05000305/FIN-2009005-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Perform Dye Penetrant Examinations of the Full Code Required Exam Surfaces |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the failure to perform dye penetrant examinations of the full required exam surface on safety injection (SI) gas collection chamber welds (SI-W603, SI-W604, and SI-H109) in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical EngineersSection XI Code. Specifically, the examiner proceeded with the examination without anticipating the effects of the increased dwell and drying times of the developer due to cooler ambient temperature than those he had been working under previously. The developer, which would normally dry to a white residue shortly after application to a warm surface and aid in determining the extent of application, remained somewhat translucent when applied to the cooler surface, masking the extent of coverage. This resulted in the examiner\'s failure to coat the full required Code areas of the welds he was examining and his failure to recognize the lack of coverage. The licensee subsequently re-performed the dye penetrant examinations and entered this issue into their corrective action program. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Absent NRC intervention, the licensee would not have performed the full Code required examination of welds SI-W603, SI-W604, and SI-H109 for an indefinite period of service, which would have placed the reactor coolant pressure boundary at increased risk for unanalyzed cracking, leakage, or component failure. This finding was of very low safety significance because a qualified examination was subsequently performed with no relevant indications detected. In particular, it did not result in the loss of function of the mitigating system. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices component, because the licensee proceeded in the face of uncertainty or unexpected circumstances (H.4(a)) |
Site: | Kewaunee |
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Report | IR 05000305/2009005 Section 1R08 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil R Ruiz J Cassidy T Bilik M Phalen M Garza D Chyu M Kunowski S Burton K Barclay J Bozga M Jones |
CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2009005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Kewaunee)
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