ML20197C611
| ML20197C611 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/09/1984 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197C372 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-49FR30726, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-73 AA36-2-028, AA36-2-28, AB17-2-26, SECY-84-072, SECY-84-72, NUDOCS 8611060296 | |
| Download: ML20197C611 (22) | |
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%.? ,ch RULEMAKING ISSUE (Information)
February 9,1984 SECY-84-72 For: The Commi nic, From: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE PROPOSED INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES (SECY-83-311 AND SECY-83-311A)
Purpose:
This paper responds to the October 7,1983, memorandum from the Secretary (M83-1004) to provide further background infor-mation on the proposed Insider Safeguards Rules (SECY-83-311 and 83-311A). Information is also included related to comments provided by industry and union representatives during the December 1,1983 Commission meeting pertaining to the proposed rules.
Background:
The proposed Access Authorization portion of the Insider Safeguards Rules is the result of a rulemaking process which started with a proposed rule requiring a clearance program for both fuel cycle facilities and power reactors. That rule was transmitted to the Commission in 1977. A Hearing Board was convened at that time at the request of the Commission to resolve the considerable controversy that surrounded that proposal. The resultant directive to the staff in June 1980 asked for a separate Access Authorization Rule for power reactors to be based on the recommendations of the Hearing Board. The staff's procosed Insider Safeguards Rules include
. provisions for an access authorization program consistent with both the Hearing Board recommendations and the Comission's direction. The staff effort in response to Commission direction to develop a rule with more specific criteria was accompanied CONTACT:
T. Allen, NMSS 42-74010 l
8611060296 861104 I PDR PR 50 49FR30726 PDR
l The Commission !
- concurrently with an industry effort to revise ANSI Standard N18.17 to include more specific criteria. Essentially, the Hearing Board recommended and the Commission endorsed an Access Authorization Rule based on ANSI Standard N18.17 consisting of background investigations, psychological assessment, and behavioral observation. The Hearing Board went on to say that the rule should include more specific criteria for establishing an industry administered program. A summary of major findings of the Hearing Board is provided as Enclosure A. A discussion of the value and limitations of the components of the Access Authorization Rule is provided in Enclosure B.
In directing the staff to develop an Access Authorization Rule, the Commission recognized that it would address the approved design basis threat, specifically the insider adversary.
j Security-related incidents are reviewed on a continuing basis
- to reassess the validity of the design basis threat. In addition j to information provided to the staff by the Intelligence ,
Community, events which take place at nuclear power stations are also considered. A brief discussion of pertinent NRC and DOE 1
events is provided as Enclosure C.
Discussion: The proposed Insider Safeguards Rules were the subject of a Commission briefing which took place on October 4,1983. During this briefing and the December 1 industry briefing certain issues arose upon which the Commission desired additional i information. The balance of this paper provides background information and observations pertinent to the issues raised i by the Commission during these meetings under the captions set forth below.
< BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION 1
[ The background investigation is one of the three basic elements l
of the trustworthiness program included in both the original ANSI Standard 18.17 and its recent revision, ' ANSI 3.3. Background
{
- investigation programs are the most . extensively used program in industry and government to assess individual ~ reliability and l
trustworthiness. In gengral, the inclusion of the background j investigation as a regulatory requirement was endorsed by l
the' Hearing Board and all participants at the Commission
- meeting of December 1,1983. (See Enclosure B)
The Commission .
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT A requirement for a psychological assessment program wa's also recommended by the Hearing Board. Its use is endorsed in both ANSI 18.17 and the revised ANSI 3.3. While psychological assess-ments are not intended to detect potential saboteurs per se, they are considered an appropriate screening tool to assess reliability and emotional stability. Psychological testing has also been shown to be useful in the early screening-out of individuals who are obviously mentally unstable. Most licensees I have committed to a psychological assessment program in their security plans and employ this technique. The industry represen-i tatives at the December 1 meeting were in favor of psychological l assessment in general tems. However, they preferred that in j lieu of Commission-established requirements the language in ANSI I 3.3 be endorsed in a Regulatory Guide. The union representatives voiced objection to this approach, claiming that there would not 4 be a standard application ~ of such programs throughout the industry.
l Both the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 4 and the United Plant Guard Workers of American (UPGWA) supported psychological assessment as addressed in SECY-311A as a requirement.
(See Enclosure 3)
BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION The behavioral observation component of the access authorization program is also endorsed in both ANSI 18.17 and ANSI 3.3.
Industry representatives at the December 1 meeting were in favor of the concept of a behavioral observation program, however, recommended approval of the Fitness for Duty Rule as a
- substitute for the provision in the proposed Insider Rule. On the other hand, the IBEW endorsed the behavioral observation i program as presently addressed in SECY-311 and 311 A (See Enclosure B). The staff favors the behavioral observation
! provisions of SECY-83-311 and 83-311 A. The Fitness for Duty Rule is aimed at a different problem (to provide assurance that individuals are in a condition to safely perform their normal jobs), and the techniques for assessing fitness for duty may differ ;
j significantly from trustworthiness-oriented behavioral observation l procedures. The staff believes that it would be appropriate to ,.
I consider consolidating fitness for duty and trustworthiness rules at a future date only if it becomes clear that the two programs could realistically employ common techniques on an industry-wide basis, l
1
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The Commission ALTERNATIVE TO BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION During the October 4 meeting the Commission requested that the staff consider alternatives to the behavioral observation program. The only alternatives identified by the staff would involve updating the background information on. a periodic (5-year) basis. The staff prefers the behavioral observation program of SECY 83-311 and 83-311A over these alternatives on the basis of program cost and effectiveness. Background updates would also significantly detract from the benefits of grandfathering.
A discussion of the various aspects of the background updates and cost benefit considerations are set forth in Enclosure D.
STANDARDIZATION AND RECIPROCITY ,
Questions were posed during the December 1 meeting regarding the effect that NRC endorsement of ANSI 3.3 would have on the reciprocity provisions envisioned by both SECY-83-311 and 311 A.
Industry representatives believe that some reciprocity could be achieved under such an approach, however, they stated that it would require the use of audits on the part of individual utilities to assure the acceptability of standards used by other utilities. Again, both unions represented at the December 1, 1983, meeting were in f avor of across-the-board regulatory requirements as the only practical means to achieving uniformity of application of programs throughout the industry. This in turn would be in the interest of their members. The staff notes that most licensees have been operating access' authorization programs under commitments to meet ANSI standards for several years, yet the programs vary so significantly that little -
reciprocity could exist today. NRC endorsement of the ANSI standard as a substitute for a binding regulation would serve
( to perpetuate the current non-uniformity of screening programs.
The Hearing Board recognized this problem stating that:
"The Board is impressed with the staff's graphic presentation of the disuniformity in private industry compliance with screening standards. In the Board's view, this checklist of varied solutions demonstrates the need for a more explicit standard than that contained in ANSI N18.17. It also demonstrates the need for a rule to be issued by the NRC rather than by the industry so that it will be binding upon the affected licensees and contractors. The Board recommends that the~NRC design and' issue such a standard utilizing the screening alternatives that utilities currently employ."
6
/
i The Commission OTHER CONSIDERATIONS In the October 4 meeting, the Commission requested the staff to redefine the term " vital island" for the purpose of clarity.
The originally proposed definition was: " vital islands are sets of vital areas in which sabotage resulting in a significant-radiological release or reactor core damage or both cannot be
- accomplished without entry into at least one vital island."
s The staff proposes that the revised definition for vital island be: "one or more vital area (s) protected as a single entity."
The rule language of 573.55(c)(1) would be revised to require vital islands to be " configured to ensure that an individual must gain access to an island to. accomplish sabotage resulting in a significant radiological release or reactor core damage or both." (Additional explanation of vital islands is included
,' in the guidance document that will be published with the proposed l rul e. )
As a separate matter, the Commission requested information from the staff concerning screening programs in analogous
- industries. While no directly analogous industries were identified, the staff reviewed some programs that may be -
applicable to the nuclear industry. A discussien of screening requirements of the FAA, and a description of programs conducted by the airlines and the precious metals industry are provided as Enclosure E. The staff's review indicated that various forms of screening-are common in private industry, while the FAA has confined most of its screening requirements to its own employees (e.g. , air traffic controllers).
l In the December 1 Commission meeting, the IBEW expressed concerns that the review prucedure outlined in the Insider Rule package would not allow access to pertinent information by union representatives in cases where access authorization is being withdrawn by the licensee. It has been the staff's intention, as expressed in the guidance accompanying the rule, that an individual's counsel (who could be a union representative) should have full at..ess to records used to i arrive at a decision to withdraw access authorization. The staff will review the rule and guidance language in this 1
regard, and make whatever changes are necessary to clarify this intent.
i
The Commission The Safeguards Committee of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) submitted a written statement to the Commission (Enclosure F) when arrangements could not be made for INMM participation in the December 1,1983 meeting.- This statement cited the problems which resulted from non-standardization of industry screening programs developed under th'e ANSI standard. .
The closing two paragraphs of this statement read as follows:
"During this entire period, the nuclear power industry has cooperated with the NRC staff by providing formal and informal input to the regulatory process. A good faith effort has been made by the industry to be responsive to a rule that has been "just around the corner" for seven years. We now ask that the Commission demonstrate its responsiveness to the industry it regulates by approving publication of the proposed rule for public comment, with or without psychological assessnent. The industry we represent wants to settle the issue. Some of us have i' screening programs that would remain in place irrespective of your decision and some do not, but all of us want and, we think, deserve at a minimum the opportunity to inform you of our positions on this matter. Publication of the rule would also allow us to contribute to resolution of two other long-standing, unresolved issues: pat down searches and vital area designation and protection.
In summary, the INMM Physical Security Subcommittee and the Institute itself endorse publication of the Insider Rule for public comment. We want the issue resolved so that the vacillation may end and we all
- may refocus our efforts on the matters that most concern us all -- safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants."
Summary: In recognition of the need for additional protection against the insider and standardization in the industry, the staff believes that the Commission should move forward with publica-tion of either SECY-311 or 311 A without further delay. The staff could support either of the two proposed papers. The staff's position is supported to a large extent by statements of the industry and the affected unions and professional organizations.
l
+
The Commission Coordination: The Office of Policy Evaluatioh agrees with the staff recommendation to move forward and release the Insider Rule for public comment. OPE continues to prefer the SECY 83-311A format of the rule (psychological testing included in rule language).
i
( 6 h5c William T. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
A. Selected Excerpts from the Hearing Board Report B. Value & Limitations of Components of Access Authorization Rule C, flRC & DOE Events Involving the
. Insider D. Alternatives to Behavioral Observation E. Screening Programs in Analogous Industries F. INMM Statement to the NRC Commissioners 1
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ENCLOSURE A SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM ,
THE HEARING 20ARD REPORT The following excerpt, dealing with the Board's general views on trustworthiness programs and thei,r recommended approach, is taken from pages 33 through 35 of the Hearing Board Report:
"The Board is persuaded by the discussion of those who favor the use of .
personnel screening in order to ensure employee suitability and trustworth-iness. It is the general view of the participants that this screening can best be done by the private sector under an improved standard based on ANSI N18.17-1973 modified as discussed in Issue 2, infra. The Board finds merit in this approach.
This leads the Board to accept the Commission's invitation to recommend changes in the rule" as proposed. The Board is impressed with the staff's graphic presentation of the disuniformity in private industry compliance with screening standards (C.S. Table I, pp.15-15c). In the Soard's view, .
this checklist of varied solutions demonstrates the need for a more explic.it standard than that contained in ANSI N18.17. Italsodamonstratesthatn}ed for a rule to be issued by the NRC rather than by the industry so that it' will be binding upon the affected licenses and contractors. The Board recem-mends that the NRC design and issue such a standard utilizing the screening alternatives that utilities currently employ. (A detailed analysis of these alternatives is contained in the discussion of Issue 2, infra.)
1 i
In making this recommendation the Board urges the Commission to determine whether l'egal authority exists for the NRC to issue standards different ffemthosepromulgatedbytheSecretaryofEnergy(seeIssu'e2 discussion, infra). If the Commission decides that such authority'does not exist, the "i~e n Part 11 clearance rule proposed a government administered clearance pregram for fuel cycle facilities and power reactors.
9 Enclosure A
Scard, based on its conclusion.,with respect to Tssue 1, does not believe that the rule as proposed should be promulgated. The Board leaves to the Commission the question whether it should seek legislation to obtain such authority. If the Commission finds that it already has such authority, the-Board recommends that its alternative proposal:be made into a rule.
I Finally, the Board agrees with 'the staff that its rule (or whatever new one is proposed along she lines suggested here) should not apply to research reactors possessing non-formula quantities of SNM (see Issue 6 discussion, infra). If the Commission nonetheless chooses to adopt the staff's position on a security clearance program, the Board believ5s that .
I the staff could establish a need for the higher clearances only if'it sets ,
out specific criteria for deciding who gets what clearance and discusses how the burden of the higher clearances can be minimized."
4 The Hearing Board r'ecommended an industry administered screening program based .
on ANSI Standard N18.17. The following excerpt ffom the Hearing Board Report j (pages 65 and 66) discusses their recommendations.
"The Board recommends that the rule contain the following elements:
(1) the requirement for a background investigation of the personal and employment history of the applicant, including any criminal history information; (2) therequirementforapsychologicalscreen.ingprogram,whichshoIld j include at a minimum a' written psychological test, an interview by a j psychologist with any applicant indicated by the test to have possible emotional problems; and a system for continued observation
. by supervisors; (3) a reiquired appeal procedure, which could be through an industry management system or to a central NRC office (the latter would offer the advantage of inter-utility unf formity and control but may not be i econcmically feasible); and d
2 Enclosure A
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(4) . requirements for protecting infor..ation and personal privacy. by prescribing specific privacy requirements for all psycholeg.ical information and any personal or derogatory information in the file."
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ENCLOSURE B VALUE AND LIMITATIONS OF COMPONENTS OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE Backcround Investications: I The staff supports the use of background investi-gations for screening purposes because they assist in: (1) establishi,ng true identity, (2) predicting future behavior based on past actions, and (3) reveal-ing information in an individual's background that could make him/her susceptible to coercion. ',
The value of background investigations is evidenced by its extensive use by industry and government agencies. A 1979 GAO report
- states that for FY 1978 over 1 million background investigations were conducted on a government-wide basis. The Department of Defense nuclear weapon personnel reliability program (PRP) uses background investigations as part of its program "...to ensure the highest possible standards in individual reliability...." -
While background investigations are widely, accepted, some possible limitations do exist. These include 'the in)bility of background investigations to infall-iblypredictfuturebehavior,phivacyconsiderationsandtheproblemofmissing or incorrect data. ,
Psycholooical Testino: Federal agencies such as the NSA, CI'A, FAA, and Coast Guard, in addition'to the' private nuclear industry, use psychological testing as an initial screening tool to assess stability and reliability. Many local police departments use such testing to detect overly aggressive or potentially violent ' police officer candidates. The Minnesota Mul.tiphasic Personality
- Report by the Ccaptroller General of the United States, " Costs of Federal Per-sonnel Security Investigations Could and Should Be Cut," August 31, 1979.
1 En' closure B
Iny'entory (KMPI) test is extensively used for this purpose as is the Sixteen '
personality Factors Questionnaire (16 PF), which is a state-required screening device for po' lice officer candidates in Pennsyivania. Such assessment is often
> used to identify drug (including alcohol) abusers, viol.ence or recklessness, and other clinical symptoms relateo to ability to reliably perform job respon- _
sibilities. Psychological assessment 'is also used to quick 1y identify and screen out individuals with obvious mental problems. In this regard, the direct value of s,uch testing relates to both fitness for duty and access authorization screening.
i While psychological testing programs for reliability and stability screening .
'are currently endorsed and used by many o'rganizations, there are still scmeI recognized limitations. These would include potential inconsistencies in test, interpretation, and inability to always predict future behavior from the test results. ,
Behavioral Observation: The function of behavioral observation in th'a nuclear setting is in identifying serious behavioral problems when they occur, and providing a formal referral mechanism for individuals who as a result may pose j' a security threat to a utility and the public. The value cf this program is in performing a continuing assessment of an individual's reliability and trustwor'th-l iness thereby complementing one-time mechanisms such as background investigations and psychological assessment. Also, behavioral observation may serve as a basis
- for an employee assistance program.
i Sebavioral observation is often seen as an inherent feature of the work environ- '
ment. Possible problems associated with behavioral observation include abuses of.the program by supervisors (although the proposed program provides a sub-
! stantial review of adverse actions) and privacy considerations.
l 1 ,
2 Enclosure B _ _.
\
ENCLOSURE C NRC AND 00E EVENTS INVOLVING THE INSIDER The staff believes that N.RC and.00E experience indicates that the postulated insider threat is reasonable. The DOE Insider Adversary Study (June 1983) pro-vides data on the existence of an insider problem. For the period from 1970 to 1981, the report records 26 acts of industrial" sabotage and numerous 6ther insider events such as vandalism, bombings, and arson at 00E facilities. NRC licensees have hfhIalso experienced insider incidents which have disrupted plant operations or have had the potential of endangering public health and safety. Two of these incidents are: (1) the 1979 event at the Surry Nuclear Power Station where two employees damaged 62 new fuel assemblies by intention-ally pouring sodium hydroxide on them; and (2) the 1981 event at the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station where a manually o'perated valve in the high pres-sure safety injection system was found shut and the chain and padlock normally used to secure the valve were found missing. Additional information on the nature and quantity of safeguards events is provided in the Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), NUREG-0525. These events suggest that the potential for harm due to malevolent insider activity is a legitimate concern requiring regula-tory attention.
s
- 00E classification of events includes a category of industrial sabotage. How-ever, none of the events documented in that category would fit the NRC defini-tion of radiological sabotage.
1 Eamloaura C
ENCLOSURE D ALTERNATIVES TO BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION Although the staff prefers the behavioral observation program of SECY 83-311 and 83-311A, possible alternatives were reviewed for feasibility and cost-effectiveness.
. The staff considered a 5 year periodic reinvestigation to include the same components as the background investigation portion of the proposed Access Authorization Rule. The cost of such a program would present a sizeable burden to the industry (see cost estimates, below).
Secause of the high costs of a complete reinvestigation every 5 years, the-staff also examined a modified industry-administered 5 year reinvestigation program containing the following elements: (1) a check of the FBI criminal history files using fingerprints, (2) a check of local criminal records in areas of residence and employment during the last 5 years, and (3) a review of security questionnaires to be filled out by individuals seeking to continue their access authorizations (see sanple questionnaire following).
It is recognized that any form of reinvestigation contradicts the concept of grandfathering. The staff believes, however, that if the Commission elected to use background updates, the cost saving benefits of initial grandfathering are
~
great enough to justify a screeni'gn program that would contain both features.
1 Enclosure 0
?
COST ESTIMATES FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION FIGURES PER SITE j Option 1-Behaviorial Observation Training necessary for implementing a continual behaviorial l observation program ($30K [1501 persons / site x $2002/ person
[ assumed average salary for trainees for a 2-day period)) +
54K [ instructor cost and overhead for 10 training classes of 15 trainees each]). 534K Cotion 2-Cccolete Backcround Investication ,
An investigation necessary to establish an individual's true identity, character and the employment, credit, education and criminal histories (cost assumes an averag'e of 1500 persons /
site x S2503/ investigation). 5375K Ootion 3-Modified 5-Year Reinvestication Reinvestigation update includes a local law enforcement records check, a fingerprint check with the FBI, and a forms review (cost assumes an average of 1500 persons / site x S354/ reinvestigation). S52.5K
~
1 Licensee and contractor supervisors (foremen and above),
2 Cost estimates based on informal data receiuad from seven utilities and the Atomic Industrial Forum.
3 Cost estimates based on informal data received from two private investigative f.irms, seven utilities and the Atomic Industrial Forum, 4 Estimate supplied by Division of. Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
2 Enalasura 0
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CONTIiiUATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATION The disclo'sure of this information is voluntary. However, failure to supply all or any part of the requested information may result in a delay in determin-ing your eligibility for the continuation of your access authorization.
- 1. PRINT NAME:
(last) (first) (middle) -
- 2. CURRENT ADDRESS:
,, (street)
(city) (state) -(zip code)
. 3. BIRTHDATE:
(month) (day) (year)
- 4. PLACE OF BIRTH:
(city) (county) (state)
- 5. Within the last 5 years, have you ever been convicted of any lav violations or are you now under indictment for a law violation *? Do not include minor traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $100.00 or less. . YES NO
- 6. If answer to Question 5 is "Yes", complete A, B, C and D for each instance.
'A. -
DATE (mo/ day /yr) of conviction (s)
B.
(city) (county) (state)
PLACE WHERE CONVICTED C.
CHARGE D.
PENALTY / DISPOSITION (if pending, indicate so)
"Yes" ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS (7, 8, 9, and 10)
MUST BE EXPLAINED. USE ITei 11 OR ADDITIONAL' SHEETS, IF NECESSARY.
- 7. During the last 5 years, has your use of alcoholic beverages ever resulted in the loss of a part-time job outside o.f this
- utility, or treatment for alcoholism? YES NO ;
l I
- Payment of a fine or forfeiture of bail is considered a conviction. )
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Enclosure 0 __- , . _ _
"- . . . . . . . . . . _ _ . . . -. .. _. 'I 1 -
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CONTINUATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATION ,
(continued)
- 8. Are you now a user of any narcotic,
- depressant, , i stimulant, hallucinogen (to include LSD or PCP) o'r cannabis (marijuana or hashish,etc.) except as prescribed by a licensed physician? YES NO
- 9. During the last 5 ye.ars, have you been treated for drug abuse by a physician' or have you ever lost a part-time job outside of this utility because of the use, possession, purchase, or sale of any narcotic? YES NO
- 10. During.the last 5 years, have you been treated by a .
physician for a mental, emotional, psychological, or -
personality disorder? YES NO
- 11. ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR FURNISHING INFORMATION IN ITEMS 1 to 10. '(If more space ,
is required, attach additional sheets with your name, item to which you are responding, and your signature /date on each sheet.)
ITEM NO. .
. s CERTIFICATION: Eefore signing, be sure you have read all the above questions, the detailed instructi~ons, the Privacy Act Statement provided for the form, and the following certification statement:
I certify that the information furnished in answer _ to these questions
. is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. I make this statement voluntarily with the understanding that the information wi11 be used as indicated in the Privacy Act Statement and in accordance with the authorities identified therein. I understand that any false statement or omissicn of a material fact may be sufficient ~cause for revocation of my access authorization., . ,
% l I
Usual Signature of Person Filling Date Signed Out Questionnaire -
4 Enclosure _0 ;
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ENCLOSURE E
. SCREENING PROGRAMS IN ANALOGOUS INDUSTRIES The staff obtained information on personnel screening programs in non-nuclear industries. The staff found no direct parallels to the nuclear industry due to the unique nature of the commercial nuclear power industry in' terms of the potential consequences of radiological sabotage resulting from insider calevolence. .
The FAA has established a special category of individuals who must undergo special qualifications and suitability screening, i.e. , airmen category (pilots, cockpit crews and air traffic controllers). The FAA believes these individuals have " critical skills" which, if suddenly diminished, could adversely impact aviation safety. Screening for the airmen category of individuals involves a comprehensive medical examination that includes inquiry into the areas cf alco-hol and drug abuse. In addition, FAA air traffic controllers undergo psycho-r logical testing and a government administered full-field background investiga-tion; A recent agency proposal would require controllers to acknowledge the danger of abusing drugs on the job and sign a statement declaring that they do not use illicit drugs.
Commercial airline pilots undergo a background investigation only for cause, i.e. , when derogatory information is developed during the medical screening process. Non-cockpit commercial Eirline personnel (i.e.., stewardesses and mechanics) are not required by the FAA to receive special screening. One major airline contacted screens. all of it's applicants and employees by using a structured pre-employment interview and psychological examination and has 1 Enclosure E
~ - -- -
. established a contract with a private investigations firm for background checks on all employees. The following table outlines the FAA requirements:
FAA REOUIREMENTS1 l Comprehensive Medical-Personnel Exams, Inquiry on Psychological Background Category Alechol end Druo Abuse Tests . Investigation Pilots, Cockpit, yes no for Crew . cause Air Traffic 2 "
Controllers yes yes yes
- l. ~
Stewardesses, -
Mechanics 2 no no no
'One major airline contacted uses structured pre-employment interviews.,
. psychological examination, and background checks on all employees.
- Air Traffic Controllers are FAA employees.
' Work of airline mechanics is monitored through redundant inspections, A major precious metals supplier and user which was surveyed indicated that pre-employment screening is conducted on all employee applicants by a contract investigations firm. These investigations are designed to confirm education and employment histories and to ascertain character / reputation information.
This program is industry-initiated; the government does not require screening at these facilities, as would be expected, since this industry is not regulated as are the nuclear and airline industries.
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4 2 Enclosure E
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w i t l, ,i Statement to the'NRC Commissioners. .
on the Insider Rulemaking (10 CFR 73.s6)
Dece$.ber 1, 1983 1
hi.s' statement has been .c'recared bv_. the Ph}'sical security. sub- .
c Nu-Ot:.r.1:t ee c;. t.ne Sa..eguarts Committee or tn.e 2nstitute 1 ear Materials Management (INF95 ) and has been endorsed by the
_t represents :..ne unanimous reccamenc.ation c: t.ne nstitute. A ubcommittee's membershio. - .
The INF91 is an international, p cfessional crganizatica devoted to sa:ecuarcs anc security .in nuclear fuel ev.cle c.lan s, incluc.
,t s mam.aersnip or arcunc e,00'..as cra 2 I rem-Ang power raactors. _
stilities, national laboratories, DO3: facilities, .
architect-engineers, nuclear fuel manufacturers, and reacter manu:acturers.
The INF95 has established a standing Committee on Safeguards.
Its Subcommittee on ?hysical Security, which is spcasoring this' ' '
statement, includes representatives of fou'r nuclear utilities, centractors and censultants to, the nuclear i$dustry, and one national laboratory.' . .
The Insider Rule has a long and torture.d reculatory history.
The proposed rule and its predecessor have'been subject to on,e round of public comment, hearing board deliberations,'contj.nuing i NRC staff development and refinement, Safsty/ Safe $uardsCommit-tee scrtitiny, and GAO Analysis. Throughout this long regulatory process, NRC's reactor licensees have been struggling to be '
iresponsive to the Commission's and the industry's concerns about
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n EhCut tWO N. E ar s aC. C , ;* t'.ac tor 12. Cen s e e S 33C.a.n to reVleV t.ielr . . . .
iaccess a.:the::izatien crec. rams :..n accorcance witn tne ant:.c as. atic .
Discus-ccar.onents of the .cac<ac.e new re: ore tne.Cc.cission. .
!siens with NP.C licensing staffs led in sore cases to formaliza- .
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_1 cense acc.licants, c. a r t i c u 3_ a r ,_ v. , nave nac p:en.3. ems. ac.
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In tne mean:1me, acquisition c: cacxgrounc in ormat:..cn ca ap- . .. . .. .
clicants was neccming mere cirzicu t as more anc t:.ghter p,rivacy
. denstrai:2ts Vere enacted throughout the country. _Furtharmore, incustry was becinning to recognize that stancardiza.tien of Ehe'
- access autnerization process is in its. hest interest because .
uniformity is the basis f or the reciprocity desired by tha i;idu s t- y . In fact, the Phy*.siical Security Subccr=ittee nas been i
expicring the feasibility of ImiM's making a. mere direct con-tribution'to the' success of recent initiatives to accoire F3I c iminal history data' a.nd to develop a Nuclear . se
, Employee DaLa , -
S v. s t e m .
Durine this entire period, the nuclear power incustry has co-cperated .eich the N.:.C staff by OrcVidino, formal and informal .
in ut to the rec.ulz. tory
. . . orocess. .
A cccd faith eficrt has been
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" MANAGEMENT ,
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.s.s been ace :v. :ne incustrv. to sa reso.casive to a rule t.a.a t tst arCunc tne Corner ICr seve:n years. s.e W acW ' as.'( .th a t tne
.e . . .
- r.missica demonstrate its respon s iveness t o rne incustrv. it
- cc,ul at e s b..i a.o.:Ncvinc cublication .of the .croc. osed rula f or V i t.a C;* VitnCut p 5 yC no.3 cgi Ca .3 assessmant.
Tn.e
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.ndustry we represent .eants to settia tne issue- Scre of us .
- aVO screeninc procra33 that would rey.Lin in place i!!espective
- f. yc'Jr 52CiSicn aIE sObe do not, Out all df US '" ant and, Ve '
3
- hink, deser Je at a r.inimum tha cpportunity. to inf err. you of car ,
acsations cn t..n1s matter. ..uD.:Catacn 0 ^1.ie ru 3 e *..'Cu 3 o. also
. . , 3 .
allow.uS to :entribute to resciutica of tu'o other long-s tanding. . . .
pa . cown sez.rtnas z.no Vita 3 area cntipation
- nres o_vec issues:
..-_. . 3 ~ .~. c - s c "i. _4 c ,
In summary, the' I1O'd4 Phy,sical Security Subecmmittee and the . .
, Institute itselI encorse pus 3_1 cat.cn or t.ne'Insicer iu.3e Ier
.=ubli: comment. We want the issun resolved so that the vacil- i
.lation may end and we 5.11 may reIccus ocr ef f orts on the matters t*nat mest concern us all -- sa'f e and se:ure operation of nucletr .
ocwer olants.
.a ;*
mg.r.Y. - .
S. Krishna.murthy, Chairran IN._M Subccmmittee en
.hysical Security 0* e
@nC10Sure
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