05000305/FIN-2009004-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Adequately Analyze the Automatic Fast Transfer Feature That Allowed Operation with Both 4 Kv SAFETY-RELATED Buses 1-5 and 1-6 Connected to the Rat |
| Description | A finding of very low safety-significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the inspectors for the failure to perform a power system analysis calculation that would have identified that the fast transfer design feature/scheme was deficient, in that, it allowed an unanalyzed electrical power system alignment where both redundant 4.16-kiloVolt safety-related buses were being supplied by an offsite source via the same transformer. Use of this electrical configuration could have resulted in an out-of-phase transfer, loss of available offsite power to the buses and potential damaging effects on redundant safety-related equipment, during a design basis event such as initiation of safety injection signal. When identified, the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and implemented interim actions to prohibit use of the fast transfer feature or manually aligning two safety-related buses to be fed from the same transformer during plant operation. This performance deficiency was more than minor because the failure to perform the required calculation resulted in a condition where the plant was being operated in an unanalyzed configuration where there was reasonable doubt as to the operability of redundant safeguard loads; this concern resulted in issuance of a Licensee Event Report (LER) 2007-007-00 on May 21, 2007. Consequently, the potential for damage or loss of power to safety-related loads during an event could have led to unacceptable consequences. The finding screened as being of very low safety-significance (Green) for the Initiating Events Cornerstone because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigating equipment or functions will not be available. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the cause of the performance deficiency was related to a historical design issue and not indicative of current licensee performance |
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000305/2009004 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Cassidy T Bilik J Neurauter M Kunowski S Burton S Bakhsh S Atwater V Meghani K Barclay J Pearson M Learn E Love E Sanchez-Santiago |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2009004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Kewaunee)
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