ML20083M251
| ML20083M251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1983 |
| From: | LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20083M240 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8302010106 | |
| Download: ML20083M251 (43) | |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
\m, Page INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1 PURPOSE ................................................... 2 METHOD OF ANALYSIS ....................................... 6 LIST OF TABLES Polar Crane 1T31-CRN002 ................................... 8 Reactor Building Receiving Area Crane 1T31-CRN019 ....................................... 17 Recirculation Pump Motor 1T31-CRNO37 ..................... 18 Recirculation Pump Motor Transfer Hoist 1T31-CRN045 ....................................... 19 Equipment Hatch Tunnel Hoist and Trolley 1T31-CRN079A and B, Equipment Hatch Monorail 1T31-CRN080, Equipment Hatch Tunnel Trolley 1T31-CRN081 ......................... 20 lO l
k s' Personnel Hatch Hoist and Trolley 1T31-CRN084 ............................................. 21 l Main Steam Trolleys - Secondary 1T31-CRN090A, B, C, D ................................... 22 Main Steam Isolation Valve Trolleys IT31-CRN094A, B, C, D - Trolley; 1T31-CRN095A, B, C, D - Hoist ........................... 23 Main Steam Safety Relief Valve 1T31-CRN091, 1T31-CRN092A and B ......................... 24 Motor Generator Hoist - 040 1X39-CRNO40; j Motor Generator Hoist - 042A 1X39-CRN041 ................. 25 Diesel Generator Hoist and Trolley 1X31-CRN104 ............................................. 26 Diesel Generator Hoist and Trolley 1X31-CRM105 ............................................. 27 Control Rod Drive Repair Area Jib 1T31-CRN048 ............................................. 28 Original lii January 1983 8302010106 830106 PDR ADOCK 05000322 PDR l
A 1 . _- -- .- _.
Control Rod Drive Pump Hoist and Trolley 1T31-CRN078 ............................................. 29 95' Equipment Hoist and Trolley 1T31-CRN093 ............... 30 Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanger Trolley and Hoist 1T31-CRN100 ........................... 31 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
System Hoist and Trolley 1T31-CRN085 ..................... 32 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Hoist and Trolley ....................................... 33 Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water (RBCLCW) Trolley 1T31-CRN083A and B ..................... 34 Standby Liquid Control Pump Hoist
'T31-CRN082A and B ........................................
. 35 Reactor Water Cleanup System Area Jib Crane IT31-CRF089 ....................................... 36 Tip Cask Hoist and Trolley 1T31-CRN088 ................... 37 Control Rod Drive Leveling Tray Hoist 1T31-CRN087 ............................................. 38 Screenwell Bridge Crane 1U31-CRN116 ....................... 39 V(T Screenwell Hoists and Trolleys 1U31-CRN120A and B ....................................... 40 CRD Pump Suction Filter Trolley 1T31-CRN099 ............... 41 480 V Motor Generator Trolleys - No Equipment Mark Number (LPCI) ............................. 42 Original iv January 1983
INTRODUCTION
() This report presents a description and specification of each crane and lifting device installed or planned for the Long Island Lighting Company Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1. The discussion of each lifting device is presented in table format as suggested in the indicative sample of Figure 1 NUREG 0612, which provides guidelines for preparation of the report. The report specifically responds to NRC letters dated December 22, 1980, and February 3, 1981. The letters requested information dealing with handling heavy loads at Shoreham.
O Original 1 January 1983
_ _ _ . . - ~ . _ _ . - _ . _ . -
PURPOSE This report is in response to NRC letters of December 22, 1980
[-) and February 3, 1981 requesting information ccncerning the
\' # handling of heavy loads at Shoreham. Specifically, the reference letters requested information from operating plants via Enclosure 2 and from applicants for operating licenses via Enclosure 3.
This t;esponse is intended to address items 2.2 and 2.3 of Enclosure 3 as required. Information required by paragraph 2.1 was submitted via SNRC-596, dated July 17, 1981.
2.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE REACTOR BUILDING 2.2.1 Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e.,
ignoring interlocks, movable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel.
RESPONSE: Name: Reactor Building Polar Crane - 1T31-CRN002 Type: Eiectric Overhead Traveling Capacity: 125 ton - main hook 30 ton - auxiliary hook 2.2.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of heavy loads over stored fuel or into
(}/
x, any location where, following any failure, such load may drop into the reactor vessel or spent fuel storage pool.
RESPONSE: The following cranes are listed in Table 1 (see SNRC-596):
Channel Handling Boom (1F11-CRN074) - The capacity of the boom and hoist is 200 lb. It is not capable of carrying a heavy load.
Fuel Handling Jib Cranes (lT31-CRNOO8A and B) -
These cranes are specifically designed to handle one fuel assembly plus handling tool and will not be used for any other function. They have a capacity of 1000 lb and are equipped with a load limiting device which will automatically stop hoisting on an overload signal of 1000 150 lb.
They are not capable of carrying a heavy load.
Refueling Platform (1F15-CRN009) - This platform will be used for refueling operations. Fuei and other reactor components will be removed from the reactor core, transported to the fuel pool, and then returned to the reactor as required. Fuel and reactor components are at all times handled remotely underwater. The capacity of the refueling f) s/
s platform hoist is 1000 lb. It is not capable of carrying a heavy load.
Original 2 January 1983
RWCU Aran Jib Crana (lT31-CRN089) - This crina 10 used for the maintenance / handling of reactor water cleanup system equipment. Its capacity is 2000 lb.
x It is capable of carrying a heavy load. However, it is permanently wall mounted at azimuth 270', 63' from centerline of the reactor and has an 11' reach. A load failure could not possibly fall within the vicinity of the spent fuel storage pool or into the reactor vessel.
Reactor Building Polar Crane (lT31-CRN002:
Auxiliary Hook) - This hook will be used during maintenance periods to handle miscellanecus loads and for moving items of equipment to and from the floor level at elevation 8'-0". The capacity of the auxiliary hoist is 30 tons. However, the
- auxiliary hoist will not be used to handle heavy
! loads in the vicinity of the spent fuel peol. This restriction will be accomplished by imposing operational limitations (i.e., developing load handling procedures, defining safe load paths),
maintaining a training program for crane operators, and utilizing only qualified operators for all polar crane operations.
2.2.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.2.1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this
( evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).
For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
RESPONSE: The information specified in Attachment 1 is j
presented as follows:
- 1. Reactor Building Polar Crane (1T31-CRN002:
Main Hook) - The Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Reactor Building Polar Crane is manufactured by the Whiting Corporation and has a Design-Rated Load (DRL) of 125 tons and Maximum Critical Load (MCL) of 123 tons.
- 2. The Polar Crane is a top running type, dual load path, double girder electric overhead.
traveling crane. It will normally be used during maintenance and refueling operations.
The main hoist incorporates a dual load path design. This is accomplished by use of a dual load path through the hoist gear train, the reeving system, and the hoist load block along
! with restraints at critical points to provide load retention and minimize uncontrolled O- motions of the load upon failure of any single hoist component.
l Original 3 January 1983 i
1 - _. . . - --._. _ --_ _ -- ._ _ _ _ . _ _ _.
FSAR Trblo 9.1.4-2 summarizas tha polar crano design, fabrication, inspection, testing, and operation with respect to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9-1, " Overhead Handling Systems j for Nuclear Power Plants."
- 3. The seismic information requested is contained in the FSAR Table 9.1.4-2, Paragraph 1.c.
- 4. The evaluation of the lifting devices is discussed in FSAR Table 9.1.4-2, Paragraph 3.
- 5. An evaluation of the interfacing lift points ic also contained in FSAR Table 9.1.4-2, Paragraph 3.
2.2.4 For cranes identified in 2.2.1 above, not categorized according to 2.2.3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the spent fuel area and your determination of compliance.
RESPONSE: None.
2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR T' ACTOR SHUTDOWN, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING.
/' 2.3.1 Identify any cranes listed in 2.1.1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).
For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
RESPONSE:: Refer to Response 2.2.3.
2.3.2 For any cranes identified in 2.1.1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.3-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:
RESPONSE: The information required to answer this response is contained in the matrix format suggested by Paragraph 2.3.2.a. As an introduction the assumptions and method of analysis used to develop the matrix follow:
O V
Original 4 January 1983
ASSUMPTIONS Credit has been taken for previous studies, as applicable, which
,_ analyzed the loss of shutdown equipment. These studies are:
/ t
\s / Cable Separation Analysis Report - This report investigated the loss of cables, raceways, and all electrical equipment which were disabled by fire in conservatively large affected areas of the Secondary Containment. A determination was then made whether shutdown could be achieved using the remaining shutdown equipment of other unaffected areas. The presumption is that cables, raceways, and all affected electrical equipment rendered unavailable from a postulated load drop occurring in a segment, as defined in this report, is analogous to cables or raceways destroyed by fire due to the relatively large segment zones.
Cable Separation Analysis Report - Primary Containment - This analysis investigated, in a manner similar to the Cable Separation Analysis Report, the loss of cables, raceways, and electrical equipment. Wedge-shaped segments of 60 degrees were chosen, and after disabling equipment in the segment, a determination was made whether shutdown could be accomplished with the remaining equipment. Upon completion of the analysis of each area, the procedure is repeated with new 60-degree segments which are indexed 30 degrees from the previously analyzed segments. This indexing assures that no sensitive interface boundary exists. The presumption, as taken in the Cable Separation Analysis Report, is still taken
~
that equipment destroyed by a postulated load drop is i analogous to equipment rendered unavailable by fire.
Separation Analysis - Instrument Lines - This analysis was made to show that sufficient separation exists between redundant instrumentation necessary for shutdown in the Primary and Secondary Containment, such that a postulated event will not prevent plant safe shutdown. The same segment size and indexing used for the Primary Containment in the preceding Cable Separation Analysis applies for this separation analysis. Additionally, an investigation of the Secondary Containment is undertaken based upon a segment size of 45 degrees, indexed 22.5 degrees. Sinae there are distinct floor levels within the Secondary Containment, i
vertical boundaries are established for the Secondary Containment at each floor elevation. It was assumed that in a given area, the safety-related instrument lines and their connected shutdown sensors located in this area or other areas are assumed to fail. The analysis concluded shutdown can be accomplished in all cases.
Separation Analysis - Small Bore Piping - This analysis took the same approach and reached the same conclusions as the Separation Analysis - Instrument Lines.
O V
Original 5 January 1983
Calculations have been used to determine the integrity of floor gS slabs, beams, and large bore piping when impacted by a postulated g / heavy load drop. These calculations are:
Missile-Barrier Interaction - This calculation presents data of the missile barrier test program carried out at the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute under the direction of Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation.
Methods are presented for design of both local and overall structural effects of missile impact on reinforced concrete barriers. The method of design for local effects is intended to prevent the phenomenon of scabbing, which is caused by movement of a shear plug. The method for overall structural response uses a single mass, single degree of freedom model to conservatively predict the response of the barrier.
Heavy Load Impact on Beams, Cable,s and Plates - This is a generic calculation developed by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation's Engineering Mechanics Division to assess the damage to piping and conduit from the impact of a postulated heavy load drop. The calculation approach is to equate plastic strain energy to the energy of an impacting heavy load. Both the case of energy absorption by plastic bending and membrane action were investigated. A graphical presentation provides a quantitative assessment of the maximum weight of a falling heavy load that can impact piping or conduit without it suffering loss of its function.
O h METHOD OF ANALYSIS The following approach was taken for each lifting device to determine the effect of a postulated load drop:
- 1. Each impact area was visually sited, and piping and equipment targets below the lifting device and beneath the operating floor were identified. The positions of these targets were verified utilizing Shoreham composite drawings.
- 2. The effect and control of a postulated load drop associated with each lifting device was next accomplished. The process consisted of three phases:
- a. The systems configuration, use, and maintenance were determined through reference to Technical Specifications, System Descriptions, and Reports on Plant Maintainability. Through these sources it was determined whether system redundancy, system separation (as determined by the combined effects of the Cable Separation Analysis Report, Separation Analysis - Instrument Lines, Separation Analysis -
Small Bore Piping and Large Bore Piping Walkdowns)
_s or site specific considerations provided sufficient g i safeguards to mitigate the effects of a postulated t
N/ load drop.
l l
Original 6 January 1983 r
- b. If the preceding analysis proved insufficient, i calculations were performed to determine if damage
(~'/
- s. would preclude system operation. Primarily this consisted of calculations which analyzed the ability of the system piping to withstand the postulated load drop, and development of alternative actions as required.
- c. A structural analysis was performed as required to determine if a postulated load drop would cause scabbing or penetration of the operating floor, and subsequent effects on safety-related equipment on lower elevations.
- 3. The following matrix was developed to present the information requested by Paragraph 2.3.2. It details the location of the lifting device, impact area, and affected safety-related equipment. Control of the postulated load drop is based upon the Hazard Elimination Categories presented in Figure 1 of Paragraph 2.3.2, and is further explained by an added discussion section.
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Original 7 January 1983 l
~g g POLAR CRANE IT31-CRN002 LocatioD Reactor Building, Seconda ry Containment Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Equipment Cateaory Discussion Load
- 1. The design criteria for the polar crane is addressed in Table 9.1.4-2 of the FSAR and meets the requi re-ments of ANSI B30.2-1976. Safe luad paths are de-veloped and diagrammed utilizing the most direct paths and minimum lift heights. Approved procedure for heavy loads carried by the polar crane a re now in place. Crane operators a re tra ined, qua lified and conduct themsolves in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976.
Various Ope ra t ing d 2. The prima ry hook (125-ton capacity) of the pola r components Floor c ra ne i s s i ng l e-fa i l u re p roo f. The information not exceeding 175'-9" and concerning the design, fa b rica t ion, installation, 125-ton main 40'-0" and testing of the main hook to the criteria of book capacity NUREG-0554 is contained in Table 9.1.4-2 of the FSAR.
Va rious 3. The auxilia ry hook (30-ton capacity) is not single-components fa i l u re p roof. However, this hoist is provided with not exceeding redundant hoist holding brakes, redundant upper 30-ton auxi l ia ry t rave l limit switches, each on separate circuits, 03 hock capacity and two ceatrifugal overspeed switches. Inspection and testing procedures, maintenance standards and j crane operator standards meet the criteria of ANSI B30.2-1976. All heavy load l i f ts, whether by the i
ma in or the auxilia ry hooks, a re covered by approved 4 p rocedu re s.
- 4. A haza rd eva luation was conducted on the va ried heavy loads capable of being raised by the auxiliary hook through the three hatchways.
Original s Janua ry 1983
J O O POLAR CRANE 1T31-CRN002 Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Catecory Discussion Load Hatchway centered 40'-0" c A. Hatchway at Azimuth 26*-52' vertically along SWEC Azimuths This hatchway is centered over the receiving floor.
26* to $2* It is. appa rent that a heavy load d ropped from the upper terminus of the hatchway (elev 175'-9") will penetrate the floor. Structura l ca lculations postulating a load drop of a 3' diameter blunt object show not more than 1500 lb. can be dropped f rom elev 175'-9" without penetration of the floor occurring. Evaluation of safety-related equipment damage is as follows:
, 1G11-TK050B Reactor Building Floor Drain Tank - not requi red for safe shutdown.
1G41-6-WS-306- Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Cross-Connect 151-3 Line - not requi red for safe shutdown.
IP42*E117A & B RBCLCW Booster Heat Exchangers - A single damaged heat exchanger can be cross connected to the un-u) damaged heat exchanger, if both heat exchangers are damaged, thei r enti re load can be transferred to 1P42*E011A and B. 1P42*E117A and B can be iso-lated by closing the following:
Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water Side 1P42-08V0148A and B (manual valves) RBCLCW Heat Exchanger inlet Valves l 1P42-10V0151A and B (manua l va lves) RBCLCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves. If the outlet valves.a re damaged three other valves can isolate the j heat exchanger:
1P42-02V00448 (manual valves) 1P42-08V0152 (manual valves)
IT47-08V00428 (manual valves)
Original Janua ry 1983
O O >
POLAR CRANE 1T31-CRNOO2 Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion Load Reactor Building Service Water Side IP42-10V0048A and B RBSW Inlet Valves 1P41*MOV129A and B RBSW Outlet Valves. If the outlet va lves a re damaged the listed valves can isolate the heat exchanger:
1P41-10V0047A and B (manual valves) 1P41-6-WS-306- Emergency service water to spent fuel' pool lines a re 151-3 isolated by locked-closed valves 1P41*MOV042A and B, IP41-6-WS-343- and 1G41*MOVO32A and B.
151-3 1P41*MOV043 Drain line for emergency service water to spent fuel 1P41-1-WS-344- pool - not required for safe shutdown.
158-3 p, IP41*MOV033C&D Ultimate cooling connection lines and valves isolated C) 1P41-20-WS-249- by locked-closed valves 1P41*MOV033A and B and check
. 158-3 valve 1P41-VTC041. The ultimate cooling connection d
1P41-20-WS-250- lines and valves are not requi red for safe shutdown.
158-3 1P41-20-WS-316-301-2 1P41-20-WS-298-301-2
> Hoistway Area 8'-0" None c B. Hatchway at Azimuth 147' centered vertically along SWEC No safety-related equipment at the base elevation Azimuth 147' that may be damaged by a postulated load d rop.
Holst Area 8'-0" None c C. Hatchway at Azimuth 306*
centered a long SWEC Azimuth Same as 4.B.
306*
i Original Janua ry 1983
x ~s POLAR CRANE 1T31-CRN002 Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Containment Ha za rd Sa fe ty-Re la ted Elimination impact Area [1L*ation Eautoment Ca teao ry Discussion Load
- 5. A haza rd eva luation was conducted on the 175'-9" operating floor for each worst case load drop, i.e., highest and heaviest combinations, for each representative thickness of concrete. Calculations have demonstrated that when assuming a conservative a pp roa ch, a sufficient lift height will be obtained that can accommodate any lift within the capacity of the auxilia ry hook.
Reactor pressure Ope ra t i ng e A. 30-inch Concrete Stab vessel insulation Floor 175'-9" The reactor pressure vessel insulation is lifted off during each refueling operation. Calculations have 4 tons Contered on shown that the insulation can be lif ted to 8'-4" for SWEC Azimuth the threshold height of scabbing and 18'-4" for the 335' perforation threshold height. Operational procedures will insure the lift height is kept below 18'-4".
For equipment struck by postulated concrete pro-pa Jectiles below the 175 -9" operating floor, the pa following analysis shows:
Ope ra t i ng 1R24"MG1f3B c Low Pressure Cooling injection (LPCI)
Floor 1R24*MG112 150'-9" The LPCI motor-generator sets are contained within their own rooms and are protected f rom overhead scabbing.
1T46*TCV059B Reactor Building Standby Yentilation System (RBSVS) 1T46*TCV060B 1T46*FE104B If one RBSVS is rendered inoperable the resultant 1T46*FE105B actions will be in accordance with the Technical IT46*UCO21B Specification Section 3.6.5.3 1T46'UCO22B Original Janua ry 1983
S J
POLAR CRANE IT31-CRNOO2 Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Containment Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination !
1moact Area Elevation Eauipment Category Discussion
]
1
- Load Control of safe shutdown can be maintained when pos-tulating damage to electrical cabling, small bo re piping, or instrument lines f rom an overhead scab by taking credit for alternative shutdown methods identi-fled in the Cable Separation Analysis Report and both separation studies for segment 150-N8.
Stud Tensioners Ope ra t ing e B. 24-Inch Concrete Stab !
and Frame floor i 175'-9" The stud tensioner (when carried in i ts no rma l con-figuration of tensioners below the' frane) can be 6 tons Centered on lif ted to 11'-9" before scabbing occurs and 26'-7" SWEC Azimuth before perforation occurs. Ope ra t iona l p rocedu re s
} 135" will keep lift height below the perforation thres-hold.
For equipment struck b Jectiles below 175'-9"y operating postulatedfloor, concrete the pro-following analysis shows:
($ Ope ra t i ng 1041-6-FC c fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - n?t requi red for Floor 152-3 safe shutdown.
150'-9" 1G41-6-FC 152-3 i 1G41-6-FC 152-3 1041-8-FC 152-3 1G41-12-FC 152-3 Cont ro l of safe shutdown can be maintained when pos-tulating damage to electrical cabling, snalt bo re piping, or instrument lines f rom an overhead scab by taking credit f rom alternative shutdown methods identi-fled in the Cable Separation Analysis Report and both separation studies for segments 150-03, 150-N3 and 150-N4.
Orig ina l January 1983
. s ,e s, POLAR CRANE 1T31-CRN002 Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment
't l
Haza rd i
Safety-Related Elimination Impact A rea Elevation Eauloment Ca tego ry Discussion
(_oa d j Head Stud Ope ra t i ng e C. 18-inch Concrete Slab j Rack Floor 175'-9" The 18" slab has the ability to withstand a drop of 10' by the head stud rack. (he rack storage 1.5 Tons Centered on position is currently over a 9" slab; however, a I SWEC Azimuth new storage a rea for the rack on the 18" slab floor 230' has been designated.
For equipment struck b ostulated concrete i projectiles below 175'y -9 p' operating floor, the following analysis shows:
Ope ra t ing 1G33-P020 Reactor Water Cleanup (used for water clarifica-Floor 1G33-TK008 tion) - not requi red for safe shutdown 150'-9" 1G33-4-C 151-4 1G33-4-SY 151-4 Cont ro l of safe shutdown can be maintained when pos-
[j tulating damage to electrical cabling, small bore piping. or instrument lines f rom an overhead o imb by taking credit for alternative shutdown methods identi-fled in the Cable Separation Analysis Report and both sepa ration studies for segment 150-05.
- 6. The following haza rd evaluation was conducted on three unique lif ts which do not represent a 9ene ra l mode l of the no rma l ma i ntenance l i f ts analyzed in the previous section. They were selected based on the special material or unusual shape being lifted.
Orig ina l Janua ry 1983
b
, POLAR CRANE IT31-CRNOO2 ,
Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Containment Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Equipment Cateoorv Discussion Load Flux Monitor Ope ra t ing e A. The flux monitor shipping crate is mounted on the Shipping Crate Floor inner wall of the Reactor Building approximately 175'-9" 15' above the operat ing floor. This unit is Wall Mount removed f rom its storage position and placed on a 181'-0" 30" section of the floor. If the flux monitor 2.5 Tons shipping crate i s d ropped f rom the 15' eleva-tion, standard evaluations show perforation of the floor will occur, 29 wever, the standa rd evaluations do not consider tne structural I-beams below the floor which support the floor. With the inclusion
^
of these beams, a drop of 19.3' can be sustained.
For equipment struck b projectiles below 175'y gostulated
-9 concreteoperating floor, the following analysis shows:
Ope ra t i ng 1R24*MG113B Low Pressure Cooling injections (LPCI)
Floor 1R24*MG112 150'-9" The LPCI motor-generator sets a re conta ined within pa their own rooms and would therefore be protected p, if the overhead was scabbed.
1T46*TCV0598 Reactor Building Standby Ventilation System (RSSVS) 1T46*TCV060B
fa6*FE104B If one RBSVS train is rendered inoperable the 1T4bs.~r105B resultant actions will be in accordance with IT46*UCO2:2 Technical Specification 3.6.5.3.
i IT46*UCO22B Control of safe shutdown can be maintained when pos-tulating damage to electrical cabling, small bore piping, or instrument lines f rom an overhead scab by taking credit for alternative shutdown methods identi-fled in the C.ble Sepa ration Analysis' Report and both sepa ration analysis for segments 150-N7, 150-N8 and 150-07.
1 Original Janua ry 1983 1
POLAR CRANE IT31-CRN002 Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Cateoory Discussion Load New Fuel Ope ra t i ng B. The new fuel sh ipp i ng c ra te s a re l i f ted th ree a t a Shipping Crates Floor time f rom the Reactor Building " receiving bay to elev 175'-9" 175'-9" and placed down on a 30 floor stab.
The crates are then individually picked up, the fuel 1.35 Tons (ea) SWEC Azimuth bundles a re removed and properly stored, and the 320*-40' empty crates a re placed in stcrage on the opposite side of the Reactor Building. During these opera-tions the new fuel shipping crate, when full, should not be lifted above 10 to prevent a drop capable of penetration.
For equipment struck by postulated concrete pro-Jectiles below the 175 -9" operating floor, the following analysis shows:
Ope ra t ing 1R24*MG111 Low Pressure Cooling injection (LPCI)
Floor 1R24*MG112 '
150'-9" 1R24*MG113A Equipment is contained within its own area and 1
1R24*MG113B would therefore be protected if the overhead was scabbed.
p,
'" Reactor Building Standby Ventilation System (RBSYS) 1T46*TCV059A IT46*TCV060A
! 1T46*TCV059B If one RBSVS is rendered inoperable the resultent 1T46*TCV060B actions will be in accordance with Technical 1146*FE104A Specification 3.6.5.3.
1T46*FE105A
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1T46*FE104B 1T46*FE105B IT46-UCO21A 1T46-UCO22A IT46-UCO218 1T46-UCO22B Original January 1983
- s. s POLAR CRANE 1T31-CRN002 I
Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact A rea Elevation Eauioment Cateaory Discussion Load Cont ro l of safe shutdown can be maintained when pos-tulating damage to electrical cabling, small bo re piping, or instrument lines f rom an overhead scab by taking credit for a lternative. shutdown methods identi-fled in the Cable Separation deport and both separation studies for segments 150-N8, 150-N1, 150-07, 150-08, and 150-01 Radiation Shield Ope ra t ing c C. This radiation shield is used during refueling opera-Floor tions only, it is l i f ted out of the d rye r a nd sepa r-175'-9" ator storage pool and positioned in the place of the refueling cana
- plugs which have been removed. This 12.5 Tons Sto rago in shield is made or lead and therefore wouid absorb base or most of the energy of a drop in crushing the shield, d rye r a nd Since the main hook cannot get to the shield, it is sepa ra to r recommended that when moving the shield, double storage pool slings be used.
SWEC Azimuth Cont ro l or safe shutdown can te maintained when pos-pa 305' ( in tulating damage to electrical cabling, sma l i bo re as s to rage ) piping, or instrument lines f rom an overhead scab by 90' (in use) taking credit for alternative shutdown methods identi-ried in the Cable Separation Analysis Report and both sepa ration ana lysis for segments 112-07 and 112-02, as well as prima ry segments N6, N2, 05, 06, and 01 which a re transversed during movement of the shield.
7.
A. LlLCO is taking further action through investigating the reasibility of acquiring s ing le-ra i t u re-p roo f capab i l i ty fo r the auxi l i a ry 1.c i st. This evaluation is being pursued to dete rm i ne the maximum ope ra t iona l capability with the lea s t p rocedu ra l restraints.
B. Additionally, to provide further defense in-depth, LI LCO ha s reduced the auxi l ia ry hoist ra t ing from 30 tons to 15 tons and instituted procedures that all lifts be double slung.
Orig ina l Janua ry 1983
I I
i i
i REACTOR BUILDINC RECEIVING AREA CRANE: 1T31-CRNO19 i i Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment 9
i Haza rd
- Safety-Related Elimination Imoset Area Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion i
i Load Receiving Ope ra t i ng None e Although this crane does not carry or pass over sarcty-Floor related equipment requi red for safe shutdown, it does Bui Elevld40 ing; Floor 40'-0" carry a load which could potentit t ly damage safety-1 SWEC Azimuth Mono ra i l related equipment ir penetration of the floor occurred 0*-45' 67'-2" during a postulated drop. Calculations have demonstra-Va rious parts ted that a full capacity load (1.5 tons) ra ised to the maximum lift helght (25 -5") will not penetrate or scab and components the receiving rioor ir dropped.
not exceeding the 1.5-ton crane capacity l
^
pa
%J 4
3 4
l 4
Original Janua ry 1983 4
l
' N RECIRCULATION PUMP MOTOR: 1T31-CRNO37 Location Reactor Building, Prima ry Conta ir. ment
- Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact A rea Elevation Eautoment Cateoorv Discussion Load SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng 1E11-20"-WR- c 1. Plant is in cold shutdown mode allowing access to 315*-135' Floor 202-901A-1 prima ry containment and ma intenance ( remova l) of 76' 1/2" reci rculation pump motor. Piping associated Rec i rcu la t ion Monora i l directly with the recirculation pump is not Pump Motor - 92' 1/2" required for maintaining safe shutdown.
1B31-P001 A or B (42,400 lb) 2. Cont rol of safe shutdown can be maintained when postulating damnge f rom a rec i rcu l a t i on pump motor d ropped in Cable Separation Analysis Report and both separation analysis studies for segments 01, 02, and 06, by ta ki ng c red i t for a l t'e rna t ive shutdown methods identified in these three analyses.
i
- 3. Line 1E11-20"-WR-202-901A-1 is part of Reactor Heat Removal (RHR) system piping utilized in the shutdown cooling mode. This segment of piping is in the common suction line for both the RHR cooling loops.
removal The reci rcula t ion pump moto r path transverses the pipe. A break of this pipe segment f rom a postulated motor drop would incapacitate the
$$ RHR cooling mode. The affected segment of piping can be isolated by closing valves 1E11*MOV048 and 047. The system configuration .to accommodate the loss of RHR cooling is ' contained in FSAR Section 212.28. Required operator action involves opening an ADS valve and establishing a closed cooling loop utilizing core sp ray taking suction f rom the supp ress ion pool and discharging through the ADS valve. (Another eme rgency co re cooling system in accordance with Technical Specification Section 3/4.5.2, is to have available at least one operable LPCI pump and a flow path capable of taking a suction from the supp ress ion chamber and transferring the water to the reac' tor).
Orig ina l Janua ry 1983 i
i
> O t
- RECIRCULATION PUMP MOTOR TRANSFER HOIST
- 1T31-CRN045 Location Reactor Building, Prima ry Conta inment i Haza rd Sa fe ty-Re la ted Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion Load SWEC Azimuth 169* Ope ra t i ng None c 1. Plant is in cold shutdown mode allowing access to Floor prima ry containment and maintenance ( removal) of Rec i rcu l a t ion 76-4 1/2" reci rculation pump motor. Piping associated Pump Motor Mono ra i l di rectly with the recirculation pump is not 1B31-P001 A or B 92'-5 1/2" required for ma inta ining cold shutdown.
(42,400 lb)
- 2. Cont ro l of safe shutdown can be maintained when postulating damage from a rec i rcu l a t ion pump moto r d rop by analysis / comparison to the Cable Separation Analysis Report and both separation analysis studies i fo r segment 06, by taking credit for alternative shutdown methods identified in these three repo rt s.
w e
l 1
Original
- J anua ry 1983 2
t4
'\s .
EQUIPMENT HATCH TUNNEL HOIST AND TROLLEY: 1T31-CRN079A AND P.i +
EQUIPMENT HATCH MONORAIL: IT31-CRN080. EQUIPMENT HATCH TUNNEL TROLLEY: 1T33-CRN081 j Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment '
Haza rd i Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion Load i
SWEC Azimuth 1T31-CRN079 None e Although this lif ting system does not carry or pass 3:5'-360' A and B over safety-related equipment required for safe Elev 78'-7" shutdown, it does ca rry a load which could potentially Ope ra t i ng damage safety-related equipment if penetration of the DrywoII Equip- Floor _ floor occurred during a postulated drop. Calculations ment Match, 76'-3". have demonstrated that the shield blocks can be dropped
.no ma rk number Mono ra l l - f rom a freight of 18'-3" above the operat ing floor and
<(18,5t0 lb) 87'-8" the e 4'-0"quipment 4 . Shield Blocks, without hatch canof scabbing be the dropped floorf rom a heightBcth occurring. of no ma rk number 51T31-CRN080 these calculated heights are below the working
{19,000 lb) c lea ra nce: required for lifting the loads to their
. Ope ra t i ng respective storage positions. Operating procedures 4
Floor shall be established to ensure the above limits are ,
76'-3" not exceeded. ' d Mono ra i l '
I 88'-3" y IT31-CRN081 i Ope ra t i ng
' ' Floor '
l 78'-7" Mono ra i l 106'6" l
1 Original Janua ry 1983
v v 4
i i PERSONNEL HATCH HOIST AND TROLLEY: 1T31-CRN084 Location Reactor Building, Prima ry Containment 4
- Ha za rd 4
Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion i Load
! SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng None c 1. Prima ry conta inment is accessible for maintenance 105*-135' Floor only during shutdown. During this period the
, 76'-O" rel ief va lve d i scha rge l ines (1821-10-SLP-202, 203, i Varied com- Mono ra i l and 204), which a re transversed by the trolley, a re ponents found 89'-5" not i n u se a nd a re not requi red for ma inta ining safe '
within the shutdown.
i prima ry con-tainment not 2. Control of safe shutdown can be mainta ined when exceeding the postulating damage from a heavy load drop in Cable 2-ton hoist Sepa ration Ana lysis Report and both sepa ration 4 capacity analysis studies for segment 02 by taking credit for alternate shutdown methods identified in these !
three analyses.
4 M
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Original January 1983 0
9
_ . . ~ . .- .-- -__ _ _ _ _ .- ---- . -
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2 MAIN STEAM TROLLEYS - SECONDARY: 1T31-CRN090A. B. C. D Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment (Main Steam Tunnel)
Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact A rea Elevation Eauipment Cateoory Discussion t.oa d SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng IE51*MOV035 C 1. Plant must be in cold shutdown mode to allow access 1
=
135*-225*, Floor 1E51-WR-5-901B'2 to the main steam tunnel for maintenance of\ the Main Steam 85'-6" 1E51-WR-20-9018-1 outer main stcom isolation valves (MSIV) and the Tunnel Monorail reacto r feedwater valves. All piping associated 96'-5" with the outer MSIVs or the reactor feedwater valves Outer Ma in Steam is not requi red for ma inta ining safe shutdown.
Isolation Valves IB21*A0V082A, 2. Piping within the main steam tunnel which may be B, C, D (10,000 lb) damaged by a postulated load drop is as follows:
Reason Not Required For Comoonent Weights: Line Maintainina Safe Shutdown Pneumatic Cylinder / 1G11-6"-DRW-55-151-4 Equipment and Floor Drains System i Spring 1G11-4"-CRW-11-151-4 l Assembly: 2,000 lb 1G11-4"-CRW-91-151-4 a Disk and Seat Assembly: 1,200 lb 1G33-4"-WD-24-9018-1 Reactor Water Cleanup System Cove r: 1,500 lb 1G33-4"-WD-28-9018-1 (Utilized only for Water Ope ra to r: 2,030 lb 1G33-4"-WD-36-151-4 Clarification)
- (j 1G33-P"-WR-79-151-4
- Reactor Feedwater Valves 1G41-4"-FC-26-152-4 Fuel Pool Cleanup System 1G41-4"-FC-27-152-4 (Utilized only for Water 1B21*MOV035A,B 1G41-4"-FC-57-152-4 Clarification)
(9,600 lb) 1821*AOV036A,B 1E51*MOV035 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
- (3,050 lb) 1E51-WR-5-901B-2 System (RCIC) requi red to 1E51-WR-20-9018-1 initiate safe shutdown, but piping exposed to a postulated i load drop is not requi red to .
maintain safe shutdown. A. load drop during power operation when
' E51 system may be used is not postulated due to an inac-cessibility of steam tunnel area.
I i
) Orig ina l January 1983
[\
U (V (V 1T31-CRN094A, B, C, AND D - TROLLEY MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE TROLLEYS: IT31-CRN095A. B. C. AND D - HolST Location Reactor Building, Prima ry Containment Haza rd Sa fe ty-Pe la ted Elimination impact A rea Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion Load SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng 1821-10"-SLP-208- c 1. Plant is in cold shutdown mode allowing access to 90*-240', Floor 301-3 prima ry conta inment for maintenance (and/or re-Elev 76'-4 1/2" moval) of the inner main steam isolation valves.
76'-4 1/2" Mono ra i l 1821-10"-SLP-209- The inner MSIVs and associated piping are not re-95'-0" 301-3 nui red for ma inta ining safe shutdown.
Inner Main Steam Isolation Valves 1821-10"-SLP-205- 2. Piping within the prima ry containment which may be 1821*AOV081A, B, 301-3 damaged by a load drop a re as follows:
C, D (9,300 lb) 1821-18"-WFP 1B21-10"-SLP-208-301-3 SRV d i scha rge p i p i ng - not Component Weichts 1501-1 1821-10"-SLP-209-301-3 requi red to ma inta in safe 1821-10"-SLP-205-301-3 shutdown.
Pneumatic 1821-18"-WFP 1821-18"-WFP-29-1501-1 Feedwater piping - not re-Cyl i nde r/Sp ri ng 1501-1 1821-18"-WFP-30-1501-1 qui red to ma inta in safe Assembly 2,000 lb shutdown Disk and Stem 1831*P001A Assembly 1,200 lb 1B31-P001A Reactor Reci rculation System - reactor (j Cover (Bol ted to coolant reci rculation pump operation Body) 1,500 lb is not required when access to MSIVs Operator 2,030 lb is available.
- 3. Control of safe shutdown can be maintained when postulating damage from a MSIV component drop by taking credit for alternative shutdown methods identified in the Cable Separation Analysis Report and both separation analysis studies for segments 02, 03, 04, N3, o r N4.
Original Janua ry 1983
s v bN MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE: 1T31-CRN091. 1T31-CRN092A AND B I
Location Reactor Building, Prima ry Containment Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination i impact Area Elevation Ecuipment Cateoory Discussion Load SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t ing 1B21-10"-SLP- c 1. Piping within impact area which may be struck by a 205*-305' Floor 207-301-3 postulated d rop:
55'-155' 97'-0" Mono ra i l 1E11-4"-WR-285 1821-10"-SLP-207-301-3 SRV d i scha rge p i p i ng - Not Main Steam Safety 111'-6" 901A-1 requi red to ma inta in safe Relief Valves shutdown IB21*RV-092A 1E11*MOV054 I through H, J 1E11-4"-WR-285-901A-1 Residual Heat Removal Sys-through L 1E21-10"-WR tem head spray inlet line.
(1,100 lb) 901A-1 Calculation has demonstrated j a postulated load drop will 1E21-10"-WR not cause a line break or 2 901A-1 loss of functional ability.
Additionally, this is not requi red to ma intain rare shutdown.
1E11*MOV054 Containment isolation valve on 1E11-4"-WR-285-901A h3 Possible failure nf this dh valve would necessitate isolation of the preced-ing line by closing 1E11*
MOV053. The loss of this line will not degrade the RHR System function.
v 1E21-10"-WR-17-901A-1 Core Spray System -
1E21-10"-WR-37-901A-1 Each line is part of sepa rate loops of the Core Spray System.
Calculations have demon-strated a postulated load drop will not damage this piping.
- 2. Control of sa fe shutdown can be demonstrated when postulating damage f rom MSRV drop by ta king cred i t for alternative shutdown methods identified in Cable Sepa ra t ion Analysis Report and both sepa ra t ion analysis studies for segments 01, 02, 04, 05, 06, N2, N5, o r N6.
Original Janua ry 1983
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1 j CONTROL ROD DRIVE REPAIR AREA JIB: 1T31-CRN048 j Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment Ha za rd 1 Safety-Related Elimination
' Impact A rea . Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion 0
Load SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng None e Although this Jib crane does not ca rry loads passing floors ove r sa fe ty- re l a ted equipment required for safe shut-
- 5'-25*,'-7" Elev 78 78'-7" down, it does carry a load which could potentially l SWEC Azimuth 40'-0", damage safety-related equipment if penetration of the
! C rane floor occurred during a postulated load d rop. Calcula-l 25'-50'I-0" Elev 40 98'-10" tions have demonstrated that a full capacity load (1.5 tons) ra i sed to the maximum lift hei l' Va ried components eleva tion, 20'-3" for 78'-3" and 58'-10" ght fo rfor each 40'-0" I of the Control Rod will not penetrate or scab the floors if dropped.
j Drive system not
! exceeding the 1.5-j ton Jib capacity.
i 1
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- 03 I
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original Janua ry 1983 l
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l O O CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMP HOIST AND TROLLEY: 1T31-CRN078 Location Reactor Bui lding, Secor.da ry Conta inment i
Ha za rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Ca tego ry Discussion Load SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng None c 1. The control rod drive water pumps are not requ i red 160*-240*, rioor for initiating or maintaining safe shutdown.
Elev 40'-0" 40'- 0" Maintenance may be performed on one pump while the Mono ra i l plant is in operation or shutdown. A postulated i 51'-0" load drop will not affect the plant safe shutdown Control rod capability by taking credit for alternative shut-drive water down methods identified in the Cable Separation pump 1C11-P017A Analysis Report and both separation analysis and B (5700 lb) studies for segments 040-N4, 040-N5, and 040-04.
Component Weichts 2. When maintenance, i.e., removal, is performed on the Reactor Recirculation MG set fluid coupling cooler CRD pump - 1540 lb ci rculation pumps (1P42-P002A or B) the pump and Motor - 2260 lb motor are disconnected from each other at the Cears - 650 lb coupling. The weight of either component is 650 lb,
! Baseplate - 1250 lb which is less than the determined weight for a heavy load.
, Reactor Reci rc. MG set fluid coupling g3 circ pump 1P42-P y) 002A and B i '
Component Weichts Motor - 650 lb Pump - 650 lb r
i i
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Original January 1983 a
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= _ _ . .. __ - ~ _ _ _ - . _ _ . - - .-. _ - .-
i i
f 95' EQUIPMENT HOIST AND TROLLEY: 1T31-CRN093 1
- Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment l
Ha za rd Sa fe ty-Re la ted Elimination i
Imoact Area Elevation Eauioment Cateoorv Discussion I
Load i
SWEC Azimuth 225*- Operating None c Lifts by this hoist and trolley do not occur over any 235' Elev 112'-9" Floor equipment or piping requi red for achieving and ma in-i 112'-9", taining safe shutdown. Any possible damage to cable, Va rious equipment Mono ra i l small bore piping, or instrument lines will not affect 4 being transferred 119'-3" safe shutdown by taking credit for alternative shutdown
! between Elev methods identified in the Cable Separation Analysis 95'-3" and Report and both separation analysis studies for segment 3 112'-9" not ex- 112-N6.
I ceeding the 1-ton hoist capacity 1
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! HICH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM HOIST AND TROLLEY: 1T31-CRN08S Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment l
l Ha za rd
. Safety-Related Elimination j impact A rea Elevation Eauipment Cateoory Discussion i
Load SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng HPCI Turbine c The HPCI System can be incapacitated only by a pos-150*-210*6 Floor 1E41*TUOO2 tulated load drop f rom IT31-CRN085 since no other Elev 8'-0 8'-0" HPCI Pump and mono ra i l system passes over the liPCI. A load drop Hono ra i l Booster would occur during maintenance or repair, and to HPCI Turbine 21'-11" 1E41*P016 have the HPCI out of service, provisions of the Tech-
. 1E41*TUOO2 nical Specifications Section 3/4.5.1 must be met.
! HPCI Pump and if cabling is damaged, safe shutdown can be achieved l Booster by ta k i ng c red i t fo r Ca b l e Sepa ra t i on Ana l ys i s Repo rt 1E41*P9?6 and both sepa ration analysis studies for segments '
008-N4 o r 006-N5.
Weichts - Va rious components of the HPCI turbine, pump and booster not exceeding the 4-ton hoist and trolley capacity.
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T original Janua ry 1983 i
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REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM HOIST AND TROLLEY: 1T31-CRNO86 Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion Load SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng Reactor Core c The Reactor Core isolation Cooling Turbine and Pump can i Floor Isolation Cooling be incapacitated only by a postulated load drop f rom 210*-235'0 Elev 8'-0 8'-0" Turbine 1E51*TU 1T31-CRN086, which is installed for servicing the RCIC Mono ra i l 005 system. Since no other monorail system carrying a Reactor Core Iso- 19'-4" Reactor Core heavy load passes over this equipment, the postulated lation Cooling isolation Cooling load drop could occur only during maintenance, and to Turbine 1E51*TU Pump 1E51*P015 take the RCIC system out of service, provisions of the 005 and Pump Technical Specifications must be met. With the RCIC 1E51*P015 not operable, the High Pressure Cooling injection (HPCI) System must be operable. Further, safe shutdown Component Weichts can be achieved if cabling is damaged by the analysis 4 done in Cable Separation Analysis Report and both Turbine - 3000 lb separation analysis studies for segment 008-05.
U.H. Turbine Case - 625 lb Rotor - 325 lb Trip & Throttle Valve - 400 lb ta Base - 900 lb LJ Pump - 2920 lb Base - 3720 lb a
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i REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED LOOP COOLING WATER (RBCLCW) TROLLEY: 1T31-CRN083A AND B -
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- Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment Ha za rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion
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Load I SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t ing IPh2*P005A,B,C c The RBCLCW consists of two independent loops both l 135'-215', rioor capable of cooling essential equipment. During an Elev 150*-9" 150'- 9" accident condition or shutdown, one loop can be a
Mono ra i l supplied cooling water by a single pump, it during
, RBCLCW Pump 166'-5" ma intenance ( removal) one RBCLCW pump component is 1 1P42*P005A,B,C dropped on an operating pump, thus disabling it, the d
pump can be secured. To conduct this maintenance Component Weichts p rocedu re, two RBCLCW pumps must be availab e.
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Pump -
827 lb No other sa fety-rela ted equipment, piping, or cable Mo to r - 1,350 lb is exposed in the impact area, nor is penetration or Bedplate - 606 lb scabbing of the floor possible,
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- s j STANDBY LIQUID CONTRCL PUMP HolST
- 1T31-CRN082A AND R 1
- Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment i
Ha za rd J Safety-Related Elimination j
impact Area Elevation Eauipment Cateaorv Discussion Load j SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng IC41*P024A c The standby liquid control pump can be incapacitated t 135'-180* Floor and B only by a postulated load drop f rom 1T31-CRN082A and Elev 112'-9" 112'-9", B, which is installed to service this same equipment.
Mono ra i l Since no other system carrying a heavy load passes Standby Liquid 125'-4" over it, this postulated load drop would occur only Control Pump during planned maintenance or unscheduled repa i r, and 4 1C41*P024A and B provisions of the Technical Specifications, l Section 3/4.1.5, would goverr . ..e actions requi red.
Scabbing of the operating f f ior is not possible.
Component Weichte
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] Pump and i Coupling - 2219 lb Motor - 550 lb 1
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REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM AREA JfB CRANE: 1T31-CRNO89 t 1 L
! Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment 4
i i Haza rd
{ Sa fety-Re l a ted Elimination
! Impact Area Elevation Xguip. ment Cateaory Discussion Load
- SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t ing None c The RWCU system components beneath the plugs are not 250'-290' Floor requi red to initiate or maintain safe shutdown. There ,
Elev 175' 178'-9" is no safety-related piping or cabling located beneath l Jib Boom the t rave l a rea o f the j i b.
Va rious components 185'-3" of the RWCU System not exceeding the crane's 1-ton ;
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TIP CASK HOIST AND TROLLEY: 1T31-CRN088 Location Reactor Building, Secondary Containment Ha za rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area Elevation Eauipment Ca teao ry Discussion Loa _d.
SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t ing None c There is no safety-related equipment, piping, or Elev 76'-7" Floor cabling transversed by 1T31-CRN088, nor i s the 76'-7", floor capable of being scabbed.
Traversing In- Ope ra t i ng core Probe (TIP) P l a tfo rm System Cask 83'-10",
1C51-CSK003 Mono ra i l 92'-6" Weicht -
1375 lb ta 4
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CONTROL ROD DRIVE LEVELING TRAY HolST: 1T31-CRN087 1
. Location Reactor Building, Prima ry Conta inment l
Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination l
Impact Area Elevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion l Load l
l SWEC Azimuth Ope ra t i ng None c This heavy load passes over no large bore piping or 1 0*-30*, Elev 63' Floor major equipment and is used only when in cold shutdown
- 76'-0" condition. Any possible damage to cabling will not i Control Rod Drive Lifting affect safe shutdown by taking credit for the alter-Level ing Tray, Padeye native shutdown methods identified in the Cable T ra c k, and Drive 96'-0" Separation Analysis Report and both separation analysis Unit (no ma rk studies for segment N1.
number, 2735 lb)
Component Weichts Cart - 200 lb l Track - 960 lb i CRD Unit - 450 lb i La
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j SCREENWELL BRIDGE CRANE: 1U31-CRN116 Location Top o f Sc reenwe l l l
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! Haza rd Safety-Related Elimination impact A rea Elevation Eauipment Ca teao ry Discussion i~
Load
! f Top o f Sc reenwe l l Ope ra t i ng None c A postulated load drop will not interfere with or l Floor interrupt the operation of any safe shutdown required j j T ra sh Ca rt 20'-6" equipment.
IN71-TRC001 Runwag Rail
. 40'-0 t
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j Trash Ca rt j 3400 lb i i
j Trash Rake j 2800 lb i
j Machinery Plat- ,
7 form w/ Drive 3000 lb l
i Cable Reel j La 200 lb i W r
l Cont rol Panel '
'300 lb l
Supe rst ructu re 10,000 lb I ,
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SCREENWELL HOISTS AND TROLLEYS: 1U31-CRN120 A and B Location Haza rd Sa fe ty-Re la ted Elimination impact A rea Elevation Eauloment Cateoorv Discussion l9.ad The subject trolleys have not been installed in the screenwell build ing. Ma intenance procedures provide for remova l of the screenwash pumps and motors through Screenwash pumps removal plugs in the screenwell building roof.
1N71-P217 A and B sk O-Orig ina l January 1983
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I CRD PUMP SUCTION FILTER TROLLEY: 1T31-CRNO99 i
Location Reactor Bisilding, Secondary Containment Haza rd
- Sa fe ty-Re l a ted Elimination impact Area Elevation Equipment Cateoory Discussion t
Load P Mono ra i l has been removed by EarDCR 184105D. l I
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V 480 V MOTOR GENERATOR TROLLEYS: NO EQUIPMENT MARK NUMBER (LPCl1 Location Reactor Building, Seconda ry Conta inment Ha za rd Safety-Related Elimination impact Area [Jevation Eauipment Cateaory Discussion Load 1R24-M0111,112: 1R24-MG111, None c The motor generator as a component of the LPCI system SWEC Azimuth 112 Ope ra t- is governed by Technical Specification 3/4.5.1 and 335*-25' ing Floor will not be exposed to a postulated load drop except Elev 150'-9" 150'-9" during remova l for repa i r. Calculations have shown a 1R24-MG113, A, B: Mono ra i l drop or the generator at elevation 161'-0" to the SWEC Azimuth 159'-0" operating floor at 150'-0" will be contained by the 335'-25' st ruc tu ra l steel beneath the concrete floor. Scabbing Elev 161'-0" Sec- 1R24-MG113A, of the floor will occur, but there is no safety-related onda ry (1R24-MG B Operating equipment that can be struck by concrete projectiles 113A&B) Floor on the elevation below 150'-0".
161'-0" 480 V Motor Mono ra i l Any damage to cables, small bore piping, or instrument Gene ra to r 169'-0" lines can be accommodated by taking credit for alter-1RP4*MG111,112, nate shutdown methods proposed in the Cable Separation llaA and B Analysis Report and both separation analysis studies for segments 150-N1, 150-N8, o r 150-08. To further Component Weiai ts ensure a safe lowering of the motor generator from 161'-0" to 150'-0", two hoists will be used. Both A Generator - 5000 lb holsts will be individually capable or holding the M Motor - 1100 lb 5,000 lb weight of the generator.
Orig ina l Janua ry 1983 l
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