ML20071H018

Response to Commission 830505 Order Establishing Procedures for Decision on Enforcement Action.Emergency Planning Deficiencies Not Significant.Nrc Enforcement Action Unwarranted & Improper.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20071H018
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	05/20/1983
From:	Morgan C MORGAN ASSOCIATES, POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8305240466
Download: ML20071H018 (43)

Text

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CCCKETED t;3SFC UNITED SUdES OF AMERICA 33 FM 20 P5:05 NUCLEAR REGULA1 DRY CCMiISSION BEFORE 'IEE CXM4ISSIONERS: ,

Nunzio J. Pall =Ai m, - Cb=i mari Victor Gilinsky John F. Ahearne

'1hanas M. Roberts _

James K. Asselstine -

_u 4

. .m . . ..-

In the Matter of )

)

CONSOLIIATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. ) Docket Nos.

(Indian Point, Unit No. 2) ) 50-247 SP

) 50-286 SP POWER AUmORITY OF THE SUdE OF NEN YORK )

(Indian Point, Unit No. 3) ) May 20, 1983

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POWER AUIEORITY'S RESPONSE 'IO CCMiISSION ORDER ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES EUR DECISION ON ENEORCD4ENI' ACI' ION - . _.

C.mies bbrgan, Jr.

Paul F. Colarulli Joseph J. Levin, Jr.

PORGAN ASSOCIATES, CHARTERED 1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 466-7000 8305240466 830520 PDR ADOCK 05000247 G PDR

) $b) _.. _ .._

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l TABLE OF O2TIENTS Page  !

l PRELIMINARY STATENENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I. TFSITE RADIOIOGICAL ENERGE2CI PIAtNING AT INDIAN POINr. . . . . . . 1 A. Background................................................ 1 B. Past Financial Support of Br&gsa'y Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 C. FEMA' s Assessnent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 D. Recent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 .

II. WES'ICHESTER COUNTY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 A. Resolution of Alleged Deficiencies........................ 6 B. Insignificance of Alleged Deficiencies.................... 9

1. ETMA' s Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2. Risk arri the Need for Evacuation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 III. TOCKEAND COUNTY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 A. Resoluticn of Alleged Deficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 B. 'Ihe Response Capability is Adequate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1. Ibckland County. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2. State of New York. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 C. Rockland County Cannot Be Allowed to Veto Nuclear Power............................................ 18 D. Risk and the Q3unty's Role............................... 23 IV. CIMPELLING REASONS SUPPORTING CNTINUED OPERATION. . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A. Econanic Impacts of a Shutdown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 B. Level of Safety of Indian Point Unit 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 V. CQHISSION'S MAY 5 ORDER DENIES POWER AUmORITY A. . . . . . . . . . . . 31 FAIR HEARDK3 CCNCWS ION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9

4 PRELIMINARY STATEMENP The Power Authority of the State of New York (Power' Authority),

licensee of Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant, subnits this ihus.andun in renne to the Nuclear Regulatory h4aaion's (%4aaion's) May 5, 1983 Order Establishing Procedures for Decision on Enforcenent A t ion.

Ebr the reasons set forth below, the Power Authority ~ subnits that the criteria established by the Ccmnissial for continued operaticn of Indian -

Point Unit 3 have been met. Specifically, the deficiencies noted by the Federal Bnergency Management Agency (FEMA) concerning the state of ener-gency planning in Westchester and Rockland Counties have been success-fully addressed. Even if the deficiencies had not been resolved, they are not significant. Additionally, 711ing reasons exist to permit continued operation of the plant. The Power Authority subnits that any enforcenent action by the 0 mnission is unwarranted, counterproductive, and pr d irally and constitutionally ligroper.

I. GTSITE RADIOI.OGICAL EMERGENCY PLAbNING AT INDIAN POINP A. Background _

Prior to the impleaentation of the Ctmnission's first detailed

, offsite energency planning regulations in Novenber 1980, the Power Authority had been ccmnitted whole-heartedly to energency planning both on- and off-site. Licensees1 have provided enornous financial support

1. (bnsolida'ted Edison Ccznpany of New York, Inc. (Con Edison) is licensee of the Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2. The Power Authority estimates that (bn Edison has spent approximately the same amount as che Power Authority cn offsite energency planning.

- over $17 millim - to state and local goverrrnents in direct pay-ments, equipnent, training, and other benefits since 1979.

'Ihe Power Authority recognizes that offsite emergency planning is enhanced by E-g+retion between the licensees and state and local gov-errinents. As a public benefit corporation,2 with a statutory mandate to provide lo w power to such customers as local governments, transit j systens, and public housirs projects, the Power Authority has a speial appreciation for this relationship.

B. Past Financial Support of Bnergency Planning

'Ihe Power Authority has contributed approximately $9 million of the i over $17 million in total fundirg arxi benefits provided by licensees to state and local goverrrnents around Indian Point. (An itami?=9 account-irg of the Power Authority's expenditures and other support of emergency planning is armixed hereto as the Appendix.) _ _ .. .

The first avraniituree were used, even before the new Ccmnission regulations be .e effective, to fund the position of coordinator of the Ebur County Nuclear Safety Ccmnittee and to pay consultants selected by l

( state and local governments to prepare evacuation travel time estimates and offsite radiological emergency response plans (RERP's) for the four surrounding counties of Orange, Putnam, Westchester, and Rockland.

'Ihose RERP's, developed by the consultants working closely with the licensees, the four counties, and the State, constitute the basis for the revised plans in effect today in Westchester, Putnam, and Orange

2. 'Ihe Power Authority is a corporate municipal instrumentality of the State of New York, exercising goverrrnental and public powers. Power Authority Act, N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law $ 1002 (McKinney 1982).

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c Counties.3 In fact, the successful refornulation of the RERP's by those counties denonstrates that Bockland also could have aanpleted its own plan by now. Ccmsultants paid by the licensees also developed the first draft of the State's radiological energency preparedness plan..

In additicn to the over $2 mi114m paid for developiry the RERP's, the licensees have paid a total of over $1.5 m4114m .to the State for _

offsite radiological energency planning purycees, a sizable amount of -

which a s passed directly on to the four counties. Moreover, the licensees have paid over $10 m4114m for itens for the State and counties such as an elaborate 146-unit siren system; an annually-revised and distributed energency plannirg brochure; portable survey kits; wterized meteorological / dose assessment system (MIDAS); ccmnunica-tiens equipnent; evacuation studies; fixed-site radiation nonitors; training s w imus and materials; public information s wims; State and .

county staff and ansulting positions; and support for a helicopter r w &ma for Rockland County. 'Ihe Power Authority also has funded the salary of the project coordinator for the Rxir County Nuclear Safety Ccunittee.

Licensees' support and cooperation has been acknowledged by offi-cials of the State and all four counties throughout the spial proceed-

3. A two-volune RERP was also prepared for, exercised, and used for scme time by Rockland County. The Rockland County RERP is still in existence, although it was formally disavowed by the Rockland County Iagislature in May 1982. Resolution No. 320 (May 18, 1982). Licensees paid the full cost of developing that plan. 'Ihcre is no reason why that plan could rot be used if there were an emergency today; the Power Authority believes that the draft plan now being finalized by Bockland County is substantially based on the earlier RERP.

C ing being conducted by the Atanic Safety and Licensing Board (Licensing Board). The Director of the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group (REPG) testified that the licensees have provided fuming, train-ing,. equipnent, and other assistance well beyond that required by law.

Tr..at 11453-57.4 Phil Schner, Orange Cbunty's emergency planning chief, testified that the licensees provided his county.with "a tranend-i ous amount of . . . sophisticated equipnent" including " sophisticated dosimeters . . . computers, telefax machines, telephones, really any-  !

l thing we requested to insure that our plan would work." Tr. at 12094 I I

(emphasis added). Michael Scalpi, Putnam County's Civil Defense Direc-tor, also stated that the " utilities, also, gave us all kinds of equip-ment. As a matter of fact, anything we want, they have been more than i

decent about giving us."

Tr. at 12095 (emphasis added) . Both the l 1

present and Sormer Westchester County Executives have acknowledged the I

" good faith efforts" by licensees and their role in significantly improving offsite emergency planning over the past two years. Tr. at 5889 (Del Bello); Direct Testimony of Westchester munty Executive Andrew P. O'Rourke. Even Rockland County, whose avowed objective is the shutdown of Indian Point, has acknowledged the contributions made by licensees there. Tr. at 3794-95 (McGuire, J.); Tr. at 4023, 4168-69 (McGuire, D.).

C. FDR's Assessment The Wiaaion's May 5 Order was prcznpted by Fa%'s April 15, 1983

4. Transcript and exhibit references denote citations to the official record in the Indian Point special proceeding.

Post Exercise Assessnent of the March 9 IMian Point fn11amle emergency planning exercise. Both there and in its Decenber 1982 interim find-ings, FEMA lauded the dramatic progress recently made in emergency plan-ning around Indian Point, and concluded that many earlier deficiencies .

had been corrected. NotwithstaMing its generally favorable assessment, however, FENA declined to certify the overall adequacy of emergency planning, cir.ing concerns about a lack of agreements -with bus operators m .

and a need for additional training in Westchester County, and Rockland Cbunty's lack of cooperation in the exercise. '1he Power Authority con-tinues to believe that FENA's Post Exercise Assessment presented an irv=plete and inaccurate picture of these two issues.5 See Intter frm J. P. Bayne, Executive Vice President, Power Authority to Ccanissioners (May 3,1983) (Bayne Istter). Nevertheless, actions taken by the

5. Additionally, basing enforcement action on FEMA'a assessment is inoyr vyriate because it would subject the Power Authority to unreason-able,' arbitrary regulations. FEMA rW as4 that its regulations are not coordinated with those of the Ccmniscion. See, e.g., Ietter fran Ime M. '1hanas to William J. Dircks at 2 (Dec.17,1552) ("the 120 day time frame in NRC's regulations is not keyed to the FEMA planning and preparedness evaluation process"); Letter fran Frank P. Petrone to Dave l McIoughlin at 3 (Apr.14,1983) ("the CFR 350 process of FEMA does not l

lend itself to tight deadlines"); Istter fran Assistant Associate Direc-tor Richard W. Krium to Samuel J. Chilk at 16 (Krimu Iatter) (inconsis-tent regulations govern exercises). Ambiguous or misinterpreted regula-tory guidelines have resulted in misallocaticm of functions between the

&-imaion and FEMA. '1he Atanic Energy Act and Ccmnission regulations make clear that the Ccmnission is reogmible for ultimately determining whether the public health and safety is adequately protected against radiological accidents. FEMA's role is simply to report the status of l emergency plans. A Canmission decision based solely on FEMA's report would necessarily exclude Ccmnission judgments about the plant's safety, risk, and accident scenarios.

The regulations are also unreasonable and arbitrary because they assume the cooperaticn of state and local governnents (see, e_.g.,10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E), but provide no means for the licensees, Ccmnission, or FEMA to empal such cooperation.

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licensees, state and local goverrments, and other parties over the past several weeks are sufficient to resolve those alleged deficiencies, iMa==dently of their significance.

D. Recent Actions _ _ _ ._ _

As detailed below,6 licensees, the State of New York,_and West- .

chester (bunty have worked intAnsively over the past .several weeks to renedy the concerns expressed by FENA. In Westchester, licensees and munty offir 4=1s have resolved FEMA's objections by obtaining cmmit-ments frczn bus owners for buses to re.ucxd to a radiological emergency and by initiating a training pt @ ma for drivers. In Rockland, the State has rewritten its energency plans to clarify for FEMA that the State's c.ugasatory plan allows the State to direct or supplanent a response to a radiological emergency, with Rockland County providing the actual resources (which it has pledged to do). Consequently, the facts no longer warrant enforcement action.

II. WEECHESTER COUNTY A. Resolution of Alleged Deficiencies According to FEMA, the only significant deficiency remaining in Westchester County emergency planning was a lack of written cmmitmants frcm bus operators and a need for additional training.7 This deficiency

6. See Sections IIA and IIIA, infra.

7. The basis for FENA's finding a deficiency in this area is not clear. Before the Licensing Board, FEMA agreed that, given the require-ments of the exercise scenario, the evacuaticn and transportation actions in Westchester County on N rch 9 were adequate. Tr. at 14893.

l This evaluaticn was also that of tha FEMA team leader in Westchester j County (Tr. at 14776-77, 14893; Con Edison Ex. 18) who, in a report written cn the evening of the exercise rated " Actions to Protect the l

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has now been resolved. Three bus -anies involved in the emergency plan have ocenitted approximately 1,000 buses to re pd in case of a Public" in Westchester as a "3" or " acceptable." Tr. at 14773-74. In addition, the Quiman of FENA's Regiorcl Assistance Comnittee has acknowledged to the Power Authority "that the observations regarding problems with bus drivers and routes set forth at pages 29-30 of the Post Exercise Assessment may not be accurate." Bayne letter at 9. Mis not only undercuts the basis for FEMA's conclusicns regarding bus utilimation in Westchester, but also raises general questions about the accuracy of the Post Exercise Assessment.

Hence, the exercise results could not provide a basis for FEMA's firding of a significant deficiency.

FEMA has indicated both before the Licensing Board (Tr. at 14977-78, McIntire) and in its May 4, 1983 Letter fr m Assistant Associate Director Richard W. Krimu to Samuel J. Chilk at 2 (Krima Letter) that its concern over the bus situation stemned fran testimcmy by the fonner Westchester County Executive and " sane bus drivers" that " bus drivers g not respond to evacuate the general population after the initial evacuation of school children was coupleted" (emphasis added). Se former (bunty Executive's testimony appeared to be only spelation.

Se only other witnesses to testify on the subject of buses were the owner of one of the largest bus conpanies involved in the plan, one bus driver, and a union official. %e bus owner testified that he believed nest of the drivers would respond in a radiological emergency. Direct i~

Testimony of Seth Cbrwin at 1. We driver testified that five of six drivers sampled in her garage indicated they would respord. Tr. at 10823 (Narod-Shiek). Se union official had no opinion as to whether the drivers would or would not respond. In Putnam County, where there are no contracts with bus drivers or owners (and FEMA evidently does not find then necessary (see Tr. at 14897-98, McIntire; Kawieski), 88 out of 100 bus drivers sampled stated they would r we to a radiological emergency. Tr. at 12135 (Scalpi). Mus, the testinmy fran the i

hearings also does not support FEMA's finding.

Finally, FEMA has just recently further clarified that its concern was that bus drivers wxtid not re.g4 to a so-called "secord wave" assi p = i after first transporting school children. Krimn letter at 2. mis situation was based cn the former "tw>-wave" evacuation procedure. That procedure has been revised by the "O'Rourke plan,"

devised by the new 0:xmty Executive to di=ias schools at the earliest stages of an incident at Indian Point. Although the early dismissal plan was successfully exercised on March 9, FEMA did not evaluate it because the revised procedure allegedly had not then been incorporated into the written plan. (While the early d4 =ianal option has always existed in the radiological energency response plans, the revised procedure femalives the intent to use it. Mareover, State law requires schools to have generic early dismissal plans, so implementing pro-codures are already in place.) The revision of this procedure provides another reascn why the alleged deficiency w;:.s without basis.

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radiological energency, over twice the nunber of buses required under.

the worst case scenario of the RERP. Bis ocmnitment is being cmfima1 by a letter of intent. mis is the step which FDR prescribed in order to elinnnate the so-called "significant deficiency" in West.c.3sster _.

03unty. Tr. at 14977 (McIntire). . . ._

Although not required by FD%, licensees have undertaken the addi- _ _

+4 e=1 step of funding a $241,725 canprehensive transportation study for .

Westchester County.8 This study, scheduled for ocmpletion within ten months, will reexamine the County's transportation network, the demand for buses in the event of an emergency, bus routes, and alternatives to street bus pick-up points in the event cf an energency. Me study will be conducted by the Transportation Planning Study Group, an organization of bus operators involved in the emergency plan. mis group recently coupleted a similar study with excellent results in Orange County.

We final 0 - Oient of the recent emergency planning efforts is the acceleration of the training program for bus drivers. A nunber of drivers have already received initial training in radiological emergency procedures. A total of sone 1,600 will be trained by June 9, or more

than three times the numbers of drivers potentially needed under the RERP. EblioM training is also scheduled.9 . _

8. Such a stix 1y was requested by Westchester (bunty. Se Power Authority notes, however, that the existing evacuaticn time estimates have been endorsed by the NRC Staff. Testimcny of Dr. 'Ihanas Urbanik, II Concerning the Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for IIxlian Point, Units 2 and 3, at 3.

i

! 9. In In re Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear ~

Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), 2 C Q N.R.R. T 30,773, at 30,746 (1983), the Appeal Board ruled that twin reactors could ccmnence opera-

l i

In addition, licensees are voluntarily training approximately 200 of their own enployees as a backup pool of bus drivers. Me training has already ccmnencei and these anployees are scheduled to be trained and 14 - ==i before June 9, 1983. B e State has delivered 1,000 dosimeters to the Westchester Cbunty Department of Transp3rtatico for possible use by bus drivers. .

-- Resolution of these transportation matters was amlished throuJh continued close cooperaticn among the licensees, the State REPG, the County Executive, and bus operators and drivers.

B. Insignificance of Alleged Deficiencies Notwithstanding the successful efforts to satisfy FEMA's objec-tions, the Power Authority continues to believe that the significance of the bus issues was overstated.

1. FEMA's Analysis _ _ _ .

FEMA did not examine the actual denand for buras. Be Post Exer-cise Assessment assunes, without analysis, that car-pooling, ride-sharing, and ad hoc transportation measures would be inMaquate. But a survey introduced by the intervenors before the Licensing Board indi-cates that only 3% of the population believe they would require bus transportation in the event of a radiological energency.10 his is a far smaller percentage than the 11% or ncre conservatively estimated in tion even though bus drivers had rot been trained, conditioned on the initiation of a training ptwican within 120 days. Were is even less reason to disallow cxxtin-i operation Ct Indian Point, where most drivers will have been trained by the Ccmnission's shutdown deadline, and nuclear plants have operated safely for 20 years.

10. Testinony of Roger Seasonwein on Ccmnission Question 3, at T-17; Bayne Letter, Ex. K.

the plans. FBR also did not evaluate the early diamianal plan for school children, which would drastically reduce any demand for buses.ll

2. Risk ard the Need for Evacuation - . . . .

'1he probability of any person near the plant incurring adverse health effects is extremely small even assunire that no protective response occurs for one day.12 Evacuation by bus is not important in a the case of a rapidly developing accident and ample time exists for a -

slow evacuation even at walking speed for the gradually evolving acci-dent. Assuning a rapidly developire accident, the risk posed to West- ._

chester (bunty rs==ina very small whethar sheltering followed by reloca-tion or evacuation is enployed. '1herefore, given the accident profile of Indian Point Unit 3, the absence of contracts with bus drivers cannot constitute a significant deficiency in energency preparedness.

Potential serious accidents at the plant can be divided into those that evolve very slowly and those that develop rapidly. The first type

11. Ebrthermore, substantial indications exist that bus use prob-

lems are not unique to Indian Point. Irdeed, FD% recognized the gen-eric nature of the problen in its recent study, " Generic Deficiencies in off-Site anergency Preparedness at Contnercial Nuclear Power Plants" (Bayne Istter at 11 & Ex. N). EB R conceded that not all regions require contractual carmitments for buses. FD R Answer to Licensees' Interrogatory 19 (Apr. 29, 1983). EDR has yet to provide vific details about these generic deficiencies or measures t.' ken in other regions. Before the Licensing Board, FDR's witnesses admitted they did not know how many of the sites FDR approved pursuant to proposed 44 C.F.R. Part 350 have contractual crmnitments fran bus owners or drivers. Tr. at 14903-04.

Selective action against the Indian Point licensees for a generic problem would not only be unwarranted, but unconstitutional as well.

12. See Section IVB, infra. __

has a median frequency of once in about 170,000 reactor years.13 Ebr ._

this accident, characterized by a gradual overpressurization containment failure, there would be a mini == of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and nere likely at least one day between accident initiation and any rad 4= M ve release.14 This is certainly sufficient time to implement adequate protective measures, irelmiing very slow evacuation, even under less than ideal condi-

- tions.15 Although this acx:ident would rot likely cause- early fatali-ties, there is a once in about 100,000,000 reactor years chance of increasirg the background cancer fatality rate by one percent. Evacua-tion has little effect on this risk because it is largely determined by lorg term exposure.16 The s w u type of accident, developing rapidly and bypassing containnent, is very unlikely, and has e madian frequency of once in about 25,000,000 reactor years.17 This accident is the aminant contributor to early fatality risk. Even unraaliatically assuning that no cne would evacuate or take vial shelter for one day followirr; a rapidly developire accident (people would continue their usual daily

13. Licensees' Testimony on Ocmnission Question One, Board Question 1.1, and Ccntenticn 1.1, at 24; IPPSS Amendment One at 8.1-5.

14. Tr. at 7337; Licensees' Testimony on Ctmnission Question One, Board Question 1.1, arxi Contention 1.1, at 24.

15. Additionally, during this one day delay, raaim> tive products would be lessened by natural processes and the plant operators would have time to attempt recovery precluding any aLccopieric release. Id.

16. Id. at 27, 30.

17. Licensees' Testimony of Dennis C. Bley, Donald F. Paddleford, Thams E. Potter, and Dennis C. Richardson cn Ccmnission Question Five at 13; IPPSS Amendment One at 8.1-5.

. C.

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t activities), the average risk of early fatality to an individual within l

a mile of the plant would be one in about 19,000,000 for each year of reactor operation.18 Furthermore, sheltering followed by relocation would be an adequate l

and effective protective response for rapidly developing accidents.

After sheltering, sme persons in a small area may need to be relo-

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cated. 'Ihis small ntnber of people would not have tc>-travel far because -

even with the nest unfavorable ausmpieric mnditions, the distance frcm the center of sudt a sector to its edge would be less than one and one-half miles.19

'Ihis approach would thus require fewer Cbunty resources, in par-ticular obviating the need to quickly provide bus transportation.

'Ihe NBC Staff's analysis concluded that, regarding early fatality risk, "an anticipator ( evacuaticn energency response is not, cn the average, appreciably lower than the risk with early [8 hours after pitze passage] relocation."20 III. BOCKLAND CCENIY

'Ihe Power, Authority continues to believe that certain prcminent figures in Rockland County are more concerned with permanently shutting

! 18. Lic'ensees' Testimcny on Ocmnission Question one, Board Question 1.1, and Contention 1.1, at 120a.

19. Licensees' Testimcny on Ccmnission Question one, Board Question 1.1, and Contention 1.1, at 119, 122-25; see Direct Testimcny of Frank Bbwscane and Roger Bicni Concerning Camission Question 1

[IV.B], at 7,12-13; Direct Testinony of Frank Bowscme and Roger Blond Concerning Cr-nission Question 5, at B-13.

20. Direct Testimony of Frank Ibwscme and Pcger Blond Concerning Ccmnission Question 1 [IV.B], at 12 (euphasis added) .

I the Indian Point plants than with expediting the approval process for a plan already drafted by the Cbunty's Office of Bnergency Services.

The licensees worked with Rockland County officials between 1979

- and the (bunty's withdrawal fran the four-county process in mid-1982 in m an attenpt to develop a plan Teeptable to all parties. Licensees have --

-- provided nearly $3 million in equipnent, services, and . funding to Ibck-1- ~ - ' land (bunty for energency planning since 1980. Notwithstanding the __

Cbunty's fonnal withdrawal fran the coordinated process -last year, -

licensees have attengted to maintain an ongoing M=lerpae with County officials. Licensees have supported the State's recent effort to clarify and amend its hwaating plan for Rockland County, which they believe would be fully effective to protect the population in the event of an energency.

A. Besolution of Alleged Deficiency FDiA's apparent basis for finding the energency planning exercise inadequate in Bockland (bunty turns en the County's failure to adopt a plan of its own and to participate with its own personnel in the March 9 exercise. As FH4A ramgnized in its Decenber 1982 interim findings,

( however, these problens were created by Bockland County itself and are l

j entirely within the County's power to correct. May 5 Order at 3; FDIA l

Update Report at 7-9 (Dec. 16, 1982).

Rockland County, which is not directly served by either of the Indian Point plants,21 has consistently sought their .imnediate

21. Although the principal electricity provider in Pbckland County

! does not purchase power directly fran Indian Point, it does purnhase l power fran the Power Authority's James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power

i shutdown.22 In May 1982, the Rockland County Iagislature I=M a resolution withdrawing frm further participatim .in the coordinated radinlogical emergency planning effort by the licensees, State of New York and neigh-boring munties. At the same time, however, the county resolved .tc par- _

t ticir=te fully in the event of an actual radiologicalenergency.

- - Reso-lution No. 320, at 3. Subsequently, Rockland County agreed to accept and has in fact received funding and training fra the State of New York, ard has made substantial W w ss on drafting its own emergency plan. Although Ibckland officials participated in the early morning hours of the March 9 exercise ard observed the entire event, the (bunty Iagislature prevented them fra actively participating during normal business hours.23

- 'Ihe State of New York has recently canpleted an intensive effort to -

resolve any doubts or ambiguities regarding the efficacy of the State empensating plan for Bockland County. -

Subsequent to Rockland munty's formal withdrawal frcm emergency i

! plant and benefits frmt other facilities. It would saffersignificant~

l penalties if Indian Point were shut down. See Licensees' Testim:ny of l Eugene T. Meehan on Wi=sion Question 6, at 33, a copy of which was l l annexed to the Bayne Ietter as Exhibit A. )

22. For exanple, Rockland County seeks the shutdown of Indian j Points in a case pending in the United States Cburt of Appeals for the ,

Second Circuit, County of Ecckland v. NRC, No. 83-4003 (2d Cir. filed '

Jan. 5, 1983), and has appeared as an " interested state" in the Licensing Board hearings.

j 23. On May 16,1983, the M.11ti-Services Ommittee of the Rockland i County legislature voted a resoluticn to consider acceptance of an interim energency plan. On May 19, however, the Cbunty legislature defeated an attempt to bring this resolution to the floor for a vote.

l

. I

' l 1

l f

planning in May 1982, New York State adoptai a ocupensating plan for use in the event of a radiological emergency. S e ocupensating plan was exercised on March 9.  % e recently revised ocupensating plan enables the State to use its own and licensees' resources to augrnent or replace Rockland Cburity's own resources, if necessary, in case .of a radiological s

emergency. Pursuant to the clarified State plan, the State would pro- . . _

vide a 50-person core response team capable of waling in Itckland - -

County in a timely manner. Approximately 300 trained licensee siployees ,

and consultants would be available, if necessary, to perform sudt tasks as traffic control, accident assessment, and decontamination.

21s acticri would address FDR's concern that the role of the State and appropriate resources in Rockland County had not been sufficiently t

4 defined. Indeed, the revised State plan should give Rockland County's 2 residents adequate protection. _  !

B. S e Response Capability is Adequate _

2e FDR Post Exercise Assessment did not even attstpt to evaluate Rockland County's actual response capabilities. Both the State and Rockland County, however, have demonstrated an adequate emergency response capability.

1. Rockland County --.

A deposition of Donald P. McGuire, Rockland County's emergency l/

(

planning coordinator, probed beyond the county's official non-participa-l tion in the exercise and revealed that acckland in fact is capable of performina its functions in conjunction with the State and licensees.

l Indeed, Mr. McGuire testified that county personnel could, if allowed, perform the tasks required by the exercise, and that he believed that 1

4 e

_ __ , - .__ .___.. _ ,_,,_ _ __ ___ ,___.,_ , , , . _ . - . . - . . _v__._,-,-.,.... ,_ _ . _ . . _ _ _ -

. . - . . - _ . , . , , - .m__ . . . _ . .

.. - _ - _ - . - . . - - . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ - = _ _ _ . . - . - _ _ . - . - _ -

I volunteers needed to support the response would, in fact, respord to an actual energency. Bayne Imtter, Ex. C at 18-20.24 Se FDR Poet Exercise Assessment also does rot reflect the sub-j -- stantial and mntirnde amount of training provided to Ibckland County ,

workers. Rockland County also participated in the March 1982 exer- -

cise. Mr. McGuire opined that his observation of the recent 1983 exer-cime was nore educational than his actual participaticn would have -

) been. M. at 112.

A recent Iractical denonstration confirms the avistence of Rock-

! land's capabilities. On April 12, 1983, the Osunty successfully evacu-I ated several hundred residents followirq a cb=nical fire. Bnergency i

organizations praptly rwsdad county-wide. In fact, key cfficials ,

i were notified with paging devices purchased with licensees' funds cor-

~

tributed to the radiological planning effort. Despite concern expressed i about the inperceptible nature of the chanical_ hazard, all personnel <

re p-ded. County officials were able to set up a cannand ard ccm-nunications center at the scene. Se rmarby population was alerted and shelters for evacuees were established cm an ad hoc basis. Mr. McGuire testified that the evacuation was a success. Id. at 102-06, 108.

i

+

mus, the most critical canponents of any emergency response -

organization, alerting, connunications, and coordination 25 - were

24. Se Power Authority notes the ananaly of FH%'s basing its deficiency finding in Westchester primarily cm the apa nation of a county elected official, while the agency has failed to consider the opinion of the leadirg professional emergency planner in Ibcklard.

25. FDR views " executive decisiorMnaking . . . in the county EDCs and the state EOCs [as the] heart ard soul of a successful disaster

clearly denonstrated by Rockland (bunty in an actual emergency.

2. State of New York _..

Se record contains extensive praise of New York State's demt:nstra-tion at the March 9 exercise. FEMA gave generally high marks.. to all l

inportant categories of the State's response incitxiing -shift changes,

~

anergency operations management, briefings, emergency classification system, monitoring, reception centers, ccmnunications,-assessment, public information, and protective action roccanendations. FDE Post Exercise Assessment at 38-43.

R1rthermore, ample basis exists to conclude that State and Ibckland County personnel could work together effectively in an actual emer-gency. We two jurisdictions worked well together ti the early morning hours of the exercise, before the Rockland Cbunty workers were precluded fran further participation.  :;

i Notwithstanding the withdrawal fran the plan, Ibckland County per-sonnel have continued to work with State personnel "[a]lrnost on an ongoing basis" to plan a response to a radiological energency. Bayne Intter, Ex. C at 26. mis incitries extmsive and continuing training l given to Rockland personnel and volunteers by the State.26 W e State's ccupensating plan is based upcn the Decenbar 1982 draft of the plan i Rockland is now engaged in fina1494rg.27 he, W Stau and Bockland response." Tr. at 15000 (McIntire). Re wwmnts identified above are essential elements of effective decision-making.

26. See New York State Ex. 9; Bayne Istter, Ex. D.

27. There may be scrne confusicn as to what " plans" actually exist for Rockland County. Se County's Office of Bnergency Services (OES) has virtually ccznpleted a radiological energency plan, principally

Cbunty p=.-4wal are well-acquainted with the plan that would be imple-manted in the event of an actual emergency. Bayne Letter, Ex. C. at 27-28. .

-In light of the demonstrated capabilities of the State and Rockland County and the recently revised State wgmatirg plan, FDCs alleged deficiency would be resolved. It is entirely reasonable.to expect that the State and the (bunty could jointly or irxiividually implement an _.

adequate response to a radiological energency.

C. Rockland County Cannot Be Allowed to Veto Nuclear Power acckland County's refusal to develop or implenent emergency plans cannot support any action by the Ccmnissicn to shut down Indian Point Unit 3. To find otherwise would give Rockland County, and similarly situated state subdivisions, an effective arri proliferatirg veto guer over safety decisions which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal regulation. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Q3nservation & Develognent Omnission, 51 U.S.L.W. 4449 (U.S.

authored by ttr. D. McGuire. ('Ihe only significant ccmponent currently missing frcm the draft plan concems the schools, but an ad hoc capabil-ity to evacuate the schools was successfully demmstrated during the March 9 exercise, and all schools are required by State law to have an early diamian1 plan for any type of emergency.) The OES plan is merely awaiting formal review arri approval by a citizens' panel and the acck-land County Iegislature. 'Ihe State wWaating plan is based cn the OES plan.

In addition, as noted above, ccusultants paid by the licensees have ccmpleted and distributed a voluninous plan tailored to Rockland County which, although not formally approved by the Cbunty, could be used during an actual emergency. Nothirq in the Crmmiasion or FDiA regula-tions requires emergency plans to be drafted or approved by a county.

Indeed, the c'enmiasicn recently stated that under its regulations and the NRC Authorization Act that the Omnission is obligated to review utility spcnsored emergency plans. In re long Island Lightina Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1), No. 50-322-OL, slip op. at 3 (N.R.C. M!Ly 12, 1983).

- 19 _

I Apr. 20,1983); FERC v. Mississippl, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (1982). The ..

potential for Ibckland County, or any local authority, to m n-guess the federal govennent's jQ=-d. with respect to the planning for radiological emergencies is endless. incal officials-will always be

- able to say that the federal govannent's j%=-4. is poor, inadequate or not far-reaching enough.28 ,

In Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4453-57, the Suprema _ _

(burt held that the Atcmic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, preempts any state attenpts to regulate the safety-related aspects of nuclear power.29 Although the state and local authorities have a potential role to play in developing and implementing emergency plans, see 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Apparv14v E (1982), ultimate responsibility for and judgment of

28. Ibckland County Resolution No. 320 is predicated al secc.=4-guessing the judgment of the re=n4Msion and FDR with respect to their decisions regarding the safe operation of the Indian Point units. For exanple, the Resolution concludes that " substantial inherent risks" exist at Indian Point, that there have been "nunerous violations of safety requirenents," ard that the existing roadway system cannot ,

"ae -- 0%te the safe and timely evacuation" of the citizens of Ibckland (bunty. Resolution 320, at 1-2.

29. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.

519, 557-58 (1978); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143,1153 (8th Cir.1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S.1035 (1972) . Specifi- ~

cally, the (burt found that California's statute "was aimed at wnTd.c problens, not radiation hazards," and es "outside the occupied field of l

nuclear safety regulation." Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 51 U.S.L.W. at l 4455, 4456 (favLcte cmitted) . Recent state attempts to restrict fed-eral regulatory authority over nuclear safety matters have been declared ura.udititutional. Washington State milaing & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630-32 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. May 3,1983) (state law banning storage ard dis-I pnaal of all icir, .sdical low-level rad 4mantive waste and spent fuel gen-erated outside Washington State unconstitutional); Illinois v. General Electric Co. , 683 F.2d 206, 214-16 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. May 3,1983) (state law prohibiting shipnent of spent nuclear fuel into Illinois for storage unconstitutional).

the adequacy of emergency preparedness and other safety matters is with-in the sole jurisdiction of the ch=4 =aion. Ibckland County's refusal to participate in federally-required emergency planning clearly frus-trates congressional policies. "'Ihere is little doubt that a primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act was, arxi continues to be, the prmatim of nuclear power." Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4457. __

Ibckland Cbunty's action, therefore, contravenes the supremacy -

clause of the United States constitution because it " stands as an obstacle to the accmplishnent arxi execution of the full purposes and objectives of (bngress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941),

and makes "cmpliance with both federal and state regulations . . . a

. _ _ _ physical knpcssibility." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.132,142-43 (1%3), qmted in Pacific Gas & Electric (b., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4452.

Consistent with Pacific Gas & Electric Co. is the recent Ch miasion decisicn affirming a Licensing Board opinion which rejects the so-called

" county veto." In re Iong Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), No. 50-322-OL, slip op. (Apr. 20, 1983) (Shoreham),

aff'd in part, No. 50-322-OL (N.R.C. May 12, 1983).

In the Shoreham case, Suffolk County's ds:isim not to adopt or implement an offsite radiological mergency response plan for the

! Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 m s used by the Cbunty as a basis l

l for its notion to terminate the operating license proceeding based cx1 the alleged legal impossibility of the applicant's ability to denon-strate cmpliance with energency planning requirements. 'Ihe Licensing Board denied the noticn holding that the applicant should be permitted

i to show that the state c2 offsite energency preparedness provides ade-quate protective measures even when a local county refuses to prepare or inplement an energency plan. Id. at 26-28. Characterizing suffolk County's inaction as "'preenption in reverse,'" the Licensing Board concitzled that "a decisicn to neither adopt nor implenent a radiological emergency response plan based on a state or local government's assess-J ment of what the public health arri safety requires is clearly precluded .

by federal law." Id. at 47-48, 56. Hence, the Licensing Board deter-mined that Suffolk County does not have a veto power over the operation of a nuclear facility. Id. at 23-24, 58 n.32.30 Such a veto power  !

30. Ib avoid an impamissible delegation of federal authority'to local governnents, the energency planning regulations should be inter-preted in one of two ways. S e first is that the regulations require local governments to participate in energency planning. "[T3he

[ Supreme] Court has upheld federal statutory structures that in effect directed state decision-makers to take or to refrain fran taking certain actions." FS C v. Mississippi, 102 S.Ct. at 2138 (federal energy statute required state regulatory cannission to carry out certain fed-eral functions); see Mishington v. Washington State Ommercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658, 692-% (1979); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 545 (1975); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1947). S e failure to require Rockland County's participation in ener-

, gency planning exercises, therefore, would be an abdication of federal jurisdiction and additionally would serve as a basis for estopping con-sideraticn of Ibckland Cbunty's rx:nparticipaticn as a factor which could affect the Power Authority's license to operate Indian Point Unit 3.

-Alternatively, the existing regulations are beyond statutory authority l because they 4_=ami=sibly delegate to local governments an effective

! veto power over nuclear facilities. Regulations must have a statutory foundation and be within the statutory authority granted the agency.

Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946). To allow state subdivisions veto power under the Cannission's emergency planning l regulations would not only be an imamissible delegation of jurisdic-tion to local governnents, but also would be a denial of due process.

By prcmulgating emergency planning regulations which are subject to the political choices of local voters, the Ostmission has, in effect, pran-ulgated standardless ani arbitrary regulaticns. In an analogous con-text, the Ninth Circuit recently struck down as standardless a state law requiring a referendue. as a pr-maiticn to further construction of l

1

-n-delegated to local goverrunent constitutes an 4===tasible delegatim of authority.31 Indesi, the Qmmission is "not only authorized" but also

" obligated to consider a utility plan submitted in the absence of State l l

l

_ _ and. local government-approved plans." In re Iong Island Lighting Co.,  !

No. 50-322-CL, slip op. at 3 (N.R.C. May 12, 1983). -

Accordingly, Ibckland County's refusal to develop and inplement an emergency plan canrot be considered as a basis for closing Indian Point Unit 3.

Indeed, it could very well be counterproductive to close the plants, even temporarily. If the plants are shut, Rocklarxi (bunty will lose any incentive it now has to ccmplete the develognent of its own nuclear power plants. O ntinental Illinois National Bank v. Washirygton, 696 F.2d 692, 700 (9th Cir.1983). Therefore, the Ccumission's emer-gency planning regulations, in the absence of an assertion of federal authority to ev==1 state subdivision conpliance, also violate due process.

31. 'Ihe potential problems of a veto power for local goverranents has received substantial marW attention. One article indicates that only 16 of the 53 nuclear power sites have formally approved emergency plans. Evacuation Issue Threatening Nuclear Plants, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1983, at Al, col. 3. Donald P. Ebdel, Secretary of Energy, has stated that the breakdown in emergency planning threatens "'the viability of the nuclear power industry'" and that the current stalemate "'has t+3

• an issue of naticnal significance.'" Id. Moreover, a local govern-mental veto has the potential for substantial abuse unrelated to local opposition to nuclear power. According to a spokesman for the Atanic

Industrial Forun, one Kentucky county "' insisted that the state build a road it had been wantire as the price for participating in an emergency clan.'" Id. Similarly, Ottawa County, Chio " refused to take part in an emergency exercise arourri the Davis Besse nuclear plant unless the util-ity financed bnprovanents in the county's emergency operating center.

When the utility agreed, the county presented a new list of denarxis."

Id.; see also M.o Should Veto Nuclear Pur?, N.Y. Times, May 7,1983, E A22, col. 1 (editorial) (Ccmnission i.nterpretation of emergency plan-ning regulations " appears to give local authorities a veto over reactors by refusing to approve or cooperate in evacuaticn plans. If so, the devolution of power over nuclear power frcan the Federal to the local

level has gone too far.").

, .._ ,r. _ -.._.7, , , . - _ _ . . . . , _ , , - , _ . _ . , _ . . .....,_..___-..._..,.m

=. . _ _ _ - _ . - -.- _. -_ _ _ . -

energency plans. 'Ihis wouM also likely encourage local goverrsnents elseWhere to take similar actions, thereby fostering the sp=ct.re of a local goverrznent veto over nuclear power. If, cri the other hand, the n'-4== ion allows the plants to continue operation, Rockland County will presunably honor its pledge to cceplete the approval process for its own plans in an =maditious manner. _ _

D. Risk and the County's Role - -

Rockland County's role within the risk profile of Indian Point Unit 3 is very snall. 'Ihe only type of accident which would develop quickly enough to require r u vL protective action would occur with a mad 4 =

frequency of once in 25,000,000 reactor years,32 and even then Rockland County is not likely to be affected.

Radimetive materini released in an accident would be unlikely to reach the County because of local wind patterns. Early fatality risk decreases markedly with increasing distance fran the plant. Mst resi-dents in the 03unty live beyond three miles fran Indian Point; further, the population is sparse near the mileWe Hudson River which separates the plant fran the County. Given this p:pulation distribution and the wind patterns, Rockland County residents are at extremely low risk even if a rare accident should occur. _

As stated earlier, evacuation has little effect on the latent fatality risk and the early fatality risk can be acceptably resporxled to l

32. Licenseen' Testimony of Dennis C. Bley, D3nald F. Paddleford,

'Ihoms E. Potter, and Dennis C. Richardson cri Ccmnission Question Five at 13; IPPSS Amendment One at 8.1-5.

. I l

s l

. by sheltering folicwed by relocation.33 Given this protective respaise and the extremely low risk in Bockland County, the role of (bunty I

officials is'particularly limited.

Additionally, more rsval4stic estimates of the amount and type of .

rM4=Mve material released (source term) fran an accident would reduce the already low early fatality risk dramatically, probably approaching zero. While disagreements exist regarding the " correct" source term for specific accident sequences, there is no debate regard-ing the basic conclusicrl: based upon current methodology, risk assessments (im1w14ng the IPPSS and the Staff's independent analysis) probably have significantly overstated the source terms and, therefore, i

overstated the risk.34 m e Power Authority's experts testified that l with a more realistic source term no early fatalities result fran accidents at Indian Point.35 he processes which deplete rM4=dve material are not dependent upon functioning of plant equipnent, operator actions or the cooperation of county officials, but rely instead en the laws of nature.

We role of Bockland County officials in affecting the risk to

33. See Section IIB (2), supra.

34. Licensees' Testimony of William R. Stratton, Walton A. Bbdger, and 'Ihanas E. Potter on Question One at 5, 61; see Staff Testimony of Robert M. Bernero en Severe Accident Source Terms at 3; Testinony of Dr.

Sarbeswar Acharya Regarding NIC Staff Assessment of Accident Conse-quences and Risks at III.C.A.-20 to III.C.A.-21.

l 35. Licensees' Testimony of Williaa R. Strattcm, Walton A. Rodger, and m onas E. Potter on Question One at 6; see Licensees' Testimony on cm=iasion Question One, Board Question 1.1, and Contention 1.1, at 125-27.

l t

County residents, thus, is particularly minimal ani the deficiencies relating to the (bunty should not be considered significant.

IV. COMPFrLTNG REASONS SUPPORTING CONPINUED OPERATION ._ _

A. Econcmic Impacts of a Shutdown .. .. . . - -.

Permanent shutdcwn of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 would result in ._

grave econcmic consequences for customers; particularly those in south-east New York. 'Ihroughcut the state, closing the Indian Point units - -

would have a strong negative effect on large industrial ernployers, such as General M3 tors in Westchester Cbunty. Closing Indian Point would also further widen the substantial rate disparity between upstate and downstate New York, already a divisive issue.

The shutdown of the Indian Point units will have a direct cost impact in the form of increased rates on the custcmers of both Cbn Edi-scn and the Power Authority.

Electricity fran Indian Point Unit 3 and the Charles Poletti Project, an 825 W oil- and gas-fueled plant, is sold to 76 governmental custcmers in New York City and Westchester County. 'Ihese entities use the pcwer for public buildings, mass transit, public housing, street lighting, and other public purposes. 'Ihe Power Authority also sells electricity to Con Ediscn frcm these plants. The largest custcmers in the New York City region are the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and New York City. In 1982, the MTA used 35% of the Pcwer Author-ity's nuclear and fossil fired output in southeast New York and New York City used 32%.36 1

36. Power Authority's Testimony of Charles R. Dean, Harold M.

- - 26 -

Se ==.a uuic inpacts of an Indian Point shutdown may be categorized as follows: replacement power costs, other costs and savings resulting fran a shutdown, business costs to the Power Authority, arxi indirect

+1--- ic effects on society. Licensees have projected the statewide _

replacement power cost of a shutdown in 1984 to be $463 millim. Prac-tically all of that increase in the cost of electricity, .$455 million, _

will occur in the Cbn F41 son service territory. De replacanent power --

. cost, for the years 1984 - 1999, totals almcat $18 billion before adjustments for inflation and any savings that would result frun closing Indian Point.37 The +x---ic consequences of a shutdown, adjusting for the savings in operations and maintenance and added capital cxast, based upon a 63% capacity factor, and caIcRated to the respective ends of -

plant lifetime, 2006 and 2009, results in a present worth replacement power cost of about $9 billion.38 Additionally, licensees calculated the replacement cost usirx3 a low oil price forecast, increased plant expense projections, and a 57% capacity factor, resulting in a net Eman, Paul H. Rubin on Carmission Question 6.3, at 6.

37. Licensees' Testinony of Eugene T. Meehan on Ccmuission Ques-tion 6, Table 4.1 at 30, Table 4.2 at 31, 40.

38. Testimony of Sally Hunt Streiter on Connission Question 6, at

2. Other parties' estimates of the replacement power cost do not vary dramatically fran the projecticri noted above based upon estimates of low capacity factor and low oil price increases. See Testimony of Vince Taylor en the Econanic Costs of Closirvy Indian Point, Union of Concerned Scientists at 2, Table A at 17 (25-year cost penalty $4.4 b4114m; cost adjustments $4.1 to $4.2 billion); Testimony of David Schlissel and John Mavretich, New York City 03uncil, at 23 (cost penalty $2.9 to $4.7 billinn); NRC Staff Testimany of W4114== A. Buehring, et al. at 42 (replacement power costs after savings $4.4 billion). Chly one party subnitted shutdown costs that were markedly different. Testinony of GECE Witness Richard Rosen on Ocmnission Question 6.3, at 5.

- , - - - - _ , , . - , , . , . ,-.._w . _ - ._..m._

- -- ---,s.,, - _ - - - -- _ _ _- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ - - - - - - _ - _

production cost inpact of $4.9 billicn for the two plants. If oil costs move higher than expected, the plants achieve a 69% capacity factor and plant expenses are not as high as estimated, the replacanent power costs could rise to $12.9 billion on a present worth basis.39 _

Se m nd.c inpact of closing Indian Point will not be borne equally by all New York City residents. Se cost inpact to a custmer 1

~~

of the Power Authority will be higher than to a typical Con Edison cus- -

tmer. It is estimated that MIA's power met will increase by approxi-mately 25 to 30% for each year after a shutdown. This will result in a fare rise. If the increased cost is paid for solely by increasing fares, it is estimated that approximately 11,400 individuals will be ecmpelled to leave the work force because of the increased cost of transportation. If the MTA chooses to meet the added cost of elec-tricity, not by increasing fares, bit. by reducing service, the job .

losses would be even greater.40

'Ihe added cost of electricity is not limited to the custcmers who are directly served by licensees. The aMed cost of energy will have indirect or W ary effects on other individuals and business entities throughout the New York City region. It is expected that the increased cost of electricity will cause job losses not only in the Power Author-ity's custcmers, but also in other businesses which are indirectly affected. Four thousand three hundred jobs per year would be lost and l

39. (bn Edison, Ex.14, at 1, 2.

40. Licensees' Testimony of Dr. Frederick C. Dunbar on Ccmnission Question 6, at 2, 12, 14, 20.

i

New York City i_- would be reduced by $160 millicn to $726 million per year (current dollars). mst of the decline in euployment would be concentrated in the nondurable manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and service sectors of the New York e.usry.41 These projected s.ucidc effects are not abstract. One Westchester County customer of Con Miaon, the General Motors' Tarrytown plant, has _

- the highest energy rate of any General Motors assenbly plant in the - .

United States. 'Ihis plant employs 2,600 workers. 'Ihere have already been extensive discussicos between plant managenent and both licensees to a4 vias General Motors' desire to reduce expenses and, in particular, to reduce the cost of electricity.42 The impact of closing Indian Point would increase, not reduce, the energy costs to this major industrial custoner.

A separate ucrde impact is the increased need for constructing new generaticn facilities. While substantial generating capacity over the %ted peak demand presently exists, the shutdoan of Indian Point would have a significant impact on reserve capacity, and would require additional generating capacity by 1998.43 A shutdown of Tndian Poinc because of emergency planning censiderations would be likely to add to the pressure to block the opening of Shoreham, where energency planning

41. Power Authority's Testimony of Charles R. Dean, Harold M.

Ibchnan, and Paul H. Rubin on Ccmnission Question 6.3, at 24.

42. O'Rourke Bids Utility Aaency Hele Keep G.M. in Cbunty, N.Y.

Times, Jan. 30, 1983, 9 11, at 1, col. 4.

43. Licensees' Testimcny of Eugene T. Meehan on Ccmnission Question 6, Table 4.1, at 30.

l

1 is also an issue.44 _.

B. Imvel of Cafety of Indian Point Unit 3 Se risk to the public frm an accident at Indian Point Unit 3 is extremely low ard within the range of risks estimatai for other operating ruclear power plants.45 me Mian frequency of one or more early fatalities is once in 140,000,000 reactor years, and the M ian frequency of one or more latent cancer deaths is once in 58,000 reactor years.46 S e NBC Staff's independent assessment is that Indian Point Unit 3 does not pose an undue or high risk.47

44. In addition to the quantifiable cost impacts, the impact of a shutdown on the role of the Power Authority in southeast New York may be substantial. Since 1974-75, when the Power Authority purchased the Charles Poletti Project and Indian Point Unit 3 frm Cbn Edison, much of the Power Authority's efforts have been directed toward reducing the high cost of energy in the New York City region. In the event that Indian Point Unit 3 were closed, the Power Authority would no longer be able to meet all of its custmer denand in southeast New York through just the Poletti Project. Certain of its present custmers may be forced to return to Con Edison. Additionally, the Power Authority may be unable to operate econmically the Poletti fossil-fueled plant on a stand-alone basis. his result, if it occurred, could lead to all of the Power Authority's custcmers returning to Con Edison and the Power Authority withdrawing fran its efforts to mitigate the cost of power in southeast New York.

45. Licensees' Testimony of Dennis C. Bley, Ibnald F. Paddleford,

'Ihmas E. Potter, and Dennis C. Richardson on Ccmuissicn Question Five at 10-12, 14-17; Direct Testimony of Frank Bowscme and Roger Blond C n:aniing &wmiasion Question Five at [A] 33.

46. Licensees' Testimony on Ommission Question one, Board Question 1.1, and Contenticn 1.1, at 30. These data are derived frcm the licensees' Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study, as amended, which the Staff termed a cenprehensive, pioneering risk assessment.

Direct Testimony of Frank Rowscne and Roger Blond Concerning Ccmnission Question 1, at 25.

l l 47. Direct Testimony of Frank Ibs:rne and Roger Blond Concerning l

Ccmnission Question 5, at [C] 14-15.

/

l

S e health risks at the plant are well below the Cr=niasion's pre-11milary safety goals: for individual early fatality risk by a factor of approximately 75, arx1 for societal latent fatality risk, by a factor of 710.48 The Staff, agreeing that the plant is below the safety goal, stated that the early fatality risk is "quite likely to be well below one tenth of one percent" of the background, non-nuclear risks arx1 that the latent fatality risk is " extremely unlikely" to " pose anywhera near one tenth of one percent of the background risk of cancer fatalities."49 Even without sheltering or evacuaticn for one day followirg a rapid radi e d ve release and assuming normal activities, the early fatality risk would still be below the preliminary goal. Staff testified that, with the unrealistic asstrnption that no one would receive supportive maaical treatment, the preliminary goal for early fatalities is still met, using a relocation approach 50 Indian Point Unit 3 cmpares very favorably with the estimates frcm other plants for those accidents that dcminate early fatality risk.51 Staff concluded that the plant is " safer than average" in this regard

48. Licensees' Testimony of Dennis C. Bley, Donald F. Paddleford, Scmas E. Potter, and Dennis C. Richardson on Comtission Question Five at 6-7.

l l 49. Direct Testimony of Frank Ibwscme and Roger Blond Concerning l Camission Question 5, at B-14, B-16.

50. Licensees' Testimony on &nniaaion Question One, Board Question 1.1, and Contention 1.1, at 120,120a; Direct Testinony of Frank Bowsme and Roger Blond Concerning Crmniasion Question 5, at B-13 to B-14.

51. Licensees' Testintny of Dennis C. Bley, Donald F. Paddleford, l hmas E. Potter, and Dennis C. Richardson on Ccmnission Question Five at 12-14.

l

and that it is one of the "best" with respect to the frequency of resulting severe releases.52 An important factor in this low risk is the Indian Point contairment capability.53 Indian Point UrJ.t 3 is well within the spectna of risks estimated for other plants with respect to latent cancer fatality risk.54 Ac mrdingly, licensees' and Staff's analyses dramatically under-score that even with a high density population the Indian Point Units are within the range of risks estimated for other plants. Itreover, even without prcznpt evacuation, the plants would still meet the Ccmnis-sion's preliminary safety goals. S e low level of risk of Indian Point Unit 3 with or without 34 evacuaticn offers ocznpelling justification for continued operation.

V. CCMMISSION'S MAY 5 ORDER IENIES RMER AUTHORITY A FAIR HEARING By order of 1%y 30,1980, the Ommission announced its intention to :

initiate a special adjudicatory proceedirg addressing the risk posed by j the Indian Point plants. Order at 3-4 (May 30, 1980). 'Ihe Power Auth-ority, for more than three years, in reliance upon the process estab-lished by the Ccmnission, has invested enor:tous time and resources in

52. Direct Testimony of Frank Ibwscme and Roger Blond Concerning Ccmnission Question 5, at [A] 9,10.

l

53. See Licensees' Testimony on Ommission Question One, Board i Question 1.1., and Ccntention 1.1, at 72-73; see Direct Testim:ny of Frank Bowsczne and Roger B1md Concerning Ccmnission Question 5, at [A]

33.

l

54. Licensees' Testimony of Dennis C. Bley, Donald F. Paddleferd, l 'Ihcznas E. Potter, and Dennis C. Richardson on Cannission Question Five at 11, 14-15, 25-26; Direct Testimony of Frank Rowsczne and Roger Blond Concerning Caumission Question 5, at [A] 9,10.

the preparaticn and presentation of its case. The trial portion of the s -:="ing c before the Licensing Board concluded on April 29, 1983. By l virtue of its May 5,1983 Order, the Camissicm has effectively pre-empted and asstned for itself the material issues presented to and _

argued before the Licensing Board: emergency planning, level of risk, .

and uwd.c impact of a shutdown.55 ,

In establishing the special adjudicatory sc -:*iing, the Ozmission stated that "[t]he record of the proceeding, together with r u m uala- -

tions, will then be forwarded to the Ostmission for the final agency decision cn the merits of the procW."56 May 30 Order at 3; In re Cbnsolidated Edison Co.,13 N.R.C.1, 6 (1981) (Jan. 8 Order) . In so

55. In order to avoid shutdown, both the May 5 Order and the Cam-mission's regulations require, inter alia, the Power Authority to pre-sent evidence by May 20 that "mT=lling reasons exist to permit opera-tion of the facility" or "other factors justify [] continued operation."

May 5 Order at 4-5; see 10 C.F.R. $ 50.54(s)(2)(ii)(1982) . The ec pe of such a showing inplicates the substantive questions which the Cmmission directed the Licensing Board to consider, and on which the Licensing Board has received evidence since June 1982.

56. Ebliowing any adverse decision by the (b=4 =aion, the Power Authority has the right to an on-the-record adjtzlication. 42 U.S.C.A.

$ 2239 (West Supp. 1:d3). This is consistent with the Ozmission's January 8,1981 Order which characterized the special adjudicatory pro - iimJ as an extension of the factfiwling process ccmpleted by the Task Force on Interim Operation of Indian Point. See In re Consolidated Ediscn Co. ,13 N.R.C.1, 5 (1981) (Jan. 8 Order) . Indeed, the Q2tmis-sion recognized the distinction between a special adjtrlicatory proceed-ing resulting in re--.-+.lations and an on-the-record adjudicatory pro-ceeding required in the event of a decision "to suspend, revoke, or modify the [ Power Authority's] operating license []." May 30 Order at 2; see 42 U.S.C. I 2239.

In addition, under 10 C.F.R. $ 50.54(s)(2)(ii), the Power Authority is entitled to an adjudicatory hearing should the Ommission determine that the overall state of emergency preparedness at Indian Point is inadequate. See anergency Planning (Final Rule), 45 Fed. Reg. 55,402, 55,403, 55,408 (1980); 10 C.F.R. $ 2.202(c).

doing, the C - tasion delegated to the Licensing Board the authority to hear evidence on questions posed by the Ommission and to make corres-pending reccmnendations.57 Moreover, the c-iasicn specifically delegated to the Licensing Board the authority, in the first instance,.

to make interim reccmnendations concerning the continued operation of -

Indian Point prior to subnitting its final recamendations on the Om-H -- mission's questicns, id. at 3, a delegaticn the Camissicn now, in __

effect, has withd'.' awn.

W e Ommission also stated that, except as noted, the procedural regulations set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 2 58 would control the Licensirx3 Board hearing. In re Consolidated Edison C.>., 14 N.R.C. 610, 611 (1981)

(Sept. la Order). Although the Ca mission may limit its consideration to the exceptions taken to the Licensing Board's decision, it is ordin-

57. Board mamhars shall preside in . . . proceedings for granting, suspending, revoking, or amending licenses or authorizations as the Cm mission may designate, and [shall] perform such other adjudicatory functions as the c - iasion deems appropriate.

10 C.F.R. $ 2.721(a); accord 42 U.S.C. { 2241(a). Rese " adjudicatory functions" incitrie the formulation of r+3 - .miations cn the Camis-sion's questions. In re Cbnsolidated Edison Co. ,13 N.R.C. at 5-6 (Jan.

8 Order).

58. Be n-famien is bound by its regulations. Nader v. NRC, 513 F.2d 1045,1051 (D.C.Cir.1975); see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 6% (1974); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 540 (1959);

United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266 (1954);

International I-buse v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir.1982); Bray v.

United States, 515 F.2d 1383,1395 (Ct.C1.1975) (per curiam) . tese regulatic:ns have the force and effect of law. Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C.Cir. 1975). Although the regulations and orders provide for discretionary pcs:srs delegated by the Ocmnission to the Licensing Board, the Ca mission is still bound by its regulations and cannot ignore them. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); Smith v.

Resor, 406 F.2d 141,145 (2d Cir.1%9) .

arily required to consider the entire record. 10 C.F.R. { 2.770(a).

A:cordingly, by regulation, the h iasion is bound to review the reemmendations of the Licensing Board.59 Moreover, failure of the Ocnnission to abide by its order prejudices the Power Authority and con-i stitutes a denial of due process.60 See Pacific mlasses Co. v.' ETC, 356 F.2d 386, 387 (5th Cir.1%6). -

l 2e Ctanission cannot now practically or constitutionally " base its decision cm evidence which has not been specifically brought before it."_ Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir.1964); accord Repub-lic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945); United States v.

Abilene & S.Ry., 265 U.S. 274, 288 (1924). Sixteen thausand pages of t transcribed testimony and thousands of pages of exhibits, all of which are before the Licensing Board and not the Ommission, reflect the ccm-plexity of this matter.61 When the Cmmission issued the May 5 Order, l 59. 'Ihe Licensing Board's " findings and conclusions, or reccm-mended action, will have great significance [and constitute], of course,

. a relevant and important part of the administrative record." T.S.C..

mtor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F.Supp. 777, 789-90 (S.D. Tex.1960), aff'd per curiam, 366 U.S. 419 (1%1). The record must be considered as a whole by the hiaslon if the Ct:nmission decides to shut down Indian Point. Any Cmmission decision is " vulnerable" if it fails "to reflect attentive consideration" to the Licensing Board's recum.iadaticns. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Et:C, 444 F.2d ~~ ~~~

841, 853 (D.C.Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).

60. Other due process ccnsideraticns relating to Ccumission action under 10 C.F.R.I 50.54(s) may bar a shutdown of Indian Point Unit 3.

See Licensees' mtion for a Stay of Ocumission's Orders of January 8, T9El arxi September 18, 1981 or for Dismissal of this PrmWing or, in the Alternative, for Certificaticm to the Camissicn and supporting memorandum (Nov. 25, 1981).

61. 'Ihe Omnission itself has recognized "the ccmplexity of this prrv'aad i ng . " In re Consolidated Edison Co.,13 N.R.C. at 6 (Jan. 8 Order).

the Power Authority was in the process of preparing its proposed find- '

ings of fact, conclusions of law, and r+h =xiations62 in order to aid ,

I the Licensing Board in analyzing the massive amount of evidence pre- l sented in the g-Wing. A "constitutie=11y sufficient review of the

- evidence entails ocnsideration of . . . firdings and reccurmendations prepared by" the Licensing Board. Jones v. Morris, 541 F.Supp. 11, 18 (S.D.Chio 1981), aff'd mem. , 455 U.S.1009 (1982) . .. - . . _

'Ihe Ommission must give " reasoned consideration to all the mater-ial facts and issues." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Etr, 444 F.2d __

841, 851 (D.C.Cir.1970), cert. denied., 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (fcubct.e cmitted).63 However, the Licensing Board is the only bcxty presently able to give " reasoned consideration" with regard to rKum&dations affecting the operation of Indian Point.64 Having established the 62, 'Ihe Power Authority's prop 3 sed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and r&um&dations are estimated to total over 400 pages, more than ten times the mount to which it has been limited by the Omnission to respond to the May 5 Order within 15 days of its issuance.

63. One of the primary objectives of procedural due i

process as applied to administrative proceedings is to insure that an agency will acquire the information it should have in a manner fairly calculated to illuninate the issues for reasoned decisionmaking, and thereby to minimize the risk of erroneous or arbitrary action.

NAACP v. Wilmington & dical Center, Inc., 453 F.Supp. 330, 337 (D. Del.

1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir.1979) (footrotes cmitted); accord Northern California Power Agency v. &rton, 3% F.Supp.

13 87,1192-93 (D.D.C.1975), aff'd mem. , 539 F.2d 243 (D.C.Cir.1976) .

64. It is important that the persons making the determinations have heard the evidence presented. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Etr, 444 F.2d at 850 ("[f]ull allowance must be given . . . fcr the oppor-tunity . . . to observe the demeanor of the witnesses") .

special adjudicatory prc-Whx3 pursuant to its own regulations, the Comission must allow the Licensing Board to exercise-its independent

~

discretion.65 Failure to do so would constitute a denial of due process. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 6% (1974);, United .

States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954). _ _ _ _ _ _ _

If the c'e==ission does not allow the Licensing Board to evaluate the proposed findings, arrive at its own findings, and make its recon-mandations to the ccmmiasion, the Licensing Board hearing will be effec-tively aborted.

The " hearing" is designed to afford the safeguard that the one who decides shall be bound in good conscience to consider the evidence, to be guided by that alone, ard to reach his conclusicri unin-fluenced by extraneous considerations which in other fields might have play in determining purely executive action. We " hearing" is the hearing of evidence and argunent. If the one win determines the facts Qtich underlie the order has not con-

65. %e Ctmnission's May 5 Order prejudges specific emergency planning issues which were delegated to the Licensing Board for adjudication and r+ -- -+-dation. See In re Cbnsolidated Edison (b.,13 N.R.C. at 7 (Ccmnission Questions 3 and 4) (Jan. 8 Order) . This prejudgment has so tainted the proceeding that an adverse rh dation -

by the Licensing Board on emergency planning and related issues may be hopelessly flawed. airthermore, the (bmnission has previously specifically rejected the noticn that the lack of an emergency plan at Indian Point alcme should precipitate shutdown.

While a successful plan for evacuation at Irdian Point would probably reduce overall risk, the fact is that most operating reactor sites do not yet have an approved plan and Indian Point is not different in this regard.

Id.

--~

at 3-4.

The Indian Point plan has dramatically improved since issuance of

! the May 30, 1980 Order and since the 1982 drill. See Sections II and III, supra. Nuclear power plants operating at 36 other sites in the nation lack approved evacuation plans. Washington Puts Indian Point on Notice, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1983, 6E, col. 3, at col. 5. The Ccmnission points to no new evidence which could justify its changed opinion.

,,~ .

idered evidence or argunent, it is manifest that the hearing has not been givec.

Nrgan v. United States, 298 U.S. at 480-81. --- - .

m us, the n'=4asion must adhere to its May 30, January 8, and September 18 Orders delegatirg to the Licensing Board the authority to issue r+x-...+-Jations regarding the safety of Indian Point, and to

- rc,.w. w d shutdown or other action if necessary. te- Ccmnission's pres-ent action as set forth in its May 5,1983 Order frustrates and preempts the orgoing special adjudicatory pxn:eedirx3 ani consequently stands as a denial of due process to the Power Authority. 'Iherefore, if the Ocmnis-sien is to satisfy due process requiranents it nust allow the Licensing Board to a m lish and conclude its delegated responsibilities.

CDNCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Power Autlerity subnits that no enforcement action is warranted. .

W l

Respectfully subnitted, b -

01arles Morgan, Jr.

Paul F. Colarulli Joseph J. Imvin, J l

. -. MCEGAN ASSOCIATES, CHARTERED 1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 466-7000 Stephen L. Baum General Counsel Q1arles M. Pratt Assistant General Counsel POWER AUIBORITY OF THE SWE OF IEW YORK Licensee of Indian Point Unit 3 10 Coltrnbus Circle New York, New York 10019 (212) 397-6200 Bernard D. Fischman Michael Curley Richard F. Czaja David H. Pikus SHEA & GOULD 330 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10017 (212) 370-8000 Dated: May 20, 1983 1

1 .-. - __. . - .. . . _ . - ._. . . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,

,.' .39 -

APPENDIX: Sunnary of Funds Expended by Power Authority on Offsite

~

Emergency Planning 1980-date Date(s) Item Amount 1980-date Salary for coordinator of Four (bunty Nuclear 110,000 Safety cannittee 1980-81 Funding of consultants (EDS Nuclear & 1,150,000 Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quude & Ibuglas, Inc.) to work with State and counties to _ . _.

develop RERP's 1980-date Alert Notification (siren) Systen 2,346,500 1980-date Power Authority Staff working with State 941,150 and counties on offsite energency planning 1980 Funding for State REPG activities prior r.o 87,859 ena i.mcad. of fee legislation 1980 Funding of study to assess energency housing 16,555 needs of evacuees 1980 Funding of camputer services to perform dynamic 15,000 traffic analysis 1980 Study of Mississauga, an=Ma evacuation 2,000 1980 acckland Cbunty helicopter pqrcun 12,000 1980 Funding of consultant to act as liaison between 15,000 State REPG and four counties 1980 MIDAS system and meterological equipnent 521,000 1980 Evacuation traffic study 21,000 1 1981-date EDF mcxiifications 552,000 1981 Funding for Radiological Dnergency Cannunica- 45,000 tions Systen (REES Hotline) connecting offsite authorities on dedicated party line l 1981 Canputer terminals for all county EDC's to 40,000 enable access to meteorological, dose assess-ment, and plane projection data 1981 Printing of county RERP's 1,500 l

1981 Federal signal study for siren activation 6,000 l

l

o 1981 State radiological preparedness fee 75,000 1981 Consultant to assist in revising and maintaining 6,000 l Putnam Cbunty RERP 1982 Printing and distribution of emergency planning 114,000 .

broctiures 1982 Comunications equipnent for State and counties 300,000 1982 Funded new radio systen to augment nam S and 45,000 place all four counties on same district disas-ter preparedness frequency .

1982 Funding of dedicated Executive Hotline connect- 30,000 ing chief executives of four counties 1982 Comunications devices for State and counties 23,249 1982 State radiological preparedness fee 250,000 1982 Additional funding for State REPG to resolve 105,000 "120-day clock" items (all monies passed cn to four counties) 1982 Training funding for county, local and 230,038 volunteer response personnel 1982 Offsite telephone maintenance 1,000,000 1982 Feuter-Stokes Offsite M211toring System 216,000 1983 State radiological preparedness fee 250,000 l

l 1983 Printing and distribution of emergency 119,000 (to date) planning brochures and posters 1983 Offsite telephone maintenance 333,333 (to date)

I 1983 Funded Westchester County transporation study 120,863 1980-date 'IorAL POWER AUTHORITY WNDING KR OFFSITE 24ERGENCY PWNING* S9,100,047 1

• This amount does not include expenditures by Cbn Edison for offsite emergency planning, or experriitures by either licensee for l

onsite emerge.Ty planning.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Oqt;.jETED Iherebycertifythatonthe20thdayofMag)Igp}gggggsed copies of the foregoing Power Authority's Response to Commission Order Establishing Procedures for Decision on Enforcemenh Ah ion to be hand delivered to:

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Victor Gilinsky U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner John F. Ahearne U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner James K. Asselstine U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Chief, Docketing and Service Section Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- Washington, D.C. 20555 m/nC .

Paul F.MolaMI

.