05000395/FIN-2013003-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Perform a Past Operability Evaluation of the Service Water Outlet Header to B Component Cooling Water Connect Valve |
Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to accomplish a past operability evaluation for the \'B\' component cooling water (CCW) train as required by corrective action program (CAP) procedures; consequently, the licensee did not recognize that the Technical Specification 3.7.3 allowed outage time was exceeded. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as condition report CR- 13-00930. The inspectors determined that the failure to evaluate past operability as required by the licensees CAP procedures was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors reviewed inspector manual chapter (IMC) 0612 and determined the PD is more than minor and therefore a finding because if left uncorrected it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that the licensee would not have performed a past operability evaluation. Consequently, the licensee would not have realized technical specifications were exceeded, would not have performed as thorough of an extent of condition review and would not have submitted a licensee event report. Additionally, the inspectors also considered IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 4.a in which the PD is more than minor if the later evaluation determined that safety-related equipment was adversely affected. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0609, Attachment 4, and Appendix A Exhibit 2, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance or Green because the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of both a reactor trip and the unavailability of mitigation equipment and associated functions. The cause of the finding involved the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution, the component of corrective action program, and the aspect of complete and thorough evaluation, P.1(c), because the licensee failed to evaluate past operability for the B CCW train. |
Site: | Summer |
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Report | IR 05000395/2013003 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | E Coffman G Mccoy J Reece |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Summer - IR 05000395/2013003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Summer) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Summer)
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