ML022410063
| ML022410063 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba, McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/2002 |
| From: | Kelber C, Rubenstein L, Austin Young Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| Byrdsong A T | |
| References | |
| +adjud/rulemjr200506, 50-369-LR, 50-370-LR, 50-413-LR, 50-414-LR, ASLBP 02-794-01-LR, RAS 4791 | |
| Download: ML022410063 (8) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL RAS 4791 DOCKETED 08/28/02 Before Administrative Judges: SERVED 08/28/02 Ann Marshall Young, Chair Dr. Charles N. Kelber Lester S. Rubenstein In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-369-LR, 50-370-LR, 50-413-LR, and 50-414-LR DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION ASLBP No. 02-794-01-LR (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2) August 28, 2002 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Certifying Question to the Commission)
Pending before the Board is Duke Energys August 8, 2002, Motion for Reconsideration (hereinafter Motion for Reconsideration), responses to which were filed by Intervenors and the Staff on August 15 and 19, 2002, respectively. Also pending before the Commission is Duke Energys August 2, 2002, Motion for Clarification of Memorandum and Order CLI-02-17 (hereinafter Motion for Clarification), responses to which were filed by Intervenors and the Staff on August 12, 2002. In the interest of efficiency in resolving issues that are involved in both motions, the Board certifies to the Commission the following question:
Would the Commission prefer that the Board resolve the Motion for Reconsideration before us, along with various other questions before us relating to certain issues also involved in the Motion for Clarification, without waiting for further clarification from the Commission, or would the Commission prefer that we await clarification from the Commission before proceeding further with regard to these areas of dispute between the parties?
Specifically, among the issues involved in both sets of motions and responses are questions centering around:
(1) whether the values from NUREG/CR-6427 referred to by the Commission in CLI-02-17 include only conditional containment failure probabilities, or encompass overall
2 containment failure probabilities;1 and (2) whether resolution of Contention 2 requires any comparison of Dukes containment failure probability estimates and those of NUREG/CR-6427, or evaluation of the adequacy of Dukes SAMA analysis in light of NUREG/CR-6427.2 How these two central issues are resolved may largely determine, among other things, whether the scope of discovery on Contention 2 should or should not be defined to encompass level 1 PRAs relating to SBO frequency, and/or whether information Duke has provided in response to Staff Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) relating to its SAMA analysis has or has not rendered moot that part of Intervenors Consolidated Contention 2 now remaining in the proceeding after the Commissions issuance of CLI-02-17.
With regard to issue (1), Duke argues that the Sandia study was a simplified Level 2 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) calculating [and focusing on] containment failure probabilities for certain plants, given core damages calculated in Level 1 assessments that 1
See CLI-02-17, 56 NRC__, __, slip op. at 17 (2002); Sandia National Laboratories, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-6427, Assessment of the DCH [Direct Containment Heating] Issue for Plants with Ice Condenser Containments (Apr. 2000) (also referred to as the Sandia Study); Motion for Reconsideration at 5, 8-9; Motion for Clarification at 3, 8; Blue Ridge Environmental Defense Leagues and Nuclear Information and Resource Services Response to Duke Energy Corporations Motion for Reconsideration (Aug. 15, 2002) (hereinafter Intervenors Response to Motion for Reconsideration) at 4 n.2; Blue Ridge Environmental Defense Leagues and Nuclear Information and Resource Services Response to Duke Energy Corporations Motion for Clarification (Aug. 12, 2002) (hereinafter Intervenors Response to Motion for Clarification) at 6-8; NRC Staffs Response to Applicants Motion for Clarification of Memorandum and Order CLI-02-17 (Aug. 12, 2002) (hereinafter Staff Response to Motion for Clarification) at 5. See also, generally, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Draft Supp. 8, Regarding McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Supp. 8 (May 2002) (hereinafter GEIS Supp. 8) at 5-4-5-30; and Draft Supp. 9, Regarding Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (May 2002) (hereinafter GEIS Supp. 9) at 5-4-5-29.
2 See Motion for Reconsideration at 8-9; Motion for Clarification at 3, 8; Intervenors Response to Motion for Reconsideration at 4 n.2; Intervenors Response to Motion for Clarification at 3-8; NRC Staffs Response to Applicants Motion for Reconsideration (Aug. 19, 2002) (hereinafter Staff Response to Motion for Reconsideration) at 2; Staff Response to Motion for Clarification at 8. See also GEIS Supp. 8 at 5-17-5-18, 5-26-5-30, and Supp. 9 at 5-15-5-16, 5-24-5-29.
3 Duke asserts are outside the scope of the Sandia study.3 Duke has also referred to its responses to Staff Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) as including the NUREG 6427 conditional containment failure probability, and characterized Contention 2 as dealing with the containment failure probabilities related to the hydrogen combustion event as a result of station blackout [SBO].4 The Staff agrees with Dukes arguments generally, referring to the calculation produced in a Level 1 PRA as [t]he frequency of SBO events that lead to core damage, and stating that the Sandia study found significantly higher conditional containment failure probabilities (CCFPs) during station blackout (SBO) events for plants with ice condenser containments than had been previously reported.5 Staff counsel has also stated that Staffs position regarding that part of Contention 2 remaining in the case after CLI-02-17 is that the values the Commission refers to were, in fact, utilized when Duke performed a reanalysis in its SAMA evaluation using the conditional containment failure probabilities from the Sandia study.6 The Intervenors, on the other hand, argue that the values at issue are overall containment failure probabilities, which it asserts incorporate both SBO probabilities and 3
Motion for Reconsideration at 5; Motion for Clarification at 3.
4 Tr. 946, 1091; see also Tr. 1039-40, and 981-1011 generally.
5 See Staff Response to Motion for Reconsideration; Staff Response to Motion for Clarification at 2, 5. We note that Staff Counsel, in the Staffs Response to Motion for Clarification, liberally characterizes various statements by board members: The Board initially indicated agreement . . .;
[i]n the Boards view . . .; Staff Response to Motion for Clarification at 3; the Board repeatedly expressed the view that . . .; [t]he Board concluded . . .; the Board concluded . . .; id. at 5-6. Without providing any indication of either the Boards possible conclusions on any issues currently pending, including those identified in the text of this Memorandum and Order, or of any opinions of any individual Board members, the Board would remind counsel that no words should be read into any statements made by individual Board members, nor should counsel presume any agreement, view, or Board conclusions absent evident unequivocal agreement of the Board member or members to any particular proposition, view, or conclusion.
6 Tr. 1104.
4 conditional containment failure probabilities after station blackout has occurred,7 citing NUREG/CR-6427's statement that [t]he early containment failure probability, as computed here, was 13.9% for McGuire, and that [t]his higher containment failure probability for McGuire is dominated by the relatively high SBO frequency and the relatively weak containment for McGuire.8 On issue (2), Duke and the Staff argue that Contention 2 does not encompass any comparison or evaluation of which approach is better, with the Staff arguing that such an approach would lead to an unreasonable result.9 Intervenors disagree, asserting that the adequacy with which Duke takes [NUREG/CR-6427] values into account is at issue, not just whether certain numbers from NUREG/CR-6427 were plugged into Dukes SAMA analysis, and that Dukes approach would make a mockery of considering the values of NUREG/CR-6427.10 In the most recent supplements to the GEIS, the Staff has defined the purpose of SAMA consideration as being to ensure that plant changes (i.e., hardware, procedures, and training) with the potential for improving severe accident safety performance are identified and evaluated,11 and done its own evaluation of Dukes SAMA analysis for each plant;12 and the Commission has indicated that [a]djudicatory hearings in individual license renewal 7
Intervenors Response to Motion for Reconsideration at 4 n.2; Intervenors Response to Motion for Clarification at 6-8.
8 NUREG/CR-6427 at xviii-xix; see Intervenors Response to Motion for Clarification at 6-7.
9 Motion for Clarification at 8; Staff Response to Motion for Clarification at 8; see Motion for Reconsideration generally; Staff Response to Motion for Reconsideration generally.
10 Intervenors Response to Motion for Clarification at 3.
11 See GEIS Supp. 8 at 5-4-5-5; GEIS Supp. 9 at 5-4.
12 See GEIS Supp. 8 at 5-17-5-18, 5-26-5-30; GEIS Supp. 9 at 5-15-5-16, 5-24-5-29.
5 proceedings will share the same scope of issues as our NRC Staff review.13 The parties disagree, however, over what sort and extent of evaluation of SAMAs is appropriate in this adjudicatory proceeding.
Duke has stated that the standard for a SAMA evaluation is that it is a reasonable assessment of the severe accident mitigation alternatives, and the risks and benefits related to them, sufficient to allow informed decision-making,14 but argues with regard to NUREG/CR-6427 that Level 1 assessments [are] outside the scope of the study.15 The Staff does not appear to disagree with this.16 The Intervenors, in contrast, argue that the adequacy of Dukes consideration of the values of NUREG/CR-6427, including its having used a lower value for SBO probability than had been used in NUREG/CR-6427, must be evaluated.17 It is apparent that the parties hold views that differ on the two central issues we summarize above. Moreover, the relevance of SBO frequency to the values of NUREG/CR-6427, as well as the appropriateness and nature of any evaluation of the adequacy of Dukes SAMA analysis vis--vis NUREG/CR-6427, or whether the Sandia studys assumptions reflect better estimates than Dukes,18 would likely be key factors in any ruling(s) by the Board on mootness and/or on discovery requests relating to the level 1 PRAs. The 13 Florida Power & Light Company (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4),
CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 10 (2001); see Duke Energy Corporation (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-20, 54 NRC 211, 212 (2001).
14 Tr. 1036.
15 Motion for Reconsideration at 5.
16 See Staff Response to Motion for Reconsideration; Staff Response to Motion for Clarification at 5.
17 See Intervenors Response to Motion for Reconsideration at 4 n.2; Intervenors Response to Motion for Clarification at 4.
18 CLI-02-17, 54 NRC at __, slip op. at 11-12; see Motion for Clarification at 6-8; Staff Response to Motion for Clarification at 7-8; Intervenors Response to Motion for Clarification at 3-5.
6 Board would therefore appreciate any advice the Commission may wish to provide, either substantively on these issues, or on whether the Commission prefers the Board to resolve these issues at this level without further guidance from the Commission at this time.
Pending further advice from the Commission and further action by the Board, discovery in this proceeding shall be suspended, and all actions taken during the July 29, 2002, telephone conference in this proceeding shall be held in abeyance.19 It is so ORDERED.
20 THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
/RA/
Ann Marshall Young, Chair ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
/RA/
Dr. Charles N. Kelber ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
/RA/
Lester S. Rubenstein ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Rockville, Maryland August 28, 2002 19 Suspending discovery and other pending actions should not create significant delay in this proceeding, given that formal discovery against the Staff was already expected to be suspended, upon Staff counsels request, Tr. 1133-34, until the Staff issues the final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statements, which the Staff expects to issue in January 2003. Nor should it compromise efficiency in resolving matters at issue in the proceeding to approach the resolution of some questions that are involved in both the pending motion before the Board and that before the Commission, as well as that would likely be involved in potential discovery-related motions, in an orderly manner that may minimize the possibility of any unnecessarily duplicative activity on the part of all parties. The Board also notes the conditional nature of the Petitioners withdrawal of its earlier-submitted amended contention. See Intervenors Response to Motion for Clarification at 5; Tr. 1131-32, 1143.
20 Copies of this Order were sent this date by Internet e-mail or facsimile transmission, if available, to all participants or counsel for participants.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )
)
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION ) Docket Nos. 50-369/370/413/414-LR
)
(McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; )
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing LB MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CERTIFYING QUESTION TO THE COMMISSION) have been served upon the following persons by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class, or through NRC internal distribution.
Office of Commission Appellate Administrative Judge Adjudication Ann Marshall Young, Chair U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Washington, DC 20555-0001 Mail Stop - T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge, ASLBP Charles N. Kelber Lester S. Rubenstein Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 4760 East Country Villa Drive Mail Stop - T-3 F23 Tucson, AZ 85718 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Susan L. Uttal, Esq. Michael S. Tuckman, Executive Vice President Antonio Fernández, Esq. Nuclear Generation Office of the General Counsel Duke Energy Corporation Mail Stop - O-15 D21 526 South Church Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 1006 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Charlotte, NC 28201-1006 Mary Olson Janet Marsh Zeller, Executive Director Director of the Southeast Office Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League Nuclear Information and Resource Service P.O. Box 88 729 Haywood Road, 1-A Glendale Springs, NC 28629 P.O. Box 7586 Asheville, NC 28802
2 Docket Nos. 50-369/370/413/414-LR LB MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CERTIFYING QUESTION TO THE COMMISSION)
David A. Repka, Esq. Lisa F. Vaughn, Esq.
Anne W. Cottingham, Esq. Legal Department Winston & Strawn Duke Energy Corporation 1400 L Street, NW 526 S. Church Street (EC11X)
Washington, DC 20005 P.O. Box 1006 Charlotte, NC 28201-1006 Paul Gunter Jesse Riley Nuclear Information and Resource Service 854 Henley Place 1424 16th St., NW Charlotte, NC 28207 Washington, DC 20026 Diane Curran, Esq.
Harmon, Curran, Spielberg
& Eisenberg, L.L.P.
1726 M Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036
[Original signed by Evangeline S. Ngbea]
Office of the Secretary of the Commission Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of August 2002