT 16
U.S. NUCLE AR REGut.ATCRY COMMIS$1CN Of fice of insOector and Auditor Dei. eie au..... August 14. 1985 Report of Interview The Security Access Records of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Resident Inspector Michael E. PARKER, Keycard Number 1251, were provided for the time period July 2, 1985, through July 7, 1985, by Thomas RANDAZZO, an attorney for the DETROIT EDISON COMPANY. Vben exanined, these records (Exhibit 3) did not indicate that PARKER was on site at the ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2, on July 6, 1985. August 14, 1985 Bethesda, Maryland 85-36 ...,,,....9 h Edward T. Camnball /Kei ch C - Tnamn-nTA O re a nateo Ai' oit e f-1& 14 R 8i T=*iS COCuvENT *s anOPE af v 05 N AC ** LOANEO TO ANOTwE R AGENCY 17 AND iTS CONTENTS Amt NOT TO SE O'STRe8uTED Outs OE THE MECteviNG AGENC Y *iT=Ovf *E mM*55 SON OF THE OF 5:CE OF IN58ECTOm AND AuOivom to 32 +1** ATTACletENT 17
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f 1 EXHIBITS 1. August 9, ~ 1985, Memorandum for Sharon R. C0f1NELLY,' Director, OIA, from Janes G. KEPPLER, Regional Administrator, Region III. 2.- DETROIT EDISON COMPANY's Deviation Event Report for July 2,1985. i l i g...
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