ML19339C915
| ML19339C915 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1981 |
| From: | Barron H, Canady K, Reed L DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19339C912 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8102120320 | |
| Download: ML19339C915 (11) | |
Text
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O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-369
) 50-370 (William D. McGuire Nuclear )
- Station, Units 1 and 2) )
TESTIMONY OF K.S. CANADY, L.A. REED AND H.B. BARRON REGARDING McGUIRE OPEPATION RELATING TO HYDROGEN GENERATION
- 1. Q. What is the purpose of this testimony?
A. The primary cause of the production of excessive hydrogen at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 ("TMI") was the premature termination / reduc-tion in operation of the emergency core cooling system ("ECCS"). This testimony addresses the measures taken at the McGuire Nuclear Station
("McGuire") subsequent to the TMI accident in the areas of pm.rsonnel, equipment, procedures and training to effectivelf preclude such improper operator termination of the McGuire ECCS.
- 2. Q. With respect to ch?nges in operating personnel, what was the organizational structure of the operating personnel at McGuire prior to TMI?
A. The overall responsibility for safe operation of the plant rests with the Station Manager. The Superintendent of Operations reports to the Station Manager and has specific ~ responsibility for the shift personnel who actually manipulate the con-trols of the reactor and supporting plant systems.
Each unit has a Unit Coordinator who reports to the Superintendent of Operations. The Unit Coordinator is responsible for the operating activities of the personnel on each shif t for the unit under his cognizance.
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2-i prior to the TMI accident each shift consisted
- of, as a minimum, a shif t Supervisor who held a
! Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license, two opera-tors who each held a Reactor Operator (RO) license and two non-licensed operators. This was the mini-mum requirement for one unit operation in any mode above cold shutdown. In addition to the minimum requirements, Duke provided an Assistant Shift Supervisor, who held an SRO license.
- 3. Q. Since TMI, what changes have been made to the organizational structure of the McGuire operating personnel?
i A. In addition to the shif t organization described I in answer 2, a Technical Advi.aor to the Shif t Super-visor will be present on all shifts and available to the control room within ten minutes. The Shift Technical Advisor's primary duty is to provide additional evaluation and assessment of both normal and unanticipated transients. In addition, McGuire technical specifications have been modified to require the presence of a Senior Reactor Operator in the control room at all times the plant is above cold shutdown conditions.
- 4. Q. How do these changes regarding operating personnel affect the issue of improper operator termination of ECCS operation, and thus excessive hydrogen generation in the event of a TMI-type accident?
A. The addition of a Senior Reactor Operator in the
) control room at all times and a Technical Advisor J
i to the Shif t Supervisor provides additional exper-tise on shift. This expertise provides further assurance that the ECCS will not be prematurely terminated in the event of a TMI-type accident in that an ECCS termination decision will be made by a Senior Reactor Operator with input available
! from the Shift Technical Advisor and the Reactor Operator.
- 5. Q. With respect to. the equipment modifications made at McGuire subsequent to the TMI accident would you please describe such changes which relate to the issue of precluding excessive hydrogen generation?
A. The changes that relate most directly are the addi-tion of new instrumentation and associated equip-ment to monitor the approach to inadequate core cooling conditions. A subcooling monitor has been installed at McGuire. This monitor measures reactor coolant system pressure, calculates satur-ation temperature for that pressure, measures reactor coolant system temperature, and compares the two temperatures to provide an indication of the margin to saturation. Pressurized water reactors are operated at temperatures below the e
saturated temperature. The saturated temperature is that temperature at which water will boil at a corresponding pressure and is indicative of a situation that could lead to inadequate core cool-ing. Alarms are previded to warn the operator of tne approach to a potential inadequate core cool-ing condition.
Duke is planning to install a reactor vessel level measurement system at McGuire. This system is de-signed to monitor the water level in the reactor vessel and provides further indication of the approach to an inadequate core cooling situation.
6 Q. How do these equipment modifications af fect the issue of improper operator termination of ECCS operation, and thus excessive hydrogen generation in the event of a TMI-type accident?
A. This subcooling monitor further enables operating personnel to ascertain the approach of inadequate core cooling by providing information in a more convenient form. The reactor vessel level measure-ment system provides operating personnel with additional information regarding the approach to inadequate core cooling.
- 7. Q. Would you please describe the changes in the McGuire administrative and operating procedures?
A. The changes that have been made in the McGuire administrative and operating procedures includes (1) A management directive that clearly estab-lishes the command duties of the Shif t Supervisor and emphasizes the Shift Super-visor's primary management responsibility for safe operation of the plant has been issued and will be reissued annually.
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(2) The Assistant Shift Supervisor has been assigned administrative duties thereby reliev-ing the Shift Supervisor of duties which could detract from or are subordinate to his manage-ment responsibility for safe operation of the plant.
(3) A detailed checklist of applicable items for shift turnover has been incorporated into the station procedures governing shif t turnover.
These checklists assure that equipment is oriented properly and that the oncoming shift is fully aware of plant status before asswming its duties.
(4) An administrative procedure has been modified to govern the amount of overtime worked by licensed operators.
(5) Procedures require verification of the oper-ability of a redundant system prior to the removal of any safety-related aystem from service, verification of the operability of all safety-related systems when they are returned to service, and notification of and action by appropriate licensed operators whenever any safety-related system is removed frem or returned to service.
- 8. Q. How do these procedural changes affect the issue of improper operator termination of ECCS operation, and thus excessive hydrogen generation in the event of a TMI-type accident?
A. These changes enhance the ability of the Reactor Operators to operate the plant in a safe and efficient manner. The operating lines of author-ity and management responsibility have been clari-fled and formalized; overtime restrictions reduce operator fatigue and the chance for operator error; verification procedures provide assurance that all necessary safety functions will be properly per-formed; and the formal shift turnover procedures .;:
assure that current information is provided to the oncoming shift and that proper system status can be re-confirmed.
- 9. Q. W'o uld you please describe the changes in the McGuire emergency procedures?
A. Prior to the TMI accident the McGuire emergency procedures required the Reactor Operators in the event of an emergency to identify what accident was occurring and then take corrective actions based on the particular procedures for the identi-fled accident. Now, operator actions required by emergency procedures are based on responding to objective control room indications. A specific diagnostic procedure has been written to address the initial operator actions in the event of any ECCS actuation. This procedure provides specific steps for evaluating the event, directs the oper-ators to the appropriate emergency procedures, or provides specific criteria for ECCS termination.
In addition each emergency procedure has been modified to specify the criteria for ECCS termina-tion.
- 10. Q. In these revised procedures, what are the criteria for terminating ECCS operation?
A. Prior to terminating the ECCS the operator must assure that each of the following four criteria are met:
(1) Reactor coolant system pressure is greater than a specified minimum value and increas-ing, and (2) Pressurizer level is greater than a speci-fled minimum value, and (3) The reactor. coolant system is subcooled by greater than 50*F, and (4) Adequate auxiliary feedwater flow for core heat removal is inj2cted into at least one i
non-faulted steam generator.
j If the above four criteria are met an inadequate core cooling situation cannot exist, and thus ,
i generation of excessive hydrogen is impossible.
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- 11. Q. Have the McGuire operators been specifically instructed in the revised emerg.ency' procedures?
A. Yes. The licensed' operators have been thoroughly instructed in the use of the new diagnostic proce-dure and in the application of the ECCS termina-l tion criteria.
- 12. Q. How do these changes in emergency procedures affect the issue of improper operator termination of ECCS operation, and excessive hydrogen generation in the i event of a TMI-type accident?
A. The revised emergency procedures provide specific criteria for terminating ECCS operation. Cperator compliance with these procedures precludes the premature operator termination of ECCS thereby preventing inadequate core cooling and excessive hydrogen generation.
- 13. Q. With respect to training, would you please explain in overview fashion the training required for an operator to become licensed?
A. The Operator Training Program is a ecordinated training effort established by the Duke Power Company to insure qualified operating personnel.
The training is designed to prepare initial and replacement personnel for new stationc and im-prove and maintain performance of existing oper-ations personnel. The program t o train the ini-
- tial staf f meets the above objective by providing a lengthy and intensive formal program that uses an effective mix of formal classroom presentations, research reactor training, on-the-job training (using task lists), simulator operations and rigorous evaluations that consist of both writtan and oral examinations. The length of the initial staff training program is over 2-1/2 years.
Li' censed operating personnel will participate in a
- requalification program that includes both formal classroom presentations and simulator operations.
- 14. Q. Would you please explain the changes in the McGuire operator training program since the accident at TMI which relate to the issue of hydrogen generation?
A. The McGuire operator training program is described in Section 13.2 of the McGuire FSAR. This program has been revised and expanded to reflect the lessons learned from the accident at TMI Unit 2.
These revisions include the following:
(1) Additional instruction in thermodynamics and heat transfer has been included in the pro-gram. This additional instruction provides greater depth to the coverage of natural cir-culation, heat exchange processes and the use of steam tables in problem solving.
i (2) Additional instruction in the methods of hydrogen generation, hydrogen flammability, and explosive limits has been added to the 4
program.
(3) The presentation on nuclear instrumentation has been expanded to include discussions of
- the effects of voiding in the core on excore indica tion.
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! (4) The emphasis on small break LOCAs (including the TMI scenario), and abnormal and emergency plant evaluations has been increased.
(5) Demonstration of a TMI-type accident on the McGuire simulator has been added to the program.
- 15. Q. W'ould you please explain the training the Shift Technical Advisors have received?
A. Shift Technical Advisors ("STA") have received all of the academic and simulator training required of Senior Reactor Operators. They also have received an additional four weeks of training both in the classrocm and on the McGuire simulator. This supplemental training program included instruction l in the following topics: STA responsibilities and accountabilities; management and supervisory skills; transient and accident analysis; plant chemistry; PWR heat transfer; PWR thermal and hydraulic transient response; small break LOCA analysis; and mitigating reactor core damage.
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- 16. Q. On several occasions you have made reference to use of a simulator. Please describe in overview-fashion the simulator?
A. Shnulator training is provided for the McGuire oper-ating staff. This training utilizes a simulator that is a replica of the McGuire Unit 1 fontrol Room and is located next to the McGuire Station and at the Technical Training Center. The initial staff training program " consists of a planned sequence of instructional modules starting with component level
i presentations on controls, through normal cpera-tions to abnormal operations. The abnormal opera-tion module includes a TMI-type scenario, natural circulation and ECCS operation. This training is greater than seven weeks in length and includes evaluations that utilize both written and simulator operating examinations. The McGuire licensed operators participate in a requalification program that periodically refreshes their operating know-ledge and skills using the simulator.
- 17. Q. How do these changes in the training program affect the issue of improper operator termination of ECCS operation, and thus excessive hydrogen generation in the event of a TMI-type accident?
A. Additional training has provided the operators with a more comprehensive understanding of the total plant response to various initiating events.
Further training in plant operation and the use of emergency procedures builds upon this technical foundation and provides an increased awareness of the importance of adherence to procedures.and ECCS termination criteria. Operator adherence with the training received precludes the premature termination of the ECCS thereby preventing inade-quate core cooling and excessive hydrogen gene-ration.
- 18. O. In your professional judgment, in the event of a loss of coolant accident, is the premature termina-tion of ECCS operation by the operating staff at McGuire a credible accident scenario?
A. No.
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Professional Qualifications of K. S. CANADY Ma r.ag e r , Project Coordination and Licensing Section Steam Production Department Duke Power Company My name is K. S. Canady. I am Manager, Project Coordination and Licensing Section, Steam Production Department, Duke Powe r Company. My business address is 442 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina, 28242.
I graduated from North Carolina State University in 1963 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering. I also did graduate work in Electrical Engineering at North Carolina State from 1965 to 1968. From June, 1963 to January, 1965, I was employed by the Lockheed Georgia Company, Marietta, Georgia, and participated in their electrical desi.gn of C-130 aircraft. From January, 1965 to July, 1968, I was employed by the Research Triangle Insti-tute, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. My work at RTI included assignments as project engineer on galvano diffusion devices and gold thin films for measuring partial pressures of oxygen on NASA contract work.
From August, 1968 to present, I have been employed by Duke Power Company in the Steam Production Department. As sign-ments have been in test engineering work and nuclear licens-ing work on nuclear generating plants. In November, 1974, I was promoted to Manager, Project Coordination and Licensing, which includes responsibility for obtaining operating licenses for Duke's nuclear power plants, providing operat-ing experience feedback from operating stations for input into new designs, and project coordination on capital improvement projects on existing generating stations.
4 Professional Qualifications of LARRY A. REED Senior Instructor, Plant Operations Steam Production Department Duke Power Ccmpany My name is Larry A. Reed. I am a Senior Instructor in the Steam Production Department, Duke Power Company. My busi-ness address is 442 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina, 28242.
From 1959 to 1964 I was employed by the United States Navy.
During this period I held numerous positions relating to nuclear power operations. Upon being honorably discharged from the Navy in 1964, I began employment with Carolina-Virginia Nuclear Power Associates where I was qualified as a Reactor Operator for the Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor.
I have been employed by Duke Power Company since 1974.
During this period the positions I have held include Control Room Operator, Shift Supervisor and Assistant Operating Engineer. In my current position as Senior Instructor, I am responsible for, among other things, the development and conduct of the Reactor Operator Training Program for the McGuire Nuclear Station.
I I have held the following licenses or certifications regard-ing operations of a nuclear power plant:
(1) Reactor Operator: A1W, United States Navy (2) Reactor Operator: S5W, United States Navy (3) Engineering Laboratory Technician: Submarine Qualified, United States Navy (4) Reactor Operator: Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor (5) Senior Reactor Operator: Saxton Nuclear Facility (6) Senior Reactor Operator: Oconee Nuclear Sta-tion, Units 1 and 2 (7) Senior Reactor Operator: Zion Nuclear Station
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Professional Qualifications of HENRY 3. BARRCN Cperating Engineer McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Power Ccmpany My name is Henry 3. Barron. I am an operating Engineer at the McGuire Nuclear Station, Ouke Power Ccmpany. My business address is: McGuire Nuclear Station, P.C. Box 488, Cornelius, North Carolina, 2S031.
I graduated frem the University of Virginia in 1972 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering, with distinction.
In 1972 I was employed by Duke Power Ccmpany as a Staif Engineer at the Oconee Nuclear Station. In this posi2 ion my responsibilities included operator training, new fuel handling and preoperational test coordination. In 1974 I transferred to the McGuire Nuclear Station as a Reactor Engineer responsible for development of reactor physics tests. In this positinn I participated in the Oconee Units 2 and 3 sero power physics and power escallation testing program. At McGuire I also held the position of performance Engineer responsible for preoperation and performance testing of various systems. I am currently an Operating Engineer at McGuire responsible for procedure development and coordination of Units 1 and 2 start-up activities.
I have held the following licenses regarding operations of a nuclear power plant:
(1) Reactor Operator: Cconee Nuclear Station (2) Senior Reactor Operator: McGuire Nuclear Station I am a registered Professional Engineer in North Carolina.