ML20206B177

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Notation Vote Approving with Comment SECY-99-109 Re Recovery of Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2
ML20206B177
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/23/1999
From: Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To: Vietticook A
NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML20206B174 List:
References
SECY-99-109-C, NUDOCS 9904290175
Download: ML20206B177 (2)


Text

NOTATION VOTE R_ESPONSE SHEEI TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary FROM: CHAIRMAN JACKSON

SUBJECT:

SECY-99-109 - RECOVERY OF MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2 Approved x #'"$!sapproved Abstain Not Participating (

COMMENTS:

See attached coments.

Shi ley Ann Jackson SIGNATURE I

April 23, 1999 DATE l Entered on "AS" Yes X No l

9904290175 990428 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR _

9tycMo/7I

F Chairman Jackson's Comments on SECY- 99-109 I approve restart authorization for Millstone Unit 2 (i.e., I approve designating the Executive Director of Operations as the senior manager responsible for verifying restart actions are complete and approving commencement of actions to allow restart of Unit 2). This conclusion is based on a careful review of the information provided to me regarding Millstone U7it 2 readiness. I believe it is important that the Millstone Station continue to receive heightened attention under the NRC's new assessment program.

Based on the successful completion of both Unit 3 and Unit 2's independent Corrective Action Verification Program (and the fact that based on NNECO's decision to permanently shutdown Unit 1, an ICAVP is not necessary at Unit 1), I approve closure of the August 14,1996 Order on ICAVP. The staff should ensure, however, that lessons-leamed from the appropriate aspects of Unit 3 and 2's ICAVP be verified as not adversely impacting those systems necessary for maintain %g Unit 1 in a safe shutdown condition (e.g., spent fuel cooling, etc.).

I remain concemed about the " fragility" of the licensee's employee concems program and safety t

conscious work environment (as ev.Jenced by the increase in the receipt rate of allegations in February and March of this year). The staff should continue effective monitoring of these programs, and independently verify appropriate licensee actions were implemented, on a sampling basis.

I agree with the staff's conclusion to ensure close management attention is directed to the licensee's backlog management. The staff should ensure that the licensee's corrective action program improvemer.ts that were identified as being necessary, and were implemented during this extended shaidown (e.g., lower thresholds for reporting problems, more management emphasis on the need for employees to identify problems, prompt processing of operability determinations, improved performance indicators, root-cause analysis, and trending) are maintained.

The staff should work with New York State following the May 1999 exercise regarding the Indian Point site ingestion pathway / post-plume plans to disseminate information to the public and apply lessons-leamed to the plans for the Millstone site.

I commend the NRC staff for their diligent efforts at inspecting, assessing, and evaluating licensee issues, programs and performance. I also commend local and federal elected officials, members of the public, public interest groups, and the press for their dedicated, questioning c' forts.

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