ML20005D755
| ML20005D755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1972 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005D724 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8912150056 | |
| Download: ML20005D755 (69) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.. - ... - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - . - -- o 30.8.3 Fuel Rod Power Corresponding to Onset of UO Melting 3 On a coriostent baus, using current best vatues t'i l conductivity and melting temperature, the values of LW/f t Y corresponding to the onset of Centerline enetting for pure 00 and the two concentrations of gadohn*a used in Seowns Ferry see Absterial Molteng kW/ft Pure 00 8 21 6 UO: w.th newee Gd,0, gg,g 003 with higher Go,03 gg,7
- NUCLEAR DEstGN References 1, ' Wilcox, T. P. and Perkins, S. T., AGN. GAM. an IBM 5 Chernick, J., Lellouche, G., and Wollman, W., "The 7000 Code to Calculate Spectru and Multiroup Cc,rv E ffect of Temperature and Xenon instatuktv,"
ssents, AGN TM 407, Aprit 196s. Nuckar Science and Enynnering,10, pp. IJ0131
. 2. Carter, J. L., Jr., Computer Code Abstracts. Computer (1961).
l CocF- HRG, Reactor Physics Dept., lechercal Activ- 6 Canosa, J., " Xenon IVuced Oscillations," Nuclear '11 ities Quarterly Report: July, August.Septemter 1960. Science and Engineering.2 6,pp,237 253 (19661, BNWL 340. October 15.19G6. 7. Ackerman, et al., "High Temperature Vapor Preswre
- 3. Honeck, H. C., THERMOS A Thermaletativn Trans of UO2." Journalof ChemicalPhysics, Vol 26. No.6, port Theory Code for Reactor Design. 6t<L 582G. December 1966.
June 19G1 8 Boyden, J. E., et al., Summary Memorandum on
- 4. Randall. D, and St John O. S . 9 ev - Sr.a':01 f act,rs<on Analysis Urcertainties, Dresden Nuclear Oscillations," Nucleon,cs. Maren 1958. Power Statiori, Unit 3, Plant Design Analysis Report, Amendment 3 l
l l 369/3.610 ( l l 8912150056 720022 i PDR ADOCK 05000259 i _. _ _ _._....._..._p _____.- _PNV_ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e t ' 4 i l-l l l-l l l i Appendix 8.5A i l l _Onsite and Offsite ; '- Shutdown Power Supplies and Distribution
- t (Added by Icer.tr.ent LO) :
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- 1
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BFNP LO
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i 00NTEN'li;
- 8. bA .1 General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.$A-1 l 8.$A.2 Design Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 . 5A - 2 l 8.$A.3 Operation of the Diesel-Generators for !
Units 1 and 2 During the Period ; immediately Following an Accident -:' or Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5A-3 8.5A.h Operation of the Diesel-Generators for Unit 3 During the Period immediately - Following an Accident or Incident . . . . . 8.5A-b 8.5A.S Operation of the Diesel-Generators During the Long Term Decay Heat Removal Period i
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5A-k ,
8.$A.6 Interactions . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5A-5 , 8.SA.? Rim Gervice Water Pumps . . . . . . . . . . . 8.SA-5 8.$A.8 Uystem Capability Evaluation . . . . . . . . 8.5A-6 i 8.$A.9 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.SA-7 t k l 1 l l 4 i i i 0 1 . l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ___...~._._-.o
BFNP LO - i i 1 i I 7tditt J J 1 Summary of Major Equipment Operating in the Short Term . . ... 8.5A-1 l Summary of Major Equipment Operating in the Lor 4 Term ... .. B.5A-2 , i Short Tem Loading Summary for a Two or Three Unit Plant . ... 8.5A-3 Long Term Loading Summary for a Two or Three Unit Plant .... 8.5A-ha antt kb i l i l i ) l
)
FIGURES ! Key Diagram of Standby Auxiliary Power System ....... .. 0.5A-1 l l Plant Layout . . . . . . .. . . .............. .. 8.5A-2 i ECCS Assignments For Units 1 and 2 . . . . . . ...... .. 8.5A-3 i i Units 1 and 2 ECCS Signal intertic . ...... ..... .. 8.5A L 1 ECCS Assi Enments - for Units 1, 2, and 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5A-5 ! i 1 l l 3.54=II l
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j APPEND 1X 8.5A ONDITE AND OFFSITE SHUTDOWN POWEF RTF1.IES AND DISTRIBUTION i in responrie to the eence. no outlir.ed in your letter of . lune T7,197P, - ve.have rederjened the cncite and offsite chutdown a-c power system. The basic design feature:; of the new system are des:ribed belrev. A corr.plete und detailed description of the three-unit design vill be l submitted an a revision to Section 8 of the PLAh in January 1973. 8.5A.1 General Descriition (Refer to Figure 8.$A-1) The shutdown a-c power distribution to unit 3 vill be separated from l 1 that of unito 1 and 2, and four additienal diesel generators (3A, 3B, l 30, and 3D) and fc,ur LKV additional shutdovn boards (3EA, 3EB, 3EC, l and 3ED) vill be provided to distribute power to unit 3 For flexibility ] J of operation, provisions vill be r.ade to interconnect 14KV shutdown board A of units 1 and 2 vith LKy shutdcvn board 3EA of unit 3. Similar ) ! connections are provided to interconnect boards B, C, and D with boards 3E13, 300, and 3ED, respectively. These connections vill be completed through manually ecntrolled breakers. An adaitional off aite scurce vill be c.lded to the unit 1-2 chutdown buses 3 throuch the new 1.F.v bus tie board fron new tranrfcr crs being added far future cocling tower cervices. The unit 3 shutdcen a-c power system l 5 vill have offsite scurces fro = the existing coc=on station service transformers through 1.Kv unit boards 3A and 3B as well as from the new cooling tower transformers through the LKv bus tie board. Eitner the ; additional offsite source or the present offsite source vill provide j sufficient power to operate the required shutdovn loads to meet the deLign bases. . The normal 250-volt :-c :ontrol ;.ever for the unit 3 rautdown power cystem vi33 1e fed from :taticn htteries 1 and 3 Isttery 1 vill provide :crmal contrel pver for ur.it 3 Iivisicn 1 ECCC logie, LKv uhutd'.sv , L: ard t 3EA and 3EB, and 40-v:.11 shutdevn besrd 3A. Battery 3
' trill provide normal control power for unit 3 Division 1: ECCS logic, c . W1
BFNP-40 k F.y shutdown boards 3EC and 3ED, and L80-volt shutdown board 3B. Loss of one battery vill cause the acts of only one Division of Unit 3 ECCS. Manually transferred alternate sources vill be available for each kKv ( and kBO-volt board. 0.5A.2 Design Bares The design of the completed system incorporates the following design bases.
- 1. The s/stot chall be designes so that a single failure vill not Jeopardite the effectiveness of the Dnergency Core Cooling Lystem.
l 2. A spurious signal shall be considered a single failure.
- 3. For the long term, three of the unit 1-2 diesel generators pr.ralleled with the thrt.e respective unit 3 diesel generators shall be adequate to supply all required loads for the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of loss of offsite power and a design basis accident on any one unit.
L. Adeqw.e fuel cupply shall te provided for operation of the diesel enginer during the maximum expected time interval between replenish-ment (7 day ).
- 5. The st,andby a-c power system and its assceinted equipment shall be i capable or withstanding design basis earthquake ground motions without impair: cent cf its function.
- 6. The standby a-c power system and its associated equipment shall be ,,
automatically initiated.
- 7. The unit 1-2 design is to be preserved, except as changes are
- required in ecnnectier. vith unit 3 changes.
- 8. The standby a-e pcver system shall be adequate te addrest tecident signals, spurious and real, f r. til th-ee units in any crder (real f:lleved by spurious or spurious folleved by real).
, 9 The standby a-: power system shall te adequate to meet the ECTS t Interic Crite.-it.. l c.5A-2
,rar-ev - - - - -
- 10. No operator action would be required in the short term (mininum of .,
10 minutes).
- 11. The standby a-c power system shall be adequate to provide power for the long term to operate two RHR subsystems at desi6n flow on each unit. This includes two RHR service water pumps on each reactor for cooling and two on the EECW system for the plant.
- 12. The proposed changes in the standby a-c power system vill meet or exceed the requirements of IEEE 308 and 279.
- 13. The proposed changes in the standby a e power system shall be tentable.
i-14 The diesel capacity will be within the limits of Safety Guide 9.
- 15. The standby a-c power system shall be adequate to net the NPSH requirements of Safety Guide 1.
8.5A.3 Operation of the Diesel-Generators for Units 1 and 2 During the period Immediately Following an Accident or Incident (Approximately 0-10 Minutes) The capabilities of the system for the short term (0-10 minutes) is essentially the same as presently proposed in Sectien 8 of the PSAR. The one significant change to the system ie in the inter-unit accident
' blocking circuits.
The ECCS equipment of units 1 and 2 assi6ned to Division I is connected to LKv shutdown boards A and B, and the Division II equipment is assigned to hKv shutdown boards C and D. (See Figure 8.5A-3). In the event of an accident signal in either unit 1 or unit 2, all the ECCS equipment associated with the accident unit will start. In the event an accident signal appears in both unit 1 and unit 2 at the same time, or in any crder, the intertie signals between the two units will give priority to Division I of the ECCS equipment hr unit 1, and Division II of the ECCS equipment for unit 2. This ensures ths.t one competent division of ECCS vill be directed te each unit. Refer to figee 8.5A h for a block
BFIF LO 1 diagram of the two-unit si 6nal intertie r.cheme. Single failures within . the intertie scheme are confined to one division and in the worst case could nullify only one division of ECCS. l ' i No operator action is required during this short term (0-10 minutes) f l i following an event, Refer to Table 8.5A-1 for the summary of major lohds operating in the J short term and to Table 8.5A-3 for the diesel-generator loads. j J i- 8.5A.h Operation of the Dierel-Ger.erators for Unit 3 Duringhe Period, , Inunediately Following an Accident er Incident ,(Approximately 0-10 Minutes) i i' Th2 four new diesel-generators and their resisective LKv distribution boards vill power' all the required services for unit 3. The shutdown boards for unit 3 vill function as in a single-unit plcnt on both offsite and onsite power. There is no interaction with the unit 1 and 2 plant cxcept that all eight diesel-generators in the plant will be startei ' on an accident signal in any unit as a pre-emergency r.ction in case of a' subsequent power blackout. No c;erator acticn is required during this short term (0-30 minutes) fc11cving an event. Refer to Table 6.5A-1 for the sumetry of ma&r lotds operating in the short term and to Table 8.5A-3 for the diercl generator loads. 8.5A 5 Operation of the Diesel-Generators During the Long Term Decay Heat Removal Period (Greater than 10 Minutes) In the long tem following an accident or incident, the four diesel generators assigned to units 1 ar.d 2, and the four diesel generatcrt assigned to unit 3 vill be paralleled as shown in Figure 8.5A-5 (hKv shutdown board A to hKv bhuti vn board 3EA, etc. ). Eynchronizing equipment is available for the existing tie breakers in the units 1 and f . 5A 1.
. _. . _ .._ =_ _
BFNP 40 - . 2 control room and paralleling vill be accomplished from this location. Loss of two dieselt , one in the units 1 and 2 complex and one in the unit 3 complex, has Nen analyzed and the consequences are acceptable. l I ? Once the paralleling is completed, the load margins available and the cqui}sent connectei to any pair of diesels minimite the consequences of , operator errors in loading the diesels. Refer to Table 8.5A h for the f dies 21-generator loads. The operators of the three plants must still coordinate their loading but the necessity to throttle the flows through > th? RHR pumps has been elir.inated for operation of two RHR subsystems
. on a set of paralleled generators. If three RHR pumps were started on '
two yaralleled generators (not a nomi case), the pumps should be on M nt, um hvvana flov tm ensure cromnt startine and acceleration of th? ' third RHR pump. Oneo started, the pumps may be loaded by opening l
- their discharge valves.
f In this completely manual mode of operation, ample time exists to allow for ,
. correction of operator errors through the subsequent correction of cooling mode misalignments.
i 8.5A.6 Interactior.n The interactions betvcen the units 1 and 2 accident signals as shown in Figure 8.5A b are based on maintaining divisional separation between the signals in each unit. The logic devices for Division I unit 1 and Division I l unit 2 vill be separated from those for Division II unit 1 and Division II unit 2. Each crosstie signal vill le routed in conduit reserved for that service only. All interconnecting signals are at 1:e lov levels of control voltsees, and the
.phyrdeal circuits are run between different areas in the centrol building which lirits the spectru of hazards to which these circuits are subjected.
8.5A.7 RER Service Water Pumis The number of RHR service water pum;s vill be increased from eight to twelve , prior to the startup of unit 3 The additional four pumps vill be installed 9 , " e- y w---..g----9--gagem----e eW a a-e* p eerw --ry-ea, - - - -- cent - -ype- ep- gy -we--g -
7 - l l i on'the pumping station deck in the spaces provided for thtm shown on j Figure Q2.6-1. They will be connected through any neeersary valves to the present supply headers for the illfR service water and Errentini Equipment , CoolinE Wter. I 1 Item 11 of the Design St.ses listed above requires in '.he long tenn two 1 R}Dt service water pumps for torus cooling of each reactor and tvc R}Dt service watcr pumps for the Essential Equipment CoolinE W;er. Thus shutdown of all the units in the three-unit plant will require a total of eight service watsr pumps. The four additional pumps are, in essence, installed spares, l and vill alleviate the cutage problems from maintenance or failures. Although all four additional pum;s are not necessary, the pumping station and piping systen arrangement, and the electrical syr,ter, desi6n made four }ucps a logical ! choice. 8.5A.8 System Capability LValuation_ _ l As stated atuve in Item 9 cf tne Design Isases, the syste: vill provide sufficient power in the chort term (0-10 minutes) to crerate the equipment n2c-dtd to meet the ECCS Interim Criterie. In the ace of an accident signal with caly the minimum ecmplement of ECCS equipmen . operable, two BliR pumps in the LPCI mode and one core spray system consisting of two core spray pumps would serve the accident unit. This contination v:uld limit the peak clad temperature to 1900*F fciloving the largest pipe treat. In the case of no spurious signals but with the largest pipe break ls break in a recirculation lins) coupled with failu-e of the LPCI lo0p selection cystem, the peak clad tcmperature would be litited to 1985 F by the operstic: cf two ecre spray systems with two pumps in each systec. 3ese rer;lts annly to a one, two, or . three , unit nlant. l
'9 thar riara11ali ne nf' t*= di esel PeneratP"" or the nav &##3ita aa' tree grrw r*a -
ment will provide sufficent power in the long terc (creater than 10 minutes) to I NEDO-10329, Los -of-Cz; ant Accident and Ibergency Ctre Occling Models for General Electric Ibil2g Water Peacters, Errata tr.d Aliendu Sheet, April 1971, Figure 2-27, page LO. NEDO-10329, Lcss-of-Cz'r.nt Accident and Ibergency Ctre Cooling Modelt for General Electric Boili:.g Water H ?a: tor. , Cut tlerent ;, April Ir71. Tatile 1, 5.5A-6 l
BITP-k0 alleviate tne requirement for a pressurized containment. Operation of two l RHR pump-heat exchtnger - RHRSW pump combinations at design flows vill limit the torus temperatures for both accident and nonaccident units to less than 175'F vith 90'F service temperature. This tempenture is well below the temperature (*190'F) st which NPSH is lost without a pressurized containment; therefore Safety Guidt 1 is met. In the short interim period between startup of unit 2 but before the additional diesel generators are operational, the loss of one diesel. generator (only three of four in service) vill be hand 1'ed as a specin1 ca.se in the long term (> 10 minutes) fc11ovinc an accident. The accident unit vould require s prcssurized containment to maintain NPSH because ene RHR pump-heat exchanger - RHRSW pump combination and one core spray cystes (consisting of tvc core spray pumps) would be assigned to the accident unit. The nonaccident unit would be shutdown with two RER pump-heat exchanger - RHRSW purp cunbinations hit the RHR pumps would be throttled to half flow. The nonaccident unit torus tempera-ture would peak at about 175 F vith a 90 F service water temperature. These same temperatures and operating modes vould also he apnlicable to two nonaccident units being shutdovn at the name time. In order to run two complete combinations on torus cooling for each unit, two of the three diesel generators vould be , paralleled utilizing the breakers presently installed. (These are the same breakers that vill ultimately be used to parallel the corresponding diesel g:nerators A to 3A, B to 3B, etc. ) Thus, Safety Guide 1 vill also be met on , nonaccident units in this interim period. l l 8.5A.9 Construction All major construction is to be confined to the unit 3 area and fine.1 work to tie in the complete unit 3 stan& fauxiliary pcver system vill have minimum effect on the operation of units 1 and 2. The four new diesel generators, their respective LKv shutriovn boards, and two L80-volt diesel turiliary boards vill be housed in the unit 3 diesel generator and toard room building shown in Figure 8.5A-2. These inch.de diesel generaters 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D, hKv shutdovn bereds 3EA, 3EE, 3EC, and 3ED, and 480-volt
. n 4 1 l
I BFNP LO j J l 1 Lei: sal auxiliary boards 3EA and 3EB. Separation vill be maintained between i boards to preserve, as a minimum, iniependence of Division I and Division II circuits. Compartments for the circuit trenhern feedir4 the unit 3 tervices l from the present hKv shutdovn bcards A, b, C, and D will become spare com- j partments'. The L60-volt 1 cads now installed will be fed from their existing br;akers in the units 1 and 2 area ur.til the new unit 3 LKv boards are j l_ installed. At that time, ti.ey vill te reconnected, as required, to their l ! L_ permanent sources. , l', 1: l The four new diesel Eenerators vill te controlled froc the unit 3 cor. trol l' room snt therefore all rajor eenstruction for the addition of these controle j vill be performed in the unit 3 contrcl room. i l_ Th2 normal offsite power source fer the new kr.v shutdevn boards 3EA, 3EB, 3EC, 1 -
; and 3ED will be fro: hEv 2n:t boards 3A and 3B in the unit 3 tarbine building.
I .The (lterntte offsite source vill be f.cn the new LKv tus tic board (Figure _ i 8.5A-1) that also vill feed the shuthvn bus center tays on the unit 3-P shutdown buses. ~his LKv b.s tie beard is to be located in the unit 3 shutdown board room and its installation vill not require constractic.n in the units 1 ; and 2. area. The bus tapn t: t h( uni.! 1-2 shutdevt. buses vill be prepared to cecept the new feed before :peration Of units 1 and 2 tegins to enable later completion of the tie with r. minimum impact on units 1 and 2. L i The breakers throup. Which prallelir.: capabilitier are svt.ilable between units 1-2 diesels and unit i diesels now exist as emerrency breakers 182h ,1828, 181k, and 1526 on the unit M 1.Kv shutde.n boards. 'i:.en
. the unit 3 LKv boards s.re available, these ties vill be co ;1eted but all ma'or control features now exist . Some minor additional instru .enta. ion and annt .:iation vill probably be added to the units 1 and 2 diesel-gene:ator boards *.o further mor.itor the !
intereenne:ted system. Pipe tees and valves for cor.necting .te e.iditicral EE pucpc into the water supply headers win te made up and ir place bercre :tt.-tup cf unit 1. Installa-tion of the additi:nal pump; can the: prc:eed with:ut enterfering with opera- l tion of units 1 and 2.
WIIP-ko o TABLE 8.5A-1 ! SUMARY OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT OPERATING IN THE SHORT-TEM (0-10 MINUTES) ' EACH DIESEL GDEA70R CONNECTPD TO ITS PREASSIGNED BOARD (NO PARALLELING) ONE UNIT PIANT TWO UNIT PIANT TEEE UNIT PLANT
+
BLACKOUT DIESEL GENERA 10RS AVAIIABLE h 3 h3 8 6 RESW'S (ON EECW) LPCI k3 L3 6 h i O O OO OO ! CS SYST M 0 0 0 0 0 0 ! i ACCIDENT' SIGNAL ON ONE UNIT ! ' DIESEL GENERATORS AVAIIABLE k3 h3 6 6
, 'RHRSW'S (ON EECW) 43 L3 6 h LPCI h3 4 3 k 3 CS SYSTMS 2 1 2 1 2 1 i ACCIDDT SIGNALS ON EACH 1[ NIT OF A TWO UNIT PIANT_
k DIESEL-GENERA 9VRS__ AVAIIABLE UNIT 1 - 1 CORE SPRAY SYSTDi 2 LPCI , UNIT 2 I CORE SPRAY SYSTD1 2 LPCI SHARED BL7 WEEN UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 h RHRSW (ON EECW) NULTIPLE ACCIDENT SIGNALS ON ALL UNITS OF A ThREE WIT PLAh"r 4 DIESEL GMERATORS AVAIIABLE ON UNIT 1 & 2 UNIT 1 3 DIESEL GMERAUDRS AVAIL #Ri? ON UNIT 3 1 CORE SPRAY SYSTDI 2 LPCI UNIT 2 !_ 1 CORE SPRAY SYSTD! 2 LPCI UNIT 3 I CORE SPRAY SYSTDi 3 IPCI l l l SHARED BETWEEN UNITS I, 2, AND 3 l
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1 l
, , ,, . _ . . - , , - - , , , , , - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - ' - -
BFNP-hD TABLE 8.5A-2 SUPARY CP !MJOR EQUIPMFliT OPERATING IN THE LONG-TIR4 (CREATDI THAN 10 MINUTIE)
ONE UNIT PIN!T 'NO UNIT _ PIANT THREE UNIT PIANT BLAOKOUT DIECEL GD1DtATORS AVAI!ABIE L3 h 3e goe 688 RHP3W'S (REACTOR COOLING) 2 2 h 48 6 6 RlL*2W'S (EECW) 2 a p p p p l
rHR 2 2 h b 6 6 p CL SYSTD!S 0 0 0 0 0 0 ACCIDD."r ON ONE tri77 DIIEEL GENERATOFE AVAIIAB12 h3 h3 8 6 ltHRSW'S (REACTOR C00LINC) 2 2 h3 6 6 RIPSW'S (EECW) 2 2 2 2 2 ?
RHP 2 2 h3 6 6 CS SYS'lD$!'" IS AVAIIABLE.
** PARALLELED IN SETS OF TWO GENERATORS F1,CH.
i
}WNP LO l l
TABLE 8.5A-3 g r.Il0RT TERM LOADI*iG (1:w) Sill 44ANY Folt A TWO-triIT OR THR};E-U!!IT PIANTI A. Blackout Condition .1:ir,ht Diesel Generators Available D/G A. 103? D/f It ill 3 D/G c f.616
- 11/4 D il2fl :
J D/G 3A $60 ' D/G 311 30h D/G 30 kOO .i D/G 31) 10h i 2
!!. Accident on Unit 1 - Eight Diesel Generators Available ;
i I D/G A 2kBb D/G 11 257h ! D/G C 2%2 : D/G 1) 2625 ! D/G 3A $60 : D/G lli ' .0 18 ! 1)/G 3C 400
;)/G 3D 30h C. Accident on linit 1 - Diesel Ger.erntor C Failed 11/.'i A P576 D/G 11 2S7fl D/G C 0
!)/G D 2625 D/G 3A $60 t- D/G 3H 30h l>/G 30 h00 D/G 3D 30h II. Accident on .Ilnit 3 - Diesel Generator 3C Failed 11/G A 1032 D/r; h 613 n/G c f>6h U/G D t\?H
- )/G 3A M20 l
D/", 314 2%R l D/c. 3r 0 D/'l 31) P36f1
7Ahu: 8.5A-3 (Continued)
)
s : 1 1-:, Accident :irnnin on tinits 1, 2, and 3 - F.inht Diesel Generators j Avniinble? 1 1 i b i>/t; A ;'l.fel. l D/r; it '51 0 j ie/t; (; ; i'.. ' li/#; 11 N59h l D/(; 3A ?>7h
- D/G 3h 2368 :
D/G 3C 257h ! D/G 39 2368 t i 1 Herer to Table 8.SA-1 for a list of flajor fonds. l The loado ou dictml :enerators A, B, C, and D would have these same i valuen under the . stated conditio:: for the plant with only units 1 and P in operation. i I
+
1 l
,c.cr,+ -m..-,,,.,. y.--.e+,.--,,, ,,-ww-we-ww- -,w ---~-w-+
I
.., TABLE 8.5A-ka LONG-T!:RN !aADING (Kw) '
2 FOM A WG-UNIT T # A. Blackout Condition - Four Diesel Generators Available D/G A 2k6k D/G B 2h36 . j D/G C 2296 i D/G D 21kk ,
)
- 8. Blackout Condition - Three Diesel Generators Available !
D/G A Failed D/G B 2732 ' D/G C 2kB6 D/G D 2k86 . (Note: Wie condition requires that diesel generators C and D be
. paralleled and that RHR flow be throttled) 'l F .
l C. Accident on One Unit - Four Dier,el Generators Available , D/G A 2568 D/G B 2636 : : D/G C 2536 ' D/G' D 2683 D. Accident on One Unit - Three Diesel Generators Available l l D/G A Failed ll 1)/G B 2732 1 L D/G C 2736 D/G D 2688 Covers the period prior to installation of the diesel generators for Unit 3. 2Refer to Table 8.5A-2 for a list of major loads. ! i t
+
- - ,e,-*
kiG-ko . TABLE 6.5A hb 1,ona-Trrn :.0ADItc (iv) EU!aFY ron A am-mnT PIAUT1 8 A. Blackout Condition - 1:ial.t Dic:.c) Generators Available D/G A in parallel with D/G 3 1 23hh D/G B in parallel with 2/3 3 I PP6C D/G C in parallei vith T/3 3 0 1PSb D/G D in parallel with li/G 3 ; 12Ph B. Blackout Condition - Six Liesel Generators Available D/G / in parallel with r/13 A Failed D/G B in parallel with L/0 3 ? 2h98 D/G C in parallel with r/G 3 0 2209 D/G D in p.trallel vith D/G 3 !. 2120 C. Accident On One Unit - light 'ienel Generaters Availabic D/G A in parallel vith 0/0 3 A D3bh P/G B in narallel with ;/3 31 2P66 D/G C in parallel with r/9 3 C 1560 D/G 'O in psn11el with D/", 31 1h90 l' ; D. Accider.t on Dne Unit .:ix 016393 Generators Avsilable ; D/G A in parallel vith : /" 3
- Failed D/G B in parallei with .901, i 2h?3 D/G C in parallel ' tith D/3 3 . 2h72 D/G D in narallel with :/G 1 L 2392 l ,
I l 1 I t loadings are fer each dies < renerater of the para'1cled i, air, i 2.efer
? to Table 5.5.'s-? for s list f ma.)or loads. .
l-
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- w 9-,- ,-w7-- -e-- - w --- - - '
-cossiI .1 i I ..I a.qr tm ::.,.
m.
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Q2,6 Apparently the probable maxinum flood (pttF) has not been determined by use of probable mnximum precipitation (MD') applied to the hydrolocie characteristics of the watershed above the plant. The IHF hydrographs with ant! vithout the effects cf the upstrean reservoir should be presented, khTIPON81: i PHAR Appendix 2.kA describes the development of the probable maximum flood (IHF). , This response defines flood protection for water reaching a continuum of leycis from'the maximum normal pool up to the design basis' flood (DBF). The plant can continue normal operation for floods where wave run up does not exceed elevation 565. This is plant grade and the elevation of the pumping station deck, Protection for vave run up to elevation 565 is therefore inherent in the plant design and no essential equipment or buildings are threatened. fio operator action is required to achieve the protection, and the protection is continuously available. For all vnter leveln and unve runun above elevntion 565 up to a anximum
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14 0 and the Hesidual Heat henoval fiervice Water (RHRfW) nunps on the intake - I structure are protected against flotation and kept dry and operatienal. All required protection including watertight doors and bulkheads is permanently in place and always available for the full spectrum of levels. The outer door to the vaste packaging area of the Radvaste Building and the outer set of double doors of the large equiinent lock and its sliding gate vill be closed and access denied these areas any time the reservoir mean level, exclusive of waves, reaches or is above elevation 558. Reservoir level infornation is a normally collected environmenta' parameter and vill be printed out by ent puter in the Control Root at preselected intervals. This level indication is independent of vare action, and should it not be available, a telephone check with the operators at either Wheeler or Guntersville pa s vill provide this information. l I l l QP.6-1 )1 1
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BFNP hD The water levels for which the plant is protected ara a combination of mean flood levels concurrent with vind induced waves. The nean flood levels range fron just above naximum normal pool at elevation 556 up to the PMF at elevation 572.5. The PMF concurrent with L5 nph vinds produces five foot voves which run up on a vertien1 vall nearly to elevation 578 Elevation 578 is thus the upper linit of flood and wave protection. For lower mean flood levels, higher concurrent vind speeds and resulting wave heights can be accepted, with the upper limit of all conbinations at elevation 578. This criterion applies down to a nean flood elevation of 568 at which the concurrent vinds reach a maximum of 85 mph producing 10-foot waves such that run up on a vertical vall reaches elevation 578. For mean flood levels between elevation 568 and elevation 556 the maximum concurrent vind speed is constant at 85 mph. In addition, to create the vaves and run ups noted above, vinds must be sustained for 30 minutes and must be from certain defined critical directions. These directions are l vinds from the southeast, the direction of longest fetch; vinds fron the south, perpendicular to the south face of the intake structure and the large equipment lock; and vinds from the vest, the only direction allowing direct approach to the Diesel and Radvaste Buildings. Because of the constant surveillance and control exer:1 sed by "".'A over the h0 Tennessee Valley, flood levels of large magnitudes can be predicted in advance of their actual occurrence. In all cases, full advantare vill be l- taken of advance warning to take appropriate action vnenever reservoir levels above normal pool are predicted; however, as previously mentioned, the plant flood protection is always in place and does not depend in any way on advanced warning. Therefor?, during flood conditions, the plant vill be permitted to operate until water begins to run across the top of the punping station at elevation 565. Seismically qualified, redundant level switches each povered from a separate division of power are provided at the pumping station to give nain control roon indication of this condition. At that time an orderly shutdovn of the plant vill be initiated, Cthough surges even to a depth of seve al feet over the punrirr station deck will not cause the loss of the main condenser circulating water numrs. Aen 42.6-2
"- BFHp.140 it is available, the television security camera mounted at the punping station provides a menns of visual confirmation of conditions at the pumping station.
The orderly shutdown of the plant vill include closing certain nornnlly open valves in drnin lines. Any inflow before conpletion of the closure operations is expected to be ninimal and vill be handled by the normal sump pumps.
' Although no portion of the plant protection is dependent on offsite power, when the decision to shutdown is made, normal shutdown procedures, including use of the Condenser Circulating Water pumps, will be used as long as practienble. At the most ennvenient time each unit vill ro on 911R cooling and enn thereby be naintained in a safe, cold shutdown condition indefinitely.
For the purposes of flood protection, any combination of flood level and vind vnves that exceed plant grade at elevation 565 vill not occur coincident with a tornado or a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The flood
- protection provides for the conbined effects of the operating basis earth-quake coincident with the naximun probable flood. Durine construction of remaining units, provisions have been made such that the flood protection of operating units is not jeopardized.
Figure 0?.6-2 is n site Inyout shoving major features and the elevation 565 contour, the elevation 570 contour, and the elevntion 578 contour. The individual features of plant protection are nore completely described in the following sections. Is0 Intake Structure The Itesiduni lleat itemoval fervice Water (Ill!PrW) Nmns on the deck of the intake ntructure are surrounded by concrete valls which extend frc~ the deck elevation to elevation 578. fee Figure Q2.c-1. This protective structure provides permanent, inplace protection to elevation P8 and requires no operator action for its implementation. These pur.-s serve both the RHHSW system and the Therrency Equiment Cooline Water (FICW) j Gysten.
':2. i-3
i HFNp l.0 I The vnlls are reinforced, poured-in-pince concrete including three inner < partitions which provide four individual punp conpartnents. The valln are ( deninned for static vnter nrensure with vnter level to e2evation 578 or for the dynnmic force resultinn fron a vnve whose height is 5.1 feet with renervoir vnter leve] nt $7P.'s or for a vnve whose height in 10 feet with ; reservoir vnter level at elevation $64 For the denien of the vnlls, it i' in nanuned that the vnve striken the vr.11 with the force that would occur . if the vnll were loented at the front race of the intake structure. The vnlls are also designed to withstand the Design Bnais Earthquake (0.18g) to prevent danage to the encioned equirnent. -i The outer and inner conpartment valls as erected forn an effectivc vnter barrier. All pipe or instrument openings are sleeved through the outer and inner vnlls and are sealed. "'he protective structure is open at the top to the venther and access to each individual cocpartment is by 1 n vntertight door which vill be nornnlly cloned. Ench ece.partment presently 1 containn two HilHSW pumps and their innediate nipinn and valving, nn EECW ntrainer, one or more condenser circulating vnter nump vnive necess. hatches, a deck opening for a future RHHSW numr, and the two central compartments each contnin a vent hood.1 i There are no cravity drains from these nnnpartnente to le cloned to ! prevent backflow into the connartment; ovever, each comp.rtment la provided i with a sunp. Enen sump has redundant, aubnersitle, hinh espacity, unwaterinc pumps sized to handle in excess of the trobable taxinun Trecipitation plus scepage. The two pumps in esch con,nrt ent are covered fron a separate l division of energency power. l h0 l The inner equinnent roons of the nunrinc station are not reluired to rer.nin dry. To annure that tne Hi' rW compart>nts will not oe ". coded with vnter coning up throurn the y 5 Jacc, t : ." roar *.:.uned nunn velb sre nenled arninst hend and nurre forcen. 'ini i n rly , tv mr..:enner circuin'..r., vnter pumr vn:ve I necenn hatches, which nra now only went .c" nroof, hnvr t.eer. redesigned to nreclude lenkare into t .e e .nnrtnent a. "re roof vent i ln. ort which provide ventilation for t e e r. i r < r.t ronnn r e:me e:e" t :0.. , n. a beer rained
'Dee P.7/2 "ection . 5 A . *' v i - rerect - ";t :re ne i t i or.- '.=I'.i nunns.
LP 7.!.0 p to exteni nhove the top of connn-tr r.iit vn' 1 n. - e93n are previded
.around punp nhaftr. nut t viveen t.5
- m ir.i enrine vul the runt deck, itedun.
dant level nvitel.cr (! *.e'- co u nr* rwnt ) rovera.1 by neparate divisions of onver annunciat e hich w'"r lew ' ;*, tFe rait centrol roon. In addition, there are no .)unctnnn in the c: tile . to t5" NF.'W purma at elevntions nub.1cet to subnerrence. 1:nch compartment shall be visually nsnecteu na-todically, checking for standing vnter and trach necumulation. In add!*. ion, at appropriate intervals ench connnrtnent vill bo terted to nanurn serviae unter -pump operation, nunp pump operation and to annroxinate lenkare. The tent vill be accompanied by filling ench- conenrtnent to a denth of 18 inenes, then denonstratine. the operation of each RHit nervice vnter punp. ifter maintaining approximately thin depth for at lennt . hnarc, t he decrease ir depth with tine vill be nennured and assunod to be out lenkane. "he nen::ured lenkare vill be nalntained at less than 15 parcent of the canacity of one unwatering pump.
"he tine it taken to enpty each crinenrtnent will be used to confirn the unwaterine- pump ennneity. "ne rear vrill of the :onnartments and the two end valln rise to elevntien 578 v:.ich is twelve inches lover than the purm deck vnll and the rnrtit tor.s betwee eenpartmenu. "his assures that in the hichly unlikely event innt ene ec .rr.-trent 1:d ".oca, the others vould not ie nfrected. Flootinr any r nelo e^nt n-t en' v' .1a result in the loss of only illlH:N punpn fed fr9n or.e chutdo.tr. bonra, t i
':quipnent and Dernenne) Accesn :oc:: to heactor cuilding 14 0 Unit,1 of the reactor 1 uildir.
- contains a larr.e aqu!pment lock and a pernonnel lock botn o' voici, are at elevntion 5d. '/he srs11 door at the nnuth end of the personncl lo:t is dec!cned to t:1d vnter for static i nand, brer&. inn vnver, . raken vnver, no nurre frrcen up te elevation 578 and protection vill n:vays t o availr." ". ~r .e e ;i pnent lock contains two nets of doors, ::r.c ' t.e t , . A encent cf the other, fc r.c n part of necondary containnent an't i: #: ted wit- ir'ints'.'e senir. ~
ne inflntable sanIn vil] protect senin.et a rtst'.- .es ; cf 1/~ .ne: of vnter n .d vill also r.91d neninst n 3' rsf vind. '<
- m er* t Nee sr e doors seninct rtatic hend, i:renkinc waves , t roker: vav. r , u. cre n .icn m te alevnti:n 579, I
a vertienlly slidine rate '-u.. : e r r r it : -ne - ; i r e t '.:. 1:. 'rcrt of .e outer ; doorn. "'he n11di ne ent" vi ' . r.o r u ' . '--M-and v .. :e raisan only 4 , _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
BHip LO The sliding gate is desirned for a mean vater level of $72.5 and a b.7' foot bronking wave generated by a h5 nph wind. The gate vill be a velded steel frame covered with n nteel skin pinte and fitted with rubber sen1s for nonling to elevation 578.. It vill be guided at each hnd by wheels onerntine on steel tracks. Hnising and lowering -of the rate vill normally be accomplished by a motorized, two-drum hoist unit equipped with means for nanuni operation. . The pinnt mobile ernne vill be used an a backup method of lowering or raising the gate. In the raised position, the gute vill be sunported by two dogging devices which cannot be withdrawn while supportin- the weight. I Existing liiesel Generator Building The existing Diesel Generator Buildinr lover floor is at elevation 565.5. The building is protected against floodvnter and wave action and vill be kept dry to elevation 570. "'here are five sets of large double doors in the west vall of'the building for both personnel and maintenance access. ! These doors are designed for all static heads, breakinc vnves, broken vnves. I i and nurge forces un to elevntion S78 with replaceable senin which are always I in place, I j t if a dienel conpartment door nunt ranain open during naintenance, the floor drninn in ti.at conpartnnnt ahn11 he nenled with ranketed cover plates, nnd the penetrations and doorway lendine from that compartnont to the pipe : h0 nnd electrien1 corrblor vill he senled to elevation S78 M1 nine sleeves and electrical penetrations through the outer walls at and belov elevation 578 nre nenled neninnt static and curce f',orcec. '"he Oh-inch EECW emergency drain in protected by an inclined hinged cover which is held closed by cravity.
'"his cover is senle<3 vith n ensket. neenare vill be handled 1.y the normal l floor drain systen and ru pei out of the huilding fron the nornal Luilding i sunp by two LOO cr nuno pun s. The nunp punps discharce through check
- j. valves to ar. elevnted line which reaches elovation 557 feet-f: inches before
.! coing underground and ter-inntinc in the yard drninare systen.
^?.6-6
e
BP'NP ko l
New (Unit 3) Diesel Generator Building i The ncy Diesel Generator Building lover floor vill be at elevation $65.5. The building vill be protected against floodwater and wave action and kept dry to elevation $78 There vill be five nets'of Jnrge doubic doorn in the ennt vall of the building for both personnel and maintenance accens. These doors vill be designed for all stntic heads, breaking waves, broken waves, and nurge forces up to elevation 578 with replaceable seals which are alwayn in place. The electrien1 boards will be located in rooms in the buildine confoming to the appropriate separation criteria required. If a diesel compartment niust be blocked open for maintenance, provisions will be nade to protect the remainder of the building. These provisions vill be similar to those described for the existing Diesel Generator Building. Heactor Building The Reactor Building is protected against floods to elevation 578 by water-tight doors, sealed pipe sleeves, and panels, h0 Off-Gas Treatment Building and Stack Because of its location and design, the entrances of the off-gas treatment building are above elevation 568. This structure vill remain dry and operational for all combinationn of water level and vare action below elevation-568. For water or wave heights above elevation 568, this building vill be allowed to flood, llecause the grade level elevation is $68, the stack base vill remain dry and operational until flood water and wave action exceed elevation S68. For water or wave heights above elevation 568, the stack vill be allowed to flood, Radvaste Building The radvaste building and its addition are protected as% inst floods and vill be kept dry to elevation S78 by exterior vatertight doors, and sealed exterior pipe sleeves. There are watertight entrances into the radvaste building from the service building and turbine building that protect to elevation 572.5. See PSAR Figure 1.6-19. The exterior doors are those Q2.6-7
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' ITNp kO' i
located between columns W2 and W3 n Figure 1.6-19, the southernmost l-
' entrance to the packaging loading area (between column W1 and the outside wall line), and the two sets of doors in the south wall of the radvaste building addition.. All interior pipe sleeves at- or below elevation 572.5 leading into the building are sealed against head forces.
- !iunusary k0 The plant can remain in normal power operation with water up to elevation 565.
The plant is protected against all flood conditions up to elevation 578 which ' included the IHF concurrent with h5 mph winds. The plant can achieve
'and maintain safe, cold shutdown with water up to elevation 578 This
~
protection will be provided before unit 3 exceeds one percent of rated power. 02.6 6 r /'
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@ FINAL 5AF ETY ANALYSIS R EPORT w...
d-Z:P.* L FITMDI';G FUdi P1,;T AFD e, c.:. 2 2 c> . =..:..
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f? i E;P-40 : fi, { ._ L K (Thic analysis included the refueline bellovs, dryvell-to-reactor ,vell seal, bulkhead plate, nn1 the _ upper portion of the dryvell.)
- 7. Drninn in tbc dryvel; na.1 ronetor well vill be neinnienlly qunli fied thrreich the fi rnt nornnily :loneri luolntion valve or ternorary p3ngs will be innerted before initintion of the refueling mode.
t n. . Qualification vill inclurie the following: 10-inch renetor well drains L-inch dryer / separator ernin
;40; 3-inch gate leahnee drain P-inch fuel transfer ca.nl drains 2-inch liner lenhnre drainn
-b. Temporary plugs vill be instnlled in the following:
a
'i-inch bulkhend drain P-inch dryvell-in-rencter-vell sen1 drain B. The 1-1/P-inch refueline be;2cun drainn will be permanently sealed.- The bellovn vill be drained br ,ennr, of a portable pump after each refueline.
All of the nnnlysen vill 1:e ^or sleted by 'invenber 1,1972, and all nodifications to the systens vill be ennpleted by March 1,1973. Cooling v311 therefore be available before ntor;nc spent 'iel in the fuel pools. The interconnections nre nonnal'.y utilized only at timen when the R!iR syntem 4 is in operation in the nhutdevr. cooline node with the reactor shutdown and depressurized. The iEli synten vin be used for fuel pool coeling in the unlikely- event of n ornlonce, n ;tnre of toth fuel pool cooline nu.pn. More lihely, it vill be use 1 nt tinas when heat lortdn in the nool are high, such as.When an entire enre in unlonded. The fuci pocl cooling rysten is capable of handling such heat londs, bu*. by supplenentinr that systen with the RHP systen, r. ore confortable tenvr;tures car. Le naintained fer he benefit of personal vorhine in *.he vicin1- . of tne mol.
- T 1C 10.1 The spent fuel cooline yuten ;n not desirnec to class I seisnic deninn criterin and dnes not have car.plete redundancy in co .noner.ts, but is interconnected to the Clann PHH synter.. ?o v'.at extent in I the interconnectinc ni-ine denirned te C1nss 1 criterin! In addition, deneribe how the "qtan: . cool i ng" resture of the fulH nyster. denirn enn nupnlenent the f#. nool coolinc capability.
Henponne-
. ln order to annure tnnt opent f.el pool cool:nr !s continuoun, the followine ntepn nre beine titlen to nod' f? ntni une.rnete e*ach of the fuel icol coolinn and clennup nyntemn'to qun11ry ar. n seinnie Clems ! systen:
1.- The- valving arrnnnenent a: shown on FDAR Firure 10.5-1 vill be altered to that shown on Picurc $19.1-1, 2 All piping, valven and ecuipment na shown on Figure 010.1-1, except that identified as nonseisnic,.are being annlyzed presently and additional restraints will be added nr necessary.
- 3. Automatic isolation and I;ypassing of the nonseisnictilly designad filter-80 denineralizer portion o cthe cyn+ cn (that portion of the systen in the radvante building) rin:t n'.tonatic ir.olation of the nonseisnically designed renetor well recircuintim. ri .nr . sill 1.e actuntad upon a lov level signal in the chinner nurce tant..
14 . - !;eisnic-qualified redundant level instrunentr. tion vill I.e trovided in the skinmer nurre tank for a:tuat.icn of the r.otor overnted valves en lov level as well as provi:le e'nnune'nt io.. i n the control roon of hirr. and lov levels. S. 14akeup water vill ne nrov. ta : t trouch the crenntie between the Riiit systen and the fuel pool cooline systen. (The intertie between the EiiRSW system
. and the R!:E vill be util!:a tr <ter.it rav ut.- ns nakeu .,
- 6. he dryer /serstrtt or pit .sr.d +1e renc+,or vell structures have teen analyze and it vns deternine:i ths. t derier. Imir ear *.nqanke vill not cause a fni?ure <lurinr tie r<'1e'.'n: rvir viti. t:.e well ami rit fu'. c f vnter.
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-2 SHOWN, REFER TO FSAR FIGURE
--ERALIZERS 10.5-1.
I 10.2 It appears from Figure 10.12-2 that charcoal filters have not been
- a. provided in the control room ventilation system. Evaluate the thyroid doses to control room operators during the course of a loss-of-conlant accident and justify why charcoal filters have not been provided. Describe the extent to which the system is operated following an accident.
RESPONSE
The control room ventilation system has been revised to include processing of outside air needed for control room pressurization during isolated con-ditions. When the common volume where all three reactor units are cont. rolled in isolated, a small stream of outside air is processed through a HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers. Two energency pressurization systems, shown in Figure 10.12-2, have been added, one in the Unit 1 area and the other in the Unit 3 area. Either system is capable of supplying clean air needed to pressurize the control room under isolated conditions. Each system provides 50 500 cfm of air processed through a cleanup unit containing an isolation damper, a llEPA filter, two two-inch deen charcoal beds in serien, a fan and a backflow damper. Test facilities to conduct standard DOP and freon leak testa are provided in each network. "'hese systems are started automatically by an accident signal or they can be started manually at any time. This addition was made without altering the basic design of the control
- room ventilation system. All of the air supply to the control rooms is taken through ventilation towers 1 and 3, which are built above the control room roof on the northeart side of the reactor buildinr. Tower 1 is located at colus, lines Pb and f on Firure 1.C-1, and tower 3 is located at column lines R19 and P on Firure 1.6-11. "he air cunply grills are located in the northeast vall of the ventilation tover, v .ich is about 19 feet from the P column line. The grills are lo:cted just alcove the cor. trol tay roof with the
E u grill center line near elevation 639. The normal heating, ventilating, and air-conditioninr' systems for the control buildine are described in subnection 10.1P.S.3. The flov diagram is shown in Firuro 10.12-P. Cooling i of the atmor.nhere in the main control room is provided by a recirculation
. air system with refriceration units. 1)uring normal operation, a small
=
, ntream of makeun air drawn through !!BC dust filters is used to maintain
; a slight positive pressure in the control room. Upon receint of an accident signal, the normal control room pressurization and makeup network is automatically isolated and shut down. Tnis same accident sirnal automatically starts the operation of both pressurization systems.
Supply air to pressurization system A is taken from a duct that takes
' outside air through either an t'BS dust filter or an llEpA filter and fan located in ventilation tower 1, and outnide air to pre:.surization System P.
In tnken throur.h either of two similar filters and fans located in tower 3. The control room operator thus has the option of drawine the makeun air stream through an ilEPA filter in addition to that in each erercenev nressuri-zation system. He also has the option to bring makeuo air in from inlets approximately 300 feet anart, givinc him an opportunity to select the best makeup air source. Either emerrency precsurization system in canable of supplyine sufficient air to keep the control room at a slicht nositive prensure. An input of $00 cfm is available from either system for tnis purnose. (Such an innut will assure a ponitive 1/L-inch ,.'ater rare orersure vith a net control room leakare area of un to 37 square ir.cher.. ) Tr.c door and damper leakare is estimated at
=
135 efn for 1/h-Inch water race nressure differential. "he remainine 345 cfm l SE is adequate to cover ninine arm electrical nenetrationr. and marrin.
, .n.
j ( A nrennure reliar vent ryr.ter. Prov *rt r tressuren frer excee line 1/t.-ir.ch
'wnter r.nr.e. ) llict.cr i n .r. n ! r f]out econe us.deni rn: 'e beenuse inrrer thrountputn c ould t r: t.- :n more ni :i.rne rnd onet ivr ntterini, i;o . l i g j M n presumre nrad ientn hetve. n tne ntd.c q nir 1r.put(nl re. the lenkrtre "olutn uml/or relief vont will exint n.tenu o the contrr , roer. h in lurre open noncen that ennnot innit it. n! r riou of t .'t l ow n r"u n i t.ude. Wit.h only one of the two pre:.nara:;nr unitu avr.;]ni '.e a ut .;ith t.in'. unit at the opponite end from t.l.e le v.a. the prer,sure differentir.'. I etween the supply and the lenk vill ee Jer' than 0.0', inches of water. 'onnequently, pressure within the nnin contrM roon will be ennentially unif rn throunhout. This fnetor and the une o' n . wtonatic tr. nnure reller elir.inaten any need for preanure differentini it trunentatier. In the control roon.
"he only adr:inintrntiv ent.rol- nnm e taterl wit h contrM roon ino14 tion in I. s reinted to doort.. ,- -ru et.t r: -
t ne rn.r er.n'.re . room vilI be naintained cloneu to annur" L c t nrennure 'ro rer.t : n . - r.i. tainel. Tn" doarn connectinn tm c r.tr- -..:- and t.r c.:x.; n. " . :. . roonn and c or.nect ' nt-the unit I and P ernir,; roor. wit- .a ut. i t 1 or.trn. roon will be r.'tir.tained open by adninintrnt Mo : ntrol. /hi: wil' accure uniforn pressure threacheut the intin control roo . An acc Mont n ; rr.a l <,.. e ' t > ." .~ n '. n c .v i - w. . enur" tr.e c ".t ral r on"1 V' U t. } } n t . nn '. . G" *
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P o 'i nt ed M(FI- 0' onorn . >n un ! : tart '- a ercen: .
- c .anr. :r t r rG - ' , ir.' Inr ne* I' n wi'l nIno be initin. ! -
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e.- .e w- r.a rr.n sir mpnn. ducts tm t~m.._ m. . c .r r s. -umrn r.~
b?:!P-L1 furninhed for this purpose , one located in the nornal nir n moly duct to the unit I nnd 2 control raan nren, and t he ot her i n t.he nornal n : r nupply duct tn the uni t 2 contrni room nren. "ich net ivi t y (ir. exccan of about I nr/hr) vill trir theso nonitorn and ir.itint e the innInted mode of operation. ".'vo loen1 rndintion nonitnrs and two particulate nionitors are located in the nnin control room to provide su nlenental information on activity in the main control roor. Sne of each tyne is located in the unit 1 and ? control roon area and one of each tyne is located in the unit 3 control roon aren.
"'he clennun filter trains for the two pressuritine air supriies are located in the airconditioninc equinnert rooms at eneb end of t he control buildinc.
"'he nir processed throur . tnese filter trains cones fron ducts that supply nnkeup nir to portions of the control buildinr that are not inclated during enerrency conditions ( see Firure IC.12-? for further details ).
')uri n c normal overnt i nt.s , e :lennur train i s cer.arnted fr m t he duct by a low-leakage isolritint, irt:er. "'l.e danper i s automati cal 1" opened under accident conditions and fai;s open upon lens of nover. " he operntor may nanually close the danner u-or. loss of power. Tror the damer the air flow nnnses tr. rough n ! EDA .ter rnt od at W cfn, Follovirm thin , the nakeup air is drawn tnr ur two bankn of AACC ~ tpe II charcoal filter trays,
'he fans on tr.e two tra .n are novered frrm serarate divi icns of the enernene:. rowar ncnto-. < 's-, oy..nunt di rec t ly i nt o tix r.n' r. c or *.rol roo- thro.rh s. e nc r f '_ o . : n- e- t o --o v o at ou t :w ir. t he event of a f an failure n. t- ro ze r.t - n . r i r st i or. o f t .e - r - on'. v n e r. m ;r;t in i n oN* r n t i'io , lle C * ; ' R ' " a * '* r " Ero ' r o '!
. . :ed *"P 130t0 ; P n: . ".7 *O **o II 1 * '? T 'rhinF
'r. e e - .e - sr rni rn r an ve - 0 21.1 e - erier- ve-
bulb tenperature. This will prevent condensntion on the cha't coal during startup of the train. In enernencies the nni.eup nir to tne control roon vill pars through at - leant three, tuul possibly four ni. cleanup staces. C."ne fourth stage is the optional llEPA filter in tne ventilation system inlet tower.) The llEPA filter (s) used are standard hir,h performarce particulate filters utilized in nuclear industry facilities for air cleanup operations. These are installed on the upstrean end of the air cleanup system to collect radioactive particulate matter and intercept dust that might collect on the screens in the downstrean charcoal filters or on the charcoal itself. The charcoal adsorbers that follow are drawer type unit trays containine approxinately bl4 pounds of charcon1 Each unit tray is rated at 333 cfm. h0 A nerien-parallel cenbinntion of two 'bankn with two trays in each unnk nre provided to vJ vo each encreency pressurir.ntion systen a processine capability considerntly in excess of 500 cfn systen capacity. This
- enables each enernet.cy pressurization systen to nrocess outside air contanissted by the DDA for 30 days vitnout' danger of saturation. Calculatiens show tha the 88 pounds of charcoal in the first bank will accumulate about one nilligran of iodine in 30 days to give an adsorber concentration of approxinately 2.5 x .0" tillinrams per gran of charcoal--far less than the rated capacity of 10 milligrans per gran of charcoal. The face velocity nerons ench bnnk of travn in these systers is less than L* feet per minute and the residence + ire in eac two-inch enarcoal tenk is in excess of 0.?5 seconds. Intrernated charcon'. ir u.ilized to asnure renovsl of netr.vi-iodine. Desorption is not a factor at any ani-ient air te:7erature level expected at the site.
RFf:P-40 This nakeup air supply systen hns sufficient features to assure long-term emergency protection for the control room personnel. The option to utilite nir inletn nt either end of the control building given the operntor an opportunity to nelect the cleanest air source. The 100 percent redun-dancy is further assurance of this capability. Using two llEPA filters in series in each train assures that dust and particulates will not clor the downstream charcoal filters. The option provided to discontinue use l of the inlet IIEPA filter in the unlikely event it became elogged is another assurance that the nakeup air system is insensitive to dust and particulates. The overcapacity of the charcoal adsorbers is still another assurance that energency protection for periods greater than 30 days is provided. ho All components in each emergency pressurization system are seismically f quali fled.
'"he ent. ire train including isolation danper, llETA filter, charcon1 hedn, fan, and ' backflow damner is fabricated as a unit and is 4
fully tested in the factory. he factory tests require a 30P test efficiency of at least 99.905 efficiency, an overall Freon leak test i efficiency of 99.80%, a methyl-iodine renoval of 855 efficiency for each bank of charcoal adsorbers, and a flow-rate test to confirm the naility to deliver 500 crm. l'ach train has provision for periodic in-place DOP and Freon leak tests. ~ These tests vill be conducted at intervals r.nt to exceed cix months. F.ach periodic tent vill demnstrate that the .9P renoval efficiency in at least 99.0% and the Freon removal efficiency is at . cast 99.0f for each charcoal bank or 99.8f. for the two tanks in series. Tne DOP and i Freon test equipment is the sam equipnent described in the fourth and
a BtTP-ho ( submitted in Amendment 2h. "he charcoal v111 be replaced every four years in lieu of periodic adsorptivity tests. Automatic initintion of control room isolation, start up of the prensuritation unitn and pressurization unit flow rate vill be demonstrated annually. The special radiation monitors shall be calibrated at intervals not to exceed three months. Pre-operational tests on each unit shall (a) include DOP and Freon tests to the same efficiency requirements as the surveillance tests, (b) demon-i h0 i stration of automatic isolation of the main control room and autonatic startup of the pressurization systen and (c) ecnfirmation of the ability of the pressurization units to deliver 500 cfn. Yhe thyroid and whole body denen to control room operators resultin6 from a lonn-of-coolant accident were calculated based on the oreration, as described above, of the control bay isolation and hirh efficiency charcostl adcorbant cleanup trains. For these analyses, the cleanup system was assumed to remove 955 of the elemental iodine and 90% of the organic and particulate iodine. Several nechanisnn for the induction of radiation into the control bay were considered. Yhe direct whole body dose from the secondary containnent surerstructure was computed to be 1.7S hen eve: the 30-dey wriod assumine enntinuoun occupancy of the control roon. For this prticular calculation the radio-active nuclides were assunod to be spread unifor .ly throur,r.out the refueline vnne nna nno voactnr vnno,
BF!iD ho { i i
?he whole body and thyroid doses also vere determined from activity escaping the lodine and- particulate filters and released up the st nek durine funination 'and nonftaniration conditionn. The radioactivity entering the control bay from this noirce van foun<1 to be insignificant. "he whole body done from the infinite cloud outnido the control building nroduced by 1 the ntuck nource in not rignificant tiue to the thick concrete walln, floorn, and roof of the control buildinc. j i
i i Another mechanisn for induction of radioactivity into the control building a in necondary containnent outlenknce. The control building is adjacent h0 to and north of the reactor buildint- (secondary containnent). Southerly ; winds of sufficient speeds can nroduce exfiltration from the reactor buildire i i i which can be introduced into the control building via the control buildinn ; nir intakes. The thyroid done during the V-day post acciden, period van computed to be lenn thnn 0.;"> Hen. '."he annlyni n annumed the ' neration of .) the control hay i no'. ntion an<l ni r cleanun sye.tenu. Fadionct!m nourcer were based on the raquirenents of 10 FR 10C. Winr1 speeds at which
.extiltration beginn were deternined for wind directions both nornal to the i
reactor buildinr* wa'.1n ns a " face on" vind and parallel to a diaconal as an " edge on" vind. Duration of the exfiltration events was determined based on the conputad nininun exfiltration vind speeds and the Browns Ferry PDAR meterr.lorical datn. Atnos6t.eric dilutian factors were tased on , Section 5.5 of "Meteoro!or~ a~! Atonic Fnerr- - 19'#." Fi nn'.'." , a t wo-hour nir cleanun neriod after ener exfiltration event van nnsuned. The total vi.oln bod:- dona fron nil nources nn caleu'nted to re lesn than 2 Hen and the .otn' thvrnid doce van cr.icu)ated to be less than i ., -. ,_ . . .. . . en._ ..%, 2 - .2 . . .a 3- o-_ + u , . ,. . e, ,3
BFNp 140 s doses specified in General Desien Criterion 19. Control room operator doses were nnnlyzed using the activity released for two separate cases of steam line rupture. "'he first case used activitien listed in FSAll subsection 11.6.5, which covered the automatic 4 inclntion of the main stenn lines. The second case used the activities calculnted in preparing the responne to AEC question 114.3 of !! arch 25, 4 1971, which took up the case of a steam line runture of a size ,iust below the automatic isolation set point that was not isolated for 10 minutes. In both cases the activity van nasumed to be uniformly mixed throughout the turbine building volume and then to flow directly into the control
. h0-building air intake. In toth cases the doses were computed assuminr. the operation of the control roon isolation systen and cleanup train systen.
The buildup of radioactive nucliden in the control room uns assumed to continue with no decay considered for two hourc with two ndditionnl hours of dose durinn c]ennup of control roon ai r. For tne firnt enne of autonatic
- inolation, the dose to thyroid vns cor.puted to be lens than 1.2 !1em.
For the second case of steam discharge for 10 ninuten, the dere to thyrcid was determined to be insirnificant. The higher flow rate in the first case
-]
resultn in water carryover and thus the nuch higher relative iodine release and the resultant nigher thyroid dose.
=
u This control room ventilation systen equipt.ent will be onerational before a the conduction of any renetor test exceedinn one percent oc rated nover. W
=
-i-----umum-
PFhT-3o !- 5.k State the desien capabilities of the protective costings used for the interior surfaces of the dryvell and suppression chamber. Discuss the reasons for the selection of there coatings, their environmental capabilities snd the reasons for using a chromate inhibitor in the suppression pool water and core standby cooling systesis. RESPONCE ho The dryvell interior surfaces were sandblasted, coated with Amercoat Dimet- l coat 6 primer and Amercoat 66 finish. It is expected that this conting system vill satisfactorily withstand temperatures and pressums of the steam environment postulated during a design basis loss-of-coolant accident as described in Section ik of the FSAR. Test panels were exposed to steam-water atmospheres under comparable or greater temperatures and pressures with negligible deterioration. In some caaes discoloration and small ( < 1/8 in. ) blisters were observed. The suppression chamber interior surfaces are coated with Napko 2-z primer, an organic sine-rich primer. This primer was selected to provide protection i 1 39 sgainst rusting during construction, but is not expected to last more than 1 a few years in service. Test panels exposed to simulated design basis I i loss-of-coolent accident conditions shoved small, adherent blisters over the surface, and sore flaking at the water line. Flakes were fragile and settled to the bottom in water. It was estimated that less than 5 pounds of flakes vu. I be produced in a DBA. The suppression chamber and core standby coolin6 systems use chromate inhibited water to provide corrosion protection for these systems. Chromate inhibitors have been successfully used at Eumboldt Bay and Oyster Creek for similar applications.
. . -J
,7 4
BLANK PAGE i-l
BFHP-1.0 l During the construction phase the torus will be drained and significant areas of rust removed and coated with Napko-2t priser. During suosequent W re:l'ueli n ' outages significant areas of rust above the chromated water will be removed by wire brushing and coated with an appropriate primer.
'. -E /
a
BFl!P-60 1hus, the desian bases for the fire prote: tion r.ystems provide protection in the case of fires, but the systems do not necessarily renain functional in an earthouake. The loss of protection by failure in the niping systems due to earthqut.kes is acceptable becauce the plant construction does not 39 easily propagate firen. Therefore, separate redundant comnonents can be relied on to provide a safe shut 6ovn of the reacts r. Ilowever, the effects of pipe failures have been recognized in the design of the fire protection systems and adequate means have been included to cope vith such failures. TVA's resnonse to this question has bec e. ot. led to respond to the AEC questions of August 11, 1972, regardinc s ci 11ating vater line failure at h0 Quad Cities Station Unit 1: QUESTIO! You are requested to evaluate your facilities and systems to determine: (1) Whether the failure of any non-Class I equipment, particularly in the circulating water systern and fire protection rystems could renuit in flooding which would advernely affect Class I equipment. (?) Whether failure of any equipment could cause flooding such that common mode failure of redundant equipment would result. R!EPONSE Diesel Generator B_uild ng Failures in the pressure boundarlen of the water systems in the diesel generator building vill not prevent a safe shutdown of the riant for the following reasons: m
BFNP ko
- 1. All penetrations, includine the larre equimment accesn doors, into the diesel renerator buildinrs are scaled except the nersonnel access hatch into the control tulldine at elevation 593.
- 2. A drainare system han b*en installed thnt tan nufficient capacity tn prevent water accumulation in the buildint no a renul+. of a double-ended-pine-break of the larcer,t diameter pipe inside the b 'ildine, lleactor Building Failures in the pressure boundarien of any water nystem (includine fire protection cystems) in one unit of the reactor buildine or inadvertant leakage into a unit (most likely from the turbine building) vill not prevent a safe shutdown of the plant for the followine reasons:
b0 1. All penetrations between units oelow ulant grade (c)evation 5# 5) are nealed; therefore, floetine till be confined to one unit.
- 2. All penetrations ir.to tha meripher:t of the reactor buildine are scaled and nada vatertirbt to elevation $76, including the nersonnel locks and equinment access.
- 3. Floodine in tha lover tortion of a unit vill be detected in Dy lenet tuo ceit-ically qualified neann such as the initiation o' the renetor buildine floor and drait system and the vster level tvitches six inches off the floor in the ters, area, FPCI roo , and PCIC roon. Ividence of a break vill alert the con *.rel room overater to take corrective reasures.
,.- b. There are a nu-ber of vm of intorruntinr the never to the nvr,tenn fece the control room beside; tneir normal never nvite5er.. Tone runn
PnT hD have their breakern located no that they can le actuated in the shutdown board roome: therefore, they are readily availabic. Mher pumns have their switch r, ear in the turbine buildine, which is not necessarily accessibic. "'here are several breakers in the electrical circuitry between these cumps and the station unit or offsite power sources (their only sources of power) that can le used to interrupt power to the pumns. In the unlikely ever.t that the plant ooerator cannot interrut.t offsite power, then the Athens and '!Yinity dirtribution centern can be uned to sever the offsite nower and thereby stop the flooding of the reactor building,
- 5. The control room operator can utilize two RIM cumn-heat exchanger combinations and two RHRSW pumps from an adjacent unit to provide reactor h0 cooling in an emergency.
?ntake Structure foss of the engineered safety systems numns !RHHSW' on the intake structure that could prohibit a safe shutdown of the clant cannot occur for the followinr reasons:
- 1. '"he high valls forming the four compartments around the BlIREW pumps provide orotection arainnt natural nhenoeena nuch as tornadoes, and vir.d waven in conjunction with floods (probable naximum flood nlun vaves from h5 mph vinds).
P. Failure of the pressure boundaries of the water cynte:u insice one commartment vill not cause the water to everflow lnto ar. aujacent com-partment because the vall desirn is such that the water nreferentially overflovt the rear vnl) front vn119 are no en.+ i nw *
- h e. n ,- + L a w ..1$-),
e i f Turbine Buildi,ngx Service Building, Padvasta BuildinMff-Gas. a Building,
.*".d, p,t,aek Failures in tbo prennure boundarien of any water system in the turbine.
service, radva:te, anet off-r.an buildings and the stack will not prevent. a safe shutdown of the plant for the following reasons:
- 1. There are no enr,ineered safety systems located inside these areas.
- 2. Sumps are included in each area with high level alarms that annunciate in the radvaste building, whi:h in turn vill be retransmitted as a trouble alarm to the control roon. Unit opere. tors can thes be dispatched to investigate the trouble and advise the control room operator to secure the faulted system.
- 3. All penetrationn between these areas and the reactor building below LO elevation 57P.5 are scaled, includine. the personnel accansas which are vntertir.ht bulkhesd-type doors. (Tnis allovn at least 20 minutes to detect the vorst failure--a condenser intake culvert open-ended-break in the turbine buildinc--and to stop the main condenser circulatine, water pumps.) This is 7 5 feet above plant grade, and the water would be drained to the olant yard through the outside doals into these areas.
"10.1-6
l BFNP k0 3.1 Your answer to question 3 5 in Amendment 13 is incomplete. Provide the following specific information
- a. A brief description of the vibration test program, including instrumentation types and diagrams of their location, which will be used for measurement cf vibration responses and those parameters which define the input forcing functions,
- b. The planned duration of the test for normal operating modes to 7 assure that all critical components are subjected to at least 10 cycles of vibration,
- c. The additional test duration for other than normal operating modes to ensure that the number of cycles imposed on the critical cm-ponents is sufficient to analyte their adequacy to withstand vibrations under these operating modes,
- d. The description of different flow modes of operation and translents to which the internals will be subjected during the test,
- e. The predooinant response mode shapes and the estimated range of numerical values of the response of the major components of the reactor internals in terms of ~ amplitudes and, where appropriate, the anticipated values of the parameters which may influence the input forcing function, under those flow modes of reactor operation, which are shown by the analyses to be the most critical,
- f. The test acceptance criteria and the permissible deviations from these criteria, and the banca upon which these criteria were established.
~
HESPONSI
- a. TVA vill conduct a preoperational vibration monitorin6 program on Brovns Ferry Nuclear Plant reactor vessel internals. The unit 1 program is intended.
to satisfy the requirements of AEC Safety Guide 20 of December 29, 1971,
" Vibration Measurements on Reactor Internals" for prototype reactors.
k0 The unit 1 program vill consist of three phases. Phase 1 vill consist of a cold flow test. This phase vill be tonitored with the installed vibratien monitoring instrumentation. Phase 2 vill consist of an in place inspecticn :f reactor vessel internals. Phase 3 vin consist of the behv described hot Cow test. A predictive vibration analysis vill be submitted prior to conducting the vibration test program. The het flow vibration test program to be conducted on Erevns Ferry-1 win i.clude measurements of vibratory motions of tne shroud, separatcr assectly, cuide
.- '1 1.1 '.
BFNP- .9 l tubes, and the jet pump assembly including the jet pump riser brace. Shroud motiona vill be measured by using displacement sensort located on the shroud-to-shroud bead flange at positions 100 attrt, and by tsing strain gages mounted on the shroud suppert legs near the juncture to the shroud at positionr. of 60" ,120", and 180 azimuth. Separator asser.bly notiens vill be measured by using accelerometers nousted on the up;er bolt-guide ring of the separator assembly at three positions 120' apart. "te major forcir.g parameter for rotions of the shroud-separator assembly is considered te be mass flow through the steam separators. The guide tube moti:ns vill be measured by using strain gages mounted in pairs (in a horizontal plane at f h5* off radial) near the juncture of the guide tube to vessel botto- head. The major forcing parameter for motions of the guide tubes is considered to be the jet pum). diffuser exit velocity which manifests itself as cross-flov in the lover plenum region.
' Motions of the jet pump assembly including the jet pump riser braces will be measured by using displacement sensors located on top of the jet pump assembly (on the " rams head") and on the diffusers of adjacent jet pumps at a position near the slip joint, and by using strain pages mounted on each face of a leg of the jet pump riser brace. The major forcing para-me',ern for notions of the jet pump rassembl.v are considered to be the jet pump nozzle velocity nnd the direction of mass flow caused by unbalnneed rect reulation pump speed o;eraticn. Since only a simple deceription is needed to adequately define ser.sor locaticr.s, detailed viring diagrams have not been included,
- b. The INF vibration acceptance criteria establish allevable sensor motions for continuous cyclic cperation of the reactor fer a period of 40 years or approximately igg cycles. TLe durat;ons of the vibration tests are sufficiently long to assure that these acceptance criteria are not violated for normal steady state or trsnaient moden cf plant operation.
The significance of the 10 cycles to whic . you refer is r.ot clear since the acceptance criteria sre bated upon the need to achieve 10 cycles of successful o;eration during the h0 year plar. li fe tiae.
- c. The atcormal operatir.c :onditicns tha*. are conridered during the vi-bration test program are the transient re:irculation pur:; trip conditions.
U 3.1-2 s
Whilo cperoting at power and at 100 parcont core flow, the recirculation puiqpe am tripped, both individually and simultaneously (three separate trip conditions), and permitted to coast down to minimum speed. Power levels cf 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent power are tested in this manner (see d. below). During each of these pump trip transients, the vibration motions are monitored and recorded to assure that the vibration is well within acceptable levels.
- 4. During vibration testing, the internals will be subjected to different flow modes of operation.and transients:
505 Thermal Power Line (Approximately 20% themal power to 50% themal power)
- 1. Approximately equally spaced flow points from minimum flow to 100% flow
- 2. With 100% core flow trip pusqp A
- 3. With 1005 core flow trip pump B
- k. With 100% core flow trip both pumps simultaneously 755 Thermal Power Line
- 1. Approximately equally spaced flow points from minimum flow to 100% flov
- 2. With 100% core flow trip pump A
- 3. With 100% core flow trip pump B
- k. With 100% core flow trip both pumps sinultaneously 100% Thermal Power Line
- 1. Approximately equally spaced flow points from minimum flow to 100% flov
- 2. With 1005 core flow trip pump A
- 3. With 1005 core flow trip pump B
- k. With 100% core flow trip both pumps simultaneously
- e. The mode shapes and allowable sensor motions for the Browns Ferry-1 vibration test are not available at this time. The predominant response mode shapes and the estimated range of numerical values of the response of the major components of the reactor internals in terms of amplitudes 3h under those flow modes of reactor operation which are most critical vill be available to the AEC prict to the start of the vibration test prcgram on unit 1.
U 31-3
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- f. The test occeptance critorio, permissible doviations froa these critoric and the basos upon which these criterio were establishod are discussed in Amendment 19 to the Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 Docket numbers 50-254 and 50-265.
The vibration test for units 2 and 3 is to be a standard BWR confirmatory test and is more pmperly included as a part of the startup test program. Bovever, low power testing is not required or included in the test procedure for minimum confirmatory vibration test programs. The confirmatory vibration test program is perforned in response to AEC requirements. The program scheduled for utit 1 is more extensive than that scheduled for units 2 and 3 because utit 1 is the first of a product line (i.e. , proto-
; type 251) and the data accumulated will serve as the bases to prove the 31 design adequacy of the entire 251 inch product line. The unit 2 and 3 vessels and intemals are identical to unit 1.
The confirmatory vibration test scope covers three major areas. These are: (1) to measure the horisontal tangential displacement of the shroud assembly, (2) measure the strain in the riser pipe braces for riser pipes of one je.t pump bank, and (3) nessure the horisontal radial motion with respect to the nactor pressun vessel at the top of the pump throat on two jet pumps. Vibration data will be taken for the following conditions: a) low power testir4 is not required on a minimum confirmatory basis. However, should the plant startup be held up at less than 50 percent of power, a test sequence similar to that required at 50 percent of power will be performed. b) Fifty percent thernal power c) Seventy-five percent thermal power d) One hundred percent thersal power Flow will be varied fron the minimum allowed by the power level to 100 per-cent flow during the terts. At each level steady state unbalanced flow and recire pump trip data vill be recorded. The confirmatory vibrath:. test progra: for units 2 and 3 is the same as the program previously described for Quad Cities 1 and 2 and Peach Botto: 2
) U 3.1 1.
and 3 oxcopt that displacerent of th? shroud assembly vill be measurod with ace 21erom2ters lo:cted on the separator assently. Thir thange was made to give better indication of threud atsestly motier.. Adequate quelity control pre: enter nr.d inspe:tions are imposed on all corponent parts of the reaeter and rea: tor internals during all stages of fabrication and handling. In addition, detai;ei installation specifications and instractions are prepared c pnsvide fielti installation, inspection 31 and testing requirements that vill assure the structural s'nd functional integrity of the installed assembly prior to preoperatiotal testing of the reactor system. Adequate quality control procedures and inspections are imposed during all stages of installation to assure strict compliance with the specificatiens and instructions. An inspection pr0 gram vill be tenducted during the first scheduled refueling outages on the Erowns Ferry uni;,c 1, 2, and 3 reactor internals using Table 18451 (paragraph N) of the 1970 ash 2: B:iler and Pressure Vessel Code , Section i
- 1 as a gui de . This approach to inspection is justified, since the BWR has no single major load carryinE components which is relied up:n during normal opera-tions to support a significant portion of the ccre. The 165 individual control roi guide tutes independently support the 76h f;el elements in the Browns ferry reactors vitt no more than four fuel elements supported by any single guide tute.
Periodie exar.ar.ation :f the ret.:t or internals d ring subseq' en'. refueling outa6ec in attordt. nee vitr iaruraph N cf Tame 10-52 of the AFI Boiler and Pressure Yessel Code, Feetion XI, I:.rervice Inspectier. Of Nuclear Pet: tor Coolt.r.t fystent vill pr; vide ir.rurance gainst ar.y gradual changes in the structurul character of the rene*.or ir.ternals whi h might ultimately have an adverse effect on tne safety of the system. TV/. does net plan a visua'. ins;ection ci reacter internals i:nediately after LO l ec:;.letion of tr.e vibraticn m::.itorir.g program en either units 2 or 3 g un*ess recults cf the mo:.iterir.g progra indiente a need. Ir.spection vill te made of inter.als of a'i ' :rece ors as atlined above at the first scheduled refueling. U 3.1-5 - l
TAB!I. OF CONTENTS Tiesponses to AEC Questions of June 2,1972 SUMECT QL'ESTION hW3Dt Reactor Pwer Distribution 1 Gadolina ':hermal Performance Limits ? Shutdwn l'.argin 3 Scram Peactivity b Reactivity Coefficients 5 Transient Analyses 6 Responsen to AEC Questions of ho August 11, 1972 and August IL ,1972 Effect of New Moderator Void Coefficient 7
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f V0-1
i BFNP LO T. Questiont Dincunn thr* inpact of the Ir. test voirt renetivity coeffleient (Amendment i T() on the trnnnient annlysen, specifienlly the recirculntion constdown typen nf t rnnnientn. Unleulate the revised thermal linita "l4CllFR" value for the most conservative vnlue of moderator void coefficient submitted in Amandment 37 for the worst case transient analysed in Section 1h of your TSAR (recirculation pump seizure). Compare the themal limits calculated for the most conservative value of the nolerster void coefficient to the thermal limits calculated for the expected value of the moderator void coefficient. Responnet Reference is made to the sensitivity study presented in tiny 1972 to AEC l in Bethesda and transmitted to AEC subsequently. The extreme least , negative value shwn then was for 100 with a ratio of about 0.8 compared to the " expected" void coefficient. (Note that least negative coefficients nive worst results for flow decrease events. ) The never calculationn shw EOC note negative than 80h. However, the B0h value has dropped to the same 40 0.fi reintive value so that the range of variation is the same as previously discussed. Previous Value _New ( Amendment 37) Value B01. ( 0 = .007 38) -$.7 6/7.(0.91) h.9 d/%(0.8 EOC ( 6 = . 00557 ) L.9 6/f.(0.80) -7.0 d/%(1.12) Hnnne of Densitivity Study h.9 d/%(0.8) through -11 d/%(1.8) l fRelativeValueScaleb 1 i i "he '1CllFil value for the vorst transient case analyzed (recirculation pump I seizure) is 1.03 for the expected void coefficient. Extrapolations of previous calculations indicate that itCilFR will be approxinately 1.01 using 807. of the expected void coefficient. 1 l l 1 l V7-1/V7-P 1
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