Text

10 North Anna 2012-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML12297A132
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	10/23/2012
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
	50-338/12-301, 50-339/12-301
	Download: ML12297A132 (223)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Power Station Scenario No.: (2012) NRC 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Mark Bates__________________ Operators: _____________________________

Amanda Toth________________ _____________________________

Tim Kolb____________________ _____________________________

-8 Initial Conditions: Approximately 10 amps, BOL. Unit was placed in Mode 4 several days ago to repair a turbine governor valve. A unit startup was performed last shift. All equipment is available. There was a small tube leak (~4.5 gpd) on "A" SG before the unit was shut down.

Turnover: Shift orders are to continue raising power to 12% in preparation for placing the turbine in service. A crew is currently attending JITT for placing the turbine in service.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R (R) (S) Raise power to approximately 10-12%.

N (B) Control SG levels with the MFRV bypasses in Manual 2 CH1201 I (R) (S) VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112 fails high. Causes divert valve TS (S) to fail open. RO stops divert per AR.

3 C (B) (S) Running BC pump trips and standby pump does not automatically start.

4/4a CH1601 C (R) (S) Running charging pump trips and check valve sticks open CH2101 TS (S)

N (R) RO restores letdown to service 5 FW0401 M (All) Running MFP trips and standby pump does not start requiring reactor trip.

6 C (B) (S) RO trip switch does not work. BOP must trip reactor.

7 RC2401 M (All) SGTR occurs once crew transitions to 1-ES-0.1 The scenario can be terminated once an RCS cooldown has been started in 1-E-3.

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 1 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 2 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION Increase power from 10-8 amps to approximately 12% reactor power 1.

BOP controls SG levels in manual using the MFRV bypasses (Normal)

2. VCT level transmitter 1-CH-LT-1112 fails high 3 Running BC pump trips and standby pump fails to auto-start Running charging pump trips and discharge check valve fails open 4/4a.

Letdown is returned to service Running feed pump trips and standby pump does not start.

5.

(Reactor trip is required by AP and RO reactor trip switch does not work.)

6. SGTR Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 1 (SGTR)

Total Malfunctions 6 (VCT level transmitter 1-CH-LT-1112 fails high, loss of BC, loss of charging, loss of MFW, failure of RO reactor trip switch, SGTR)

Abnormal Events 3 (Loss of BC, loss of charging, loss of MFW)

Major Transients 2 (Loss of MFW, SGTR)

EOPs Entered 1 (E-3, possibly ES-0.1)

EOP Contingencies 0 Critical Tasks 3 SCENARIO DURATION 120 Minutes 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 3 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 1 The scenario begins with the unit at approximately 10-8 amps, BOL. The unit was placed in Mode 4 several days ago to repair a turbine governor valve. A startup was performed last shift. All equipment is available. There was a small tube leak (~4.5 gpd) in "A" SG before the unit was shut down. Shift orders are to raise power to approximately 12% in preparation for placing the main turbine in service. A crew is currently attending JITT for placing the turbine in service.

The first event will be a power increase from 10-8 amps to approximately 12% power in preparation for placing the main turbine in service. This can be pre-briefed. The BOP will control SG levels with the MFRV bypasses in manual (Normal).

Once power increase is complete, VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, will fail high.

The VCT divert valve will fail open. The RO will use the annunciator response for VCT hi/lo level (C-A4) to manually close the divert valve. The crew will discuss the loss of auto-swapover to the RWST on low VCT level. Once the valve is closed, VCT level returned to a normal value, if required, and TS have been addressed, the next event can occur.

The "A" bearing cooling pump, 1-BC-P-1A, will trip. The crew should identify the loss of bearing cooling and respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." The crew should determine that the "B" bearing cooling pump did not automatically start and, per the RNO, start 1-BC-P-1B. Once the crew has verified that the BC System has been restored the next event can occur.

The running charging pump will trip and its discharge check valve will stick open.

Letdown will isolate and the standby charging pump will automatically start, but charging flow will be zero. The crew will enter 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging," and close the discharge valves on the "A" charging pump (CT). Charging header pressure will return to normal and flow will increase. The crew will throttle charging to maintain pressurizer level and return letdown to service (Normal). The US will review TS 3.5.2.

The running MFW pump will begin losing oil pressure. The pump will trip and the standby pump will not auto start. The crew will enter 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," and trip the reactor. The reactor trip switch on the RO side will not function; the BOP must turn his switch in order to trip the reactor. When the reactor is tripped a SGTR will occur on "A" SG.

The crew will likely transition to 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response," and throttle AFW. At this time they will determine that "A" SG level is continuing to increase at an unanticipated rate. The crew will initiate safety injection and return to 1-E-0. The crew will continue through 1-E-0 and transition to 1-E-3, "SGTR." The "A" SG will be isolated (CT). The crew will begin an RCS cooldown (CT). At this time the scenario can be terminated.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 4 Revision 0

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at approximately 10-8 amps. The unit was placed in Mode 4 several days ago to repair a turbine governor valve. A startup was performed last shift. RCS boron is 2058 ppm and core age is 150 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

All equipment is available. There was a small tube leak (~4.5 gpd) in "A" SG before the unit was shut down. The maintenance rule window is green. 2H is the protected train.

Shift Orders:

Increase power to approximately 12% in preparation for placing the turbine on line. A crew is currently in JITT for rolling the turbine.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 5 Revision 0

EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at 10-8 amps, the crew will ramp the unit to approximately 12%

power per 1-OP-1.2, Unit Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2," and 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Reactor power increases to approximately 12%

RO withdraws control rods and establishes SUR in preparation for reaching the POAH.

RO increases reactor power to < 5% using control rods and stabilizes power.

BOP manually controls SG levels on Normal MFRV bypasses.

Crew turns off toggle switch on Scaler/Timer drawer.

Crew observes steam dumps for proper operation.

Crew directs opening of MSR 1" warm-up valves.

Crew directs closing of BC valves at Flash Evaporator.

Crew transitions to 1-OP-2.1.

RO raises power to approximately 12%

using control rods.

NOTE: The next event can occur once power is stable at approximately 12%.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 6 Revision 0

EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator C-A4 illuminates

1-CH-LI-1112 will indicate off-scale high

1-CH-LCV-1112C output will go to zero

VCT level will decrease

"A" Stripper level will increase RO identifies annunciator C-A4, VCT HI-LO LEVEL L-112.

RO identifies 1-CH-LT-1112 is failed high and VCT is diverting to stripper.

NOTE: The following steps are from the annunciator response for C-A4.

(Attached)

US reads note in AR about 1-CH-LT-1112 failing high - loss of auto swapover capability on low VCT level, full divert to stripper.

RO places 1-CH-LCV-1112C in manual and raises output to 100%.

RO verifies VCT level > 5 %.

RO verifies charging flow normal and 1-CH-FCV-1122 is not failed.

RO verifies Letdown flow is normal.

RO verifies VCT makeup is not in progress.

RO verifies 1-CH-LCV-1115A in VCT position.

RO verifies all instrumentation is normal.

(NO)

US reviews TRM 3.3.9 for Reg Guide 1.97 instrumentation. (Not Applicable)

Crew evaluates plant parameters to determine if VCT or letdown line leaking or ruptured. (NO)

US reviews TS 3.4.13 (RCS leakage) which applied while letdown was diverting to the stripper.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 7 Revision 0

EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS US makes notifications about 1-CH-LT-1112 failure and requests instrument shop assistance along with CR.

NOTE: The next event may occur once VCT level has been stabilized and TS reviewed.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 8 Revision 0

EVENT 3: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators F-F4, and F-E4 illuminate

1-BC-P-1A has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit)

1-BC-P-1B does not auto-start BOP identifies annunciator F-F4, BC WTR PP 1A-1B AUTO TRIP SYS MISALIGNED.

BOP identifies 1-BC-P-1A has tripped.

BOP identifies that 1-BC-P-1B did not automatically start.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-19.

BOP checks status of BC pumps:

Checks one BC pump operating (NO)

BOP starts 1-BC-P-1B. IOA BOP verifies at least one BC pump running normally:

Checks pump operating with normal amps.

Crew verifies that BC system is operating tower-to-tower.

Crew verifies that BC system is operating normally:

BC system intact BC tower level normal BC tower fans running Crew monitors main generator temperatures.

(Not applicable since generator is offline.)

Crew dispatches operator to check equipment supplied by BC:

MFP, Cond pumps, EHC, HPs, LPs. (Most equipment not running due to low power level.)

US reports loss of BC pump and failure of standby pump to auto-start and requests assistance, and CR.

NOTE: When sent to investigate, the operator will report that there is an overcurrent trip on the breaker (15B8) for 1-BC-P-1A.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 9 Revision 0

EVENT 3: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has restored BC.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 10 Revision 0

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and there is a loss of the running charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

1-CH-P-1A trips and the discharge check valve sticks open

1-CH-P-1B automatically starts

Charging pump discharge pressure decreases on 1-CH-PI-1121

Annunciators C-A5, C-B5, C-C5, and C-G6 illuminate

Charging flow goes to zero on 1-CH-FI-1122 RO identifies the trip of 1-CH-P-1A and the auto-start of 1-CH-P-1B.

RO identifies annunciator C-B5, CH PP TO REGEN HX LO PRESS, and C-C5, CH PP TO REGEN HX HI-LO FLOW.

Crew identifies loss of charging flow.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-49.

Crew checks the charging pump that was started for gas binding. (NO)

Crew identifies that a charging pump manipulation has taken place.

CT1 Crew closes discharge MOVs for *Prior to Safety Injection being required the previously running pump by degraded plant conditions.

("A").

1-CH-MOV-1286A

1-CH-MOV-1287A RO verifies charging conditions returning to normal:

Discharge header pressure Charging flow Motor amps.

RO checks letdown in service. (NO) 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 11 Revision 0

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and there is a loss of the running charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO restores letdown per RNO of step 6: Normal

Controls 1-CH-FCV-1122 to establish at least 25 gpm charging flow

Places 1-CH-PCV-1145 in manual and opens to 100%

Verifies 1-CH-TV-1204A/B and 1-CH-LCV-1460A/B open

Opens 1-CH-HCV-1200A/B/C(as required)

Adjusts 1-CH-PCV-1145 to establish 300 psig letdown pressure and puts the valve in auto

Places 1-CH-FCV-1122 in auto, if desired

Maintains pressurizer pressure at 2235 by operating pressurizer heaters and spray valves.

Crew determines that there is no standby charging pump at this time.

US reviews Technical Specification 3.5.2 Condition A for having only one operable HHSI pump. Have 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to restore 2 trains to operable NOTE: Crew may discuss starting the "C" pump on the 1H bus.

US reports failures and requests CR and management notifications be made.

NOTE: Crew should also discuss an entry into TS 3.0.3, which was applicable from the time the "B" started until the "A" discharge MOVs were closed.

NOTE: Once the US has referred to Tech Specs the next event can occur.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 12 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main Feedwater Pump and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,"

and 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator E-H5 illuminates

"A" MFP breakers have amber and green lights lit

"B" MFP does not auto-start

RO reactor trip switch does not work BOP identifies annunciator 1E-H5, FW PUMP 1A LUBE OIL PRESS LOW.

BOP identifies trip of "A" MFP.

BOP informs US of MFP trip.

BOP identifies start failure of "B" MFP.

US direct the BOP to take actions of 1-AP-31.

BOP checks reactor power greater than 70%. (NO)

BOP checks 1 feed pumps running. (NO)

US direct crew to enter 1-E-0.

RO verifies reactor trip:

BOP manually trips reactor (RO switch will not work.)

RO checks reactor trip and bypass breakers open

RO checks Rod Bottom lights LIT

RO checks neutron flux decreasing.

BOP verifies turbine trip. Note that turbine is not in service.

BOP manually depresses turbine trip pb

BOP verifies all stop valves are closed

BOP verifies reheaters reset

BOP verifies G-12 is open Crew verifies emergency power is available.

Crew verifies SI is neither actuated nor needed.

US directs transition to 1-ES-0.1.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 13 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main Feedwater Pump and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,"

and 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks RCS temperature trending to desired temperature.

BOP throttles AFW.

NOTE: The next event was initiated on the reactor trip.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 14 Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is tripped and a SGTR occurs, the crew will be respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

RCS pressure and level decrease

"A" SG level increases unexpectedly Crew identifies decreasing RCS pressure and level.

US directs crew to manually initiate SI and re-enter 1-E-0.

RO/BOP manually initiate SI.

RO verifies reactor trip.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

Crew verifies both emergency buses are energized.

Crew checks if safety injection has actuated:

LHSI pumps running

Any SI first out LIT (YES)

RO/BOP verify SI manually initiated.

RO checks CAP items 1-6.

US initiates attachments 4(5) and 8. Attachment 8 is attached NOTE: Attachment 8 will perform steps to isolate ruptured SG. This CT is included on next page.

Crew verifies SI flow indicated.

NOTE: AFW flow will probably be isolated.

Crew verifies AFW flow:

AFW flow to all SGs indicated

Total AFW flow > 340 GPM.

Crew checks average temperature controlling at desired temperature.

Crew adjusts total AFW flow to maintain >

340 gpm until NR level in at least one SG is greater than 11%.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 15 Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is tripped and a SGTR occurs, the crew will be respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks pressurizer PORVs and spray valves:

Pressurizer PORVs closed

Pressurizer spray valves responding to control pressurizer pressure at 2235 psig or demand at zero with valves closed.

At least one pressurizer PORV block valve open.

Crew checks RCS subcooling based on CETCs < 25°F. (NO)

Crew checks SG pressures all greater than 80 psig and under control of operator.

Crew checks level in any SG increasing in an uncontrolled manner. (YES)

US directs transition to 1-E-3.

Crew checks RCS subcooling based on CETCs < 25°F. (NO)

Crew identifies ruptured SG due to unexpected level increase. (A)

CT2 Crew isolates flow from ruptured *Prior to need to transition to ECA-3.1.

SG:

Crew places ruptured SG PORV setpoint at 1050 psig

Check ruptured SG PORV closed

1-E-0 attachment 8 complete

Crew isolates/verifies feedwater flow to "A" SG when NR level > 11% (from attachment 8)

Crew dispatches operator to close 1-MS-18 (from attachment 8)

Crew checks 1-MS-HCV-104 closed

Crew checks "A" SG BD TVs closed

Crew closes "A" MSTV.

Crew initiates attachment 2 for local turbine building operations.

Crew checks pressurizer PORVs and block valves:

Power available to PORV block valves

Pressurizer PORVs closed

At least one PORV block valve open.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 16 Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is tripped and a SGTR occurs, the crew will be respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks intact SG levels:

NR level > 11%

Control AFW flow to maintain NR level between 23 and 50%.

Crew resets both trains of SI.

Crew manually aligns condenser air ejector discharge to containment:

Remove the condenser AE RM instrument fuses

Reset both trains of Phase A isolation

Put both COND AIR EJECTOR DIVERT TO CONT SI RESET switches to RESET

Verify 1-SV-TV-102-1 open

Verify 1-SV-TV-103 open

Verify 1-SV-TV-102-2 closed

Open AS-FCV-100A/B.

Crew verifies outside IA supplying containment.

Crew verifies flow from ruptured SG isolated:

Procedure step 3 complete

1-E-0 attachment 8 step 5 complete

Ruptured SG pressure > 350 psig.

Crew determines required core exit temperature based on SG pressure.

Crew blocks SI high steam flow with block switches.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 17 Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is tripped and a SGTR occurs, the crew will be respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT3 Crew initiates RCS cooldown: *When directed by procedure

Crew determines required CETC temperature

Crew verifies steam dumps are available.

Crew checks P-F3 LIT, if not dump steam. If P-F3 lit, crew verifies P-F4 LIT. If not then RO momentarily places both steam dump interlock switches to interlock

BOP dumps steam at maximum controllable rate

Crew stops cooldown when CETCs less than required temperature

Crew maintains CETCs.

NOTE: Scenario can be terminated once a cooldown has been established.

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REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Operating Procedure 1-OP-1.5, "Unit Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2." 83 Operating Procedure 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." 104 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." 17 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging." 14 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." 17 Emergency Procedure 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 44 Emergency Procedure 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." 30 Emergency Procedure 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture." 26 Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Performance." 7 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 19 Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 20 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 21 Revision 0

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM 2012 NRC RUN 1 Initial conditions

1. Recall IC 149 (BOL)

2. Ensure Tave (545-555), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Designate 2H as the protected train.

4. Select feedwater Venturi Calorimetric.

5. Set Low Cap blowdown to 15, 15, 15 and high cap to 0.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

Failure of standby BC pump Remote function:

to auto-start BCP_AUTO_DEFEAT 1-CH-P-1A check valve Malfunction:

sticks open CH2101 Failure of "B" MFP to auto- Switch override:

start FWP1B1_ASTOP = OFF FWP1B2_ASTOP = OFF Failure of auto reactor trip Malfunction:

RD32 Failure of RO trip switch Switch override:

RX_TRIP_TRIP = OFF SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Ramp to 12% power NOTE: The turbine building operator will be sent to open the MSR 1" warmup valves. These are on the monitor screen for 2012_NRC_1 in the examiner folder, or can be done on the monitor screen for MSR startup. (1-MS-473, -474, -475, -476)

The 2 BC valves (268 and 269) do not exist.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 22 Revision 0

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

2) 1-CH-LT-1112 fails high Malfunction:

CH1201, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 10, Severity = 1, Trigger = 2 NOTE: The next event may occur once VCT level has been stabilized and TS reviewed.

3) Loss of BC Remote functions:

BCP1A_PROTECT = T, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3 NOTE: When sent to investigate, the operator will report that there is an overcurrent drop on the breaker (15B8) for "A" BC pump.

NOTE: The next event will occur once BC is restored, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

4) 1-CH-P-1A trips (check Malfunctions:

valve failure is pre-loaded) CH1601, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 4 NOTE: If asked to check on 1-CH-P-1B, can report that the pump appears to running satisfactorily, with no seal leakage.

NOTE: Once the US has referred to Tech Specs or as directed by the Lead Evaluator, the next event will occur.

5) Trip of "A" MFP Malfunction:

FW0401, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 60, Severity = 100, Trigger = 5 NOTE: When requested to investigate cause for loss of oil pressure informs US that oil is leaking from a flanged connection on the south end of the MFP.

NOTE: The next event will occur when the reactor is tripped.

6) SGTR Malfunction:

RC2401, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 50, Trigger = 6 Set up trigger 6 as RD1 on trigger screen.

NOTE: When sent to close 1-MS-18 use trigger 15.

Remote function:

MS_18 = 0, Delay time = 30, Ramp = 30, Trigger = 15 NOTE: Scenario can be terminated once crew has started a cooldown.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 23 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 24 Revision 0

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 25 Revision 0

EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at 10-8 amps, the crew will ramp the unit to approximately 12% power per 1-OP-1.2, Unit Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2," and 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R111 Perform a reactor startup form Mode 2 to approximately 3% power.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 26 Revision 0

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

None CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 27 Revision 0

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R522 Stabilize the unit following a loss of bearing cooling water.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 28 Revision 0

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and there is a loss of the running charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R704 Respond to a loss of normal charging.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 29 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew takes action to prevent charging pump run-out due to a stuck open discharge check valve on a non-running charging pump.

Safety Significance:

Failure to prevent charging pump run-out constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

Indication/annunciation that one charging pump has tripped or been shutdown with a stuck open discharge check valve.

High amps on the running charging pump.

Low/no charging flow or seal injection indicated.

Performance Indicator:

Crew closes charging pump discharge MOVs on the previously running charging pump.

Feedback:

Discharge MOVs for the previously running pump indicate closed and charging and seal injection flow returns to normal.

WOG

Reference:

None.

Conditions:

Prior to Safety Injection being required by degraded plant conditions.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 30 Revision 0

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main Feedwater Pump and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,"

and 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 31 Revision 0

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is tripped and a SGTR occurs, the crew will be respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R187 Identify and isolate a ruptured steam generator.

R759 Cool down the RCS during the response to a steam generator tube rupture.

CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 32 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew isolates affected Steam Generator.

Safety Significance:

Failure to isolate the affected SG allows the continued contamination of the secondary systems and increases the effects on the environment should a leak in the secondary occur.

This constitutes an incorrect performance that "...necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy..."

Cues:

Indication and annunciation of:

Increasing SG water level and radiation.

Reactor has been tripped.

Performance Indicator:

BOP adjusts "A" SG PORV setpoint at 1050 PSIG BOP verifies/closes "A" SG MSTV and Bypass valve RO/BOP directs an auxiliary operator to locally close 1-MS-18 BOP closes 1-FW-MOV-100D.

Feedback:

Indication of:

Stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG

Decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate to the ruptured SG.

WOG

Reference:

E Background document Conditions:

Isolate before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 33 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew initiates RCS Cooldown.

Safety Significance:

Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that "...necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy...."

Cues:

Procedurally directed by E-3.

Performance Indicator:

RO/BOP dumps steam Feedback:

Indication of steam flow rate greater than zero Indication of RCS temperature decreasing OR Indication of RCS temperature less than target temperature WOG

Reference:

E-3 -- B Background Conditions:

Crew maintains adequate subcooling.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 34 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at 10-8 amps, the crew will ramp the unit to approximately 12%

power per 1-OP-1.2, Unit Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2," and 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Reactor power increases to approximately 12%

EVENT 2:Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response.

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator C-A4 illuminates

1-CH-LI-1112 will indicate off-scale high

1-CH-LCV-1112C output will go to zero

VCT level will decrease "A" Stripper level will increase EVENT 3: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators F-F4, and F-E4 illuminate

1-BC-P-1A has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit)

1-BC-P-1B does not auto-start EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and there is a loss of the running charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

1-CH-P-1A trips and the discharge check valve sticks open

1-CH-P-1B automatically starts

Charging pump discharge pressure decreases on 1-CH-PI-1121

Annunciators C-A5, C-B5, C-C5, and C-G6 illuminate

Charging flow goes to zero on 1-CH-FI-1122 2010 NRC RUN 2 Date _________ Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main Feedwater Pump and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,"

and 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator E-H5 illuminates

"A" MFP breakers have amber and green lights lit

"B" MFP does not auto-start

RO reactor trip switch does not work EVENT 6: Given that the unit is tripped and a SGTR occurs, the crew will be respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

RCS pressure and level decrease

"A" SG level increases unexpectedly 2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 2 Revision 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Power Station Scenario No.: (2012) NRC 2 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Mark Bates__________________ Operators: _____________________________

Amanda Toth________________ _____________________________

Tim Kolb____________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL. There is a small tube leak (~4.5 gpd) on "A" SG. 1-SI-P-1A was tagged out for motor maintenance 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Maintenance will not be complete until next shift.

Currently in 0-AP-41, "Severe Weather Conditions," due to the report of severe thunderstorms heading for the area. All anticipatory actions of 0-AP-41 have been completed.

Turnover: Shift orders are to perform 1-PT- 44.7, "PORV Block Valves."

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N (R) (S) Perform 1-PT- 44.7, "PORV Block Valves." 1-RC-MOV-1536 will TS (S) fail to stroke closed (and open) in the allotted time. The SRO will enter the applicable TS.

2 RD07 C (R) (S) A continuous rod insertion will occur. The rods will stop moving when placed in manual.

3 CN0401 C (B) (S) 1-SD-P-1A trips. Standby condensate pump does not start automatically. BOP must start Condensate pump.

4 RC0702 I (R) (S) 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high. PORV opens. RO closes using switch.

5 C (B) (S) "B" SG PORV will fail open. The BOP will be able to close it using the full station. The crew may or may not need to ramp the turbine down to stabilize the unit.

6 RC32 C (R) (S) 1-RC-PCV-1456 begins to leak by. Crew isolates using MOV.

TS (S) 7/7a MS1001 R (R) (S) Steam leak develops in the MSVH. The crew ramps the unit down N (B) to stabilize reactor power.

8 MS1001 M (All) Steam leak increases to the point where a reactor trip is required.

"B" SG is faulted in MSVH between TV and containment.

9 C (All) BIT MOVs do not open automatically. BOP must open them manually.

10 SI1304 C (All) Single train Phase A. Must use switches to isolate valves and equipment on other train.

Scenario is terminated once the BIT has been isolated in 1-ES-1.1.

(Events 9 and 10 occur during event 8. These are numbered only for use on subsequent forms.)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 2 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 2 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves"

2. Continuous rod insertion 3 1-SD-P-1A trips (with failure of standby condensate pump to start in auto)

4. 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high

5. "B" SG PORV fails open

6. 1-RC-PCV-1456 leaks by it's seat 7/7a Steam leak develops in MSVH/Power reduction to stabilize reactor power

8. Steam break requiring reactor trip Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (BIT MOVs do not open automatically, single train Phase A)

Total Malfunctions 9 (Continuous rod insertion, 1-SD-P-1A trips/standby Condensate pump does not start in auto, 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high, "B" SG PORV fails open, 1-RC-PCV-1456 leaks by its seat, steam leak in MSVH, MSLB, BIT MOVs do not open automatically, single train Phase A)

Abnormal Events 6 (Continuous rod insertion, 1-SD-P-1A trips/standby Condensate pump does not start in auto, 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high, "B" SG PORV fails open, 1-RC-PCV-1456 leaks by its seat, steam leak in MSVH)

Major Transients 1 MSLB EOPs Entered 2 (E-2, 1-ES-1.1)

EOP Contingencies 0 Critical Tasks 2 SCENARIO DURATION 95 Minutes 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 3 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 2 The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power, MOL. There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been inoperable for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Maintenance will not be completed by the end of this shift. 0-AP-41, "Severe Weather Conditions," has been entered due to the report of severe thunderstorms heading for the area. All anticipatory actions of 0-AP-41 have been completed Shift orders are to perform "1-PT- 44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and to support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

The first event will be a normal evolution of performing time strokes of the PORV block valves by the RO using 1-PT-44.7. This can be pre-briefed so that the crew is prepared to do PT once they take the unit. The second valve tested, 1-RC-MOV-1536, will fail to stroke closed or open in the required time. (The crew may stop the PT with the valve closed.) The SRO will enter action and the crew will place the associated PORV in manual. Once TS have been addressed, the next event can occur.

A continuous rod insertion will occur. The crew will enter 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion." The RO will place rods in manual to stop rod motion. The next event can occur any time after rods have been placed in manual and the unit is stabilized. (CT)

High-pressure heater drain pump, 1-SD-P-1A, will trip. The standby condensate pump will not auto-start when required. The crew will enter 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," and the BOP will manually start the condensate pump and restore MFW suction pressure. The crew may need to reduce turbine power slightly due to the affect of colder feed water on calorimetric power. The next event can occur after the unit has been stabilized.

1-RC-PT-1445, RCS pressure transmitter, fails high. The crew will enter 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." The associated PORV, 1-RC-PCV-1456, opens and must be manually closed. Once the crew has stabilized the unit the next event can occur. (CT)

NOTE: When I&C is notified about the PT failure they will at that time relay the information that they found a bad card in the auto rod control circuit. They will report that rods should work in manual. They are pursuing a replacement card. (If the WCC is notified instead of I&C being called directly, the WCC supervisor will give the information.)

The "B" SG PORV, 1-MS-PCV-101B, will fail open. The crew will determine this from either a PCS alarm, or an increase in reactor power. The BOP will place the controller in manual and close the valve using the full station per the immediate operator actions of 1-AP-38, "Excessive load Increase." The crew may or may not need to ramp the turbine down slightly.

The next event can occur once the PORV is closed and the unit has been stabilized.

1-RC-PCV-1456 will begin to leak by its seat. The RO will isolate the PORV by closing the associated block valve. The US will consult TS and determine that the PORV is not operable and the associated block valve must be closed but may remain energized.

At this time a steam leak will occur on the "B" steam line in the MSVH. The crew will re-enter 1-AP-38 and ramp the unit down. After a sufficient ramp has been observed, the steam 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 4 Revision 0

leak will worsen and require the crew to trip the reactor. The crew will trip the reactor and enter 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." An automatic safety injection will occur. The BIT MOVs will not open automatically. The crew will use a 1-E-0 attachment to restore charging flow through the BIT (CT). Also, a single train Phase A will occur, the crew will manually operate valves on this train per attachment 5 of 1-E-0. The crew will continue through 1-E-0 and transition to 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." The "B" SG will be isolated (CT). The crew will transition to 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination", and isolate the BIT. At this time the scenario can be terminated.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 5 Revision 0

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1035 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. T.S. 3.5.2A was entered 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Maintenance on the low head will not be completed by the end of this shift. 0-AP-41, "Severe Weather Conditions," has been entered due to the report of severe thunderstorms heading for the area. All anticipatory actions of 0-AP-41 have been completed. The maintenance rule window is green. 1J is the protected train.

Shift Orders:

Shift orders are to perform "1-PT- 44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and to support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 6 Revision 0

EVENT 1: Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and required follow-up tasks.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

1-RC-MOV-1536 will fail to stroke open or closed in specified time limit Crew will check valve flow lights in Acoustic Monitoring Panel.

RO will check limit switch indicators on control board to verify they are both indicating the same.

RO will verify that both PORV block valves are open.

RO will record initial valve positions for It will be covered at the brief that all block valves from Unit 1 PCS. Unit 2 PCS points will be "as expected".

RO requests Unit 2 operator to report valve positions for Unit 1 block valves.

RO closes 1-RC-MOV-1535 and records (Acceptance criteria: 9.60 - 12.98 time. seconds)

RO records indicated valve position for 1-RC-MOV-1535 from Unit 1 PCS.

RO requests Unit 2 operator to report indicated valve position for 1-RC-MOV-1535 from Unit 2 PCS.

RO opens 1-RC-MOV-1535 and records (Acceptance criteria: 8.94 - 12.08 opening time. seconds)

RO closes 1-RC-MOV-1536 and records (Acceptance criteria: 8.51 - 11.51 time. seconds)

NOTE: The RO may stop when the MOV fails to stroke closed in the specified time. The crew may discuss whether to stop the PT and leave the MOV closed. If consulted, management will concur with the decision they make.

RO records indicated valve position for 1-RC-MOV-1536 from Unit 1 PCS.

RO requests Unit 2 operator to report indicated valve position for 1-RC-MOV-1536 from Unit 2 PCS.

RO opens 1-RC-MOV-1536 and records (Acceptance criteria: 7.41 - 12.33 opening time. seconds)

RO reports that 1-RC-MOV-1536 failed to stroke closed and open in required time.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 7 Revision 0

EVENT 1: Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and required follow-up tasks.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SRO consults Tech Spec 3.4.11 and declares the valve inoperable per Condition D. The PORV must be placed in manual in closed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The block valve must be restored to operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

SRO instructs RO to place 1-RC-PCV-1455C in CLOSE.

RO places switch for 1-RC-PCV-1455C to CLOSE.

SRO requests WCC to enter a CR and perform the actions required by VPAP-0805.

RO marks PT as unsat.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has placed the PORV switch in CLOSE.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 8 Revision 0

EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and a failure in the rod control system has resulted in a continuous inward control rod motion, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Control rods insert at 72 spm in automatic.

Control rods stop when placed in manual RO identifies control rods inserting in automatic.

RO/BOP determines that no obvious instrument failure has occurred.

US directs entry into 1-AP-1.1.

RO places control rods in manual.

RO verifies that rod motion has stopped.

RO verifies that 1-RC-TI-1408A, Median/HI Tavg is normal. (YES)

RO is instructed to maintain the following using control rods and boration:

Rod Bank LO/LO-LO limit annunciators NOT lit

AFD monitor annunciator A-H7 NOT lit RO checks RCS temperature:

Loop average temperature 541°F

RCS temperature above min and below max line on attachment 2.

RO checks PRZR pressure stable or tending to 2235 psig.

RO checks PRZR level is stable.

Crew checks controls rods above the low insertion limit.

RO is instructed to maintain stable plant conditions:

RCS Tave

RCS pressure

PRZR level.

US notifies I&C to investigate.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 9 Revision 0

EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and a failure in the rod control system has resulted in a continuous inward control rod motion, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS US references, or directs WCC to reference, the Reactivity Management Program.

US requests WCC to enter a CR to document the reactivity event.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 10 Revision 0

EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a high-pressure heater drain pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator F-A6 illuminates

1-SD-P-1A trips as indicated by amber light lit

Annunciator Q-E3 illuminates (slight delay)

Reactor power increases slightly (delay due to calorimetric)

Main feed pump suction pressure decreases

Standby condensate pump does not auto-start BOP identifies annunciator F-A6, HP DRAIN PUMP 1A-1B-1C AUTO TRIP.

BOP identifies trip of 1-SD-P-1A.

US directs entry into 1-AP-31.

BOP verifies power > 70%.

BOP verifies 2 main feed pump running.

BOP checks main feed pump suction pressure > 300 psig and stable. (NO)

NOTE: Auto start is defeated for standby condensate pump.

BOP starts "B" condensate pump.

Watchstander is dispatched to investigate cause for trip of "A" HPHDP.

NOTE: Crew may determine the need to enter 1-AP-38 and ramp the unit down slightly due to an increase in calorimetric power. These steps are not included here, but can be found in event 5.

Crew checks for MFW pump evolutions in progress:

Any MFW pump tripped or degraded.

(NO)

Crew evaluates reducing turbine load to

<55% - Only one MFW pump running (NO).

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 11 Revision 0

EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a high-pressure heater drain pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS BOP stabilizes SG levels:

Verifies feed flow adequate

Verifies SG levels are at or trending to program.

NOTE: Operator reports an overcurrent drop on breaker for 1-SD-P-1A. (15A9)

BOP verifies acceptable MFW pump performance:

Motors amps < 550 amps

Annunciator F-B5 NOT lit Crew is instructed to maintain stable plant conditions.

BOP checks HP heater drain pump tripped.

Crew evaluates need to reduce reactor power.

Crew checks if isotopic analysis of RCS is needed. (NO)

US makes, or directs WCC to make, notifications to:

STA

OMOC

System operator

Other as directed by VPAP-2802

MOC Crew has operator locally check the Condensate pump that was started.

BOP checks operation of MFW recircs.

Crew directs operator to locally walkdown feed train.

US requests WCC to submit a CR.

US exits 1-AP-31.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the Condensate pump has been started and the unit has been stabilized.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 12 Revision 0

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a RCS pressure transmitter has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators C-D1, B-F7, B-E7, (and possibly B-H6 and B-H2) are illuminated

1-RC-PCV-1456 indicates open RO identifies annunciator C-D1, PRZR SAFETY VALVE OR PORV OPEN.

US directs crew to perform actions of 1-AP-44.

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.

Crew identifies PORV open.

RO performs RNO step and closes 1-RC-PCV-1456.

RO checks master controller not failed.

RO checks PRZR spray valves closed.

RO verifies all PRZR heaters energized.

RO checks 1-CH-HCV-1311 closed.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and safety valves closed.

RO verifies RCS pressure stable or increasing.

RO verifies RCS pressure normal.

US refers to Technical Specifications:

3.4.1A - DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to restore pressure to within COLR limits (>2205 psig) (If applicable.)

3.4.13A (RCS Leakage) - 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to restore leakage to within limits TS 3.4.11. Determines that PORV is operable.

US requests WCC to submit a CR.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 13 Revision 0

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a RCS pressure transmitter has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: At this time, the WCC will report that I&C has reported that the problem with rod control is a bad card in auto rod control. Manual rod control is not affected. I&C is working on getting a replacement card ready to install.

Crew restores any unaffected equipment to normal.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the PORV has been closed and the unit has been stabilized.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 14 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Reactor power increases slightly

Megawatts decrease

"B" PORV indicates open

PORV closes when taken to manual Crew identifies increasing reactor power Will also get a PCS alarm on PORV and decreasing megawatts. opening.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1-AP-38:

RO verifies steam dumps are closed

BOP identifies "B" SG PORV is open

BOP takes manual control of "B" SG PORV and closes it

Crew checks turbine load is normal

Crew verifies reactor power 100% and stable.

Crew reduces power using turbine, if required.

NOTE: Crew may need to reduce power.

This will depend on the length of time the PORV was open.

RO uses rods to control RCS Tave within 1.5°F of Tref.

RO energizes additional pressurizer heaters if required to maintain RCS pressure.

NOTE: If crew does not need to ramp they may discuss the necessity of the following steps.

BOP checks turbine load control:

Verifies reactor power reduced to the power level before the event started

Verifies valve position limit light is OFF

If not, reduces turbine load until light is OFF

Verifies turbine load controller is in IMP IN (NO)

Ensures reference and setter matched and pushes IMP IN pushbutton. (This may have already been done.)

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 15 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO is instructed to maintain the following using control rods and boration:

Rod Bank LO/LO-LO limit annunciators NOT lit

AFD monitor annunciator A-H7 NOT lit Crew checks plant status is stable:

Main generator output is stable

Tave is on program with Tref BOP checks steam flow channel indications are normal.

BOP checks that turbine control is in operator auto.

Crew checks plant systems:

BOP checks that SG PORVs and safety valves are closed using SPDS indication.

Crew dispatches operator to locally check SG PORVs and safeties closed.

BOP checks MSR inlet FCV operation is normal

BOP checks that 1-AS-PCV-105 is operating normally

Crew checks that plant steam systems are intact.

RO checks for RCS dilution:

No improper demin operation

No improper operation of 1-CC-TCV-106

No indications of PG water leakby Crew verifies that cause of load increase is corrected.

RO verifies that steam dumps are NOT in Off/Reset.

US reviews T.S. 3.7.4 and determines that PORV is still operable.

US requests a CR be submitted for the SG PORV.

US exits 1-AP-38.

NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has stopped the power increase.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 16 Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a pressurizer PORV begins to leak by, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with the AR for B-H2, or 1-AP-44, and close the associated PORV block valve.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator B-H2 illuminates

RCS pressure slowly decreases

Pressurizer level slowly decreases

Charging flow slowly increases

1-RC-TI-1463, PORV line temp, increases

PRT pressure and level increase RO identifies annunciator B-H2, PRZ AR attached POWER RELIEF LINE HI TEMP, is illuminated.

RO identifies that RCS pressure is slowly decreasing.

NOTE: It is possible that crew will enter 1-AP-16 for RCS leakage.

NOTE: Crew may discuss which block valve to close first (if both open) to determine which PORV is leaking by.

Crew closes 1-RC-MOV-1535 to stop leakby of PORV.

Crew verifies RCS pressure is increasing and tailpipe temperature is decreasing.

TS US consults TS:

3.4.11B for inoperable PORV - close block valve and leave energized.

3.4.13 for RCS leakage during time PORV was unisolated and leaking.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the block valve is closed and TS have been reviewed.

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EVENT 7/7A: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline leak occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and reduce turbine load.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Megawatts decrease

Reactor power increases

Tave decreases

Annunciator D-C8 illuminates (Delayed)

Crew identifies increasing reactor power and decreasing megawatts.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1-AP-38:

RO verifies steam dumps are closed

BOP SG PORVs are closed

Crew checks turbine load is normal

Crew verifies reactor power 100% and stable.(NO)

Crew reduces power using turbine in operator auto RO uses rods to control RCS Tave within 1.5°F of Tref.

RO energizes additional pressurizer heaters if required to maintain RCS pressure.

BOP checks turbine load control:

Verifies reactor power reduced to the power level before the event started

Verifies valve position limit light is OFF

Verifies turbine load controller is in IMP IN

Ensures turbine reference and setter are matched and presses IMP-IN pushbutton RO is instructed to maintain the following using control rods and boration:

Rod Bank LO/LO-LO limit annunciators NOT lit

AFD monitor annunciator A-H7 NOT lit 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 18 Revision 0

EVENT 7/7A: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline leak occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and reduce turbine load.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: If operators are dispatched to look for steam leaks, 5 minutes later he will report back that there is steam coming from the upper louvers on the MSVH. He will get a "buddy" and attempt to enter building and determine exact location of the leak.

If no one is sent, once crew has commenced ramp and smoke detector is alarming, a security officer will report that steam is coming from the upper louvers on the Unit 1 MSVH.

Crew checks plant status is stable:

Main generator output is stable

Tave is on program with Tref BOP checks steam flow channel indications are normal.

BOP checks that turbine control is in operator auto.

NOTE: If steam leak is not large enough for crew to ramp a sufficient amount, then call can be made that OMOC would like to ramp the unit off-line at 2%/min using Fast Ramp AP.

NOTE: The next event can occur once a sufficient ramp has been observed.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 19 Revision 0

EVENT 8: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

"B" SG pressure decreases rapidly

RCS pressure decreases rapidly

Pressurizer level decreases rapidly

"J" train phase "A" equipment does not reposition

BIT valves do not automatically open BOP identifies decreasing pressure in "B" SG.

RO identifies degrading primary plant conditions.

US directs crew to enter 1-E-0.

RO verifies reactor trip:

RO/BOP manually trip reactor

RO checks reactor trip and bypass breakers open

RO checks Rod Bottom lights LIT (NO)

RO checks neutron flux decreasing.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

BOP manually depresses turbine trip pb

BOP verifies all stop valves are closed

BOP resets reheaters

BOP verifies G-12 is open Crew verifies emergency busses are energized.

Crew checks if safety injection has actuated:

LHSI pumps running

Any SI first out LIT Crew manually actuates safety injection.

NOTE: US will read the immediate actions before addressing CAP items.

US directs review of CAP items 1-6. CAP Attached Crew identifies that BIT is not flowing. CAP 2 SI flow verification US initiates attachment 6 of 1-E-0. Attached (Manual verification of SI flowpath) 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 20 Revision 0

EVENT 8: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT 1 Crew establishes HHSI flow to the *Critical task to open one BIT outlet and RCS: one BIT inlet before transition to 1-E-1

Crew verifies 1-CH-MOV-1115D open is required.

Crew opens 1-CH-MOV-1115B

Crew verifies 1-CH-MOV-1115E closed

Crew closes 1-CH-MOV-1115D

Crew verifies 1-CH-MOV-1289A and/or B is closed

Crew verifies BIT recirc valves, 1-SI-TV-1884A/C are closed

Crew closes 1-SI-TV-1884B

Crew opens at least one BIT outlet valve, 1-SI-MOV-1867C or D

Crew opens at least one BIT inlet valve, 1-SI-MOV-1867A or B

Crew verifies charging pumps running

Crew verifies SI flow is indicated US initiates attachments 4 - Equipment Attachment 4 attached Verification (Attachment 5 - Verification of SI and Phase A Isolation will be directed by attachment 4) and 7 (Faulted SG Isolation).

NOTE: Attachment 7 will cover CT 4 Attached for isolating feed to the faulted SG. Will also close MSTVs.

Crew verifies SI flow indicated.

Crew checks RCS pressure < 225 [450]

psig. (NO)

NOTE: AFW flow may have already been isolated to the faulted SG.

Crew verifies AFW flow indicated to all SGs.

Crew verifies total AFW flow > 340 gpm.

Crew checks RCS average temperature stable at or trending to 547°F.

Crew adjusts total AFW flow to maintain >

340 gpm until at least one SG NR level is >

11%.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 21 Revision 0

EVENT 8: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks pressurizer PORVs closed.

Crew checks pressurizer spray valves responding to control RCS pressure at 2235 psig or closed.

Crew checks at least one pressurizer PORV block valve open.

If not, crew will open 1-RC-MOV-1536.

Crew checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria:

RO checks RCS subcooling < 25°F

[85°F] (NO)

Crew checks SGs not faulted:

All SG pressures > 80 psig and under control of operator. (NO)

NOTE: Crew will manipulate various Attachment 5 page 5 attached valves that didnt reposition on phase A using attachment 5 of 1-E-0.

(1-RC-MOV-1381, 1-CV-TV-150B and 150D, 1-VG-TV-100B, 1-RM-TV-100C and 100D, 1-CH-TV-1204B)

NOTE: If RCS pressure increases to PORV setpoint due to SI flow, then crew may discuss either placing 1-RC-PCV-1455C in auto, or operating it manually to reduce RCS pressure until SI is terminated.

Crew transitions to 1-E-2.

NOTE: Crew will have used attachment 7 of 1-E-0, Faulted SG Isolation, to isolate "B" SG.

Crew verifies main steam trip valves and bypass valves are closed.

Crew checks pressure in any SG greater than 80 psig and stable or any SG pressure increasing. (YES)

Crew checks an SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or any SG completely depressurized. (YES, B) 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 22 Revision 0

EVENT 8: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT 2 Crew isolates the faulted SG. Critical Task

BOP verifies MFW isolated. *Prior to transition out of E-2

BOP closes 1-FW-MOV-100B.

BOP verifies 1-FW-HCV-100B closed.

BOP verifies "B" SG PORV closed.

BOP verifies all SG blowdown trip valves closed.

Crew dispatches an operator to locally close 1-MS-57 (attachment 1)

Crew dispatches an operator to verify closed 1-MS-58.

BOP checks ECST level > 40%.

BOP verifies outside IA supplying containment.

Crew checks secondary radiation:

RO resets SI, Phase A, and AMSAC

Crew checks last known SG blowdown radiation

Crew checks last known AE radiation

Crew checks MS line and Terry turbine radiation.

Crew checks if SI can be terminated:

RCS subcooling based on CETCs >

25°F [75]

Secondary heat sink:

EITHER >340 gpm total AFW flow to intact SGs OR >11% [22%] NR in at least one intact SG

RCS pressure stable or increasing

Pressurizer level > 21% [26%]. (YES)

US directs crew to transition to 1-ES-1.1.

RO verifies/resets SI.

RO stops all but one charging pump and places in Auto.

Crew checks RCS pressure stable or increasing.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 23 Revision 0

EVENT 8: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew isolates the BIT:

BOP checks LHSI suctions from containment sump are closed

RO verifies/opens 1-CH-MOV-1373

RO verifies/opens CHP recirc valves (1-CH-MOV-1275A/B/C)

BOP closes BIT inlet valves (1-SI-MOV-1867A and/or B)

BOP closes BIT outlet valves (1-SI-MOV-1867C and/or D)

BOP verifies 1-SI-MOV-1836 and 1-SI-MOV-1869A and 1869B are closed.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated after the isolated the BIT, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 24 Revision 0

REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Operations Periodic Test 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves." 25 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion." 9 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." 10 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase." 17 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." 19 Emergency Procedure 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 44 Emergency Procedure 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." 12 Emergency Procedure 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination." 21 Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Performance." 7 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 25 Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 26 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 27 Revision 0

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM 2012 NRC RUN 2 Initial conditions

1. Recall IC 142

2. Ensure Tave (575-585), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Rack out breaker for 1-SI-P-1A. (SIP1A_RACKIN = F)

4. Place red sticker on 1-SI-P-1A.

5. Designate 1J as the protected train. Don't forget to lower sign on Safeguards panel.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

"A" SG tube leak Malfunction:

RC2401 = .0004 Block valve 1-RC-MOV- Monitor:

1536 fails to stroke in RCMOV536_RATE = 250 required time Increased Circ water Remote function:

temperature CW_INLET_TEMP = 81 Condensate pump strainers Malfunctions:

slightly clogged CN0301 = 2 CN0303 = 2 Auto-start failure of 1-CN-P- Switch override:

1B CNP1B_ASTOP = OFF 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 28 Revision 0

CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

BIT MOVs do not open Monitor:

automatically SIMOV867_RATE(1) = 0 SIMOV867_RATE(2) = 0 SIMOV867_RATE(3) = 0 SIMOV867_RATE(4) = 0 Set up triggers 15 thru 18 on trigger screen as follows to reset rates when open PB is pressed:

Trigger = 15 MOV867A_OPEN(1)

Set SIMOV867_RATE(1) = 400 Trigger 16 MOV867C_OPEN(1)

Set SIMOV867_RATE(3) = 400 Trigger 17 MOV867B_OPEN SET SIMOV867_RATE(2) = 400 Trigger 18 MOV867D_OPEN SET SIMOV867_RATE(4) = 400 Single train phase A Malfunction:

SI1304 SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) PORV block valve test Preloaded NOTE: When called as Unit 2, report expected valve positions for PORV block valves.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has placed 1-RC-PCV-1455C in CLOSE.

2) Continuous rod motion Malfunction:

RD07, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 2 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 29 Revision 0

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

3) 1-SD-P-1A trips Malfunction:

CN0401, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3 NOTE: When sent to check pump/breaker, wait 5 minutes and then report that there was nothing unusual noted at the pump.

The pump breaker (15A9) has an overcurrent drop.

NOTE: When sent to check "B" Condensate pump, wait 5 minutes and then report that the pump is running normally. If told to get the procedure to align the vent valve, state that you will do that.

NOTE: When sent to walk down the feed train, wait at least 5 minutes and report back that the feed train looks good and you will continue to monitor.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the Condensate pump has been started and the unit has been stabilized.

4) 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high Malfunction:

RC0702, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 30, Severity = 1, Trigger = 4 NOTE: The next event can occur once the PORV has been closed and the unit has been stabilized.

5) "B" SG PORV fails open Controller override:

PCVMS101B = 0, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Trigger = 5 NOTE: When sent to locally check SG PORVs and safeties, report that all are closed.

NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has stopped the power increase.

6) 1-RC-PCV-1456 leaks by Malfunction:

RC32, Delay time = 5, Severity = 5, Ramp = 300, Trigger = 6 NOTE: The next event can occur once the block valve is closed and TS have been reviewed.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 30 Revision 0

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

7) Steam leak on "B" Steam Malfunction:

line MS1002, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 600, Severity = 1.5, Trigger = 7 NOTE: If operators are dispatched to look for steam leaks, wait 5 minutes and report back that there is steam coming from the upper louvers on the MSVH. The operator will get a "buddy" and attempt to enter building and determine exact location of the leak.

If no one is sent, wait until crew has commenced ramp and smoke detector is alarming, then make the report as a security officer that steam is coming from the upper louvers on the Unit 1 MSVH.

NOTE: If steam leak is not large enough for crew to ramp a sufficient amount, then call can be made that OMOC would like to ramp the unit off-line at 2%/min using Fast Ramp AP.

NOTE: The next event can occur once enough of a ramp has been observed.

8) MSLB Use trigger 8 to increase steam leak to 50% over 30 seconds Set up on trigger screen as follows:

Command: MS1002 50 30 NOTE: When sent to close 1-MS-57, use trigger 10. Wait 5 minutes and report that valve is closed.

Remote function:

MS_57 = 0, Delay time = 30, Ramp = 30, Trigger = 10 NOTE: The scenario can be terminated once the crew has completed 1-E-2 and declared transition to 1-ES-1.1.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 31 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 32 Revision 0

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 33 Revision 0

EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and required follow-up tasks.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 34 Revision 0

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a failure in the rod control system has resulted in a continuous inward control rod motion, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R475 Perform the immediate operator action in response to a continuous uncontrolled rod motion.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 35 Revision 0

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a high-pressure heater drain pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 36 Revision 0

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a RCS pressure transmitter has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R634 Respond to a loss of RCS pressure.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 37 Revision 0

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 38 Revision 0

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a pressurizer PORV begins to leak by, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with the AR for B-H2, or 1-AP-44, and close the associated PORV block valve.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R634 Respond to a loss of RCS pressure.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 39 Revision 0

EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline leak occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and reduce turbine load.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 40 Revision 0

EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R185 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

R730 Verify safety injection flow R727 Perform the Phase A isolation verification following a safety injection actuation.

R183 Identify and isolate a faulted steam generator.

CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 41 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew establishes HHSI flow to the RCS.

Safety Significance:

Failure to establish HHSI flow constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

Indication/annunciation of:

PRZR level requiring SI

no HHSI flow Performance Indicator:

BOP manually aligns valves to establish charging pump cold leg injection.

BOP opens 1-SI-MOV-1867C and/or 1867D

BOP opens 1-SI-MOV-1867A and/or 1867B Feedback:

HHSI flow to the cold legs is indicated.

WOG

Reference:

E-0 -- I Background Conditions:

Before procedure requires transition to 1-E-1.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 42 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew isolates faulted Steam Generator.

Safety Significance:

Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the integrity CSF beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. For the reference plant, neither of these transients (blowdown of a single SG with or without RCPs running) constitutes an orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF. However, if the faulted SG is not isolated, the cooldown transient for reactor vessel inlet temperature could result in an orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF, especially if RCPs are not running.

Cues:

"B" SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely depressurized and

Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the faulted SG Performance Indicator:

BOP closes 1-FW-MOV-100B to secure AFW flow to "B" steam generator.

Feedback:

AFW flow indication to "B" steam generator decreases to zero.

WOG

Reference:

E-2 -- A Background Conditions:

Prior to transitioning out of E-2.

2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 43 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and required follow-up tasks.

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

1-RC-MOV-1536 will fail to stroke open or closed in specified time limit EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and a failure in the rod control system has resulted in a continuous inward control rod motion, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Control rods insert at 72 spm in automatic.

Control rods stop when placed in manual EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a high-pressure heater drain pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator F-A6 illuminates

1-SD-P-1A trips as indicated by amber light lit

Annunciator Q-E3 illuminates (slight delay)

Reactor power increases slightly (delay due to calorimetric)

Main feed pump suction pressure decreases

Standby condensate pump does not auto-start EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a RCS pressure transmitter has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators C-D1, B-F7, B-E7, (and possibly B-H6 and B-H2) are illuminated

1-RC-PCV-1456 indicates open EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Reactor power increases slightly

Megawatts decrease

"B" PORV indicates open

PORV closes when taken to manual 2012 NRC RUN 2 Date _________ Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a pressurizer PORV begins to leak by, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with the AR for B-H2, or 1-AP-44, and close the associated PORV block valve.

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator B-H2 illuminates

RCS pressure slowly decreases

Pressurizer level slowly decreases

Charging flow slowly increases

1-RC-TI-1463, PORV line temp, increases

PRT pressure and level increase EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline leak occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and reduce turbine load.

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Megawatts decrease

Reactor power increases

Tave decreases

Annunciator D-C8 illuminates (Delayed)

EVENT 8: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

"B" SG pressure decreases rapidly

RCS pressure decreases rapidly

Pressurizer level decreases rapidly

"J" train phase "A" equipment does not reposition

BIT valves do not automatically open 2012 NRC RUN 2 Page 2 Revision 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Power Station Scenario No.: (2012) NRC 3 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Mark Bates__________________ Operators: _____________________________

Amanda Toth________________ _____________________________

Tim Kolb____________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 48% power, MOL. The unit was shut down 1 week ago to repair a MSTV air line.

Power has been stable at 48% for several days due to a problem with "A" RSST. This problem has been resolved and all paperwork is complete. Xenon is currently stable. There is a small tube leak

(~4.5 gpd) on "A" SG. The tube leak was stable at this value for several weeks before the unit shutdown. 1-SI-P-1A was tagged out for motor maintenance 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Maintenance will not be complete until next shift.

Turnover: Shift orders are to swap charging pumps and then ramp the unit to 100% power.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N (R) (S) Swap to 1-CH-P-1B in service. Place 1-CH-P-1A in Auto.

2 R (R) (S) Ramp unit up using dilution/turbine.

N (B) 3 RC4601 C (R) (S) 1-RC-PCV-1455A Spray valve fails open. RO must take manual TS (S) control and close.

4 CC0701 C (B) (S) Seal leak on running CC pump. Swap pumps and isolate leak.

Refill CC head tank.

5 CH08 I (R) (S) 1-CH-FT-1122 fails high. Must restore charging flow.

6 FW1205 I (B) (S) "C" SG selected feed flow fails low.

TS (S) 7 RD2142 M (All) Rod ejection occurs. Reactor trip required. Reactor does not rip either automatically or manually. Crew enters 1-FR-S.1.

8 TU03 C (B) Turbine does not trip automatically.

9 SI08 C (All) SI does not automatically actuate The scenario can be terminated once the crew has performed actions in 1-E-1.

(Events 8 and 9 occur during event 7. (These are numbered only for use on subsequent forms.)

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 3 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 2 Revision 1

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Swap charging pumps to 1-CH-P-1B and place 1-CH-P-1A in auto

2. Increase reactor power using dilution/turbine 3 1-RC-PCV-14455A Spray valve fails open.

4. Seal leak on running CC pump

5. 1-CH-FT-1122 fails high

6. "C" SG selected feed flow fails low

7. Rod ejection/SBLOCA/Failure of reactor to trip Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 3 (Reactor does not trip automatically or manually, turbine does not automatically trip, SI does not automatically actuate)

Total Malfunctions 8 ("A" spray valve fails open, seal leak on running CC pump, 1-CH-FT-1122 fails high, selected feed flow fails low on "C" SG, rod ejection/SBLOCA, reactor does not trip automatically or manually, turbine does not automatically trip, SI does not automatically actuate)

Abnormal Events 4 ("A" spray valve fails open, seal leak on running CC pump, 1-CH-FT-1122 fails high, selected feed flow fails low on "C" SG)

Major Transients 1 Rod ejection/SBLOCA/failure of reactor to trip EOPs Entered 1 (E-1)

EOP Contingencies 1 (1-FR-S.1)

Critical Tasks 6 SCENARIO DURATION 100 Minutes 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 3 Revision 1

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 3 The scenario begins with the unit at 48% power, MOL. The unit was shut down 1 week ago to repair a MSTV air line. Power has been stable at 48% for several days due to a problem with "A" RSST. This problem has been resolved and all paperwork is complete. Xenon is currently stable. There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately ~4.5 GPD. At this power level the readings on the N-16 for the steam header are high enough to bring in the N-16 alarm. This is expected due to the increased sensitivity of this RM. Chemistry has verified the leakage on "A" SG remains < 5 gpd. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been tagged out for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Maintenance will not be completed by the end of this shift. Shift orders are to swap charging pumps to 1-CH-P-1B, and then ramp the unit to 100% power. Support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

The first event will be a normal evolution of swapping charging pumps by the RO using 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Pumps." This can be pre-briefed so that the crew is prepared to do the swap once they take the unit. Once the charging pumps have been swapped, the next event can occur.

The next event will be a ramp up in power. This event can be pre-briefed. Once enough of a ramp has been seen, the next event can occur.

The "A" pressurizer spray valve, 1-RC-PCV-1455A, will fail open slowly. The crew will enter 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure," and take manual control of the spray valve and close it (CT). Once TS have been reviewed and RCS pressure has stabilized, the next event can occur.

A CC leak will develop on the seal of the running CC pump. CC surge tank level will decrease and AB sump level will increase. Personnel dispatched to the area will identify the leak location. The crew will direct a makeup to the CC surge tank, swap CC pumps, and direct isolation of the affected pump. Once the leak is isolated and head tank level is returned to service, the next event can occur.

The charging flow transmitter will fail high causing charging flow to decrease. Per the AR, the RO will place 1-CH-LCV-1122 in manual and control charging flow. Once charging flow has been restored, the next event can occur.

The selected feed flow transmitter on "C" SG will fail low. The BOP will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation," and place the associated MFRV in manual and restore level. The crew will swap to an operable instrument channel. Once TS have been reviewed and the MFRV is back in auto, the next event can occur.

A control rod will be ejected. Pressurizer level and pressure will begin to decrease. The crew will attempt to trip the reactor, but it will not trip automatically or manually. The crew will enter 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," trip the turbine (CT), and dispatch an operator to trip the reactor locally. Control rods will step in automatically for a short period of time and then stop moving in automatic. The RO will place rods in manual and drive them in manually. The RO will emergency borate (CT). Once the reactor has been tripped locally, the crew will transition back to 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." No automatic 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 4 Revision 1

safety injection will occur and the crew will have to manually safety inject (CT). The crew will secure RCPs (CT) and close the charging pump recirc valves (CT) in accordance with the CAP.

The crew will continue through 1- E-0 and transition to 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." Once the crew has performed actions in 1-E-1, the scenario can be terminated.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 5 Revision 1

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 at 48% power. RCS boron is 1228 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. The unit was shut down 1 week ago to repair a MSTV instrument air line. Power has been stable at 48% for several days due to a problem with "A" RSST. This problem has been resolved and all paperwork is complete. Xenon is currently stable. Aux steam is on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. The tube leak was stable at this value for several weeks before the unit shutdown. At this power level the readings on the N-16 for the steam header are high enough to bring in the N-16 alarm. This is expected due to the increased sensitivity of this RM. Chemistry has verified the leakage on "A" SG remains < 5 gpd.

1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been inoperable for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Maintenance on the low head will not be completed by the end of this shift. The maintenance rule window is green. 1J is the protected train.

Shift Orders:

Shift orders are to start 1-CH-P-1B and place 1-CH-P-1A in auto. Once the charging pumps have been swapped, ramp the unit to 100% power. Support maintenance with work on 1-SI-P-1A.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 6 Revision 1

EVENT 1: Swap charging pumps to 1-CH- P-1B in service per 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Amps increase on "B" charging pump when started

Amps decrease on "A" charging pump when stopped RO places "B" charging pump bearing Normal event temperatures on a short interval trend using PCS.

RO verifies with operator in AB that Aux oil pump for 1-CH-P-1B is in auto and running.

RO announces and starts 1-CH-P-1B.

RO verifies that 1-SW-TI-103B is < 128°F.

RO stops 1-CH-P-1A and places in AUTO-AFTER-STOP.

RO continues to monitor bearing temperatures on 1-CH-P-1B until stable, then returns trend interval to normal.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has swapped charging pumps.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 7 Revision 1

EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at approximately 48% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Reactor power increases

Turbine power increases

Tavg/Tref increase

Generator megawatts increase NOTE: The crew may raise primary Attached temperature prior to ramping the turbine. Turbine operation is done using attachment 8 (Guidance for main turbine operations) of 1-OP-2.1.

BOP verifies/sets desired ramp rate (0.3%

per minute).

BOP adjusts limiter position, as required.

BOP increases turbine setter to desired position.

BOP presses GO on turbine.

BOP monitors turbine ramp.

RO starts a dilution when required using 1- Attached GOP-8.3.1 or 1-GOP-8.3.2.

RO monitors control rods to maintain Tave within 1.5°F of Tref with rods above insertion limits.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has ramped a sufficient amount, or as determined by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 8 Revision 1

EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

PRZR spray valve 1-RC-PCV-1455A has full open indication

Master pressure controller output decreases

PRZR pressure decreases

Annunciators B-F7 and B-H6 illuminate NOTE: Event 4 is on the same trigger.

RO identifies annunciator B-F7, PRZ HI-LO PRESS and later B-H6, PRZ LO PRESS -

BU HTRS ON.

RO identifies RCS pressure decreasing.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1-AP-44:

RO checks PRZR PORVs closed (1-RC-PCV-1455C and 1456)

RO checks master pressure controller not failed

RO checks spray valves closed (1-RC-PCV-1455A and 1455B)

RO determines that 1-RC-PCV-1455A is open.

CT 1 Crew stops RCS pressure decrease: *Prior to a loss of subcooling (<25°F)

RO manually closes spray valve 1-RC-PCV-1455A.

NOTE: The crew will likely hold the turbine ramp and stop the dilution at this time. They will talk about temperature control as the dilution water continues to affect RCS boron concentration. If management is consulted, they will concur with the crew's decision.

RO verifies all PRZR heaters are energized.

RO checks that 1-CH-HCV-1311, Aux spray valve, is closed.

RO checks PRZR safety valves closed and PORVs closed or isolated.

RO verifies RCS pressure stable or increasing.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 9 Revision 1

EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO verifies RCS pressure returned to normal.

US refers to TS 3.4.1 DNB, Action A (2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ), if pressure went below 2205 psig.

TS 3.4.11 and 3.4.13 are not applicable for this event.

US requests Work Control Center supervisor to inform the OMOC of the failure and initiate WR and CR.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has returned RCS pressure to normal, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 10 Revision 1

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

CC head tank level decreases

Aux building sump level increases

Annunciator G-A1 annunciates at ~20% surge tank level BOP identifies decreasing CC surge tank level.

BOP identifies increasing AB sump level.

Crew dispatches operator(s) to look for CC leak.

Crew uses either 1-AP-15 or AR for G-A1 AR attached for guidance and dispatches operator to make up to CC head tank using attachment of 1-AP-15 or 1-OP-51.1. 1-AP-15 steps are included below. Crew could also choose to use 0-AP-39.2 for AB flooding.

NOTE: At this time an operator will report that there is a bad seal leak on 1-CC-P-1A.

Crew determines that it is necessary to swap CC pumps in order to isolate leak on 1-CC-P-1A.

NOTE: Depending on current CC head tank level, the crew may swap CC pumps without time to reference 1-OP-51.1.

Crew uses 1-OP-51.1 to start 1-CC-P-1B and stop 1-CC-P-1A.

NOTE: Operator will report when makeup to CC head tank has commenced. Operator should monitor head tank level and adjust make up as necessary.

Crew uses prints or 1-MOP-51.01 to determine that closing 1-CC-16 will isolate the pump suction and 1-CC-25 will isolate the discharge.

Crew directs operator to close 1-CC-16 (and possible 1-CC-25).

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 11 Revision 1

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew notes that CC head tank is no longer decreasing and/or that the AB sump level is no longer increasing.

NOTE: Operator will report that 1-CC-16 is closed and the leak has stopped.

NOTE: The following steps are from 1-AP-15 which the crew may enter based on degrading CC conditions or surge tank low level.

BOP checks CC head tank level stable or AP-15 increasing.

If NO, RNO gives choice of attachments for refilling head tank. Attachment 4 will most likely be initiated.

Crew determines if CC system should be split out:

Crew determines that CC is cross-tied Crew determines that both units have intact and available CC systems and that there is no CDA on Unit 2.

Crew monitors RCP temperatures:

Motor bearing temperature < 195°F Pump radial bearing temperature <225°F Stator winding temperature < 300°F RO isolates letdown by closing orifice valves and 1-CH-LCV-1460A/B.

Crew checks excess letdown is secure.

RO closes 1-CH-FCV-1122.

Crew closes 1-CH-MOV-1380.

RO adjusts seal injection flows to approximately 6 gpm each using 1-CH-HCV-1186.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 12 Revision 1

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks CC head tank level stable or increasing:

If NOT: BOP will put CC pumps in PTL Crew will direct isolation of 1-CC-P-1A by closing 1-CC-16 (and possibly 1-CC-25)

Crew will restore CC head tank level Crew will return to Step 2 and verify at least one Unit 1 CC pump running (NO)

BOP will start 1-CC-P-1B BOP will check running CC pump amps BOP will check CC flows are normal Crew will have operator to locally check SW to CC HX delta Ps.

Crew will perform attachment 2 to restore Attached charging, letdown, and seal return.

Crew will return to procedure and step in effect.

Crew dispatches operator to identify source, AP-39.2 steps location, and severity of flooding.

(Previously done.)

Crew checks key vital parameters on both units normal: (If asked: all Unit 2 vital parameters are normal except CC head tank level.)

Pressurizer level

CC surge tank level (NO)

Crew initiates attachment 4 of 1-AP- 15 to refill head tank If CC surge tank is empty and CC pump amps are fluctuating, then crew will place all CC pumps in PTL and initiate 1-AP-15, while continuing with this procedure.

Evaluate the need to shutdown or trip both units

VCT level Crew identifies equipment in the vicinity of the flooding and considers securing and de-energizing equipment affected by flooding.

Crew notifies HP of flooding.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 13 Revision 1

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks CVCS parameters on both units normal:

Przr level

Charging pump discharge pressure

Charging flow

Letdown pressure

Letdown flow

VCT level

VCT pressure

BAST level

Alarms for CVCS - NOT lit.

Crew checks CC parameters on both units normal:

CC pump amps

CC HX flows

CC head tank level If CC surge tank level cannot be maintained then crew will place all CC pumps in PTL and initiate 1-AP-15 Crew will attempt to isolate the damaged section of the CC system using procedures, valve lineups, plant drawing (FM-79A) End of AP-39.2 steps Crew directs WCC to request tags for 1-CC-P-1A and that a CR be submitted.

US reviews TS 3.7.19 and determines that 3 CC subsystems are still operable.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the CC leak has been isolated and CC head tank level has been returned to normal.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 14 Revision 1

EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a loss of charging flow occurs, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator C-C5 and restore charging flow to normal.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator C-C5 illuminates

1-CH-FCV-1122 output decreases

1-CH-FI-1122 indication fails high

1-CH-TI-1123 indication increases

1-RC-LC-1459G output increases

Pressurizer level slowly decreases

VCT level increases during time there is no charging flow RO identifies annunciator C-C5, CH PP TO REGEN HX HI-LO FLOW is illuminated.

RO identifies that charging flow indicator 1-CH-FI-1122 indicates high flow and 1-CH-FCV-1122 is closing.

RO uses AR (or US direction) to take AR attached manual control of 1-CH-FCV-1122 and RO will have to use alternate indications restore charging flow. to verify charging flow is adequate.

RO uses AR to place 1-CH-LC-1459G in manual and reduces output to normal.

US directs WCC to submit CR and inform I&C of failure.

NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has restored charging flow to normal.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 15 Revision 1

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling feed flow channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators F-D3 illuminates

"C" MFRV ramps open

"C" SG Channel III feed flow is off-scale low BOP identifies annunciator F-F3, SG 1C LEVEL ERROR.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1-AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP identifies "C" SG feedwater flow channel III has failed low.

BOP takes manual control of "C" SG water level and controls level.

Crew verifies first stage pressure indications normal.

RO verifies pressurizer level indications are normal.

Crew verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal.

Operable channel selected

Proper annunciator configuration

Emergency back up heaters

Letdown in service

Level control in Auto (No, due to previous failure)

Control group heaters not tripped Crew verifies both first stage pressure channels normal.

Crew verifies all SGWLC channels selected to an operable channel. (NO)

NOTE: Crew will want to wait until rods are not stepping to control Tave before placing them in manual.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 16 Revision 1

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling feed flow channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew swaps to operable SGWLC channels.

RO places control rods in manual

RO places steam dumps in either OFF or steam pressure mode

BOP checks all bypass MRFVs in manual

BOP places all MFRVs in manual

RO selects channel IV on all steam flow and feed flow channels and for first-stage pressure

Crew verifies all SG level channels are operable

BOP verifies steam generator levels are on program

BOP places MFRVs in Auto.

RO returns steam dumps to Tave mode:

RO verifies both channels of first stage pressure are operable

RO verifies/places both interlock switches OFF/RESET

RO verifies annunciator P-E4 is NOT lit

RO verifies/places mode selector switch to Tave

RO ensures steam dump demand is zero

RO places both interlock switches to ON.

RO matches Tave and Tref and returns rods to auto, as required.

Crew verifies that "C" SG feedwater flow channel III is the only failed channel.

US directs RO to enter 1-MOP-55.78.

TS US reviews TS 3.3.1 condition E and determines that channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has identified channel trip requirements and the US has referred to tech specs, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 17 Revision 1

EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur and the reactor does not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

RCS level and pressure decrease

Rod B-8 indicates >235 steps

Reactor does not trip automatically or manually

Turbine does not automatically trip

SI does not occur automatically RO identifies rapidly decreasing pressurizer level and pressure.

RO informs the US of RCS conditions. NOTE: Crew may isolate letdown in an effort to assess leak size, before entering 1-E-0.

US directs crew to enter 1-E-0.

RO/BOP attempt to open reactor trip breakers. (NO)

US directs crew to enter 1-FR-S.1.

RO verifies rods in auto.

CT 2 BOP manually trips the turbine: *Within 30 seconds of recognizing

BOP pushes both turbine trip ATWS condition exists.

pushbuttons

BOP verifies turbine stop valves closed.

BOP resets reheaters

BOP verifies generator output breaker open 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 18 Revision 1

EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur and the reactor does not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT 3 Crew identifies the reactor did not Critical task can be satisfied by either trip and takes action to bring the one of the following: manually inserting reactor subcritical. rods or establishing emergency boration flow.

RO verifies control rods inserting in

Before exiting 1-FR-S.1 auto at greater than 48 steps per minute (NO)

RO manually inserts control rods

BOP checks AFW pumps running. If not, starts all pumps manually.

RO verifies at least one charging pump running.

RO places 1-CH-P-2A in FAST.

RO opens 1-CH-MOV-1350.

Crew verifies adequate negative reactivity insertion by checking emergency boration flow indicated, control rods moving in, and neutron flux decreasing

RO checks PRZR pressure < 2335 psig.

Crew checks if reactor trip has occurred. (NO)

Crew dispatches an operator to locally open the reactor trip breakers.

NOTE: Reactor trip breakers will be opened locally 3 minutes after operator is dispatched.

NOTE: Due to the existence of an SI Attached signal the US will most likely initiate attachment 2 of 1-FR-S.1 at this time.

Crew checks if turbine trip has occurred.

Crew checks if reactor is subcritical:

Neutron flux < 5%

Intermediate range negative startup rate.

NOTE: If reactor is subcritical, then crew will transition to 1-E-0 at this time.

BOP checks SG levels.

RO verifies all dilution paths isolated.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 19 Revision 1

EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur and the reactor does not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks for reactivity insertion from uncontrolled RCS cooldown.

RO checks CETCs.

Crew verifies reactor subcritical.

US directs crew to return to 1-E-0.

RO verifies reactor trip.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.

Crew determines that SI has not occurred.

Crew determines that SI is required.

NOTE: Attachment 2 of 1-FR-S.1 may have performed this action.

CT 4 Crew manually actuates safety *Before completion of step 4 of 1-E-0 injection.

NOTE: The US will read the immediate operator actions before addressing the CAP.

RO reviews CAP items 1-6 and determines CAP attached that item 3(RCP trip criteria) is applicable.

Item 4 (Charging pump recirc path criteria) will be applicable once RCPs are secured.

Item 1(Adverse containment) will be applicable once containment pressure increases to > 20 psia.)

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 20 Revision 1

EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur and the reactor does not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT 5 Crew stops all RCPs: CAP 3

RO checks at least one charging pump When directed by 1-E-0 running and flowing to RCS

RO checks RCS subcooling < 25°F

[85°F]

RO stops all RCPs CT 6 Crew takes action to prevent HHSI CAP 4 pump runout by performing the When all criteria are met following:

Verifies RCS pressure < 1275 psig

[1475 psig] AND RCPs tripped

RO closes all charging pump recirc valves (1-CH-MOV-1275A/B/C).

US initiates attachment 4 - Equipment Verification (Attachment 5 - Verification of SI and Phase A Isolation will be directed by attachment 4).

Crew verifies SI flow.

Crew verifies AFW flow to all SGs.

RO checks RCS average temperature:

Stable or trending to 547°F if controlling on steam dumps OR

Stable or trending to 551°F if controlling on PORVs.

Crew adjusts AFW flow, as required.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria. (RCPS already stopped and CHP recircs closed.)

Crew checks SGs not faulted:

All SG pressures > 80 psig and under control of operator. (YES)

Crew checks SGs not ruptured:

Any SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner (NO)

RMs normal (SG BD, AE, MS, TT) (YES) 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 21 Revision 1

EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur and the reactor does not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks if RCS is intact inside containment:

Containment pressure normal. (NO)

US directs crew to transition to 1-E-1.

STA/crew commences monitoring CSFs.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

Crew checks SGs not faulted:

SG pressures > 80 psig and under control of operator.

Crew checks intact SG levels:

> 11% and control to between 23% and 50%.

Crew checks secondary radiation levels: Actions are performed in this step.

RO resets SI, and Phase A

Crew verifies IA trip valves open

RO resets AMSAC

Crew checks SG blowdown, AE, MS, and terry turbine exhaust RM normal

Crew verifies all SG NR levels >23%

and initiates attachment for aligning BD RMs when level is sat

Crew opens SG surface sample trip valves

Crew requests that chemistry sample SGs.

RO checks pressurizer PORVs and block valves

Power available to block valves

PORVs closed

At least one block valve open.

Crew checks if SI can be terminated:

RCS subcooling > 25°F

Secondary heat sink with either AFW flow > 340 gpm or one SG NR > 11%

RCS pressure stable or increasing (NO).

Crew checks if manual CDA required. (NO) 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 22 Revision 1

EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur and the reactor does not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks QS status.

Crew checks if LHSI pumps should be stopped. (NO)

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated after the crew has performed necessary actions, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 23 Revision 1

REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Operation Periodic Test 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps." 9 Operating Procedure 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup From Mode 2 to Mode 1." 104 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." 19 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-15, "Loss of Component Cooling Water." 23 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." 25 Maintenance Operating Procedure 1-MOP-55.78, "Feed Flow Instrumentation." 7 Functional Restoration Procedure 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power 16 Generation/ATWS."

Emergency Procedure 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 44 Emergency Procedure 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." 25 Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Performance." 7 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 24 Revision 1

ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 25 Revision 1

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 26 Revision 1

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM 2012 NRC RUN 3 Initial conditions

1. Recall MOL 48% IC 146

2. Ensure Tave (555-565), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Rack out breaker for 1-SI-P-1A (SIP1A_RACKIN = F)

4. Place red sticker on 1-SI-P-1A.

5. Designate 1J as the protected train. Don't forget to lower sign on Safeguards panel.

6. Calorimetric to 0.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

"A" SG tube leak Malfunction:

RC2401 = .0004 Turbine does not Malfunction:

automatically trip TU03 ATWS Malfunctions:

RD32, RD38 Remote function:

AMSAC_DEFEAT = T SI does not automatically Malfunction:

actuate SI08 SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Swap charging pumps NOTE: Give all communications required as AB operator for both charging pumps. This can include seal leakage - none, vibrations, etc.

NOTE: The next event can occur once charging pumps are swapped.

2) Unit Ramp NOTE: The next event will occur once the crew has ramped a sufficient amount.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 27 Revision 1

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

3) "A" spray valve fails open NOTE: Events 3 and 4 are on the same trigger.

Malfunction:

RC4601, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3 NOTE: If called to discuss how to control temperature with PG still affecting RCS temperature, ask what they recommend and agree with it. (Rods, turbine)

NOTE: The next event will occur at the same time as the spray valve and will take several minutes to be noticeable.

4) Seal leak on running CC Malfunction:

pump CC0701, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 40, Trigger = 3 Set up on trigger screen to automatically reduce leak size once Surge tank level has decreased a significant amount. Trigger 15 MCC0701_DEG .GE. 0.4 IMF CC0701 20 30 NOTE: When called to look for CC leaks: Wait 1 minute and report back that there is a bad seal leak on 1-CC-P-1A.

NOTE: When called to make up to CC head tank, slowly open CN_41 to between 20 and 75%, depending on how far LCV is open.

NOTE: When told to isolate 1-CC-P-1A, use ExtremeView screen to close valves per crew direction. Should be 1-CC-16 (on a trigger) and 1-CC-25. Constant vent valve not modeled.

Once closed, report back that leak has stopped.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the CC leak has been isolated and CC head tank level has been returned to normal.

5) 1-CH-FT-1122 fails Malfunction:

CH08, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Severity = 1, Trigger = 5 NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has restored charging flow.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 28 Revision 1

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

6) "C" SG channel III feed Malfunction:

flow fails low FW1205, Delay time = 5, Severity = -1, Trigger = 6 NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has identified channel trip requirements and the US has referred to tech specs.

7) Rod ejection/SBLOCA Malfunction:

/ATWS RD2142, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 7 RD14, Trigger = 300 (RX20 - reactor power < 40%)

NOTE: Reactor can be tripped using trigger 29.

Remote functions:

SP_RTA_BKR = F, Delay time = 120, Trigger = 29 SP_RTB_BKR = F, Delay time = 121, Trigger = 29 NOTE: The scenario can be terminated once actions have been performed in 1-E-1 or 1-FR-P.1.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 29 Revision 1

ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 30 Revision 1

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 31 Revision 1

EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Swap charging pumps to 1-CH- P-1B in service per 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R593 Transfer the running charging pump.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 32 Revision 1

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at approximately 48% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R705 Dilute the RCS using the blender.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 33 Revision 1

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R634 Respond to a loss of RCS pressure.

CRITICAL TASK:

See Next page 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 34 Revision 1

CT Statement:

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.

Safety Significance:

Failure to close the RCS spray valve under the postulated plant conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release." In this case, DNBR is reduced. Therefore, failure to close the spray valve represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."

Cues:

Valid indication of pressure decreasing by the presence of various annunciators, indication of RCS spray valve open, and RCS pressure indication decreasing and procedurally directed by 1-AP-44.

Performance Indicator:

RO places controller for associated spray in manual and closes Feedback:

RCS pressure decrease stopped.

WOG

Reference:

N/A Conditions:

Prior to a loss of subcooling.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 35 Revision 1

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R707 Respond to a leak in the Component Cooling Water System.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 36 Revision 1

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a loss of charging flow occurs, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator C-C5 and restore charging flow to normal.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 37 Revision 1

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling feed flow channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 38 Revision 1

EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur and the reactor does not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R224 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a nuclear power generation/ATWS.

R185 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages 2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 39 Revision 1

CT Statement:

Crew manually trips the turbine in FR-S.1 Safety Significance:

Failure to trip the turbine during an ATWS event could lead to violation of the RCS emergency stress limit.

Cues:

Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room, and indication that the turbine stop valves are fully open.

Performance Indicator:

BOP simultaneously depresses both turbine trip pushbuttons.

Feedback:

Turbine stop valves closed.

WOG

Reference:

FR-S.1 -- A Background Conditions:

Within 30 seconds of recognizing ATWS condition exists.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 40 Revision 1

CT Statement:

Crew identifies reactor did not trip, transition to 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, and take actions to bring the reactor subcritical.

Safety Significance:

Failure to insert negative reactivity under the postulated plant conditions results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control."

Cues:

Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room.

Performance Indicator:

RO manually insert control rods if rod speed decreases to < 72 spm OR RO place in-service boric acid transfer pump in fast speed.

RO open emergency borate valve 1-CH-MOV-1350 Feedback:

Control rods moving in or fully inserted.

Emergency boration flow indicated.

Neutron flux decreasing.

Pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig.

OR

Rod bottom lights on.

IRPIs indicating zero.

Neutron flux < 5%.

WOG

Reference:

FR-S.1 - Background Document Conditions:

Prior to completion of step requiring its performance.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 41 Revision 1

CT Statement:

Crew manually initiates safety injection.

Safety Significance:

Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

Indication/annunciation that SI is required, with NO indication that SI has actuated.

Performance Indicator:

RO manually actuates safety injection.

Feedback:

Indication/annunciation that SI has actuated.

WOG

Reference:

E-0 D-Background.

Conditions:

Prior to completion of step 4 of 1-E-0.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 42 Revision 1

CT Statement:

Crew stops Reactor Coolant Pumps.

Safety Significance:

Tripping RCPS at this time "prevents excessive depletion of RCS water inventory through a small break in the RCS which might lead to severe core uncovery if the RCPs were tripped for some reason later in the accident." The RCPs should be tripped "before RCS inventory is depleted to the point where tripping the pumps would cause the break to immediately uncover."

Cues:

Indication of:

Subcooling less than 25°F [85°F]

At least one charging pump running and flowing to the RCS Performance Indicator:

RO/BOP places control switch(es) for all running RCPs in STOP.

Feedback:

Indication/annunciation of no RCPs running.

WOG

Reference:

RCP Trip/Restart Background Document Conditions:

Prior to completing step 4 of 1-E-0.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 43 Revision 1

CT Statement:

Crew takes action to prevent HHSI pump runout.

Safety Significance:

Failure to prevent HHSI pump runout constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

Indication/annunciation that SI is actuated and is required and

Indication of RCS pressure less than 1275 psig [1475 psig] and

RCPs tripped Performance Indicator:

RO closes charging pump recirc valves.

1-CH-MOV-1275A

1-CH-MOV-1275B

1-CH-MOV-1275C Feedback:

Charging pump recirc valves indicate closed.

WOG

Reference:

None Conditions:

When all criteria are met.

2012 NRC RUN 3 Page 44 Revision 1

ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Swap charging pumps to 1-CH- P-1B in service per 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Amps increase on "B" charging pump when started

Amps decrease on "A" charging pump when stopped EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at approximately 48% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Reactor power increases

Turbine power increases

Tavg/Tref increase

Generator megawatts increase EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

PRZR spray valve 1-RC-PCV-1455A has full open indication

Master pressure controller output decreases

PRZR pressure decreases

Annunciators B-F7 and B-H6 illuminate EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level.

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

CC head tank level decreases

Aux building sump level increases

Annunciator G-A1 annunciates at ~20% surge tank level EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a loss of charging flow occurs, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator C-C5 and restore charging flow to normal.

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator C-C5 illuminates

1-CH-FCV-1122 output decreases

1-CH-FI-1122 indication fails high

1-CH-TI-1123 indication increases

1-RC-LC-1459G output increases

Pressurizer level slowly decreases

VCT level increases during time there is no charging flow 2012 NRC RUN 3 Date _________ Revision 1

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling feed flow channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators F-D3 illuminates

"C" MFRV ramps open

"C" SG Channel III feed flow is off-scale low EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur and the reactor does not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

RCS level and pressure decrease

Rod B-8 indicates >235 steps

Reactor does not trip automatically or manually

Turbine does not automatically trip

SI does not occur automatically 2012 NRC RUN 3 Date _________ Revision 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Power Station Scenario No.: (2012) NRC 4 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Mark Bates__________________ Operators: _____________________________

Amanda Toth________________ _____________________________

Tim Kolb____________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL. There is a small tube leak (~4.5 gpd) on "A" SG. The leak has been stable at this value for several weeks. 1-SI-P-1A was tagged out for motor maintenance 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Maintenance will not be complete until next shift. Currently in 0-AP-41,"Severe Weather Conditions," due to the report of severe thunderstorms heading for the area. All anticipatory actions of 0-AP-41 have been completed.

Turnover: Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RC0803 I (R) (S) Selected pressurizer level channel fails low causing a letdown TS (S) isolation.

1a N(R) (S) Restore letdown.

2 C (B) (S) Instrument air compressor trips and standby compressor does not automatically start. BOP starts standby compressor.

3 RD1618 C (R) (S) Control rod drops into core.

TS (S) 4 Grid voltage begins to swing. System operator requests that North Anna 1 ramp back 100 megawatts.

4a R (R) (S) Crew ramps the unit down per system operator.

N (B) 4b C (B) (S) "A" MFRV fails to manual. Requires BOP to control level in manual during ramp.

5 EL01 M (All) Loss of switchyard (with spurious SI and then a loss of all AC) 6 SI0502 C (All) Spurious SI occurs 7 C (All) 1H EDG output breaker does not close. 1J EDG trips on overspeed. 1H output breaker can be closed manually in 1-ECA-0.0.

The scenario can be terminated once the crew performs actions in 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

(Events 4a and 4b occur during event 4. Events 6, 7 occur during event 5.

These are numbered only for use on subsequent forms. Event 4 does not require action other than entering an AP.)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 4 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 2 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Selected pressurizer level channel fails low 1a. Restore letdown

2. Instrument air compressor trips and standby compressor does not automatically start

3. Dropped rod

4. Grid voltage swing 4a/4b. Unit ramp per system operator/"A" MFRV fails to manual

5. Loss of switchyard/Spurious SI/Loss of All AC Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (Spurious SI, 1H EDG output breaker does not close/1J EDG trips on overspeed)

Total Malfunctions 8 (Selected pressurizer level channel fails low, instrument air compressor trips/standby compressor does not automatically start, dropped rod, grid voltage swing, "A" MFRV fails to manual during ramp, loss of switchyard, spurious SI, 1H EDG output breaker does not close/1J EDG trips on overspeed)

Abnormal Events 5 (Selected pressurizer level channel fails low, instrument air compressor trips/standby compressor does not automatically start, dropped rod, grid voltage swing, "A" MFRV fails to manual during ramp)

Major Transients 1 (Loss of switchyard)

EOPs Entered 1 (ES-1.1)

EOP Contingencies 1 (ECA-0.0)

Critical Tasks 1 SCENARIO DURATION 90 Minutes 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 3 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 4 The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power, MOL. There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. The tube leak has been stable at this value for several weeks.

1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been tagged out for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Maintenance will not be completed by the end of this shift. 0-AP-41, "Severe Weather Conditions," has been entered due to the report of severe thunderstorms approaching the area. All anticipatory actions of the AP have been performed. Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

The first event will be a failure of the selected pressurizer level channel low. The crew will enter 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation," minimize charging and swap to an operable channel(CT). As a normal event, the RO will return letdown to service. Once letdown is in service and Tech Specs have been consulted, the next event can occur.

A loss of instrument air will occur when the running instrument air compressor trips and the standby compressor does not auto-start. The crew will enter 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air," and the BOP will start all available compressors(CT) and this will return instrument air pressure to normal. Once this has happened, the next event can occur.

A control rod will drop into the core. The crew will enter 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod," and place control rods in manual. Once rods are in manual, the next event can occur.

System voltage will begin to swing. The crew will note the swings and leave the voltage regulator in automatic. They will enter 0-AP-8, "Response to Grid Instability," The system operator will be called. He will report problems on the grid and will request that North Anna Unit 1 reduce their megawatt output by 100 MW. Required equipment will be checked and notifications made. This event has no direct actions. The next evaluation will be the ramp.

The crew will ramp the unit back to reduce megawatts. During this ramp the "A" MRFV will fail to manual, forcing the BOP to control "A" SG level in manual during the remainder of the ramp. Once enough of a reactivity event has been seen, the next event can occur.

A loss of the switchyard will occur. The crew will enter 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," at this time there will be a spurious single train SI. 1H EDG output breaker will not close. 1J EDG will trip on overspeed after the spurious SI. The crew will transition to 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and manually close 1H EDG output breaker(CT). The crew will transition back to 1-E-0, terminate SI, and transition to 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination." Once the crew has performed actions in 1-ES-1.1, the scenario can be terminated.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 4 Revision 0

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1035 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. The tube leak has been stable at this value for several weeks. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been inoperable for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Maintenance on the low head will not be completed by the end of this shift. 0-AP-41, "Severe Weather Conditions," has been entered due to the report of severe thunderstorms approaching the area. All anticipatory actions of the AP have been performed. The maintenance rule window is green. 1J is the protected train.

Shift Orders:

Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 5 Revision 0

EVENT 1/1a: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators B-F8, B-G7, and B-E2 are illuminated

1-RC-LI-1461 fails low

Letdown isolates RO identifies annunciators B-F8, PRZ LO LEVEL, and B-G7, PRZ LO LEV HTRS OFF - LETDWN ISOL.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-3.

RO identifies that the selected pressurizer level channel 1461 has failed low.

Crew verifies redundant instrument channel indication normal.

BOP verifies SG level parameters normal.

BOP verifies turbine first stage pressure indication normal.

RO verifies pressurizer level indications are normal. (NO)

RO places 1122 in manual and minimizes charging.

RO verifies systems affected by pressurizer level channels are normal. (NO)

RO selects operable channel of pressurizer level for control (459/460).

RO verifies proper annunciator configuration.

RO verifies emergency backup heater configuration.

RO verifies letdown in service. (NO) 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 6 Revision 0

EVENT 1/1a: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Normal RO restores letdown using attach 2. Attachment 2 is attached Ensures charging flow at least 25 gpm Ensures 1-CH-LCV-1460A/B are open Ensures 1-CH-TV-1204A/B are open Places 1-CH-PCV-1145 in manual &

opens Opens 1-CH-HCV-1200B (or 1200A or C)

Adjusts 1-CH-PCV-1145 to obtain 300 psig letdown pressure and places in Auto Adjusts charging and letdown to maintain program PRZR level.

RO restores pressurizer level to program RO adjusts 1-RC-LCV-1459G, if required RO places 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

RO resets PRZR control group heaters.

BOP verifies both turbine first stage pressure channels normal.

BOP verifies operable channels selected for SGWLC.

Crew verifies operation of other vital instrumentation.

Crew refers to 1-MOP-55.72 for placing the failed channel in trip.

TS US refer to TS-3.3.1 Function 9, Condition L and determine that the channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the applicable MOP and pressurizer level control is back in automatic, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 7 Revision 0

EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power, and a loss of instrument air has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator J-D2 illuminates

Instrument air pressure decreases BOP identifies annunciator 1J-D2, INST AIR COMPR>/DRYER TROUBLE.

Crew identifies lowering IA pressure.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-28.

BOP starts all available air compressors.

BOP checks IA pressure < 70 PSIG. (NO)

Crew determines cause of loss of IA to be a failed compressor.

BOP verifies IA pressure > 94 psig or trending to 94 psig..

Crew checks if either 1-IA-TV-102A or 102B is closed. (NO)

Crew returns air compressors to normal.

Crew dispatches operator to ensure 2-IA-TV-211 is closed.

Crew checks letdown in service.

Crew verifies attachment 6 was not initiated.

US directs WCC to submit a CR.

NOTE: The next event can occur once IA is verified to be increasing.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 8 Revision 0

EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a control rod has dropped into the core, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators A-G2, A-F1, A-B7, A-C7, A-C8, A-D4 illuminate

IRPI for B-10 indicates 0 steps

Pressurizer pressure and level decrease

RCS temperature and reactor power decrease slightly RO identifies annunciator A-G2, ROD BOTTOM/ROD DROP.

RO identifies IRPI for rod B-10 in "A" control bank indicates 0 steps, and that the rod bottom light is lit.

RO verifies actual dropped rod drop by noting decrease in reactor power, PRZR level and RCS Tave.

RO notifies US of dropped rod.

US directs entry into 1-AP-1.2.

RO verifies only one control rod dropped.

RO places control rod bank selector switch in MANUAL.

US notifies SM, OMOC, Reactor Engineer and STA.

Crew verifies reactor critical above the POAH.

RO verifies the lowest RCS Tave 541°F.

Crew verifies rod bank insertion limits not exceeded.

Crew discusses maintaining Tave within 1.5 degrees of Tref by adjusting turbine load.

NOTE: At this time the outsides operator will call and report that the sky is very dark off to the west and it appears that the expected thunderstorms are heading towards the site.

Crew records the time the rod was dropped.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 9 Revision 0

EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a control rod has dropped into the core, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO verifies annunciator A-B7, NIS PR CHNL AVE FLUX DEVIATION, not lit.

(NO)

Crew initiates 1-PT-23 and enters T.S.

3.2.4. (If a QPTR is done, then power will need to be reduced by 3% RTP for each 1% QPTR > 1.00 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months due to QPTR being not within limits.)

RO verifies dropped rod IRPI = 0 steps.

TS US refers to TS-3.1.4B and directs a SDM be performed and notes that either power must be reduced to<75% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , or a flux map must be done within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

NOTE: The next event will occur after technical specifications, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 10 Revision 0

EVENT 4/4a: Given that the unit is at power and grid voltage begins to swing, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-8, "Grid Instability," and 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Voltages oscillates

MW oscillate

Generator voltage oscillates

Exciter voltage and amperage oscillate

"A" MFRV fails to manual during ramp Crew identifies that grid voltage is not stable and not within +/- 4 volts of voltage schedule.

US enters 0-AP-8.

Crew determines that no notification of RTCA being inoperable has been received.

Crew verifies that no notification of increased grid vulnerability exploitation has been received.

Crew contacts system operator to determine extent of condition and any required actions.

NOTE: If crew does not enter AP, make call from system operator when directed by evaluator.

NOTE: System operator will report that there are instabilities elsewhere on the grid and request that North Anna Unit 1 and Unit 2 reduce their megawatt output by 100 MW each, within the next 20 minutes.

RO initiates RCS boration using either Attachment 5 is attached attachment 5 of 1-AP-2.2 or a standard ramp AP-2.2 steps plan and 1-GOP-8.3.4.

BOP reduces plant load: Attachment 4 is attached Verifies valve position limit light OFF Removes turbine from limiter using attachment 4, as required Verifies turbine load control in IMP-IN Places turbine control in IMP-IN by depressing pushbutton Initiates turbine load reduction using attachment 4.

RO verifies rods in automatic. (NO) 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 11 Revision 0

EVENT 4/4a: Given that the unit is at power and grid voltage begins to swing, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-8, "Grid Instability," and 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: Rods were placed in manual due to a dropped rod. US may call for guidance on using rods in auto. Booth will ask for his recommendation and agree with what he wants to do.

RO energizes additional pressurizer heaters to maintain RCS pressure, as required.

RO verifies proper rod auto control rod insertion. (NO)

RO inserts control rods to maintain Tavg within 5°F of Tref.

RO monitors steam dumps for proper operation.

RO maintains rod lo/lo-lo limit alarms clear.

RO maintains AFD alarm (A-H7) clear.

US makes appropriate notifications.

US ensures aux steam is sufficient, or directs transfer to MS.

BOP identifies that "A" MFRV has swapped "A" MFRV fails to manual once power to manual operation. is <95%

US directs BOP to operate "A" MFRV in manual during power decrease.

BOP operates "A" MFRV in manual, as required.

NOTE: The N-16 alarm may annunciate as power is reduced due to the increased sensitivity of the MS header N-16. The crew will discuss/enter 1-AP-5. Steps are not included.

Crew verifies required equipment operable: More AP-8 steps Terry turbines

All EDGs

SBO

Various diesels

Diesel fire pumps.

US makes notification to operations management.

Crew checks that all station service buses are energized.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 12 Revision 0

EVENT 4/4a: Given that the unit is at power and grid voltage begins to swing, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-8, "Grid Instability," and 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks for low voltage on system.

Crew checks for high voltage on system.

NOTE: The next event can occur once enough of a power decrease has been observed.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 13 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Loss of switchyard causes loss of all RCPs

Spurious SI signal after reactor trip

1H EDG output breaker does not close

1J trips on overspeed Crew identifies that a loss of switchyard has occurred.

RO verifies reactor trip:

RO/BOP manually trip reactor

RO checks reactor trip and bypass breakers open

RO checks Rod Bottom lights LIT (NO)

RO checks neutron flux decreasing.

BOP manually trips the turbine:

BOP verifies all stop valves are closed

BOP identifies no power on Reset button for reheaters

BOP verifies G-12 is open Crew verifies AC emergency buses 1H EDG output breaker does not close energized. (NO)

Crew identifies that an SI has occurred. Spurious SI - 60 seconds after reactor trip.

Crew manually initiates SI.

Crew identifies that 1J EDG has tripped. 60 seconds after SI.

US directs crew to enter 1-ECA-0.0.

Crew verifies reactor trip.

Crew verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies all RCPs are stopped.

Crew verifies no reports of a fire in emergency switchgear.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 14 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT 1 Crew restores power to an Attachment 5 is attached emergency bus: *Prior to depressurizing all intact SGs

Crew verifies 1H EDG running

Crew verifies 1H bus energized (NO)

Crew attempts to energize 1H bus using attachment 5 by doing the following:

Crew accesses Unit 1 RCP temperatures

Crew monitors seal water outlet temperature for all RCPs

Crew verifies all RCP seal water outlet temperatures are 235°F

Crew places synchronizing switch for 15H2 to ON

Crew verifies incoming voltage is indicated

Crew closes 15H2

Crew turns off 15H2 sync switch Crew verifies RCS isolation.

Verifies/closes letdown valves closed (1-CH-HCV-1200B and 10CH-LCV-1460A/B)

Verifies pressurizer PORVs closed

Verifies excess letdown isolation valves closed (1-CH-HCV-1201 and 1137)

Closes 1-CH-HCV-1142

Verifies sample system trip valves closed (1-SS-100A/B, 101A/B, 102A/B, 103A/B, 106A/B)

Verifies reactor vent valves closed

Verifies pressurizer vent valves closed.

Crew verifies AFW flow >340 gpm.

Crew verifies power to 1H bus is restored.

EDG running

1H bus voltage indicated

1H voltage and frequency normal.

US directs transition to 1-E-0.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 15 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: Due to crew size, US will need to prioritize 0-AP-10 and 1-E-0 attachments until another operator is available.

US initiates 0-AP-10.

US initiates attachment 4 - Equipment Verification (initiates attachment 5 -

Verification of SI and Phase A isolation).

Crew verifies SI flow.

Crew verifies AFW flow to all SGs indicated (NO)

Crew verifies total AFW flow > 340 GPM.

Crew checks RCS Tavg stable at or trending to desired temperture.

Crew adjusts AFW flow.

Crew checks pressurizer PORVs and spray valves:

Pressurizer PORVs closed

Pressurizer spray valves closed with 0 demand

At least one pressurizer PORV block open.

Crew checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria:

RCS subcooling < 25°F. (NO)

Crew checks SG pressures all greater than 80 psig and under control of operator.

Crew checks SG tubes not ruptured:

Level in any SG increasing in an uncontrolled manner SG blowdown, condenser AE, main steam and Terry turbine RM normal (or last known normal).

Crew checks containment pressure, recirc spray sump level, and containment radiation are normal.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 16 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks that vent stack radiation is normal, no safeguard sump level alarms are lit, AB sump alarm not lit, no alarm for high ambient area temperatures.

Crew checks if SI should be reduced:

RCS subcooling > 25 °F

Secondary heat sink available

RCS pressure stable or increasing

Pressurizer level > 21%.

Crew reset SI.

Crew stops all but one charging pump and Only "A" is running. "B" got a start puts in after stop. signal, may have been red flagged.

Crew checks RCS pressure stable or increasing.

Crew isolated BIT:

Verifies 1-CH-MOV-1373 open (last known)

Verifies CH pump recircs (1275A/B/C) open

Closes BIT inlet 1-SI-MOV-1867A

Dispatches operator to close 1-SI-MOV-1867B locally

Closes BIT outlet 1-SI-MOV-1867C.

Verifies 1-SI-MOV-1836, 1-SI-MOV-1869A/B are closed.

Crew establishes charging:

Places 1-CH-FCV-1122 in manual and closes.

Verifies 1-CH-FCV-1311 is closed.

Opens 1-CH-HCV-1310,

Opens 1-CH-MOV-1289A

Dispatches operator to locally open 1-CH-MOV-1289B

Controls charging flow to maintain pressurizer level.

US directs transition to 1-ES-1.1, step 7.

Crew checks RCS pressure stable or increasing.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 17 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks LHSI suctions from containment sump (1-SI-MOV-1860A/B) are closed.

Crew places "B" LHSI pump in AUTO "A" tagged, "B" had a start signal. May standby. have red-flagged before power lost.

Crew verifies SI flow is not required:

RCS subcooling > 25°F

Pressurizer level >21%.

Crew resets Phase A.

NOTE: The scenario can be terminated once actions have been performed in 1-ES-1.1.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 18 Revision 0

REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." 25 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air." 33 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod." 14 Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-8, "Response to Grid Instability." 8 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction." 23 Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power." 73 Operating Procedure 1-OP-26.8, "500 KV Switchyard Voltage." 17 Emergency Procedure 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 44 Emergency Procedure 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC." 25 Emergency Procedure 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination." 21 Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Performance." 7 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 19 Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 20 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 21 Revision 0

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM 2012 NRC RUN 4 Initial conditions

1. Recall IC 144

2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Rack out breaker for 1-SI-P-1A (SIP1A_RACKIN = F)

4. Place red sticker on 1-SI-P-1A.

5. Designate 1J as the protected train. Don't forget to lower sign on Safeguards panel.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

"A" SG tube leak Malfunction:

RC2401 = .0004 1-IA-C-1 fails to start Switch override:

automatically IAC1_AUTO = OFF IH EDG output breaker fails Monitor:

to close automatically ED15H2_LO = True SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Pressurizer level channel Malfunction:

fails RC0803, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 1, Severity = -1, Trigger = 1 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the applicable MOP and pressurizer level control is back in automatic, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 22 Revision 0

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

2) Instrument air compressor Remote function:

trips U2_IAC1_FAULT = TRUE, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 2 Malfunction:

CA0401 Severity = 5.2, Trigger = 2 Set up Trigger 30 to delete leak when IA compressor started IAC1_HAND DMF CA0401 NOTE: If called to check 2-IA-TV-211 closed, report that red light is NOT lit and dryer appears to be operating normally.

NOTE: The next event will occur once the crew has ramped a sufficient amount.

3) Dropped Rod Malfunction:

RD1618, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3 NOTE: During the performance of 1-AP-1.2, the outsides operator will call and report that the sky is very dark off to the west and it appears that the expected thunderstorms are heading towards the site.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the US refers to technical specifications, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 23 Revision 0

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

4) Grid disturbance/unit Malfunction:

ramp/failure of "A" MFRV EL1803, Trigger = 4 EL1802, Delay time = 10, Ramp = 30, Severity = 18, Trigger = 4 NOTE: Have to delete EL1803 to get grid back to infinite.

After that you can use toggle feature on ExtremeView screen EL11 to toggle between infinite and finite grid. Voltage swings are not noticeable on infinite grid.

Controller override:

FCV478_MAN = ON when power >95% (RFK200 .le. 95.0),

Trigger = 10 NOTE: If crew does not enter AP, make call from system operator when directed by evaluator.

NOTE: Make call from system operator on automatic ringdown (or when called on ARD): Due to problems on the grid, request that North Anna Unit 1 and Unit 2 reduce their megawatt output by 100 MW each, within the next 20 minutes.

NOTE: If called about using control rods in auto during ramp:

Ask for US recommendation and agree with whatever he wants to do.

NOTE: The next event can occur once enough of a power reduction has been observed.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 24 Revision 0

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

5) Loss of Malfunction:

switchyard/spurious SI/loss EL01, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 5 of all AC SI0502, Delay time = 65, Trigger = 5 NOTE: Delete SI0502 once it has actuated before they try to reset.

Remote functions:

EDGJ_OVSPD_TRP = T, Delay time = 125, Trigger = 5 1H EDG output breaker fails to close (Preloaded)

NOTE: If sent to look at EDGs: 1H is running fine. If sent to output breaker - no drops. 1J has tripped on overspeed, looks like governor has come apart?

NOTE: The following will allow 15H2 to close when switch is turned to CLOSE:

Trigger = 15 SUPFD_BUSH_C Set ED15H2_LO = 0 Trigger 16 SUPFD_BUSH_ACLSE Set ED15H2_LO = 0 NOTE: If sent to align SBO to 1J bus, say that you will get procedure and brief in Annex.

NOTE: If sent to locally close/throttle 1-FW-MOV-100D, use PNID to do so. 10% open is ~100 gpm.

NOTE: If sent to align AFW to "B" SG, get AP and do alignment as directed.

NOTE: May be sent to locally close FW MOVs (100s&150s).

This would take a while.

NOTE: If sent to locally close 1-SI-MOV-1867B, use PNID to ramp closed.

NOTE: If sent to locally open 1-CH-MOV-1289B, use PNID to ramp open.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated once actions have been performed in 1-ES-1.1.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 25 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 26 Revision 0

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 27 Revision 0

EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R633 Respond to a failure of the controlling pressurizer level channel.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 28 Revision 0

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power, and a loss of instrument air has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R530 Respond to a loss of instrument air outside of containment.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 29 Revision 0

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a control rod has dropped into the core, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

None CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 30 Revision 0

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and grid voltage begins to swing, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-8, "Grid Instability," and 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R706 Borate the RCS using the blender.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 31 Revision 0

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R185 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

R214 Perform the immediate actions in response to a loss of all AC power.

CRITICAL TASK:

See Next page 2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 32 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew restores power to any AC emergency bus.

Safety Significance:

Failure to energize an AC emergency bus constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded...emergency power capacity." Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of a barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS...capacity" at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress.

Cues:

Indication of loss of both 4160V emergency buses.

No voltage indicated on emergency buses.

Loss of various emergency equipment.

Numerous annunciators.

Performance Indicator:

Backboards manually closes breaker 15H2 Feedback:

Indication of Voltage indicated on the "H" 4160 emergency bus.

WOG

Reference:

E-0 -- C Background Conditions:

To be performed prior to depressurizing all intact SGs.

2012 NRC RUN 4 Page 33 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators B-F8, B-G7, and B-E2 are illuminated

1-RC-LI-1461 fails low

Letdown isolates EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power, and a loss of instrument air has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciator J-D2 illuminates

Instrument air pressure decreases EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a control rod has dropped into the core, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Annunciators A-G2, A-F1, A-B7, A-C7, A-C8, A-D4 illuminate

IRPI for B-10 indicates 0 steps

Pressurizer pressure and level decrease

RCS temperature and reactor power decrease slightly EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and grid voltage begins to swing, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-8, "Grid Instability," and 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Voltages oscillates

MW oscillate

Generator voltage oscillates

Exciter voltage and amperage oscillate

"A" MFRV fails to manual during ramp EVENT 5: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials)

Loss of switchyard causes loss of all RCPs

Spurious SI signal after reactor trip

1H EDG output breaker does not close

1J trips on overspeed 2012 NRC RUN 4 Date _________ Revision 0

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