ML20040D603

Proposed Tech Spec Pages Re Emergency Power Sys

ML20040D603
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	01/26/1982
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20040D600	List: ML20040D599 ML20040D603
References
TAC-10026, TAC-11262, TAC-47044, TAC-47045, TAC-47876, TAC-47877, NUDOCS 8202020073
Download: ML20040D603 (12)

Text

l APPEtOIX 2 Georgia Power Company tRC Docket 50-321 Operating License DPR-57 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 s Proposed Changes to Technical Specifications

- Emergency Power Systems f The proposed changes to the Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications would be incorporated as follows:

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3.2-1 3.2-1 3.2-23a 3.2-23b 3.2-49a I 3.2-49b 3.2-68 3.2-68 a

3.2-68a 3.2-69 3.2-69 3.9-4 3.9-4 3.9-Aa 3.9-4a 3.9-12 3.9-12 P

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS 3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRlNENTATION 4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUENTATION Applicability Applicability The Limiting Conditions for Operation The Surveillance Requirements apply to the plant instrumentation apply to the instrumentation which performs a protective function. which performs a protective function.

Objective Objective The objective of the Limiting Condi- The objective of the Surveillance tions for Operation is to assure the Requirements is to specify .the type operability of protective instrumen- and frequency of surveillance to tation. be applied to protective instru-mentation.

Specifications Specifications The Limiting Conditions for Operation The check, functional test, and of the protective instrumentation af- calibration minimum frequency for fecting each of the following protec- protective instrumentation affect-tive actions shall be as indicated in ing each of the following protec-the corresponding LCO table. tive actions shall be as indicated in the corresponding SR-table.

Protective Action LCO Table SR Table A. Initiates Reactor Vessel and 3.2-1 4.2-1 Containment Isolation .

B. Initiates or Controls HPCI 3.2-2 4.2-2 C. Initiates or Controls RCIC 3.2-3 4.2-3 D. Initiates or Controls ADS 3.2-4 4.2-4 E. Initiates or Controls the LPCI 3.2-5 4.2-5 Mode of Rm

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F. Initiates or Controls Core Spray 3.2-6 4.2-6 G. Initiates Control Rod Blocks 3.2-7 4.2-7 i

H. Limits Radioactivity Release 3.2-8 4.2-8 I. Initiates Recirculation Pump Trip 3.2-9 4.2-9 J. Monitors Leakage Into the Drywell 3.2-10 4.2-10 l- K. Provides Surveillance Information 3.2-11 4.2-11 L. Initiates Disconnection of Offsite 3.2-12 4.2-12 Power Sources M. Initiates Energization by Onsite 3.2-13 4.2-13 Power Sources-3.2-1

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TABLE 3.2-12 INSTRUENTATION WHICH INITIATES THE DISCOMECTION OF OFFSITE POWER SOURCES Action to be Taken -

Required Channels if the Ntaber of Operable Required Trip Setting Required Operable Ref. No. Instrument Channels Is Not e t Channels To Trip (a) (b) 1 4.16 kv Emergency N s 2/Dus 2/ Bus greater than or equal to 2000 (c) volts. At 2000 volts time delay Undervoltage Relay (Loss of Voltage will be less than or equal to Condition) 6.5 sec.

2 4.16 kv Emergency Bus 2/ Bus 2/ bus greater than or equal to 3280 (c) volts. At 3280 volts time delay Undervoltage Relay -

will be less than or equal to (Degraded Voltage w

- Condition) 21.5 sec.

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NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-12

a. The column entitled "Ref. No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be established between items.,in Table 3.2-12 and items in Table 4.2-12.

b. This instrumentation is required to be operable during reactor startup, power operation, and hot shutdown.

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! c. With the number of operable channels one less than the required operable channels, operation may proceed ~

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until performance of the next required instrument functional test provided a trip sipal is placed in the t LOSP lock out relay logic for the applicable inoperable channel.

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TABLE 3.2-13 , ,

INSTRUENTATION WHICH INITIATES ENERGIZATION BY ONSITE POWER SOURCES Action to be Taken Required Required Chamels if the M.smber of Ref. No. Instrument Operable Required Trip Setting Required Operable (a) (b) Chamels To Trip Channels Is Not Met 1 Start up auxiliary 2 1 Trip setting (c) transformer 1C greater than or loss of voltage equal to 3280 condition volts. At 3280 volts trip of relay will be instantaneous (no time delay).

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w NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-13

a. The column entitled "Ref. No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be established between items in Table 3.2-13 on items in Table 4.2-13.

b. This instrumentation l's required to be operable during reactor startup, power operation, and hot shutdown.

c. With the number = of operable channels one less than the required operable chamels, operation may proceed provided the relay is removed from its case. Removing the relay accomplishes the same action as an operable relay operating to open its trip circuit.

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INSTRUMENTATION WICH INITIATES THE DISCONNECTION 3

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NOTES FOR 4.2-12 ,,

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a. The colunn entitled Ref. No." is only for conveniece so that a one-to-one relationship can be ' '

' established between items in Table,3.2-12 aPd items in Table.4.2-12.

b. Surveillance of this instrumentation is rendred (uring reactor startup, power operation, and hot s ,

shutdown. ,

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TABLE 4.2-13 INSTRUPENTATION WHICH INITIATES ENERGIZATION SY ONSITE POWER SOURCES _ _ , _

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Instrument Furctional Instrument Ref. No. Instrument Instrument Check Test Minimum Calibration (a) (b) Minimum Frequency Frequency Minimum Frequency 1 Startup N/A Once/ Month Once/ Operating auxiliary cycle transformer 1C loss of voltage condition t'

"4 NOTES FOR TABLE 4.2-13 e

a. The column entitled "Ref. No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be established between items in Table 3.2-13 and items in Table'4.2-13.

b. Surveillance of this instrumentation is required during reactor startupt power operation, and hot shutdown.

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8ASES FOR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.J.A. Scintillation Detector For Monitoring Radiciodine (Continued)

Level reading is indicative of a leak in the nuclear system process barrier in the primary containment. A sample that is contiruously d:: awn from the primary containment is collected on an iodine filter and monitored by a gamma sensitive scintillation detector. Radiation levels b are read out by a log rate meter and recorded on a strip chart located in the control room. A high radiation level alarm and a failure alarm are also provided and are annunciated in the control room. Also, a high-low flow alarm is annunicated in the control room.

5. GM Tubes for Monitoring Noble Gases A set of GM tubes contained in an instrument rack are used to monitor the release of noble gases in the drywell and torus. A high radiation level reading is indicative of a leak in the nuclear system process barrier in the primary containment. A sample that's continuously drawn from the

> primary containment is passed through a shielded sample chamber which contains the beta sensitive GM tubes. Radiation levels are read out by a log rate meter and recorded on a strip chart located in the control room.

A high radiation level alam and failure alarm are provided and are annunciated in the control room. Also, a high-flow alarm is annunciated in the control room.

K. Instrumantation Which Provides Surveillance Information (Table 3.2-11)

For each parameter monitored, as listed in Table 3.2-11, there are two channels of instrumentation except for the control rod positions indicating system. By comparing readings between the two channels, a near continuous surveillance of instrument performance is available. Any significant deviation in readings will initiate an early recalibration, thereby maintaining the quality of the instrument readings.

The hydrogen and oxygen analyzing systems consist of two redundant, separate

• systems and are each capable of analyzing the hydrogen and oxygen content of the drywell-torus simultaneously. They are designed to be completely testable at both the analyzer rack and in the control room. With an oxygen concentration of less than 4% by volume, a flammable mixture with hydrogen is not possible.

L. Instrumentation Wnich Initiates Disconnection of Offsite Power Sources (Table 3.2-12)

The undervoltage relays shall automatically initiate the disconnection of offsite power sources whenever the voltage se'tpoint and time delay limits have been exceeded. This action shall provide voltage protection for the emergency power systems by preventing sustained degraded voltage conditions due to the offsite power source and interaction between the offsite and onsite emergency power systems. The undervoltage relays have a time delay characteristic that provides protection against both a loss of voltagu and degraded voltage condition and thus minimizes the effect of short duration disturbances without exceeding the maximum time delay, including margin, that is assumed in the FSAR accident analyses.

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BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION M. Instrumentation Which Initiates Energization by Onsite Power Sources (Table 3.2-13)

The undervoltage relays shall automatically trip the loss of offsite power (LOSP) lockout relays if voltage is lost on the emergency buses and low voltage is sensed on start-up transformer 1C (SUT 1C). This lockout will, if a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) has previously occurred, cause energization of the emergency 4160 volt buses by the Diesel Generators (D/Gs). If the LOSP and LOCA occur simultaneously, the lockout relay will provide a permissive allowing D/G output breaker closure when the D/G .

voltage is up to normal. The undervoltage relays will have no time d21ay.

The absence of time delay provides a faster response time if the diesel generator has been previously initiated and prevents an additional time delay if it has not. This scheme prevents the connection of the D/G to the offsite power source.

3.2.1 References

1. FSAR Appendix G, Plant Nuclear Safety Operational Analysis

2. FSAR Section 7.3, Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System

3. FSAR Section 14, Plant Safety Analysis

4. FSAR Section 6, Core Standby Cooling Systems

5. FSAR Section 14.4.4, Refueling Accident

6. FSAR Section 6.5.3, Integrated ' Operation of the Core Standby Cooling .

Systems

7. FSAR Section 6.5.3.1, Liquid Line Breaks

8. 10 CFR 100 3.2-68a

Bt5ES FOR SURVE1LL4 CE RE031REMENTS 4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 4

• The instrumentation listed in Table,4.2-1 thruThe 4.2-13 same willdesign be functionally tested reliability goal asand the calibrated at regularly scheduled intervals.

Reactor Protection System of 0.99999 is generally applied for all applications of one-out-of-two-taken-twice logic. Therefore, on-off sensors are tested once every thre months, and bi-stable trips associated with analog sensors and amplifiers are tested once per week.

Those instruments which, when tripped, result in a rod block have their contacts arranged in a one-out-of-n logic, and all are capable of being bypassed. For such a tripping arrangement with bypass capability provided, there is an optimum test in-terval that should be maintained in order to maximize the reliability of a given ,

channel (Reference 1). This takes account of the fact that testing degrades re-lisbility and the optimum interval between tests is approximately 91ven by:

Where i = the optimum interval between tests.

t = the time the trip contacts are disabled from performing their function while the test is in progress.

r = the expected failure rate of the relays.

' To test the trip relays requires that the channel be bypassed, the test made, and the system returned to its initial state. It is assumed this task requires an estimated 30 minutes to complett in a thorough and workmanlike manner and that the relays have a failure rate of 10-0 failures per hour. Using this data and the above operation, the optimum test intervals is: ,.

i. 2(0.5) = 103 hours0.00119 days <br />0.0286 hours <br />1.703042e-4 weeks <br />3.91915e-5 months <br /> .

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42 days i

l A test interval of once-per-month will be used initially.

The sensors and electronic apparatus have not been included here as these are analog l

l devices with readouts in the contn>l room and the' sensors and electronic apparatus can be checked by comparison with other like instruments. The checks which are made on a daily basis are adequate to assure operability of the sensors and electronic apparatus, and the test interval given above provides for optimum testing of the re-j lay circuits.

The above calculated test interval optimizes each individual channel, considering it to be independent of all others. As an example, assume that there are two channels with an individual technician assigned to each. Each technician test his channel at the optimum frequency, but the two technicians are not allowed to communicate j so that one can advise the other that his enannel is under test. Under these con-Now, ditions, it is possible for both channels to be under test simultaneously.

assusne that the technicians are required to comunicate and that two I" 3.2-69

p LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS 4.9.A.6. Emergency 250 Volt DC to 600 Volt AC Inverters (Continued)

b. Once every scheduled refueling outage, the emergency 250 volt DC/600 volt AC inverters shall be subjected to a load test to demonstrate operational readiness.

3.9.A.7 Logic Systems 4.9.A.7 Logic Systems The following logic systems shall The logic systems shall be tested in be operable: the manner and frequency as follows:

a. The common accident signal a. Each division of the common logic system is operable. accident signal logic system shall be tested every scheduled refueling outage to demonstrate that it will function on actuation of the core

, spray system to provide an automatic start signal to all 3 diesel generators.

b. The undervoltage relays and b.1. Once every scheduled refueling supporting system are operable. outage, the conditions under which the undervoltage logic system is required shall be simulated with an undervoltage on each start bus to demonstrate that the diesel generators will start. The testing of the undervoltage logic shall demonstrate the operability of the 4160 volt load ' shedding and auto bus transfer circuits. The '

simulations shall test both the degraded voltage and the loss of off-site power relays.

2. Once per month, the relays which initiate energization of the emergency buses by the Diesel Generators when voltage is lost on the. emergency buses and start-up transformer IC, will be functionally tested.

c. The common accident signal logic c. Once per operating cycle each system, and undervoltage relays diesel generator shall be de-and supporting system are operable. monstrated operable by simulating both a loss of off-site power and a degraded voltage condition in conjunction with an accident test signal and verifying:

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I LIMITING COPOITION FOR OPERATION SLRVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS 3.9.A.7. Logic Systems (Continued) 4.9.A.7 . Logic Systems (Continued) de-energization of the- emergency-buses -and load shedding- from the emergency buses; the diesel starts from- ambient- condition on the "

auto-start ' signal, energizes the emergency buses and sequentially closes all safety load breakers (load breakers in test position):

and that on diesel generator. trip ,

that safety load breakers .on the ,

emergency bus open, and that with '

an auto-start signal the diesel restarts and energizes _ the  :

emergency buses and sequentially-closes all safety load breakers (load breakers in test position).

d. The undervoltage relays for the start ooses shall be calibrated.

annually for trip and reset voltages and the measurements recorded.

e. The 600-volt load shedding e. Once every scheduled refueling logic system is operable. outage, the condition _under which the 600-volt load shedding.-logic system -is required shall. be simulated to demonstrate that the load shedding -logic system' will t initiate load shedding on the  !

diesel auxiliary boards, react MOV boards, and the ~ 600-volt shutdown boards.

f. 600 volt swing bus transfer f. Every two months the swing buses circuitry for MCC S018A and supplying power to the Low Pres-S0188. sure _ Coolant Injection System valves shall be tested to assure' that the transfer circuits operate ~

as designed.

B. Requirements for Continued Operation B. Requirements for Continued Operation ,

With Inoperable Components With Inoperable Components-Whenever the reactor is in the Start Continued reactor operation is

& Hot Standby or Run Mode and the perpissible with inoperable com- -

reactor water temperature is greater ponents in accordance with Speci-i- than 2120F, the availability of aux- fication 3.9.8 provided that the L iliary electrical power shall be as following increased Surveillance i specified in-3.9.A, except as speci- ' Requirements are satisfied.

fled herein. If the' requirements of this Specification cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be ini-tlated and the reactor shall be-i placed in the Cold Shutdown Condi-

, tion within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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BASES F(R 5t.RVEILLAPCE REQUIREPENTS 4.9.A.2.e. Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Following the monthly test of the diesels, the fuel oil transfer pumps'shall be operated to refill the day tank and to check the operation of these pumps.

3. 125/250 Volt DC Emergency Power System (Plant Batteries lA and 18) 1 The plant batteries may deteriorate. with time, but precipitous failure is unlikely. The type of surveillance described in this specification is that which has been demonstrated through experience to provide an indication of a cell becoming irregular or inoperable long before it fails.

4. Emergency 4160 Volt Buses (1E, IF, and 1G) s The emergency 4160 volt buses (IE, 1F, and 1G) . are monitored to assure readiness and capability of transmitting power to the t emergency load.

These buses distribute AC power to the required engineered safety feature equipment. The normal feeds and backup to the emergency buses (IE, 1F, and 1G) are taken from the startup auxiliary transformers. If neither startup auxiliary transformer is available, buses 1E, IF, and 1G will be energized from the standby diesel generators.

5. Emergency 600 Volt Buses (1C and ID)

The emergency 600 volt' buses (1C ar.d 10) are monitored to assure readiness and capability of transmitting the emergency load.

6. Logic Systems The periodic testing of the logic systems will verify the' ability of the logic systems to bring the auxiliary electrical systems to running standby readiness with the presence of an accident signal and/or a degraded voltage or LOSP signal.

~ The periodic testing of the relays which initiate energization of the emergency buses by the diesel generators when voltage is lost on startup transformer IC will verify operability of these relays.

The periodic simulation of accident signals will confirm the ability of the' 600 volt load shedding logic system to sequentially shed and restart 600 volt-loads if an accident signal were present and diesel generator voltage were the only source of electrical power.

D. References

1. " Proposed IEEE Criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear i- Power Generating Stations" (IEEE Standard No. 308), June, 1969.-

2. American Society for Testing and Materials,1970 Annual Book of ASTM

, Standards, Part 17.

3.9-12~.

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