LR-N06-0154, Revision to License Change Request S05-06: Request for Change to Technical Specifications Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

Revision to License Change Request S05-06: Request for Change to Technical Specifications Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

ML061080457
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/10/2006
From:	Joyce T Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LCR S05-06, LR-N06-0154
Download: ML061080457 (3)

Text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236

'APR1 0 2006 LR-N06-0154 LCR S05-06 0 PSEG ATuclearL.LC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 REVISION TO LICENSE CHANGE REQUEST S05-06: REQUEST FOR CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT I AND UNIT 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75

References:

(1) Letter from PSEG to NRC: "Request for Change to Technical Specifications, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Facility Operating Licenses DPR-70 and DPR-75, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311", dated August 31, 2005 (2) Letter from PSEG to NRC: "Revision to License Change Request S05-06: Request for Change to Technical Specifications Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Facility Operating Licenses DPR-70 and DPR-75, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311", dated December 8, 2005.

On Tuesday March 20, 2005 a telephone conference was held between PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) and the NRC Staff regarding License Change Request (LCR) S05-06. As a follow-up to that conversation the following information is provided.

1. The staff requested a discussion supporting that the electronic check source feature is as effective in identifying material discrepancies as a SOURCE CHECK.

The electronic check source (ECS) feature of the Containment High Range Accident Monitors is designed to assure the integrity of the detector, cabling and electronics.

Experience at Salem has demonstrated that this feature has reliably assured these components remain operable, and has generated an alarm condition when these components are not operable. There have been no false positive cases where the cause of a failed ECS was not identifiable.

95-2168 REV. 7/99

APR 1 0 M006 Document Control Desk LR.-N06-0154 The following charts contain the equipment challenges that the Salem Containment High Range Accident Monitors have experienced over the last ten years.

Adverse Material Conditions detected by ECS Bad detector cable Dirty function switch Loose detector connectors Adverse Material Conditions not detected by the ECS.

Setpoint drift Channel Calibration Drift Alarm and warning lights not functioning Failed Functional Checks Channel Spiking It is important to note that the conditions that were not identified by the ECS would not have been detected by a SOURCE CHECK either. The purpose of a SOURCE CHECK and the ECS is the same, which is to ensure the integrity of the circuit between the detector and the instrumentation display.

The station has historically operated by crediting the ECS in lieu of monthly SOURCE CHECKS. This practice was successful in identifying equipment degradation in a timely manner. The ECS is performed automatically several times a day, whereas the manual SOURCE CHECK is performed monthly. The ECS generates an alarm condition that alerts the control room operators to a malfunction.

2. As previously stated in reference (1), there is unnecessary occupational dose received by our technicians in performing the manual SOURCE CHECK. Additionally, our technicians are exposed to industrial safety hazards that when performing these monthly checks. To perform the manual SOURCE CHECK, technicians are required to remove the instrument from it's mounting to expose the detector to a source of radioactivity. Since this change to the surveillance methodology was instituted, the increased wear on the instrument leads has caused this equipment to fail, this was subsequently detected by an ECS. It is important to note that during this failure it had just passed it's manual SOURCE CHECK.

Based on the above it can be concluded that the use of the ECS is a more effective method for ensuring equipment reliability than the SOURCE CHECK.

Document Control Desk LR.-N06-0154 Should you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Mr. Justin Wearne at (856) 339-5081.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on _ _/__ _ _ _

(D te)

Sincerely, Thomas P. Joy Site Vice President Salem Generating Station C: Mr. S. Collins, Administrator - Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. S. Bailey, Licensing Project Manager - Salem U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 08B1 Washington, DC 20555 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem (X24)

Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering P0 Box 415 Trenton, New Jersey 0862