IR 05000395/2014008

Download: ML14276A466

Text

October 3, 2014

Mr. ThomasVice President South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station P.O. Box 88 Jenkinsville, SC 29065

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2014008

Dear Mr. Gatlin:

On August 21, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at your Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. On August 21, 2014, the NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

Based on the inspection samples, the inspectors determined that your staff's implementation of the corrective action program supported nuclear safety. In reviewing your corrective action program, the inspectors assessed how well your staff identified problems at a low threshold, your staff's implementation of the station's process for prioritizing and evaluating these problems, and the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by the station to resolve these problems. In each of these areas, the inspectors determined that your staff's performance was adequate to support nuclear safety.

The inspectors also evaluated other processes your staff used to identify issues for resolution. These included your use of audits and self-assessments to identify latent problems and your incorporation of lessons learned from industry operating experience into station programs, processes, and procedures. The inspectors determined that your station's performance in each of these areas supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the inspectors determined that your station's management maintains a safety-conscious work environment adequate to support nuclear safety. Based on the inspectors' observations, your employees are willing to raise concerns related to nuclear safety through at least one of the several means available.The enclosed inspection report discusses one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) identified during this inspection. This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it was entered into your corrective action program. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the V.C.

Summer station.

If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the V.C. Summer station.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). Adams is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA Reinaldo Rodriguez for/ Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000395/2014008

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000395/2014008; 08/04/2014 - 08/21/2014: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station;

Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The inspection was conducted by a senior project engineer, a senior project inspector, a reactor inspector, and a fuel facilities inspector. One Green non-cited violation (NCV) was identified. The significance of most findings is identified by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP); cross-cutting aspects were determined using IMC 0310; Aspects Within Cross-Cutting Areas; and findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after

NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5.

Problem Identification and Resolution The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The threshold for initiating Condition Reports (CRs) in the corrective action program (CAP) was appropriately low, as evidenced by the types of problems identified and the number of CRs entered annually into the CAP. However, the team did identify deficiencies in the areas of identification of problems, prioritization and evaluation of identified problems, and effectiveness of corrective actions. The inspectors determined that overall audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensee's processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.

Based upon interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments and a review of the 2013 Safety Culture Assessment Report, the team determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to identify and correct conditions adverse to quality. Specifically, inspectors determined the licensee failed to identify three degraded emergency feedwater (EF) system piping supports during the May 27, 2014, water hammer post transient event walkdown. These included one upstream of the turbine driven EF pump discharge check valve XVC01016-EF (EFH-4018), one downstream of the turbine driven EF pump discharge valve, XVG01036-EF (EFH-0050), and one downstream of the 'C' SG turbine driven EF pump supply stop check valve, XVK0120C-EF (EFH-5048) during a routine plant walkdown.

Enclosure Failure to identify three damaged pipe supports as conditions adverse quality during a previous licensee evaluation for the water hammer event was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it adversely impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as seismic) to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, these damaged piping supports resulted in a condition where there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the EF system. Subsequently, the licensee performed pipe stress calculations and concluded that the EF system was degraded, but operable. In accordance with Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and

Characterization of Findings," a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, and did not represent an actual loss of system safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance resource because the licensee did not have an approved plant procedure to support the piping walk-downs post water hammer event. H.1 of IMC 0310.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of condition reports (CRs). To verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed CRs that had been issued between July, 2012 and August, 2014, including a detailed review of selected CRs associated with the following risk-significant systems:

AC Vital (AC), Component Cooling Water (CCW), Service Water (SW) and Emergency Feedwater (EF). Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the inspectors selected a representative number of CRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including operations, maintenance, engineering, health physics, chemistry, and security. These CRs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed selected CRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where CRs were screened for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold.

The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns of equipment associated with the selected systems and other plant areas to assess the material condition and to look for any deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed CRs, maintenance history, completed work orders (WOs) for the selected systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period of time; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a five-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues. Control room walk-downs were also performed to assess the main control room deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were entered into the CAP. Operator workarounds and operator burden screenings were reviewed, and the inspectors verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment which were being implemented in the field.

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of selected CRs to assess the adequacy of the root-cause and apparent-cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem described in the CRs and the guidance in licensee procedure SAP-1356, "Cause Determination."

The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

The inspectors reviewed selected industry operating experience items, including NRC generic communications to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed site trend reports to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.

The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution programs and processes, to verify that findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these audits and assessments were consistent with the NRC's assessment of the licensee's CAP. The inspectors attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process. These included CR Review Team (CRT) meetings and Management Review Team meetings (MRT).

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Assessment Problem Identification The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating CRs as described in licensee procedure SAP-0999, "Corrective Action Program," management expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate CRs for any reason. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. Based on reviews and walkdowns of accessible portions of the selected systems, the inspectors determined that system deficiencies were being identified and placed in the CAP. However, the team identified one minor performance deficiency and one finding related to the identification of issues.

Problem Prioritization and Evaluation Based on the review of CRs sampled by the inspectors during the onsite period, the inspectors concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensee's CAP procedures as described in the CR categorization guidance in procedure SAP-0999. Each CR was assigned a priority level (category) by the CR Review Team and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk.

The inspectors determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensee's CAP procedures and assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue consistent with procedure SAP-1356.

The inspectors identified a performance deficiency associated with the licensee's classification of conditions adverse to quality. V. C. Summer Unit 1 Quality Assurance Program Description requires the application of specific program controls to non-safety related structure, system, and components (SSCs), for which 10 CFR Appendix B is not applicable, that are considered to be significant contributors to plant safety. Specifically, it requires that "measures to ensure that failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected" for risk significant contributors to plant safety. The current classification of Condition Adverse to Quality is SAP-0999 does not formally take into account the risk significance of the SSC that has been identified in the event. This performance deficiency was considered minor because there was no adverse impact on cornerstone objectives. This minor performance deficiency has been entered into the licensees CAP as CR 14-04554. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the inspectors determined that overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective.

c. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality regarding degraded emergency feedwater piping supports.

Description.

On July 8, 2014, the inspectors identified three damaged pipe supports on the emergency feedwater (EF) system. These included one upstream of the turbine driven EF pump discharge check valve XVC01016-EF (EFH-4018), one downstream of the turbine driven EF pump discharge valve, XVG01036-EF (EFH-0050), and one downstream of the 'C' SG turbine driven EF pump supply stop check valve, XVK0120C-EF (EFH-5048). The inspectors determined the licensee failed to identify the degraded piping supports during the May 27, 2014, water hammer post transient event walkdown. The inspectors noted that the piping support, EHF-0050 indicated signs of transient loading evidenced by the baseplate having shifted its base grout. Piping support, EFH-4018 indicated signs of transient load compression evidenced by a rotated pipe clamp and a strut that had bent the strut paddle plate within clamp. Piping support, EFH-5048 indicated signs of transient loading evidenced by the baseplate having separated from the wall on the south edge. The licensee initiated engineering evaluation of these degraded piping supports and determined that piping support, EFH-4018 needed to be repaired and a further detailed analysis for EFH-4018 was required to determine if this support was fully capable of performing its design basis function. Subsequently, the licensee performed pipe stress calculations and concluded that the EF system was degraded, but operable and therefore capable of performing its intended safety function.

In addition, inspectors found that CR-09-02602 documented operating experience from the Wolf Creek water hammer event in 2009 and the proposed corrective action was to develop a procedure to performing piping system walkdowns post event (e.g. transient, water or steam hammer) as an enhancement. The inspectors reviewed this CR and determined that plant support engineering guide (PSEG)-36, "Transient Event Walkdown Guideline," was still under development at the time of the inspection. Since this procedure was still in revision, it was concluded by the inspectors that licensee personnel did not have an adequate procedure for performing the post water hammer EF system walkdown.

Analysis:

Failure to identify three damaged pipe supports as conditions adverse quality during the previous licensee walkdown evaluation for a water hammer event on May 27, 2014, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as seismic) to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, these damaged piping supports resulted in a condition where there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of a system to perform its safety function during a seismic event. Subsequently, the licensee performed pipe stress calculations and concluded that the EF system was degraded, but operable. In accordance with the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated July 1, 2012, the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency and did not represent an actual loss of system safety function.

This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance resource because the licensee did not have an approved plant procedure to support the piping walk-downs post water hammer event. H.1 of IMC 0310.

Enforcement.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires, in part, that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to identify and correct three degraded piping supports on the EF system during a previous licensee evaluation for a water hammer event on May 27, 2014. Because this performance deficiency was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the CAP as CR-14-03806, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000395/2014008-01, Degraded Emergency Feedwater System Piping Supports)

.2 Use of Operating Experience (OE)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors examined licensee programs for reviewing industry operating experience, reviewed licensee procedure SAP-1351, "Operating Experience Program," reviewed the licensee's operating experience database to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal operating experience data was handled at the plant. In addition, the inspectors selected a sample of operating experience documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal operating experience items, etc.), which had been issued since September 2012. The inspectors reviewed this to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the V.C. Summer station, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Assessment Based on a review of documentation related to review of OE issues, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening OE for applicability to the plant. Industry OE was evaluated by plant OE Coordinators and relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. Operating experience issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in root cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedure SAP-1356.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems

identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedures.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspectors' independent review. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document all areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate. Site trend reports were thorough and a low threshold was established for evaluation of potential trends, as evidenced by the CRs reviewed that were initiated as a result of adverse trends.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Safety-Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors interviewed several on-site workers regarding their knowledge of the CAP at the V. C. Summer station and their willingness to write CRs or raise safety concerns. During technical discussions with members of the plant staff, the inspectors conducted interviews to develop a general perspective of the safety-conscious work environment at the site. The interviews were also conducted to determine if any conditions existed that would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and interviewed the ECP coordinator. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were properly reviewed and that identified deficiencies were resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.

b. Assessment Based on the interviews conducted and the CRs reviewed, the inspectors determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees.

Based on discussions conducted with a sample of plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On August 21, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Thomas Gatlin and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

R. Burt, Plant Support Engineering Supervisor

G. Douglass, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services

T. Gatlin, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

M. Harmon, Manager, Chemistry Services

R. Justice, Manager, Nuclear Operations

G. Lippard, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

M. Moore, Nuclear Licensing Supervisor

B. Ratchlord, Planning Scheduling Supervisor

J. Rinehart, Health Physics Supervisor

D. Shue, Manager, Maintenance Services

W. Stuart, General Manager, Engineering Services

A. Wright, Performance Improvement

NRC personnel

E. Coffman, Resident Inspector

J. Reese, Senior Resident Inspector

S. Rose, Chief, Branch 7, Division of Reactor Projects

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened and Closed

05000395/2014008-01 NCV Degraded Emergency Feedwater System Piping Supports (Section 4OA2.1.c)

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

Station Administrative Procedure (SAP)-143, Preventive Maintenance Program, Revision 15, Change C

SAP-0157, Maintenance Rule Program Implementation, Revision 1

SAP-0209, Operability Determination Process, Revision 1

SAP-0999, Corrective Action Program, Revision 12

SAP-0999B, CR Review Team (CRRT), Revision 0

SAP-0999C, Management Review Team (MRT), Revision 0

SAP-0999E, Corrective Action Review Board (CARB), Revision 2

SAP-1101, Plant Health Program, Revision 2

SAP-1306, Employee Concerns Program, Revision 3

SAP-1356, Cause Determination, Revision 7

SAP-1351, Operating Experience Program, Revision 10

Engineering Services Procedure (ES) - 0437, Inspections for Maintenance Rule - Structures, Revision 1

ES-0514, Maintenance Rule Program Implementation, Revision 5

ES-0514A, Maintenance Rule - Scoping, Revision 0

ES-0514B, Maintenance Rule - Function Safety Significance Classification, Revision 0

ES-0514C, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria Selection, Revision 0

ES-0514D, Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring, Revision 0

ES-0514E, Maintenance Rule - (a)(1) and (a)(2) Transitioning, Revision 0

ES-0514-F, Maintenance Rule - Expert Panel Roles Panel Roles and Responsibility, Revision 0

ES-0514G, Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment, Revision 0

ES-0524, Equipment reliability Strategy Development, Revision 2

Plant Support Engineering Guide (PSEG)-02, System and Major Component Walkdown, Revision 7

PSEG-12, System and Program Health Reports, Revision 7 Quality Systems Procedure (QSP)-213, Inservice Inspection Program Administrative Guidelines, Revision 6

OAP-113.1, Operator Workaround and Dark Board Program, Revision 3

OAP-107.1, Control of IPCS Functions, Revision 3

Condition Reports

(CRs) ReviewedCR-05-00573

CR-09-02602

CR-10-03553

CR-10-01427

CR-12-00534

CR-12-02013

CR-12-02303

CR-12-02439

CR-12-03551

CR-12-03644

CR-12-03930

CR-12-03931

CR-12-03940

CR-12-04116

CR-12-04122

CR-12-04152

CR-12-06193

CR-13-00091

CR-13-00739

CR-13-00930

CR-13-03795

CR-13-04877

CR-13-05139

CR-13-03610

CR-14-00760

CR-14-01103

CR-14-01143

CR-14-02533

CR-14-03191

CR-14-03039

CR-14-03638

CR-14-03806

CR-12-04776

CR-14-03650

CR-14-03191

CR-14-02393

CR-14-02282

CR-14-01926

CR-14-01768

CR-14-01005

CR-14-00048

CR-14-00002

CR-13-05139

CR-13-04877

CR-13-04274

CR-13-03733

CR-13-03290

CR-13-02657

CR-13-01471

CR-13-00930

CR-13-00731

CR-13-00045

Attachment

CR-12-05393

CR-14-00112

CR-14-02574

CR-14-02575

CR-13-05137

CR-13-03186

CR-13-03288

CR-13-03289

CR-11-03491

CR-11-03925

CR-12-05687

CR-12-05132

CR-12-04279

CR-12-05283

CR-12-05688

CR-12-02276

CR-13-00736

CR-13-04267

CR-13-05106

CR-13-05245

CR-13-03178

CR-13-05313

CR-13-01962

CR-13-04265

CR-14-00643

CR-14-02076

CR-14-02164

CR-14-02281

CR-14-02187

CR-14-02437

CR-14-02561

CR-14-02254

CR-14-04345

CR-14-04342

CR-14-04341 System Health Reports EV- AC Vital Busses, January 2014

EV-AC Vital Busses, June 2014

Work Orders

1214014-01, dated 11/30/2012

214014-02, dated 12/3/2012

1214014-03, dated 12/5/2012

Radiological Work Permits

RWP 12-04300, Rev. 00, dated 11/14/2011

RWP 12-04300, Rev. 01, dated 10/17/2012

RWP 12-04300, Rev. 02, dated 11/04/2012

RWP 12-04300, Rev. 03, dated 11/09/2012

Design Basis Document

120 Volt Class 1E Vital AC Electrical System, Revision 2

Modifications

ECR 71640, Collapsible Fire Hose for Hose Reel, dated 12/1/12

ECR 71922, Class 1E 480V MCC Thermal Overload Relay Replacement Kits, dated 7/31/2014

Drawings

E-206-001, One Line and Relay Diagram- Notes, Legend and References, Revision 31 E-206-061, Balance of Plant- Vital AC/DC System, Sheet 1, Revision 38 E-206-061, Balance of Plant-Vital AC/DC System, Sheet 2, Revision 22

E-206-061, Balance of Plant-Vital AC/DC System Sheet 3, Revision 4

E-3-3-292, Safe Shutdown & Accident Mitigation ESS, Revision 5

E-206-062, Electrical One Line Diagram, Engineered Safety Features Vital AC System Sheet 2, Revision 34 E-206-062, Electrical One Line Diagram, Engineered Safety Features Vital AC System Sheet 1, Revision 40 E-206-062, Electrical One Line and Relay Diagram, Vital DC System Sheet 3, Revision 19 E-206-062, Electrical One Line and Relay Diagram, Vital DC System Sheet 4, Revision 6 E-206-005, Plant Electrical Distribution, Revision 26

Attachment Miscellaneous Documents Design Basis Document (DBD) Emergency Feedwater System (EF), Revision 15 System Health Reports, EF, 2014

Self-Assessment (SA)13-PE-02 - Maintenance Rule Fire Protection Program Log #

130456, dated 4/28/2014

Fire Watch Area Tag Log #

130105

Roving Fire Watch Log, dated 6/29/2014 Roving Fire Watch Log, dated 4/4/2014 Roving Fire Watch Log, dated 5/22/2014