ML20249A680

Notation Vote Approving W/Comments SECY-98-119, Remaining Issues Related to Recovery of Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3

ML20249A680
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	06/11/1998
From:	Diaz N NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML20249A676	List: ML20249A675 ML20249A677 ML20249A679 ML20249A680 ML20249A681
References
SECY-98-119-C, NUDOCS 9806180082
Download: ML20249A680 (3)

Text

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NOTATION VOTE RESPONSE SHEET l TO: John C. Hoyle, Secretary FROM: COMMISSIONER DIAZ

SUBJECT:

SECY-98-119 - REMAINING ISSUES RELATED TO RECOVERY OF MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 3 Approved Abstain Ig Disapproved Not Participating Request Discussion COMMENTS:

See attached comments.

1s w SIGNATURN I i Release Vote / I / 6.t \ 96 DATE

. Withhold Vote / /

I No Entered on "AS" Yes WMW CORRESPONDENCE PDR

COMMENTS OF COMMISSIONER DIAZ ON SECY-98-119 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is voting on the staff recommendation to allow restart of Millstone Unit 3. The Commission has been well briefed by the staff, lit,ansee, independent oversight, and concerned interest groups. The reports from numerous NRC inspections, the Independent Corrective Action Verification Program, and the Independent Third Party Oversight of Employee's Safety Concerns issues are completed. FEMA and the Office of Emergency Management of the State of Connecticut have concurred with the licensee's proposal to restart Millstone Unit 3. The acceptability of the technical reports and the exhaustive evidence of an ar eptable employee concerns program favor restart. In fact, the amount and quality of the reports are almost overwhelming..

t Yet there are valid questions from many concemed citizens whether "enough has been done" and "what could happen if Millstone is left to stand alone" with its own technical, managerial, and human resources. The largest and best NRC effort ever in public information and public involvement -- besides TMI - could not clear these lingering doubts. This is understandable: the people are concerned that a nuclear power plant "so bad", with so many "significant" and " cultural" issues to resolve, and without respect for the safety concerns of its employees, can become "so good" in so little time. I respect their judgment; their concern is real, and its basis is not mere perception.

The problem lies in how the Millstone issues became a " catastrophe" waiting to happen.

An obviously poor system of dealing with employees' safety concerns, a deficient corrective action program, and many issues of design-basis documentation that were i not significant to safety, were transformed into a quagmire of technical, managerial, and design-basis documentation issues that obscured the fundamental determination of adequate protection of health and safety. If I were to believe that the problems resulting in the shutdown of all three Millstone Units were as serious as projected and that the ensuing regulatory requirements, inspections and assessme.nts thereof were justified, I would agree with the concerned citizens who want proof of sustained requisite performance prior to restart. I reaffirm my strong support for the establishment of an effect!ve employees' safety concerns program, but the fact is that I do not agree with many of those actions that have had little relationship to safety. And especially, I do not agree with not making the difference clear to the pople of this country.

From the perspective of the media and the public, extraordinary regulatory requirements imposed by a health and safety agency manifest a dangerous health and safety issue. " Millstone" was not and is not a dangerous health and safety issue.

" Millstone" was an issue of poor handling of employees' safety concerns, a weak corrective action program, and deficiencies in design-basis documentation. It required careful fixes and additional regulatory attention. Because of uncertainty at the beginning of the Millstone saga, it was appropriate to determine whether the public health and safety were compromised. However, the ensuing response was out of

.s ,

2 proportion to the potential hazard to public health and safety. The enormous costs of the protracted response -in terms of time, fear, and money - to the people of

. Connecticut, to the employees of Millstone, to its many " mom" and " pop" investors, and

. to the NRC's health and safety mandate, are staggering.

I praise the staff efforts in working through the mazes of technical and regulatory issues. I also commend the Commission efforts to involve the concerned public and

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- respcnd to their queries. In the Commission's meeting on June 2, the staff assured the Commission that we have fair, equitable, accountable, transparent, and reasonably -

implemented processes to monitor Millstone activities and ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. The vote on Unit 3 should be the beginning of learning how

^not to escalate regulatory issues and how to manage them with due process and with

. sound and rieliberate decision-making. Policy formulation and implementation to prevent reoccurrence should start at Commission level.

On_the basis of documents, briefings, my visit to_the site and my own review, I approve the restart of Millstone Unit 3 under the conditions recommended by the NRC staff. I also recommend that the Millstone Units be permitted to operate in accordance with L their licenses as soon as feasible, and without a third party interposed between the licensee and the NRC Both the licensee and the NRC have to fully discharge their duties and responsibilities. Therefore, the Special Project Office should discontinue activities for Millstone by September 30,1998, and independent third party oversight

- should be' discontinued as soon as feasible. - Millstone Unit 3 should ste.M on its own feet and be allowed to operate as required by its license, fully under the iicensee's management control. Any significant deviations from a status of edequate protection of health and safety in these units should be brought immediately to the Commission's attention for appropriate action.

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