05000305/FIN-2009005-07
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Procedure Inadequacy Results in the Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer Breaker Reopening After Alignment to the Bus |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the licensee\'s failure to have adequate procedures to ensure that steps were sequenced such that unplanned transients were not initiated. Specifically, the procedure for performing emergency diesel generator train A automatic testing allowed steps to be sequenced in a manner such that a jumper used to simulate a station blackout signal was left installed during the restoration of offsite power. Because of the installed jumpers, a transient was initiated on the associated bus and attached equipment during the restoration from testing. In response to the issue, the licensee implemented compensatory corrective actions and corrected the procedure deficiency prior to conducting the same test on the opposite train. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the issue using IMC 0609,Appendix G, Checklist 3, and determined that the power availability guidelines were met. Because the finding did not increase the likelihood of a loss of offsite power or degrade the licensee\'s ability to cope with a loss of offsite power, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices component, because the procedure was not adequately verified when steps were changed from being sequence-dependent to allow for completion in any order. Specifically, personnel proceeded to change procedure without implementing peer-checking during the validation process to ensure that the change was applicable to all plant conditions (H.4(a)). |
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000305/2009005 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil R Ruiz J Cassidy T Bilik M Phalen M Garza D Chyu M Kunowski S Burton K Barclay J Bozga M Jones |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2009005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Kewaunee)
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