| 08-19-2015 | On June 22, 2015, at 1406, control room operators were notified by chemistry personnel that the Salem Unit 1 Containment Spray Additive Tank Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) concentration was less than the minimum concentration by weight as required by Technical Specification {TS). Salem entered TS Action Statement 3.6.2.2.a for low NaOH concentration in the Containment Spray Additive Tank. On June 23, 2015 at 1908, NaOH concentration was returned to its minimum required TS value and the plant exited TS 3.6.2.2.a.
This report is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) for "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications ... " and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) for "Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: ... (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. |
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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor {PWR/4} Containment Spray System, Tank {BE!TK} Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}.
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE
Event Date: June 22, 2015 Discovery Date: June 22, 2015
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE
Salem Unit 1 was in operational Mode 1, operating at approximately 100 percent power. No additional structures, systems or components were inoperable at the time that contributed to this event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE
On June 22, 2015, at 1406, Salem Operations was notified by chemistry personnel that the Salem Unit 1 Containment Spray Additive Tank {BE!TK} Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) concentration was 29.6 percent by weight. Unit 1 entered TS Action Statement 3.6.2.2.a for the Containment Spray Additive Tank being less than the required value of between 30 and 32 percent by weight of NaOH solution.
At 1521, additional sampling confirmed the Salem Unit 1 Containment Spray Additive Tank NaOH concentration to be 29.6 percent by weight.
At 2055 an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS) report was made under the requirements of 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) for " Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: ...
(C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
On June 23, 2015, at 1908, Salem Unit 1 exited TS 3.6.2.2.a when chemical addition and subsequent testing verified the Containment Spray Additive Tank contents to be 31.4 percent by weight of NaOH.
Subsequent analysis of past Containment Spray Additive Tank level versus estimated NaOH concentration 2. DOCKET 6. LERNUMBER
1. FACILITYNAME
0001, or by internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
CONTINUATION SHEET
by weight indicated that the NaOH concentration in the tank had decreased below the TS required range of between 30 and 32 percent by weight value in January of 2015, exceeding the TS 3.6.2.2.a allowed outage time for inoperability of the Containment Spray Additive Tank of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
This report is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) for "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications ... " and 1 O CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v) for "Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: ... (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CAUSE OF EVENT
A review of control room logs indicates that a slow rise in Containment Spray Additive Tank level occurred over the course of several months. The last surveillance performed on November 11 , 2014 indicated a tank level of 79.4 percent with an NaOH concentration of 30.9 percent by weight. Subsequent surveillance testing performed on June 22, 2015 indicated a level increase to 81.5 percent and a corresponding NaOH concentration decrease to 29.6 percent by weight. Trending capability was not sufficient to identify this long-term trend.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
This event did not result in any offsite release of radioactivity or increase of offsite dose rates, and there were no personnel injuries or damage to any other safety-related equipment.
The purpose of the Containment Spray System is to operate following a primary coolant system failure to reduce containment pressure in conjunction with the Containment Fan Cooler Units and to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere. The purpose of the Containment Spray Additive Tank is to provide a source of NaOH to the Containment Spray stream to enhance iodine removal capability during the initial phase of a primary coolant system failure and to minimize chloride induced stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel inside containment. If a large break loss of coolant accident were to occur, the concentration of NaOH in solution must be sufficient to raise the injection spray to a pH of at least 8.5, as specified in the Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Calculations assuming a 29.6% NaOH concentration by weight solution in the Containment Spray Additive Tank indicate that the resultant spray solution would have a pH of greater than 8.5 and thus would be capable of driving absorption of elemental iodine sufficiently to ensure the Containment Spray system was capable of performing its intended safety function.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
Although the Containment Spray system was determined to be inoperable, it was capable of performing its intended safety function, thus this event does not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of Salem Unit 1 and 2 LERs for the previous three years identified no other similar events.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1. Salem Chemistry department will develop and implement a method for long term trending of Containment Spray Additive Tank parameters.
2. Salem Operations department will develop and implement a method for long term trending of Containment Spray Additive Tank parameters.
3. Troubleshooting will be performed to identify the source of in-leakage to the Containment Spray Additive Tank.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no regulatory commitments.
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000311/LER-2015-001 | P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236
PSEG
MAR 1 0 2015
LR-N15-0040
10 CFR 50.73
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001
LER 311/2015-001-00
Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-75
NRC Docket No. 50-311
SUBJECT: Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification for One Channel of
Overtemperature Delta-T Inoperable
The Licensee Event Report, "Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification for One
Channel of Overtemperature Delta-T Inoperable" is being submitted pursuant to
10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the
plant's Technical Specifications..."
The attached LER contains no commitments. Should you have any questions or
comments regarding the submittal, please contact David Lafleur of Salem Regulatory
Assurance at 856-339-1754.
Sincerely,
John F. Perry
Site Vice President — Salem
Attachments (1)
MAR 1 9 2015
10 CFR 50.73
Page 2
LR-N15-0040
CC
Mr. D. Dorman, Administrator — Region 1, NRC
Ms. C. Sanders, Licensing Project Manager — Salem, NRC
Mr. P. Finney, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Salem (X24)
Mr. P. Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNE
Mr. R. Braun, President and Chief Nuclear Officer — Nuclear
Mr. T. Cachaza, Salem Commitment Tracking Coordinator
Mr. L. Marabella, Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator
Mr. D. Lafleur, Salem Regulatory Assurance
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(01-2014)
*Send LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See Page 2 for required number of
digits/characters for each block)
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections
Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by
Internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget Washington, DC
20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB
control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,
the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME
Salem Generating Station - Unit 2
2. DOCKET NUMBER
05000311
3. PAGE
1 OF 3
4. -nTLE Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification for One Channel of Overtemperature Delta-T Inoperable | | | 05000272/LER-2015-001 | Fuel Movement in Progress With Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-2015-002 | Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification for One Channel of Steam Generator Level Indication Inoperable
LER 15-002-002 for Salem, Unit 1, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification for One Channel of Steam Generator Level Indication Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-2015-002 | P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236
PSEG
Nadea, II,C
OCT 0 2 2015
LR-N15-0205 10 CFR 50.73
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001
LER 311/2015-002-00
Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-75
NRC Docket No. 50-311
SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report 311/2015-002-00
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PSEG Nuclear LLC is
submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2015-002-00, "Reactor
Trip Due to Loss of 4kV Non-Vital Group Bus."
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact
Mr. David Lafleur of Salem Regulatory Assurance at 856-339-1754.
Sincerely,
John F. Perry
Site Vice President — alem
Attachment
OCT 0 2 2015
10 CFR 50.73
Page 2
LR-N15-0205
CC
Mr. D. Dorman, Administrator— Region 1, NRC
Mr. T. Wengert, Licensing Project Manager (acting) — Salem, NRC
Mr. P. Finney, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Salem (X24)
Mr. P. Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNE
Mr. R. Braun, President and Chief Nuclear Officer — Nuclear
Mr. T. Cachaza, Salem Commitment Tracking Coordinator
Mr. L. Marabella, Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator
Mr. D. Lafleur, Salem Regulatory Assurance
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
01-2014)
t, , .1
•
'., LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
'S ree Page 2 or required number of
digits/characters for each block)
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.
Reported lessons learned are Incorporated Into the licensing process and fed back to Industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections
Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by
Internet e-mall to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC
20503. If a means used to Impose an information collection does not display a currentlyvaild OMB
control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,
the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME
Salem Generating Station - Unit 2
2. DOCKET NUMBER
05000311
3. PAGE
1 OF 4
4. TrrLE Reactor Trip Due to Loss of 4 kV Non-Vital Group Bus
LER 15-002-01 for Salem, Unit 2, Regarding Reactor Trip Due to Loss of 4 kV Non-Vital Group Bus | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-2015-003 | Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | | | 05000311/LER-2015-003 | Both Trains of High Head Safety Injection Inoperable Due to a Relief Valve Failure
LER 15-003-00 for Salem, Unit 2, Regarding Both Trains of High Head Safety Injection Inoperable Due to a Relief Valve Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | | 05000272/LER-2015-004 | Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification for One Channel of Overtemperature Delta-T Inoperable | | | 05000272/LER-2015-005 | Low Containment Spray Additive Tank Sodium Hydroxide Concentration | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000272/LER-2015-006 | Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves and Block Valves Do Not Meet the Requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-2015-007 | Inoperable Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Due to Failed Charcoal Filter Surveillance Test
LER 15-007-01 for Salem, Unit 1, Regarding Inoperable Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Due to Failed Charcoal Filter Surveillance Test | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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