ML031820231

Ucd/Mnrc 2002 Annual Report

ML031820231
Person / Time
Site:	University of California-Davis
Issue date:	06/26/2003
From:	Richards W Univ of California, McClellan AFB, CA
To:	Eresian W Document Control Desk, NRC/FSME
References
FS 69799, ISO 9001:2000
Download: ML031820231 (65)

Text

UCDDAVIS McCLELLAN NUCLEAR RADIATION C R 5335 PRICE AVENUE McCLELLAN, CA 95652 PHONE: (916) 614-6200 FAX: (916) 614-6250 WEB: http://mnrc.uodavis.edu LA O ISO 9001:2000 FS 69799 June 26, 2003 To: See Distribution List

Subject:

UCD/MNRC 2002 Annual Report Attached is the UCD/MNRC 2002 Annual Report. As this report shows, 2002 was a very busy year. The reactor operated for 3900 hours0.0451 days <br />1.083 hours <br />0.00645 weeks <br />0.00148 months <br /> with a utilization factor of 89%. That was the second highest number of reactor operating hours since operation began in 1990.

The year 2002 produced a record number of research irradiations as the UCD Geology Department programs continue to progress.

The Department of Energy awarded the UCD/MNRC one of four Innovations in Nuclear Infrastructure and Education grants. The grant allows for the purchase of new research equipment plus support for four (4) graduate students.

As part of the UCD/MNRC Educational and Outreach Program, over 100 students and faculty toured the reactor facility this year.

The Iodine-125 production loop began operating for the first time in March 2002. Since that time, the demand for 1-125 has steadily increased.

J.dRiaSad,Ph.D.

Director UCD/MNRC 1 Attachment UCD/MNRC 2002 Annual Report Atr

UC Davis MNRC 2002 Annual Report Distribution List

1. Dr. Warren Eresian, NRC

2. US NRC Document Control Desk

3. Dr. Barry Klein, UCD Vice Chancellor for Research

4. Dr. Wade Richards, MNRC Director

5. Deena Bynoe, MNRC Business Officer

6. Nathan Hall, MNRC Operations Manager

7. MNRC Nuclear Safety Committee Members Jeffrey Ching Donald Feltz Arthur Johnson Kevin Kiger Dr. Robert Nelson James Shackelford Gerry Westcott Martin C. Witding

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McCEUWAN NUCLEAR RADLATON R 2002 ANNUAL REPORT

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1. Introduction The University of Califomia, Davis McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center (MNRC) consists of a research reactor and associated radiography and positioning equipment.

This MNRC Annual Report is published each year in support of the license provided by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The aforementioned license is for the operation of a steady-state TRIGATM reactor with pulsing capability.

It is the intent of this document to provide information relevant to the safe operation of the UCD/MNRC. A brief description of the MNRC facility and administration is followed by operational events and health physics information concerning this facility during CY 2002.

2. General Information The United States Air Force (USAF) began building the reactor in 1988 and completed the project in 1990. The McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center (MNRC) achieved criticality on January 20, 1990. The reactor was operated at 1 MW from 1990 to 1997.

The reactor was upgraded to 2 MW and the first 2 MW operation was done on April 14, 1997.

The USAF ran the reactor from 1990-1999 in support of their nondestructive inspection program. This program involved inspecting aircraft structures for signs of moisture and corrosion using neutron radiography.

McClellan Air Force Base closed in July 2001. Therefore, the MNRC was officially transferred to the University of Califomia, Davis (UCD) on February 2, 2000. This transfer also included the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) operating license R-130 from the USAF to UCD.

The UCD/MNRC is located on the McClellan Industrial Park site; the reactor is housed in Building 258. The McClellan Industrial Park site is approximately 2600 acres, located eight miles northeast of Sacramento, Califomia.

For more detailed information on the UCD/MNRC project, the reader is referred to the UCD/MNRC Safety Analysis Report.

3. UCD/MNRC Facility Description The UCD/MNRC facility is a three level 14,720 sq. ft. rectangular-shaped enclosure that surrounds a 2 MW research reactor. The UCD/MNRC provides four neutron beams and four bays for radiography. All four bays are capable of using radiography film techniques, but Bays 1 and 3 will normally use electronic imaging devices. Space,

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WkMMNRC tDLWUCDIMNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 X shielding and environmental controls are provided by the enclosure for neutron radiography operations performed on a vanety of samples. Adequate room has been provided to handle the components in a safe manner.

In addition to the radiography bays, the UCDIMNRC reactor also has several in-core facilities ranging from a pneumatic tube system to a central irradiation facility.

4. UCD/MNRC Programs The year 2002 has been a very active building year for the facility. The research programs have increased as a result of winning one of the DOE Innovations in Nuclear Infrastructure and Education Program (INIE) grants. The commercial programs have experienced a growth in that the Iodine Loop that was being repaired for most of the year is now up and running. The number of educational visits and demonstrations has increased from last year.

4. 1. Educational Programs

-Grants (1) The DOE Innovations in Nuclear Infrastructure and Education Program (INIE) was awarded in July. This grant will allow the purchasing of research equipment, support for graduate and undergraduate students and provide for educational programs to be conducted from the UCD/MNRC site. The grant also provides for UC Berkeley students to visit and participate in classes being taught at the UCD/MNRC.

(2) The DOE University Reactor Upgrade grant provided the funds to purchase a new reactor safety channel, which is being integrated into the new reactor console.

(3) The DOE University Reactor Sharing grant provided the funds to cover the many student visits and demonstrations through out the year. These funds also support UCD researchers to a small extent.

(4) The American Nuclear Society Student Educational grant provided the funds to buy the demonstration equipment use for student visits.

(S) The UCDIM[NRC grant to the UCD Geology Dept. to study the composition of rocks and soil utilizing the neutron tomography and film radiography systems is in its final year. The program has increased the collaboration between Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory. This collaboration has resulted in grants being generated to continue the work beyond the three-year UCD/MNRC grant.

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4.2. Research

- The primary areas of research continue to be the geology, plant sciences, Vegetable Crop Dept. and Physics. The research program participants include UCD, UCB, Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia National Laboratory, and Oregon State University.

4.3. Commercial

- The primary commercial work being done at this time is the Precision Casting Corp. (PCC) aircraft structures.

- Irradiation testing is being done for ICS.

Participating Principal Number of Number of Description of Institution Investigator students Faculty Project Sandia National Dr. Larry Posey Three Performed neutron Laboratory experimenters pulsing experiments on fiber optic materials Will C. Wood Mr. Art Sixty Three Two groups toured the High School Beauchamp reactor. High School chemistry class.

UCD Applied Dr. David Ten One Tour of reactor. Under-Science Dept Hwang graduate Energy Seminar Class Workshop on Dr. Steve Binney Twenty One One-day workshop Neutron covering neutron Activation activation analysis Analysis principles UCD Geology Dr. Dawn Two Graduate One Using neutron Department Sumner Students tomography to study mineralogy of oil bearing rocks UCB Dr. Richard Zero One Irradiation studies for McDonald the Dark Matter Program UCD Land Air & Dr. Jan Hopman Two Graduate Two Study of water flow in Water Resources & Wendy Silk Students porous media UCD Veg & Dr. Jan Dvorak Two Graduate Two Study of effects of Crop Seed & Students radiation on vegetable Department Dr. Ken Bradford seeds UCD COSMOS Dr. Mike Meier Forty High School Two Tour of reactor and class Program Juniors and Seniors lab experiment on radioactive decay

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UCDAYLS MCDAN1 VN A UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Neutron Beam Imaging Studies The UCD/MNRC has world-class neutron imaging facilities. These facilities are being used more extensively by the UCD researchers and researchers outside the UC system. The most extensive use of the UCD neutron tomography capabilities has been through the Geology Department. These studies have included a variety of geological and soil samples. Neutron tomography studies have been carried out on over thirty geological samples and a similar number of soil cores. Since most of this work is a continuation from last years work the researches are at the point where they are ready to submit grants to continue the work and fund the neutron beam time. A detailed listing of the samples is included in the Annual Report for 2001.

With the award of the INIE grant from the DOE the neutron tomography system will be upgraded to allow an increase in the spatial resolution (i.e., going from 250 microns to 50 microns). This increased resolution will allow a large step in the type of analysis that the geology department researchers can accomplish. A further upgrade will be to purchase a multiplate channel neutron detector that will also allow further resolution gains to be realized.

There is continuing interest in the neutron imaging capabilities from both Lawrence Livermore National Lab and Los Alamos Lab. These participants are in the stage of putting together programs that collaborations can be started.

5.0 UCDIMNRC Administration UCD/MNRC Organization. The UCDIMNRC is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to operate under the provisions of operating license R-130.

The University of California Regents have designated the Chancellor at UC Davis to be the license holder.

UCD contracted with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to operate the MNRC.

The UCD/MNRC is under the direction of the UCD/MNRC Director. The Director is a UCD employee that reports to the Vice Chancellor for Research.

A complete organization chart can be found in UCD/MNRC Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.

6.0 Licensing and Re2ulatorv Activities 6.1 NRC Items There were no requests to amend the facility license during this period.

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6.2 Nuclear Safety Committee (UCD/NSC)

(a) The annual NSC audit of the UCD/MNRC was conducted during the month of May 28-30, 2002. All observations have been addressed. There were no Recommendations.

(b) The Nuclear Safety Committee met twice during 2002: September 30,2002 March 15, 2002.

6.3 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission performed an inspection on August 14-16, 2002.

The inspection was rated satisfactory.

6.4 The following lists contain the 50.59 actions for CY 2002.

Evaluation of Experiments or Modifications Under the Provision of 10 CFR 50.59 12 5 Exynriment! Mnvina IndinA Chamhbr frnm C-035 to E-06 Date: 8 Auaust 200l2 Does the proposed change, experiment Yes No Justirication or modification:

a. Result in more than a minimal increase in xx Does not result in a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident the frequency of occurrence of an previously evaluated in the FSAR (as accident previously evaluated in the updated). FSAR because it has already been analyzed for placing the irradiation chamber in inner hex ring. It will require a minimal wording change in the FSAR as it now states the irradiation chamber will be conservatively located in the outer hex rings.1

b. Result in more than a minimal increase in xx The structure has not changed. It has the likelihood of occurrence of a just been relocated to a different malfunction of a structure, system, or position in the core.

component important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR (as updated).

c. Result in more than a minimal increase in xx No change in the increase in the the consequences of an accident consequences of an accident previously previously evaluated in the FSAR (as evaluated in the FSAR because we are updated). limited to 20 curies of iodine, below

$1.75 reactivity limit for a secured experiment, and it is not a fuel temperature problem.

d. Result in more than a minimal increase in xx The structure has not changed. It has the consequences of a malfunction of a just been relocated to a different structure, system, or component important position in the core.

to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR (as updated).

e. Create a possibility for an accident of a xx There is not a possibility for an accident different type than any previously evaluated of a different type than any previously in the FSAR (as updated). evaluated in the FSAR.

f. Create a possibility for a malfunction of a xx This is not a SSC.

structure, system, or component important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the FSAR (as updated).

g. Result in a design basis limit for a fission xx Not a fission product barrier.

product barrier as described in the FSAR (as updated).

' Attachment 1: Proposed wording changes to the FSAR.

h. Result in a departure from a method of xx This is not a departure from a method of evaluation as described in the FSAR (as evaluation as described in the FSAR (as updated) used in establishing the design updated) used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analysis. bases or in the safety analysis.

Based on the evaluation conducted in the above table, it is concluded that the proposed action does not meet any of the IOCFR 50.59 criteria; therefore, no license amendment or change to the Technical Specifications is needed to perform the proposed action.

O Based on the evaluation conducted on the above table, it is concluded that the proposed action does meet one or more of the IOCFR 50.59 criteria; therefore, a license amendment or a change to the Technical Specifications, is required to perform the proposed action.

Performed By: Charles C. Heidel Signature: (sianed)

Date: May 01, 2001 Facility Director: Wade J. Richards (signed)

Date: 8 Aug 2002

Evaluation of Experiments or Modifications Under the Provision of 10 CFR 50.59 Experiment: Installation of Two (2) 1 2 5Iodine Irradiation Chambers Date: September 4, 2002 Does the proposed change, experiment Yes No Justirication or modirication:

a. Result in more than a minimal increase in xx Two 1-125 irradiation chambers installed the frequency of occurrence of an accident in the reactor core minimal increase in previously evaluated in the FSAR (as the frequency of occurrence of an updated). accident, due to the increase number of chamber and the increase in the number of Curies radioactive gases produced.'

b. Result in more than a minimal increase in xx No minimal increase in the likelihood of the likelihood of occurrence of a occurrence is expected as both malfunction of a structure, system, or irradiation chambers are of a similar component important to safety previously design as the present irradiation facility.

evaluated in the FSAR (as updated).

c. Result in more than a minimal increase in xx There is an increase in the consequences the consequences of an accident of an accident previously evaluated previously evaluated in the FSAR (as because this allows for the production of updated). 40 curies of I-125 versus the present Technical Specifications limit of 20 curies.

d. Result in more than a minimal increase in xx No minimal increase in the likelihood of the consequences of a malfunction of a occurrence is expected as both structure, system, or component important irradiation chambers are of a similar to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR design as the present irradiation facility.

(as updated).

e. Create a possibility for an accident of a xx There is an increase in the consequences different type than any previously evaluated of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR (as updated). because of the production of 40 curies of I-125 versus the present Technical Specifications limit of 20 curies.

f. Create a possibility for a malfunction of a xx This has no effect on any safety system structure, system, or component important components.

to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the FSAR (as updated).

g. Result in a design basis limit for a fission xx No fuel limits or boundaries are affected product barrier as described in the FSAR (as by this modification.'

updated).

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' MEMORANDUM, August 13,2002, TO: Chuck Heidel, FROM: H. Ben Liu,

Subject:

Safety Analysis Report for 1-125 Irradiation Chambers in the UCD/MNRC's Reactor Core

h. Result in a departure from a method of xx The original evaluation as described in evaluation as described in the FSAR (as the FSAR evaluated for one iodine updated) used in establishing the design irradiation chamber versus the two bases or in the safety analysis. irradiation chambers that are not being considered and the increase of the production of 40 curies of I-125 versus the present Technical Specifications limit of 20 curies.

Based on the evaluation conducted in the above table, it is 0 concluded that the proposed action does not meet any of the 10CFR 50.59 criteria; therefore, no license amendment or change to the Technical Specifications is needed to perform the proposed action.

Based on the evaluation conducted on the above table, it is concluded that the proposed action does meet one or more of the 10CFR 50.59 criteria; therefore, a license amendment or a change to the Technical Specifications is required to perform the proposed action.

Performed By: Charles C. Heidel Signature: (signed)

Date: September 4. 2002 Facility Director: Wade J. Richards (signed)

Date: September 5, 2002

UCDAVIS MANRC,4 MEWtNR RADAON UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

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7.0 OPERATIONS OPERATING HISTORY:

TOTAL OPERATING HOURS THIS YEAR: 3,899.88 TOTAL OPERATING HOURS: 28,174.95 TOTAL MEGAWATT HOURS THIS YEAR: 6,695.68 TOTAL MEGAWATT HOURS: 36,813.47 TOTAL NUMBER OF PULSES PERFORMED THIS YEAR: 0 TOTAL NUMBER OF PULSES PERFORMED: 410 425 7.1 UNSCHEDULED REACTOR SHUTDOWNS:

In 2002, there were sixty-nine (69) unscheduled scrams at the MNRC reactor Facility. Watchdog scrams are the largest contributor to the total number of unscheduled shutdowns (60%) followed by equipment failure/problems (30%),

iodine loop problems (6%), facility electrical power loss (3%), and personnel error (1%). The following is a list of the unscheduled shutdowns:

2002 REACTOR SHUTDOWNS Jan 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Feb 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 Mar 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 Apr _ 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 May ___ 6 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 Jun 3 0-0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 Jul 3 1 0 _ 0 0 1 0 _ 0 0 0 5 Aug_ 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 8 Sep.. 2 0 1 0 0_ 0 0 0 0 0 3 Oct 5 0 1 0_ 0 0 0 0 2 0 8

_O Nov 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 12 Dec 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 5 I I LI I imewm .. i 91.

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LI(CDAVIS MiNRCkR UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 2002 REACTOR SHUTDOWNS Type of Failures Total Number CSC 41

!Equipment Failures 21 Iodine Loop Problem 4 Loss of Power 2 Personnel Error 1 I TOTAL NUMBER OF ANOMALIES IN 2002 69 Reactor Shutdowns 2002 Percent of Total Number Iodine Loop Loss of P0 werProblem Equipment 3% 6% Failures I Personnel Error 1%

csc 60%

UCDIMNRC A-ual Repol 2002 COI

UCDAVIS MNRC UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 lanuary

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed once during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time out. Operation personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

February

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed four times during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

March

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed six times during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

2. On 8 March 2002, at 2100, the reactor was operational at 1.8 MWs. The reactor operator received a reactor room continuous air monitor fault alarm and shutdown the reactor.

Health Physics personnel reported that the reactor room continuous air monitor printout indicated there had been a high/low flow condition but the indicated flow on the meter was within specifications. Personnel rebooted the reactor room continuous air monitor and verified the high and low flow set points. All electrical connections on the continuous air monitor were checked and verified to be properly connected.

The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to continue normal operations of the reactor after no cause for the alarm could be determined.

3. On 11 March 2002, at 2100, the reactor was operational at 1.8 MWs when the reactor operator shutdown the reactor as directed by the Reactor Manager, after receiving a reactor room continuous air monitor alert during 125I operations2 .

2 Refer to section 7.2 ANOMALIES: March UWlMNRC Amnwl Repon 2002

UCDAVIS MNRCL UCD/MNRCANNUAL REPORTFOR 2002:

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed twice during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel performed the following on both occurrences:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

Mav

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed six times during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel performed the following on all occurrences:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

2. On May 09, 2002, at 1631, the reactor operator manually scrammed the reactor when he received a Stack CAM Alarm during a 41Ar recovery process. A small amount of 4"Ar was released into the reactor room during the process of disconnecting the collection bottles from the system.

3. On May 30, 2002, at 1636, the reactor operator manually scrammed the reactor when he received an EF-1 (reactor room ventilation fan) low flow alarm. The Senior Reactor Operator investigated and found the motor on EF-1 had tripped on a thermal overload condition. Operations personnel replaced the EF-1 motor and replaced the fan belts. After operationally testing the ventilation system the Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal reactor operations.

June

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed three times during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

2. On June 05, 2002, at 1714, and again on June 06, 2002, at 1551, the reactor operator manually scrammed the reactor when he received an EF-1 (reactor room ventilation fan) low flow alarm. The Senior Reactor Operator investigated and found the motor on EF-1 had tripped on a thermal overload condition. Operations personnel traced the problem to one bad thermal overload in the EF-1 controller.

The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal reactor operations after personnel replaced all thermal overloads in the EF-1 controller and operationally testing the ventilation system.

UCDIMNRC Annul Repw 2002

UCDAVIS M N RC t UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 -

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1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed three times during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

2. On July 02, 2002, at 1330, the reactor was operating at 1.8 MWs when Shim #2 dropped off its magnet. The Reactor Operator manually shutdown the reactor and notified the Senior Reactor Operator. Operations personnel visually inspected the control rod, control rod drive, and connecting rod. Operational checks performed on Shim #2, performed by operations personnel could not determine any cause for the control rod to decouple from its magnet. Operability checks performed on the control rod were within specifications with a rod scram time of 0.39 seconds. The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal reactor operations.

3. On July 10, 2002, at 1459, the reactor was operating at 1.8 MWs when the Reactor Operator noticed the Reactor Room CAM was not indicating properly on the reactor console. The Reactor Operator manually shutdown the reactor and notified the Senior Reactor Operator. Personnel found the circuit breaker supplying the Reactor Room CAM had tripped. The Reactor Room Cam and the air conditioning unit for the CAM share the same breaker. The daytime air temperatures were over 100 OF and the breaker cannot support both units operating for extended periods. Personnel plugged the air conditioning unit into an outlet that utilized a different circuit breaker.

After Health Physics personnel performed all daily and weekly checks on the Reactor Room CAM, the Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal reactor operations. Personnel are investigating how to wire the air conditioning unit to a separate circuit breaker.

August

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed four times during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operations personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactory performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

2. On August 04, 2002, at 1500, and August 06, 2002, at 1630 the reactor was operating at 1.8 MWs when there was a loss of building power. The Reactor Operator manually shutdown the reactor and notified the Senior Reactor Operator. After power was restored to the facility the Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal reactor operations.

tXCDLNRC Annuat Report 2002

UCDAVIS MEItMWNFMRMCoH UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

3. On August 15, 2002, at 1416, the reactor was operating at 1.8 MWs when the reactor scrammed on External #2 indications. The Reactor Operator reported the following indication on the auxiliary panel to the Senior Reactor Operator:

a. Bays #1 massive shutter - The open and shut indications were illuminated.

b. Bay #1 shielding door - Open indication was illuminated.

Personnel found the Bay #1 massive shutter's open indication limit switch had stuck in the open position. Operations personnel replaced the limit switch.

After Operations personnel checked all of the Bay #1 external scrams and interlocks the Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal reactor operations.

4. On August 20, 2002, at 1154, the reactor was operating at 1.8 MWs when the reactor scrammed on External #2 indications. The limit switch that operations personnel replaced on August 15, 2002 needed readjustment. Operations personnel readjusted the limit switch and satisfactorily checked all of the Bay #1 external scrams and interlocks. The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal reactor operations.

SeRtember

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed twice during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operations personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactory performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

2. On September 24, 2002, at 1500, at 1122 the reactor was operating at 1.8 MWs when the Reactor Operator received an alert on the Reactor Room CAM's iodine channel. Personnel had been dispensing 125I since 1008. At 1132, the Reactor Operator manually shutdown the reactor and notified the Senior Reactor Operator that the iodine channel did not appear to be working. Health Physics personnel source checked the Reactor Room Cam and verified that all the channels were within specification. The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission resume normal reactor operations.

October

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed five times during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operations personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactory performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

UCDUJNRC Annal Repoa2002

UCDAVIS MNRC UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

2. On October 08, 2002, at 1016, at 1122 the reactor was operating at 1.8 MWs when the Reactor Operator received an alert on the Reactor Room CAM's iodine channel.

Personnel had been dispensing 1251 since 0918. At 1017, the Reactor Operator manually shutdown the reactor and notified the Senior Reactor Operator that the iodine channel did not appear to be working. Health Physics personnel source checked the Reactor Room Cam and verified that all the channels were within specification. The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal reactor operations.

3. On October 11, 2002, at 1335 and again on October 20, at 1940, the Reactor Operator shutdown the reactor when the Bay 2 massive shutter stop in an intermediate position (not fully shut or opened). Personnel entry into Bay 2 cannot be made if the massive shutter is not fully shut and the reactor is operating.

Personnel found the circuit breaker for the massive shutter drive motor had tripped both cases. After resetting the circuit breaker, personnel operated the massive shutter several times with no additional failures. Reactor Operations personnel satisfactory performed all interlock check associated with the bay interlock system.

The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal operation of the reactor.

The MNRC Electronic Engineer is evaluating the circuit breaker problem.

November

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed three times during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operations personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactory performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

2. On November 25, 2002, at 1346 the reactor was operating at 1.8 MWs when the Reactor Operator received an alert on the Reactor Room CAM's iodine channel.

Personnel had been dispensing 1251 since 1305. The Reactor Operator manually shutdown the reactor and notified the Senior Reactor Operator that the iodine channel did not appear to be working. Health Physics personnel source checked the Reactor Room Cam and verified that all the channels were within specification. The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal reactor operations.

3. On eight occasions the Reactor Operator shutdown the reactor when the Bay 2 massive shutter stopped in an intermediate position (not fully shut or opened).

Personnel entry into Bay 2 cannot be made if the massive shutter is not fully shut and the reactor is operating.

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McOELLANNMfEAR ftflADWIN C*M UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Personnel found the circuit breaker for the massive shutter drive motor had tripped both cases. After resetting the circuit breaker, personnel operated the massive _ 1 shutter several times with no additional I failures. Reactor Operations personnel November 11, 2002 2108 satisfactory performed all interlock check November 14, 2002 1922 associated with the bay interlock system. The November 18, 2002 1020 Senior Reactor Operator granted permission November 22, 2002 1111 to resume normal operation of the reactor. November 22, 2002 1700 NAovemuer 26, Z200 December November 26, 2002 2326 November 27, 2002 1611

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed twice during the month due to CSC watchdog circuit time out. Operations personnel performed the following on each occurrence:

a. Rebooted the CSC computer.

b. Satisfactory performed all weekly checks on the computer.

c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.

2. Twice this month, the Reactor Operator shutdown the reactor when the Bay 2 massive shutter stopped in an intermediate position (not fully shut or opened).

Personnel entry into Bay 2 cannot be made if the massive shutter is not fully shut and the reactor is operating.

Personnel found the circuit breaker for the massive shutter drive motor had tripped both cases. After resetting the circuit breaker, personnel operated the massive shutter December 04, 2002 1249 several times with no additional failures.3 December 04,2002 1521 Reactor Operations personnel satisfactory performed all interlock checks associated with the bay interlock system. The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to resume normal operation of the reactor.

3. On December 17, 2002 at 1652, the reactor was operating at 1.8 MWs, when the reactor automatically scrammed with the following indication:

a. NPP-1000 Hi Voltage Lo

b. DAC DIS064 Timeout

c. NPP-1000 Power Hi Upon entering the console's history playback mode, the Senior Reactor Operator noted that at no time did the reactor power level exceed ninety percent power.

Operations personnel inspected the DAC, performed high voltage and high power scram checks, and ran the pre-start test on the NPP-1000. No cause for the scram could be determined. The Senior Reactor granted permission to resume normal reactor operations and notified the Reactor Manager.

3 Refer to Section 7.3. MAINTENANCE OTHER THAN PREVENTIVE: DECEMBER UCDIMNRC Annual Repof 2002

UCDAVIS MNNUa"RAMTNC RUCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 March

1. On llMarch 2002, operations personnel started the first recovery process on the iodine loop.

TIME 11 March 2001 0930 Operations personnel started the 125I recovery process from Decay Storage 1 (DS-1).

0944 Operations personnel shifted the reactor room ventilation system to modified recirculation.

a. In this mode, the ventilation is redirected through the main charcoal filters and out the facility stack.

0954 Personnel commenced the transfer of the xenon gas from DS-1 to DS-2 by cryogenic pumping with liquid nitrogen.

1044 Personnel completed the transfer of the xenon gas from DS-1 to DS-2 2100 Personnel started the recovery process of 1251 from DS-1.

2116 Health Physics personnel alarmed the reactor room continuous air monitor to place the reactor room ventilation system into the full recirculation mode of operation.

a. In this mode, the ventilation is redirected through the main charcoal filters and back into the reactor room.

2136 The reactor operator received a reactor room continuous air monitor alarm and shutdown the reactor.

a. Particulate channel reading - 1.7 x 103 CPM

b. Noble Gas channel reading - 5.2 x 102 CPM

c. Iodine channel reading - < 10 CPM 2137 Operations personnel secured dispensing 1251 from DS-1 and evacuated the reactor room.

2138 Health Physics personnel reported that the reactor room continuous air monitor's iodine channel had failed.

2336 After numerous air samples, Health Physics personnel recommended that the reactor room ventilation system be returned to the modified recirculation mode.

2346 Health Physics personnel reported the iodine channel did not fail, but had become saturated with 125Xe. When this occurred the iodine channel stopped functioning and restarted after personnel changed the charcoal collection filter.

UCDWUNRC Annual Report 2002

UCDAVIS MNRQt McCEUAN NUCRLR UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

7.2 ANOMALIES

During 2002, there were twenty-eight (28) reported anomalies at the MNRC facility.

Personnel called back are the largest contributor to the total number (16) of anomalies (82%), fuel element problems next (11%), followed by personnel error (7%).

Anomalies Occurrences 125 Xenon Problem 4 1 Dropped Irradiator' 1 125I Loop Problem 6 1 Failed Fuel Element 7 1 Personnel called back to the facility during off hours (Failed Photohelic Stack Cam) 1 (Iodine Cam) 4 (Bay Cam) 1 (CSC) 7 (Reactor Cam) 1 (Power Loss) 2 TOTAL NUMBER OF ANOMALIES IN 2002 20 2002 Reactor Anomalies Percent of Total Number Personnel Error 5%

CAM Problems 35% A Equipment Failure 60%

4 Refer to section 7.2 ANOMALIES: March 5 Refer to section 7.2 ANOMALIES: May 6 Refer to section 7.6 REPORT ON STATUS OF IODINE LOOP ATTACHMENT 3 7 Refer to section 7.2 ANOMALIES: October UCDIMNRC Annual Report 2002

UJCDAVIS.::!

MUDNUEA UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 TIME 12 March 2001 0015 Health Physics personnel performed a weekly test on the iodine channel with the check source. The channel's readings were out of specification. Health Physics personnel restricted personnel entry into the reactor room until they could perform additional air and contamination surveys.

1115 Health Physics personnel calibrated and satisfactorily source-checked the iodine channel on the reactor room continuous air monitor.

1130 The Senior Reactor Operator granted permission to continue normal operations of the reactor. Limited access to the reactor room was still in effect.

13 March 2001 0700 Health Physics personnel released the reactor room for unlimited access.

18 March 2001 Wayne Hamilton (SAIC cryogenic expert) from SAIC's Engineering and Logistics Solutions Division arrived to evaluate why the iodine loop expelled xenon gas. 8 20 March 2001 Operations personnel commenced the 1251 recovery process from DS-1.

21 March 2001 Based on Wayne Hamilton's evaluation of the iodine loop, parts were ordered to install a xenon cryogenic trap. 9 5 ADril 2001 Operations personnel installed the xenon cryogenic trap.9 8 Refer to section 7.6 OTHER: Attachment 1 9 Refer to section 7.6 OTHER: Attachment 2 UCOAMNRC Annual Report 2002

UCDAVIS IU MNCMiM MUMRAVATM CMR UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 April

1. On 04-30-02, after receiving notification from the UCD/Police desk, operations personnel returned to the facility to find a reactor room CAM alert message on the console. The reactor room CAM was inoperative but the iodine CAM was operating. The operator noted an illuminated iodine CAM alert light on the temperature control panel.

Operations personnel proceeded to the iodine CAM and noted the reading on the CAM was less than the alarm set point. Operations personnel acknowledged the alarm and reset the alarms to the UCD/Police desk. The Health Physics Supervisor was notified the following workday.

May

1. On May 31, 2002, the reactor had been operating at 1.8 MW for a neutron irradiator experiment. The reactor operator shut down the reactor at 1034 in preparation to remove Experiment 02-113 from the irradiator.

Operations personnel removed the exposure vessel from the irradiator and successfully removed the first section of tubing from the exposure vessel. The Reactor Operator was bumping the reactor room chain hoist in the up direction to move the irradiator into position to remove the last two sections of tubing.

During this operation, a flanged connection attached to the tubing encountered the neutron irradiator's drive table. Once the flange contacted the drive table, a weld on one of the tubing sections failed causing in the exposure vessel and lead weights to fall into the reactor tank.

The Senior Reactor Operator immediately contacted the Reactor Manager who suspended all reactor operations.

An immediate investigation conducted by the Reactor Manager and Senior Reactor Operator noted the Irradator Resting On Chimney an following: Leaning Against the Tank Wall

a. The tubing supplying helium to the neutron irradiator was bent.

b. The exposure vessel hit the 16N diffuser nozzle causing it to rotated it clockwise approximately 450 down.

UJCOIMNRC A,n,a( Repor 2002

UCDAVIS MNRC UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

c. The exposure vessel came to rest on the chimney with its connecting pole leaning over on west side of the tank

d. The exposure vessel did not contact the reactor core or Diffuser graphite reflector and there was no apparent damage to the reactor tank.

Actions taken to recover from the Operations personnel fabricated wire snares to secure the vessel in place. One snare was looped around the top portion of the lead weights on the vessel and held in Inmdiator Resting place so that the vessel would not on ChinmfeV contact the reactor tank wall when lifted. A second snare was placed near the top of the lifting porting of the vessel and then attached to the hoist to lift the vessel up. After personnel secured the vessel and connected it to the hoist, operations personnel proceeded to raise the vessel to the drive table and secure it in place. Personnel attached the normal lifting device on the vessel and it was removed from the reactor tank.

After removing the exposure vessel from the reactor tank, personnel attempted to reposition the ' 6N diffuser nozzle. When they pushed down on the nozzle to return it to its proper position; it separated from the supply piping. A locating pin on the bottom of the diffuser held it in a vertical plane, preventing it from falling over.

- Flange Contact Point _.

Personnel removed the '6N diffuser assembly from the reactor tank. The impact from irradiator had caused the 16N diffuser to rotate, but the direct cause of the of the 16N diffuser separating from the supply piping, was that it had become un-threaded itself at its lowest joint. The connecting elbow and the connecting pipe were rethreads and the N16 diffuser reinstalled.

UCDIMNRC Annual Report 2002

UCDAVIS M NRCL1 cm UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Actions to correct the anomaly

1. The exposure vessel (one of two) has been removed from service. The attachment pole is bent preventing the irradiator from rotating in the irradiation well.

2. The connecting pole was re-welded.

r

3. Several stainless steel cables .

are now attached to each connecting pole and the crane during lifting and lowering operations to act as safety lanyards.

UCDIMNRC Annual Report 2002

UCDAVIS MNRC&

meanim mom tAmAam UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

- :- 77 ___" ---;; "I.I .

. ". I- ;' -MON june

1. Operations personnel returned to work during non-duty hours four times this month upon receiving an alarm notification from the UCD/Police desk.

a. On June 17, 23, and 23, 2002, responding personnel found the alarms were due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel rebooted the CSC computer, acknowledged the alarm, and reset the alarm panel to alarm at the UCD/Police desk.

b. On June 02, 2002, responding personnel found a Stack CAM Fault annunciator activated. The Senior Reactor Operator notified Health Physics personnel. When Health Physics personnel arrived, it was determined that a failed Photohelic had caused the fault condition.

Personnel replaced the Photohelic and cleared the Stack CAM Fault alarm. Operations personnel reset the alarm panel to alarm at the UCD/Police desk

1. On June 26, 2002, operations personnel experienced problems transferring activated xenon gas from the irradiation chamber to Decay Storage #1.

Personnel could not get any gas to transfer through valve AV-09 (stop valve to Decay Storage #1). To place the activated gas in a safe position, the Reactor Manager decided to transfer the gas to Decay Storage #2 and commence an investigation why the gas would not pass through AV-09. A test was performed to see if gas could be passed through AV-09 and back to the irradiation chamber. This failed to produce the desired results. The decision was made to UCDIMNRC Annual Report 2002

UCDAVIS NlFARCRAlBIR0 CIaft[MN UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 shutdown the Iodine Loop' 0 , remove the secondary containment, and investigate the problem with AV-09. In addition, the Reactor Manager decided to replace the pressure transmitters with a more robust design, as the transmitters were showing degradation from continuous exposure to a high radiation field.

Auaust

1. Operations personnel returned to work during non-duty hours four times this month upon receiving an alarm notification from the UCD/Police desk.

a. On August 4 th, gth, and 21st of 2002, the UCD/Police desk notified the operations personnel of an alarm at the facility. Responding personnel found the 125I CAM alarming. Operations personnel proceeded to the 1251 CAM and noted the reading on the CAM was less than the alarm setpoint. A history on the iodine channel determined there was never an actual alarm condition. The alarm most likely came in as part of a derivative alarm function of the CAM. If the CAM perceives the rate of increase is high, a derivative alarm is interpreted as a high level.

Operations personnel acknowledged the alarm and reset the alarm panel to annunciate at the UCD/Police desk.

b. On August 04, 2002, responding personnel found the alarms were due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel rebooted the CSC computer, acknowledged the alarm, and reset the alarm panel to annunciate at the UCD/Police desk.

September

1. Operations personnel returned to work during non-duty hours twice this month upon receiving an alarm notification from the UCD/Police desk.

a. On September 25, 2002, at 0330 the UCD/Police desk notified the operations personnel of an alarm at the facility. Responding personnel found the Bay CAM alarming. Operations personnel proceeded to the Bay CAM and noted the CAM was in a fault condition. Operations personnel turned the CAM off and notified Health Physics personnel.

They acknowledged the alarm and reset the alarm panel to annunciate at the UCD/Police desk.

b. On September 15, 2002, responding personnel found the alarms were due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel rebooted the CSC computer, acknowledged the alarm, and reset the alarm panel to annunciate at the UCD/Police desk.

10 Refer to REPORT ON STATUS OF IODINE LOOP -- ATTACHMENT 3 --28 July. 2002 UCDMNRCAnnua1Repod2002

UCDAVIS IANUCEARtN R UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 A October

1. On October 24, 2002, operations personnel were performing the annual fuel inspection. At 1052, the Senior Reactor Operator reported to the Reactor Manager that fuel element 10667 could not be removed from the reactor core.

Operations personnel could extend the element through the upper grid plate approximately fifteen inches and then it would stop. The Reactor Manager informed the Senior Reactor Operator to continue with the normal fuel inspections and to additionally visually inspect fuel elements adjacent to element 10667. All adjacent fuel element inspections revealed no apparent abnormalities.

On October 29, 2002, operations personnel arranged to remove one of the tri-flutes from fuel element 10667 (SOP 02 Removing Tri-Flute on Element 10667). Operations personnel removed the tri-flute and removed the fuel element from the reactor core.

Visual inspections of the fuel element did not reveal any apparent visual bulging. Personnel removed the element from service as a damaged fuel element.

November

1. Operations personnel returned to work during non-duty hours three times this month upon receiving an alarm notification from the UCD/Police desk.

a. On November 03, 2002, at 0735 the UCD/Police desk notified the operations personnel of an alarm at the facility. Responding personnel found a Reactor Room CAM Fault alarm. Operations personnel proceeded to the Reactor Room CAM and noted the CAM was in a fault condition. Operations personnel turned the CAM off and notified Health Physics personnel. They acknowledged the alarm and reset the alarm panel to annunciate at the UCD/Police desk.

b. On November 07, 2002, at 0240, and November 28, 2002, at 1610, the UCD/Police desk notified the operations personnel of an alarm at the facility. Responding personnel found the alarms were due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs. Operation personnel rebooted the CSC computer, acknowledged the alarm, and reset the alarm panel to annunciate at the UCD/Police desk.

December

1. Operations personnel returned to work during non-duty hours three times this month upon receiving an alarm notification from the UCD/Police desk.

a. On December 14, 2002, and December 15, 2002, the UCD/Police desk notified the operations personnel of an alarm at the facility. Responding personnel found the facility was without electrical power. Operations UCDWNRC Annul Report 2002

UCDAVIS M NMRnFAWRCM UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 personnel remained at the facility until restoration of electrical power.

They acknowledged all alarms and reset the alarm panel to annunciate at the UCD/Police desk.

b. On December 024, 2002, at 1610, the UCD/Police desk notified the operations personnel of an alarm at the facility. Responding personnel found the alarms were due to CSC watchdog circuit time outs.

Operation personnel rebooted the CSC computer, acknowledged the alarm, and reset the alarm panel to annunciate at the UCD/Police desk.

UCDIMNRC Anc.mal Repot 2002

UCDAVIS MNRC;"

1. AcQEUAN MMXIFAW*

M~itc UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 7.3 MAINTENANCE OTHER THAN PREVENTIVE:

Januari

1. When operations personnel were performing the daily checklist, they noted the secondary flow was not indicating. The operator attempted to start the pump locally and he immediately secured the pump-when sparks and smoke emitted from the motor housing.

Operations personnel found the motor shorted to ground. They replaced the motor and shaft seal on the pump. After replacement of the secondary pump's motor, normal reactor operations continued.

2. During normal routine maintenance, operations personnel replaced the fan belts on the following equipment:

a. HV-1

b. HV-2

c. AC-1

d. EF-3

3. Contractor personnel replace the blower vent motor on AC-7 and AC-8, fixed a Freon leak and recharged AC-6, and replaced the thermostats on AC-4 and AC-8.

1. During normal routine maintenance, operations personnel replaced the fan belts on the following equipment:

a. HV-1

b. AC-7

2. Operations personnel install the 125S irradiation facility in core position C-05.

Ie Core excess prior to installation $4.18 $0.00 Core excess after removing fuel element $3.94 -$0.24 from C-05 _

Core excess with 125I irradiation facility in $3.75 -$0.19 core position C-05 Total reactivity loss -$0.43 (fCDAMNRC Annrat Report 2002

-- L UCDAVIS MNRCt c N RC nMJAN UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 - -:

3. Operations personnel measured the control rod drop times with the following results:

mim~~

_ ~~E I - ie-1 SHIM 1 0.40 _

Shim 2 0.47 Shim 3 0.40 Shim 4 0.40 Regulating 0.40 Transient 0.39 March

1. Operations personnel installed an additional local area radiation monitor in the reactor room.

Anril

1. During normal routine maintenance, operations personnel replaced the fan belts on EF-3.

2. Operations personnel replaced all four demineralizer resin columns.

Mav None June

1. Contractor personnel replaced the emergency lights in the following locations:

a. Control Room

b. South Radiography Control Room

c. Bay 1 Escape Hatch

d. Bay 2 Escape Hatch

2. Operations personnel replaced the thermal overloads in the EF-1 controller.

July None UCDIMNRC Annual Repon 2002

UCDAVIS MN MCMtMK0WRA0&0a4C&ffR

• UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

1. On August 19, 2002, operations personnel moved the 125I irradiation chamber from core position C-05 to position E-06.

2. During normal routine maintenance, operations personnel replaced the fan belts on the following equipment:

a. EF-1

b. EF-2

3. Operations personnel replaced sticking limit switches on Bays 1 and 4 massive shutter closed indication. After replacing the limit switches personnel satisfactorily performed all scram and interlock checks associated with both shutters.

September

1. Operations personnel repaired a small leak on the demineralizer system outlet strainer.

2. During normal reactor operations, operations personnel noted a decline in demineralizer flow and an increase in system pressure. Personnel removed and cleaned the demineralizer system outlet strainer. After cleaning the strainer the flow and pressure readings returned to normal operating parameters.

October

1. While performing the Daily Startup Checklist, Operations personnel noted that Shim Rod #3 was not indicating properly. Personnel noted that the stepping motor was rotating but the control rod was not moving. After disassembling the control rod drive assembly, they found that the roll pin attaching the pinion gear to the drive shaft had fallen out. This prevented the pinion gear from rotating and racking out the control rod. Personnel installed a new roll pin and tested Shim Rod #3 for operability. The rod drop time was measured (0.41 second) and personnel resumed normal reactor operations.

UCOWNRC AnmuaReport 2tr2

UCDAVIS MNRC~k M~CtRIAN MICJE"R "WltION UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Annual Shutdown

1. Performed the annual fuel inspections, control rod calibrations, and shutdown margin calculation.

W a mil me 1'.

Transientrod $ 2.31 $1.95 Regulating rod $ 2.42 $2.42 vv%ef _.&,# I & 7 CA I &12 7?

.g^^

.. . .. w r p c.Jr ,uC .Jc Shim rod #2 $ 2.46 $2.18 Shim rod #3 $ 2.50 $2.31 Shim rod #4 $ 2.39 $2.56 IP relTMe LFE November

1. Operations personnel replace a master key switch on Bay 2 west shielding door. After replacing the switch, personnel satisfactory checked all reactor and door interlocks associated with the Bay 2 west door.

UCDUWNRC Annual Repod 2002

UCAM kZ1 M&EUNAQAtSAlGNR UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 December

1. During the investigation of the problem with the Bay 2 massive shutter, personnel noted that the shutter's guide rail appeared to be rubbing on the bottom of the massive shutter. Also, there were pieces of rubber material in the area of the of the shutter's Hilman roller bearings. This material appeared to have been flattened in the track area by the rollers of the bearing.

After researching the bearing, personnel found that there is an electrometric preload pad, used on top of or built into the top of each individual roller. These replaceable pads" are made of a neoprene material with a Electrometric preload pad durometer high enough to make them both resilient and strong.

A The fact that the pads are pliable under heavy loads while providing protection to the bas of the load, Sr j

allow the roller footprint to conform to minor imperfection in the rolling surfaces as it remains under tension with the load. This pliability provides the user with the dual benefit of reducing the metal-to-metal slippage that can occur when moving a large piece of metal based equipment and allowing the movement of heavy loads over less than perfect floor surfaces.

Each electrometric preload pads (total of twelve) is approximately 1/4 -

inch thick and is deteriorating. This lowers the massive shutter enough to come in contact with the shutter guide rail. The drag created by the massive shutter contacting the guide rail is causing the drive motor to have an over current condition and thus tripping the circuit breaker.

Personnel machined the guide rail approximately 0.100-inches to allow the shutter to operate without the contacting the guide rail. This is an interim fix to allow operations to continue in Bay 2.

Eventually personnel will have to raise the massive shutter, remove the twelve Hilman bearings, and replace the preload pads.

Personnel also inspect the massive shutters in Bays 1 and 3 and they are starting to show signs of contacting the guide rail.

P Data Sheet, Hilman Rollers Co.

UCDMANRC Annual Repor 2002

UCDAVS MNRC*

waku" tar" mmna4 c"R UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

-il I 'i 5.I"

-. Z7 40

- I e 4-

-'A

-~-\ "' " -'-tS Machined Guide Rail

2. During routine maintenance, operations personnel replace the blower fan belts on AC-2 and AC-7.

3. Operations personnel shifted the demineralizer resin columns from the north set to the south set.

4. The electronics engineer replaced the voltage to current converter on the demineralizer outlet conductivity meter.

UCDiMNRC Annual Report 2002

UCDAVIS ,

MNRCAoq M&MM I4flLAR WaW RALMAtE UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 7.4 PROBLEM AREAS:

1. On 11 March 2002, at 2100, the reactor was operational at 1.8 MWs when the reactor operator shutdown the reactor as directed by the Reactor Manager after receiving a reactor room continuous air monitor alert during 1251 operations"2 .

2. On June 26, 2002, operations personnel experienced problems transferring activated xenon gas from the irradiation chamber to Decay Storage #1.13

3. Technical Specifications Violation

a. A violation occurred when a lecture and an examination covering Regulations and Administrative Controls were not completed by August 13, 2002 (ending date for the two-year requalification cycle). This category is not required by 10CFR55.59 (Requalification of Licensed Operators);

however, it is required by the UCD/MNRC Selection and Training Plan (Document No. MNRC-0009-DOC). The Technical Specifications explicitly state that training shall be in accordance with the Selection and Training Plan,

b. The NRC was notified and training with an examination administered early in September. Corrective action was to add the category of Regulations and Administrative Controls to the requalification checklist (Table I of the letter to the NRC detailing the facility's reactor operator requalification program).

12 Refer to section 7.2 ANOMALIES: March 13 Refer to REPORT ON STATUS OF IODINE LOOP. -- ATTACHMENT 1 -- 28 July 2002.

LEDIMNRC Am,ual Report 2002

LJ( DAVIS MNRC, McClRIAN MJQFAI VaAflOM UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

7.5 TRAINING

January None February

1. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators past a written examination on the following subject:

TRAINING

1. Design and Operating Characteristics March

1. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators attended training on the following subjects:

TRAINING

1. Iodine Production - General Training and Emergency Procedures.

2. ISO Quality Management System

3. QSP's 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9

4. MNRC Document Control Plan (QSP-6)

2. All personnel operating the 1251 loop received additional training on the following subject:

TRAINING

1. Iodine Production - SOP 01-10, Valve lineups.

UCDMMNC Annuat Report 2t02

UCIDAVIS &

MNRCM~

McCtELh 9"&1FA RAMI"ON UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 April

1. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators passed the Annual Operating Examination.

2. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators attended training on the following subjects:

TRAINING

1. Nuclear Instrumentation - Class I

2. Annual ALARA Training

3. Fitness for Duty

3. All personnel received additional training on the following subject:

TRAINING

1. QSP's 10 through 21 May

1. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators attended training on the following subject:

TRAINING

1. Nuclear Instrumentation - Class 2 Lune

1. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators attended training on the following subject:

TRAINING

1. Operating Instructions - Revision 11 tUCDIMRC Annut Repot 2OO2

LIC DAVIS MNRC;.

M~0CtMLNUM.FAR RADXAflc R UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

2. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators passed a written examination on the following subject:

TRAINING

1. Nuclear Instrumentation July

1. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators attended training on the following subject:

TRAINING

1. Nuclear Theory/Reactor Kinetics Review

2. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators passed a written examination on the following subject:

TRAINING

1. Biennial Written Re-qualification Examination Auaust None September None October None UCOIMANRC Annual Repot 2002

UCDAVIS MA>IAN RNME UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 November

3. All licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators attended training on the following subjects:

TRAINING

1. Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Procedures (Class 1)

2. Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Procedures (Class 2)

December None UCOIMNRC Annuat Repod 2002

LJCDAVIS MNRC&-

WcOMAN NMXFARRArAATKMIt UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

7.6 OTHER

a. Attachment 1: WAYNE HAMILTON'S REPORT FROM SAIC

b. Attachment 2: XENON CRYOGENIC TRAP

c. Attachment 3: REPORT ON STATUS OF IODINE LOOP - 28 July, 2002 UCDIOANRC Annuat Repod 2002

UCDAVIS ,o,z -'-,

i.-i MNRC*

MdZClffJ NUER tRADLC CR UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 I., , I il" "I ,I,,

Attachment 1 Wayne Hamilton's Report from SAIC UCOWJNRC Annmu Report 2002

UCDAVIS MNRCE UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Attachment 1 Wayne Hamilton's Re2ort from SAIC

1. Introduction This report presents a preliminary review completed by SAIC's Engineering and Logistics Solutions Division (Div. 66) of the McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center Iodine Loop Cryogenic System.

During the first operation of the iodine loop, all operations were nominal until the iodine 125 that was produced was to be drawn off into a vial. When the sodium hydroxide was introduced into the system it apparently forced some xenon remaining in the system to be released from the vial vent line. A charcoal filter in the vial vent line inside of the glove box trapped most of the xenon. Two additional vent line charcoal filters outside of the glove box captured any remaining xenon before it could be released to the atmosphere.

1.1 Objectives The objective of this effort was to review the cryogenic system design and operation and to recommend improvements or changes as necessary.

2.0 Review Results An attempt was made to determine the amount of xenon gas released from the system during this first run. Using the amount of radioactive xenon trapped in the charcoal filter downstream from the Iodine 25 sample vial, it was calculated that 3.7e-8 cc of xenon was released.

A second attempt was made by using the volume of the system that was holding the xenon gas, 99cc's, and the pressure of the system just prior to introducing the sodium hydroxide solution and nitrogen gas to capture the iodine in the system.

Two pressures were observed in the system, 800 mTorr in decay storage 1 and 1.05 Torr in storage 2. The actual system pressure is assumed to be somewhere between the two observed pressures. The gas temperature was assumed to be constant and at room temperature, 70 F. The calculated xenon system volume at standard conditions is between 0.104 and 0.137 cc.

A third calculation was made to determine the minimum pressure that can be obtained by cryopumping xenon gas with liquid nitrogen. Using LN2 at 77 deg K gives a xenon vapor pressure of .0024 Torr. Using the system volume of 99 cc gives a xenon quantity of 0.000313 cc.

UCDlhNRC Anm,at Repowf 2002

UCDAVIS MNNRCM UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Attachment 1 Wayne Hamilton's ReDort from SAIC 3.0 Recommendations Based on the previous results, at appears that some very small amount xenon will remain in the system after the majority is cryo-pumped to and then isolated in the other decay storage vessel or cold finger.

One solution may be to use a vacuum pump to evacuate the xenon prior to drawing off the iodine. However, there are several problems with this approach:

1. The small diameter tubing in the system will result in a long pumping time to evacuate the system.

2. The mechanical vacuum pumps will not produce the "high" vacuum required.

3. The xenon that is removed from the system will need to be captured and stored until it decays.

4. The vacuum pump is exposed to radioactive xenon.

A second solution is to add a liquid nitrogen cryotrap to the vial vent line to trap any xenon that is expelled from the system while removing the Iodine 125. After the Iodine is recovered, in inlet and outlet valve on the cryotrap would be closed, the cryotrap is allowed to warm to ambient temperature and the xenon is recovered or stored until it decays. Sizing of the cold trap is based on a heat exchanger calculation. One side is at liquid nitrogen temperature (-196 C),

assume stainless steel as the transfer material and adjust the tubing length to obtain an outlet temperature that will freeze xenon (-112 C).

A small tubing diameter gives a better chance of a xenon atom striking the cold wall and sticking but too small and the tube may become blocked. A guess, if there is about 0.137 cc (0.0084 in 3) of xenon in the system at room temperature, a 0.25" diameter, 0.032 wall (flow area = 0.0272 in2) would be adequate and make it several feet long.

A third option is to place an evacuated tank on the vent line and use it as a storage reservoir to trap any remaining xenon in the system. The tank would then be stored until the xenon decays. This option eliminates the need to handle the liquid nitrogen needed for the cold trap and the possibility of some xenon not being caught in the cold trap.

UCVAMNIC Annrl Repast 2002

IJCDAVIS ';t MNRC AkCIFUANNJMXFAR RAIATION . UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Attachment 1 Wayne Hamilton's ReDort from SAIC pressure 1 volume 1 pressure volume 2 plvl=p2v2 2

Torr cc Torr cc 0.8 99 760 0.104211 Xenon vapor pre sure 1.05 99 760 0.136776 Torr Deg C 1.2 99 760 0.1563161 0.00001 62.7 0.0024 99 760 0.000313 0.0001 68.1 0.001 74.4 Tube Dia Wall Area 0.01 82.1 0.25 0.032 0.027172 0.1 91.5

_______ X_____ 1 103.5

_______ ~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~10 118.5 0.027172 -== = 100 139.5 cc in 3 0.104 6.346 10-3 0.156 9.52 10-3 0.137 8.36 10-3 Xenon Vapor Pressure 150 140 130 120 110 100 D 90 80 70 60 50 IE-05 1E-04 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Torr UCDAMNRC Annua Reporl 2002

LW IDAVIS MNRC,J IAN NUCLFAI1 McctEI RAATENIR UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Attachment 2 Xenon Cryogenic Tran CORRELATED L EQRA000STYLE A 61IL0.1 IlTllll Q-.T,

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ii GLASSFLOWMETER2 100 .30(ML'MINK cMSTERCAR- 42040K41 QUASI I 7 SS-'E-Q.A.11 &

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(JCDAVIS MNRC,qR MCCLELtANNmrAp RAimATK)N - R UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 REPORT ON STATUS OF IODINE LOOP ATTACHMENT 3 28 July, 2002 UCOUANRC Annual Report 2002

UCDAVIS M MWRAA UCD/MNRCANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 REPORT ON STATUS OF IODINE LOOP ATTACHMENT 3 28 July. 2002 Summarv On June 26, 2002, operations personnel experienced problems transferring activated xenon gas from the irradiation chamber to Decay Storage #1. Personnel could not get any gas to transfer through valve AV-09 (stop valve to Decay Storage #1). To place the activated gas in a safe position, the Reactor Manager decided to transfer the gas to Decay Storage #2 and commence an investigation why the gas would not pass through AV-09. A test was performed to see if gas could be passed through AV-09 and back to the irradiation chamber. This failed to produce the desired results. The decision was made to shutdown the Iodine Loop, remove the secondary containment, and investigate the problem with AV-09. In addition, the Reactor Manager decided to replace the pressure transmitters with a more robust design, as the transmitters were showing degradation from continuous exposure to a high radiation field.

Findings On July 27, 2002, operations personnel progressed to the point of removing the bonnet on AV-09 to see inside of the valve. Upon opening the valve (Figure 1),

personnel discovered that the valve disk appeared melted and was blocking the exit port of the valve. The remains of the valve disk were charred and several pieces fell off the disk. These parts were highly radioactive and caused unexpected increase in the radiation levels. Personnel reassembled the valve and secured for the day.

On July 28, 2002, operations personnel removed several pieces of the valve disk from the glove bag. This reduced the radiation levels in the glove bag from approximately 100 mr/hr (contact reading in local areas) to the normal 1 to 2 mr/hr noted at the start of the evolution.

Several valves of the same type as AV-09 (AV-01, AV-03, AV-06, and AV-13) were disassembled and inspected for the same damage noted on AV-09. All valves inspected were in perfect operating condition and showed no signs of damage or wear. Because AV-09 is one of three valves that isolate the radioactive xenon gas in Decay Storage #1, operations personnel decided to remove one of the other isolation valves, AV-08. AV-08 is a different type valve (diaphragm valve) but the seat material is the same as the disk material used in AV-09. The possibility was investigated that perhaps decay heat might be the caused of the degradation of AV-

09. After disassembling AV-08, personnel noted that the valve was in perfect operating condition and showed no signs of damage or wear.

UCDAMNRC Arnuar Repaor2002

UCDAVIS MNRC MC10E1LANW FMXIAf ADAT

~ UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 REPORT ON STATUS OF IODINE LOOP ATTACHMENT 3 28 July. 2002 Conclusion After the inspection of all the valves, mention above it is my conclusion that the stop valve (AV-09) was damaged during initial construction of the Iodine Loop. None of the other valves showed any sign of the heating damage to the valve disk that was apparent on AV-09. The damage appeared to have happened during the welding process of connecting the tubing to the valve body. The disk material, PCTFE/AMS 3650, has a normal operating temperature range of -10 *F to 150 F. Heating the disk caused the disk material to become very brittle. During the normal cycling of the valve, a portion of the disk fractured from the bellows assembly and lodged on the outlet side of the valve, effectively closing the valve regardless of what position the disk assembly was in.

Recommendations The following are recommendation for correcting the problem:

1. Remove the valve body of AV-09 and replace it.

2. To make the stop valves more robust, replace the valve disk/bellows assemblies in all stop valves with the with VESPEL disk.

3. This material has a higher temperature rating.

4. Harder material than PCTFE/AMS 3650.

5. Should last longer under repetitive use.

6. Leave the four dispensing diaphragm valves (AV-7, 8, 10, and 11) in place with the original seat material (PCTFE/AMS 3650).

I-L;1rC1AM--V io.-Ou -4U -- to 10U I-VESPEL -40 'F to 400 'F Follow-un During the replacement of the valve disk/bellows assemblies, personnel found AV-04 in a similar condition as AV-09 (See Figures 3 and 4).

UCDIMNRC Annual Repo, 2002

UCDAM MNRC;,

mdcffBmmN:ffm"mnmM UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 REPORT ON STATUS OF IODINE LOOP ATTACHMENT 3 28 July. 2002

,'I-I - 1: X -

BURN MARKS FROM OVERHEATING DISK ASSEMBLY Figure 2 UCDl'ANRC Annual Report 2002

UCD.BAVISXE RAIDO F2 UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 e REPORT ON STATUS OF IODINE LOOP ATTACHMENT 3 28 July, 2002

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Figure 4 UCDIMNRC Annual Report 2002

UCDAVU MNRC*

M,MIM MMM RADWOON C94MR UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

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i, 8.0 Radioactive Effluents A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environment beyond the effective control of the MNRC, as measured at or prior to the point of such release or discharge, include the following:

8.1 Llciuld Effluents Liquid effluents released during 2002 are summarized on a monthly basis in Table 1 below. No liquid effluent releases were made in 2002.

TABLE 1 2002

SUMMARY

OF LIOUID EFFLUENTS MONTH TOTAL ACT. DETECTABLE SPECIFIC TOTAL ACT. OF AVG. CONC. FRACTION TOTAL VOL RELEASED RADIO- ACT. OF EACH DETECT- OF RAD. OF 10CFR20 OF NUCLIDE(S) EACH ABLE RADIO- MATL. AT LIMIT EFFLUENT DETECT- NUCLIDE POINT OF WATER ABLE RELEASE(1) (INCLUDING RADIO- DILUENT)

NUCUDE RELEASED (Ci) (uCl/ml) (CI) (uCi/ml) (gal)

JAN 0 NONE FEB 0 NONE MAR 0.00001046 [-125 6.91E-05 0.00001046 1.29E-06 0.0645 2089 APR 0 NONE MAY 0 NONE JUN 0 NONE JUL 0 NONE AUG 0.00002988 [-125 3.37E-05 0.00002932 1.17E-06 0.0585 6816

[-126 1.16E-06 0.00000066 2.64E-08 0.0026 6601 SEP 0.00000033 NONE 9.69E-07 0.00000033 9.69E-07 0.0484 90 OCT 0.00000020 NONE 2.25E-07 0.00000020 2.25E-07 0.0113 235 NOV 0.00000002 NONE 7.99E-08 0.00000002 7.99E-08 0.0040 50 DEC 0 NONE (1) This concentration is an overestimate since the total volume of effluent (including the diluent) released from the facility is not factored into calculation of the concentration.

LCDWMNfCAnfwwReporr2

LJCDAVIS MNRC*

MMcQIA MXtnAR RAflN IAFMR2X UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 8.2 Airborne Effluents Airborne radioactivity discharged during 2002 is tabulated in Table 2 below.

TABLE 2 2002

SUMMARY

OF AIRBgRNE EFFLUENTS MONTH TOTAL TOTAL EST.MAX AVG. FRACTION OF EST. DOSE (2) FRACTION OF TOT. EST. AVERAGE EST. EST. CONC. OF APPLICABLE FROM Ar-41 APPLICABLE QUANTITY CONC. OF ACT. QUAN. Ar-41 IN 10CFR20 Ar-41 FOR 10CFR20 OF ACT. PART. ACT.

UNRESTRICTEC IN RELEASED Ar-41 UNRESTRICTED CONC. LIMIT FOR AREA (1) DOSE LIMIT PART. RELEASED (Ar-41, I- RELEASED AREA (1) UNRESTRICTED FOR FORM WITH 125 and AREA (1) UNRESTRICTED WITH HALF-LIFE Xe-125) AREA (1) HALF-LIFE > 8 DAYS

>8 DAYS (CI) (CI) (UCI/ml) (mrem) (es) (Ci) (uCI/ml)

JAN 16.02 16.02 4.63E-10 4.6 2.35E-01 0.23 NONE NONE FEB 19.10 19.10 6.11E-10 6.1 3.10E-01 0.31 NONE NONE MAR 19.20 19.20 5.55E-10 5.5 2.81E-01 0.28 NONE NONE APR 18.35 18.35 5.48E-10 5.5 2.78E-01 0.28 NONE NONE MAY 19.42 19.42 5.61E-10 5.6 2.85E-01 0.28 NONE NONE JUN 9.18 9.18 2.74E-10 2.7 1.39E-01 0.14 NONE NONE JUL 17.95 17.94 5.20E-10 5.2 2.64E-01 0.26 NONE NONE AUG 15.28 15.22 4.71E-10 4.7 2.39E-01 0.24 NONE NONE SEP 14.55 14.55 4.65E-10 4.7 2.36E-01 0.24 NONE NONE OCT 14.55 13.99 4.33E-10 4.3 2.20E-01 0.22 NONE NONE NOV 18.38 18.30 5.85E-10 5.9 2.97E-01 0.30 NONE NONE DEC 32.01 14.27 4.41E-10 4.4 2.24E-01 0.22 NONE NONE TOT 213.99 195.54 3.01 3.01 NONE NONE AVG 4.94E-10 4.9 (1) This location is 240 meters downwind which is the point of maximum expected concentration based on the worst case atmospheric conditions (see MNRC SAR Chapter 11).

(2) Based on continuous occupancy and the calculation techniques used in Appendix A of the MNRC SAR (Ar-41 at 2.3E-10 uCi/mi continuous for one year equals 1.4 mrem).

tJCnPMNRCAnnuat Repo.1 2002

UCDA%qS MNRC*

WQR" WaEM RM004 COM UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 f'"'

8.3 Solid Waste Solid waste packaged and transferred for disposal during 2002 is summarized in Table 3 below.

TABLE 3 2002

SUMMARY

OF SOLID WASTE TOTAL VOL. TOTAL DATE OF ACTIVITY SHIPMENT (Cu. ft.) (Ci) 0 0 NA NA 9.0 Radiation Exposure Radiation exposure received by facility operations personnel, facility users, and visitors during 2002 is summarized in Table 4 below.

TABLE 4 2002

SUMMARY

OF PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURES NUMBER OF AVERAGE GREATEST AVERAGE GREATEST INDIVIDUALS TEDE INDIVIDUAL EXTREMITY EXTREMITY PER TEDE INDIVIDUAL (mrem) (mrem) (mrem) (mrem)

FACILITY 25 312 1892 1796 17757 PERSONNEL FACILrTY 0 *

• 0 0 USERS VISITORS 1222 0.04 40 * *

• Extremity monitoring was not required.

UCDAMNRC Annfw Ret 2002

UCDAVIS hORIANNUWARAOIATICN RUCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 10.0 Radiation Levels and Levels of Contamination Radiation levels and levels of contamination observed during routine surveys performed at the MNRC during 2002 are summarized in Table 5 below.

TABLE 5 2002

SUMMARY

OF RADIATION LEVELS AND CONTAMINATION LEVELS DURING ROUTINE SURVEYS AVERAGE HIGHEST AERAGE HIGHEST (mrem/hr) (mrem/hr) (dpm/lOOcm 2 ) (dpm/lOOcm 2 )

OFFICE SPACES <0.1 0.1 < 5000(l) < 5000(l)

REACTOR CONTROL RM <0.1 <0.1 <5000(1) <5000(t)

RADIOGRAPHY CONTROL RM <0.1 <0.1 <5000(1 <5000(1)

COUNTING LAB <0.1 4.8 <5000") <5000(l)

STAGING AREA <0.1 0.5 <5000l") <5000(1)

COMPOUND <0.1 0.2 <800(2) <800(2)

EQUIPMENT RM 0.5 175 <800(2) <800(2)

DEMINERALIZER AREA 30 500 <800(2) <800(2)

REACTOR RM 10 300 <800(2) <800(2)

ROOF <0.1 <0.1 <800(2) <800(2)

SILICON STORAGE SHED <0.1 2.2 <5000(l) <5000(1)

RADIOGRAPHY BAYS 1.0 910 <800(2) <800(2)

(1) <5000 dpm/100 cm 2 = Less than the lower limit of detection for a direct frisk survey.

(2) <800 dpm/100 cm 2 = Less than the lower limit of detection for a swipe survey.

UCODM!RC Annuaf Repod 2002

UCDAVIS MNRC* UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 I . 1.

11.0 Environmental Surveys Environmental surveys performed outside of the MNRC during 2002 are summarized in Tables 6-10 below. The environmental survey program is described in the MNRC Facility Safety Analysis Report.

TABLE 6 2002

SUMMARY

OF PROJECTED ANNUAL DOSE (WITH NATURAL BACKGROUND" 1 ) SUBTRACTED)

BASED ON DIRECT MICROROENTGEN PER HOUR MEASURMENTS (ACTUAL DOSE PROVIDED BY TLD RESULTS IN TABLE 7 BELOW)

AVERAGE HIGHEST (mrem) (mrem)

ON BASE (OFF SITE 1-20 & 64) 3 26 ON SITE (SITES 50-61 & 65-69 & 71) 28 201 (1) Natural background assumed to be the off base (Sites 27-42) average of 44 mrem

• Projected for continuous occupancy.

TABLE 7 2002

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL TLD RESULTS (WITH NATURAL BACKGROUND( 1 ) SUBTRACTED)

AVERAGE HIGHEST (mrem) (mrem)

ON BASE (OFF SITE 1-20 & 64) 6 17 ON SITE (SITES 50 - 66 & 65-69 & 27 60 71)

(1) Natural background assumed to be the off base (Sites 27-42) average of 23 mrem.

UCDWNRC Annual Repof 2002

I I CDAVIS MaNRF"RpC R UCD/IMNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 TABLE 8 2002

SUMMARY

OF RADIOACTIVITY IN SOIL SAMPLES 8ETA Cs-137 K-40 Ra-226 Th-232 U-238 (pci/gm) (pCi/gm) (pci/gm) (pCi/gm) (pCI/gm) (pCi/gm)

AVERAGE 20.63 0.08 12.54 0.51 0.74 0.58 HIGHEST 26.80 0.17 14.40 0.54 0.96 0.71 MDA is the minimum detectable activity at the 95% confidence level.

The MDA range for the analyzed radionuclides (pCi/gm).

MIN MAX Beta 16.10 26.80 Cs-137 0.04 0.17 K-40 7.21 14.40 Ra-226 0.49 0.54 Th-232 0.53 0.96 U-238 0.45 0.71 TABLE 9 2002

SUMMARY

OF RADIOACTIVITY IN VEGETATION SAMPLES BETA Cs-137 K-40 Be7 (pci/gm) (pCI/gm) (PCI/gm) (pCi/gm)

AVERAGE 22.99 <MDA 17.25 2.00 HIGHEST 39.9 <MDA 44.2 2.43 MDA is the minimum detectable activity at the 95% confidence level.

The MDA range for the analyzed radionuclides (pCi/gm).

MIN MAX Beta 11.5 39.9 Cs-137 0.09 0.17 K-40 3.92 44.20 Be-7 1.75 2.43 UCOWMNRC Annual Report 2002

UCDAVIS C MNRC~

DAcQBIf' 4OPAR ftAnMAnICH UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 TABLE 10 2002

SUMMARY

OF RADIOACTIVITY IN WELL WATER ALPHA BEA TIrTIUM Cs-137 (pCi/I) (pCi/I) (pCi/I) (pCi/I)

AVERAGE <MDA 3.2 <MDA 8.1 HIGHEST <MDA 4.1 <MDA 10.9 MDA is the minimum detectable activity at the 95% confidence level.

The MDA range for the analyzed radionuclides (pCi/L).

MIN MAX Alpha 1.4 2.0 Beta 2.8 4.1 Tritium 289 365 Cs-137 2.5 10.9 UCDMNRC Annual Repor 2002

L,CDAVIS MNRCtL

• CELLM N£EM OJ operating Hours UCDIMNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 4500 4000 -

3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 _-

500 0-_

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 UCD/MNRC Operating History UCDiMNRC Annual epoal 2002

MNRC Mca.ELLAN-M RAIAE

%XIEAR 7

UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Reactor Tank Irradiation Facilities Total Number of Irradiations Completed (2002)

- Silicon Fixture --Central Facility - Argon -* Neutron Irradiator

-- 2002 Total ---- Iodine Facility - - - - Linear (2001 Total) 80 75 70 65 60 0 55 v

50 ID I-6 45 E 40 0

35 E 30 z 25 20 15 10 5

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0n Number of Irradiations

I FP H~~P 0 VI g VI C 0 o a Jan N m a~~~~a 0 VI ;Z(

Feb Mar 41 Apr 1<

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A AVIS MNRC$

MWcLbA EAR RADkU TKAN CENTER UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Unscheduled Reactor Shutdowns Total -- 2002 es CSC o Other - 2002 Total - - Linear (2001 Total) 80 -

70 -

60 -

50 -

40 -

30 -

20 -

10 -

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.5.' m 0. m nvU 0 ri U.- I 4 (A 0 z a UCDIMNRC Annual Report 2002

MNRCP;j MWQEUAN NUXLEAR RAL UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 Reactor Hours (2002) o Total Op-Hrs E-- Total MW-hrs Linear (2001 Op-Hrs) - - - Linear (2001 MW-Hrs) 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 z

0 3000 2000 1000 0

.m U. S c 0. U 01 0 41 IL 4L E (A 0 z UCDIMNRC Annual Report 2002 Co2