ML100990088
| ML100990088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/2010 |
| From: | Price J Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 10-207 | |
| Download: ML100990088 (12) | |
Text
10CFR50.90 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261April8,2010 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttention:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555SerialNo.10-207 NL&OS/GSS RODocketNos.50-338/339LicenseNos.NPF-4/7 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY (DOMINION)
NORTH ANNA POWERSTATIONUNITS1AND2 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TS 3.7.12-ECCSPUMPROOM EXHAUST AIR CLEANUP SYSTEM (PREACS)ADDITION OF CONDITIONS/ACTION STATEMENTS in a September28,2009letter(SerialNo.09-034A),Dominionrequestedamendments,intheformofchangestothe Technical SpecificationstoFacilityOperatingLicense NumbersNPF-4andNPF-7forNorthAnnaPowerStationUnits 1and2,respectively.Theproposedchangeswilladdnew Conditions BandCwithassociatedAction StatementsandCompletionTimestoTS3.7.12andmodifyConditionsAandD.Thechanges specifically addressthefiltrationfunctionofECCSPREACSandare consistentwiththeassociateddesignandlicensingbasisaccidentanalysisassumptions.InaMarch11,2010e-mailfromDr.V.Sreenivas,theNRCrequestedadditionalinformationtocompletethereviewoftheproposed amendments.
Attachment1providestherequestedinformationin accordance withtheagreeduponschedule.Theinformationprovidedinthe attachmentdoesnotimpacttheconclusionofthe significant hazards consideration determinationasdefinedin10CFR50.92ortheevaluationfor eligibilityforcategoricalexclusionassetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).Dominioncontinuestorequestapprovaloftheproposedchangesby September30,2010witha60day implementationperiodfollowingNRCapprovalofthelicenseamendments.
SerialNO.1 0-207 Docket Nos.50-338/339RAI-EGGSPREAGSLARPage2of3Ifyouhaveany questionsorrequireadditional information, please contact Mr.ThomasShaubat(804) 273-2763.Verytrulyyours, rice sident-Nuclear Engineering Attachment 1.ResponsetoRequestfor Additional Information Commitmentsmadeinthisletter:None.
COMMONWEALTHOFVIRGINIACOUNTYOFHENRICOTheforegoingdocumentwasacknowledgedbeforeme,inandfortheCountyandCommonwealthaforesaid,todayby J.AlanPrice,whoisVicePresident-NuclearEngineeringofVirginiaElectricandPowerCompany.Hehasaffirmedbeforemethatheisdulyauthorizedtoexecuteandfiletheforegoing documentinbehalfofthatCompany,andthatthestatementsinthedocumentaretruetothebestofhisknowledgeandbelief.Acknowledgedbeforemethis t3--H<../dayof Ap r;\'2010.MyCommissionExpires:
_...L.Al.L.-ao..,MIIe C**I......,...,.otaryPublic cc:U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IISamNunnAtlantaFederal Center61ForsythStreet,SWSuite23T85Atlanta,Georgia30303Mr.J.E.Reasor,Jr.OldDominionElectric Cooperative Innsbrook Corporate Center4201DominionBlvd.Suite300GlenAllen,Virginia23060StateHealth Commissioner Virginia DepartmentofHealth JamesMadisonBuilding-i h floor 109 Governor StreetSuite730Richmond,Virginia23219 NRC Senior Resident InspectorNorthAnnaPowerStationDr.V.SreenivasNRCProject ManagerU.S.Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOneWhiteFlintNorthMailStop 08 G-9A11555RockvillePikeRockville,Maryland 20852-2738 Ms.K.R.CottonNRCProject ManagerU.S.Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOneWhiteFlintNorthMailStop 08 G-9A11555RockvillePikeRockville,Maryland 20852-2738 Serial No.1 0-207 Docket Nos.50-338/339RAI-EGGSPREAGSLARPage3of3 SerialNo.10-207 Docket Nos.50-338/339 AttachmentRESPONSETOREQUESTFOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROPOSED LICE NSE AMENDMENT REQUESTTS3.7.12-ECCSPUMPROOMEXHAUSTAIR CLEANUP SYSTEM (PREACSl ADDITION OF CONDITIONS/ACTION STATEMENTS North Anna Power Station Units1and2 Virginia Eleotric and Power Company (Dominion)
SerialNO.10-207DocketNos.
50-338/339ECCSPREACS
-RAIPage1of8RESPONSETOREQUE
- iT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROPOSED LICE NSE AMENDMENT REQUESTTS3.7.12-ECCSPUMPROOM
- XHAUST AIR CLEANUP SYSTEM lPREACS)ADDITION OF CONDITIONS/ACTION STATEMENTS(TAC.NO.ME2413
&ME2414)BackgroundInaSeptember 28,2009letter(SerialNo.09-034A),Dominionrequestedamendments,intheformofchangestotheTechnical SpecificationstoFacilityOperatingLicenseNumbersNPF-4andNPF-7forNorthAnnaPowerStationUnits1and2,respectively.Theproposedchangeswilladd new Conditions BandCwithassociatedActionStatementsandCompletionTimes toTS3.7.12andmodifyConditionsAandD.ThechangesspecificallyaddressthefiltrationfunctionofECCSPREACSandareconsistentwiththeassociateddesignandlicehsingbasisaccidentanalysisassumptions.InaMarch11,2010e-mailfromDr.V.Sreenivas,theNRCrequestedadditionalinformationtocompletethereviewoftheproposedamendments.ThefollowinginformationisprovidedtoaddresstheNRC concerns/questions.
Request for Additional Information A.Containment and Ventilation Branch, Division of Safety SystemsRAISCVB-1:DescribehowtheECGSpumpleakagewillbemonitored.Arethesealsin a staticcondition(pumpnotoperating)ordynamic condition (pump operating)?Howisthevolumetricleakagerate measured?Dominion Response:ECCSpumpsealsaremonitoredbyOperations.TheECCSpumpsconsistofthreeChargingpumpsperUnit(also referredtoasHighHeadSafetyInjection(HHSI)pumps),whicharelocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingandtwoLowHeadSafetyInjection(LHSI)pumpsandtwoOutsideRecirculationSpray(ORS)pumpsperunit,whicharehousedineachUnit'sSafeguard Buildings.Thepumpsealsaremonitoredinastaticcondition,exceptforoneChargingRump[HighHeadSafetyInjection(HHSI)]whichisrunningduringnormalplantoperation.ThetwoLowHeadSafetyInjection(LHSI)pumpsperunitareinAutoStandbyduringnormalplantoperation.TheHHSIandLHSIpumpsareoperatedforsurveillancetestingonceevery92days.Also,therearetwoOutsideRecirculationSpray(ORS)Pumpsthatareoperatedevery18monthsforsurveillancetesting.TheCharging(HHSI)pumpsarerotated approximatelyevery30daystobalancetheruntimeandperformanceofinservicetesting.Monitoringofthesepumpsealsandassociatedvalves/pipingforleakageisperformedbyOperatorroundsoncepershift(currently12hours)fortherunningHHSIpumpandthenormallyrunningLHSIandORSpumps.Thenon-runningHHSIpumpsaremonitoredduringoperatorroundsoncedaily.Specifically,anyleakageismonitoredanddocumentedin SerialNO.10-207DocketNos.
50-338/339 ECCS PREACS-RAIPage2of8theECCSLeakageLog (1-LOG-20&2-LOG-20).The quarterly surveillancetestingoftheHHSIandLHSIpumpsandthe18month surveillancetestingoftheORSpumps directs OperationstoinspectpumpsandassociatedvalvesforleakageandtorecordanyleakageintheECCSLeakageLog.ItshouldbenotedthattheLHSIandORSpumpsutilizeatandemseal arrangementwiththeinboardsealcooledbyprocessfluidandtheoutboardsealcooledbyRWST waterandasealheadtank,respectively.Thus,anyleakagefromthesesealsisnotconsideredEGGSleakage.Theleakrateisestimatedbasedonvisual inspection(countingdropsperminuteorbymeasuringleakageinagraduated cylinderoveraspecifictimeperiod).RAISCVB-2:Pumpsealsrequiresomeleakagewhile operating to preventsealfailure.
IftheEGGSpumpleakage monitoring is performedwith,the pump notoperating,(sealsin a static condition) provide justificationwhythisis acceptable for predicting sealleakagewhenthepumpisoperating.
Dominion Response:Thechargingpumpsareprovidedwitha mechanicalsealdesignbyFlowserve NuclearPumpDivision.Thesealassemblyiscomposedofbothprimaryand secondary seals.Thesecondaryseals(o-rings)aredeslqnedtorundrywithnoleakage.Primarysealingiscontrolledbythedegreeofseparationbetweentherotatingand stationarysealrings.Whenthepumpisshutdown,the twofacesareincontact.Whenthepumpisrunning,thesealfacesseparate.Thisallowsforathinfilmlayerofpumpingfluidtoactasalubricantandreducetheheatbuilduponthesealfaces.Thisthinfilmlayerbetweenthesealfacesisnotenoughfluidtobe measurableandwillexitthesealhousing,usuallyintheformofvapor,but occasionally theexitcanbeintheformofadrop.Onoccasion,afteraHHSIpumphasbeensecured,tracesofboricacidcrystalsmaybecomelodgedbetweenthesealfaces (micro-inches)whenthesealfacescool.Consequently,someminorleakagemay occuronthemagnitudeofafewdropsperminutewhenthepumpissecured.Todatewehavenotseenanyindicationthataleakingsealinstaticconditionwillbedegradedwhenthepumpisrunning.Infact,staticleakageusuallygoestozerowhenthepumpisstarteddueto dynamicforcesonthesealfacesandthe temperature increasebetweenthesealfacestoabovetheboricacidsolubilitycurve.Asnotedaboveintheresponseto RAISGVB-1,pumpleakageisalsomonitoredduringtheperformanceofinservicetestingandtheEGGSleakageupdatedtoreflecttheleakageobservedduringinservicetesting.ThisobservedleakagevalueisusedtocalculatethetotalEGCSleakage.ThetotalECCSleakagevalueisnotreducedifthepumpsinastaticconditionexhibitlowerleakage.
Serial No.1 0-207 Docket Nos.50-338/339 EGGS PREAGS-RAIPage3of8 RAISCVB-3:
Page 11 ofthelicense amendment requestsaysthe proposed change includes a surveillance requirement to monitor ECGSleakage.This"surveillance requirement" is includedasa Required Action for Conditions8,C,andD.No ECCStestingis being added TS 3.7.12 Surveillance Requirements.
No EGGS test programisbeing added to section 5.5,"ProgramsandManuals", oftheTechnical Specifications as part of this amendment request.(a)Isthe monitoring of the EGCS system leakage part of an existing technical specification otherthanTS 3.7.12?(b)Isthe new surveillance requirement added to meet the requirements of10GFR50.36(c)(3),"Surveillence Requirements"?(c)If not, provide justification for not having a technical specification surveillance requirementtoassurethatthe condition of the systemiswithinthelimiting conditions for operation of the EGGSPREAGSsystemwith inoperablefilterorfilterswillbemet.DominionResponse:
Dominion agreesthattheuseofthe words"surveillance requirement" to monitor ECCS leakage when in ConditionsB,C,or0is inappropriate.
Consistentwith10CFR50.36,"Limiting Conditions for Operation" this surveillance shouldhavebeenreferredtoasa remedial actiontobe performeduntilthe conditioncouldbemet.(a)Yes,TS5.5.2,"Primary Coolant Outside Containment" requiresthatthe leakage fromthosesystems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident be minimizedtolevelsaslowas practicable.
This program requires: (1)Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspections, and(2)an18month integrated Ieak testforeachof these systems Withinthisprogram, leakage is monitoredandif identified measuredona periodic basis consistentwiththe program requirementsabove.This monitoring is necessary to ensure the leakage is maintained below operationallimits,whichinturn ensuresthatthe system leakage is below the leakage valuesforfilteredand unfiltered leakage assumedinthe accident dose analysis of record.(b)No,The"new surveillance"requiredbythe Conditions,B,C,andDisa remedial action"conditional surveillanoe," that requires monitoring/measuringofECCS leakageatan increased frequency to ensure that the leakage remainsbelowthe operational limit for which filtrationisnotrequiredto meet the accident dose analysis ofrecordand, therefore, continueduseofthe extended CompletionTimeis permitted.
SerialNO.1 0-207 Docket Nos.50-338/339 EGGS PREAGS-RAIPage4of8(c)Iftheextended CompletionTimesareenteredforan inoperable filtertrainor filtertrains,theTSActionsrequirearemedialactionor"conditional surveillance," toverifythatECCSleakageiswithin operationallimitsevery12hoursduringthe extended CompletionTime.Duringplant conditionswhenthefiltersareoperable,theTSProgram5.5.2,"Primary Coolant Outside Containment"requires:(1)leakagebeminimized,(2) periodic maintenanceandinspection,and(3)anintegratedleakrate testofthesystem,whichis adequate to ensure thatsystemleakageis maintainedwithindesignandanalysislimits.RAISCVB-4:Isthe monitoring oftheEGGSleakagethroughvalve packing performedwiththe packing under the differential pressure expected when operating during adesignbasis accident?DominionResponse:Insomecases,thesystempressureexpectedduring accident conditionswillbe higherthanthe operatingsystempressure.As describedonpage 7 of Attachment1ofthe license amendmentrequest(LAR), proceduresrequireanyidentifiedECCSleakagetobeadjustedby conservative calculationtoreflectthe accident conditions (i.e., higherleakageratedueto higher system operatingpressure).Theleakagelogs described inSCVB-1reflectthiscalculated higher value.RAISCVB-5:
What safetyfactorwillbeusedforthe maximum allowableEGGSleakageratetoassure that if an accident should occuranyincrease of leakage overtheduration of the eventwouldnotcausedoselimitstobe exceeded?DominionResponse:
As describedonpage7of Attachment1oftheLAR,a safety factorof2isincludedintheECCSleakagemodeledintheanalysis,Le.,theanalyzed amountis2timesthe AllowableECCSleakage.RAISCVB-6:WhatEGGSleakagewouldbe expected when operating under accident conditions with the maximum allowable unfilteredEGGSleakageand asinglefailure oftheworstcasepumpsealorvalve packing?Will off-site and control room radiologicaldosesremainwithinlimitswithtwotrains ofEGGSPREAGSfilters inoperable?
Serial No.1 0-207 Docket Nos.50-338/339 EGGS PREAGS-RAIPage5of8 Dominion Response:RG1.183removedthe requirement to evaluate the impactofagrosspassive failure (50gpmleakfor30 minutesat24hours after the accident)onthe design basis LOCA dose consequence analysisduetothe arbitrary nature of the assumptions.
Accordingly, this condition is outsideofthe licensing basis forNorthAnna.
Two independent evaluations (Westinghouse and Flowserve) have concluded that catastrophic failureoftheHHSIpumpsealsdueto debrisloadingishighlyunlikely.In the unlikely event thatthesealsdofailinsuchamanner,the disasterbushingwillkeep leakage below50gpm.Ifthiswereto occur the leakagewouldbe directedtothe auxiliarybuildingsump,whichis equippedwithtwo50gpmsumppumpsand redundanthighlevelalarms.An increasing tank level and/oralarmcoupledwitha continuously running auxiliarybuildingsumppumpwouldcausethe operatortoinitiatean inspectionofthe auxiliarybuilding.This inspectionwouldstartwithactive components in systems underhighpressure,as they present the greatestleakpotential.Thus,therunningECCSpumpswouldbeamongthefirstitems checked.However,withbeyondalicensingbasis leakagerate,the accident dose forthecontrolroom operators wouldexceedtheGDC19limits.Areviewofseal leakagesfromallHHSIpumpssincethe installation of Flowserve seals beginning in December 2003 indicates the worst leak experiencedwas20ml/minor1200cc/hr.
Therefore,basedonour internal operating experience, the worst caseexpectedincreaseinECCS leakageduetothe failureofasealorvalvepackingsince installation of Flowservesealsin2004was1200cc/hr.Thecontrolroomand offsitedoselimitsarereachedwhentheECCS leakage increasestothefollowing approximate levels:ControlRoomControlRoom EAB LPZ 5100 cc/hr(0.022gpm) 2900 cc/hr (0.013 gpm)increasingto50gpmfor0.5hrat24hr 6gpm18gpmNotethattheabovevaluesdonotincludea safety factor oftwo.Also,the assessmentisbasedon containment leakageatTSlevels, RWST back-leakageof4800 cc/hr (2400cc/hrallowable),andcontrolroomunfiltered inleakageof250cfm.TheECCS leakageforthecontrolroomdosecouldbeincreasedif measured values for containmentleakage,RWST back-leakageandcontrolroom unfiltered in-leakagewereused.BasedontheworstcaseexpectedincreaseinECCS leakageduetothesingle failure ofasealorvalvepackingbeing1200cc/hr,thecontrolroomand offsite accident doseswillbewithintheGOC19limits.
Serial No.1 0-207 Docket Nos.50-338/339 EGGS PREAGS-RAIPage6of8 RAI SeVB-7:Aserial accounting ofthetime needed to performthetasks neededtoreplacethe filters, perform post-maintenancetesting,anddeclaringthefiltersoperableisusedto justify the proposed 14-day allowedoutagetimeforthefilters.Whatisthe estimatedminimumtime if some ofthetasks are performed concurrently (such as removing the old charcoal concurrent with receipt of the new charcoal)?
Dominion Response:Itispossiblethatthetimecouldbereducedifsometasksareperformedinparallel,suchasHPset-upandremovingoldcharcoalwhilewaitingforthenewcharcoalto arrive (potentially 7%days).However,thereare other variablesthatcould negativelyimpacttheduration,suchas vendor unavailability or weekenddelays.Thepostulated timelineisintendedto representanestimated durationbasedonbest reasonable effort (expedited), withoutunduetimepressurewhichcouldimpactsafety.Thebestestimatefortherepair durationwouldbebetween7-12days.
Without expeditedattention,therepairwould normally take significantly longer.RAI SeVB-8:Thebasisfor 30-daycompletiontimetorestore a filter backtooperablestatus(whenonlyonefiltertraininoperable)isthetime necessarytocompleterepairsonthefilter assembly and/or its associateddampers.Withtwofiltertrainsinoperablethebasisforthe14-daycompletiontimetoreturnonefiltertraintooperablestatusisthatthetime requiredtocomplete necessary repairs on a filter assembly and/or associateddampers.Thelicense amendment requeststatesthatthe replacement of a charcoalfilterassembletakes only 93'2daysevenwhenalltasksare performedinsequence.
Provide adiscussionwhythe necessaryrepairstake longerwhenonefiltertrainis inoperable as opposedtotwofiltertrainsinoperable.
Dominion Response:Thepotentialscenariousedto identify repairtime(i.e.,needtoreplaceallthecharcoalinoneorboth filterbanks)would apply equallytobothconditions.Ifbothtrainsofcharcoalare determinedtobe inoperableandneedreplacement,repairswouldfocusonreplacingonebankatatimetorestorethesystem safetyfunction.The durationidentified(7-12days)isforreturningonebanktoservice.
After that, maintenanceeffortswillfocusonrestoringthesecondtraintooperable.Since7-12dayshaspassedwhilerestoringthe othertrain,thetotaltimetorestorebothtrainsmaytakeupto24 days.Repairtimeisonlyoneofthefactorsonwhichtheproposedactiontimesarebased.Withonlyonetraininoperable,thesecondtrainofECCSfiltrationremains operable toperformitsintended safetyfunction,ifneeded.
ConsistentwithImprovedTechnical Specifications,theproposed CompletionTimeis greaterforone inoperabletrainthan Serial No.1 0-207 Docket Nos.50-338/339 EGGS PREAGS-RAIPage7of8fortwotrainsorall inoperabletrains.Twoorall inoperabletrainsusuallyresultsinlossofsafetyfunction.TheproposedCompletionTimesprovide flexibilitytomanageplantriskandfocusstationsresourcesonexistingplantconditionsand/orinoperable risk/safety significantSSCandstillcompletetherepairsinacontrolledmanner.Inaddition,theextendedCompletionTimesareonlypermittediftheECCSunfilteredleakageisverifiedtobebelowthe1700cc/hrlimit,forwhichthefiltrationisnotnecessarytomeetthe AccidentDoseAnalysislimits.IftheunfilteredECCSleakagewouldexceedthe1700cc/hrlimitwhileintheextendedCompletionTime,theCompletionTimewouldbereducedtothecurrenttimesandthestation managementwouldreassessriskandfocusresources appropriately.
RAJ SCVB*9:Howisthe operability oftheEGGSPumproom boundary determined?
Do technical specification surveillance requirements exist for determining boundary operability?
Ifthereis,no surveillance requirements to determine the operability oftheEGGSPump room boundary provide a discussion for determining entranceintoor exit fromGonditionD.DominionResponse:Inadditionto operatorroundsoncepershift (currentlytwelvehours)andmonthlyengineeringwalk-downs,the operabilityoftheECCSpumproomboundaryisdeterminedbytheverificationofanegativepressurerelativetothesurroundingareainthepumproomsduring accidentalignment.Ifanegativepressuredoesnotexistwiththesamesuctionflowconditions,thiscouldbeanindicationthatabreachofthepumproomboundaryexists.Thisnegativepressure verificationisa surveillance requirement(SR3.7.12.5)andisperformedaspartofthePREACS performancetestevery18months.Ifanegativepressurecannotbeverifiedduringthe performanceofthesurveillancetest,theECCStrainswouldbedeclaredinoperableresultinginentryintoTSCondition 3.7.12.8 for inoperablepumproomboundary.
RAJ SCVB*1 0:Whatisthe expected frequency for entryintoCondition C,"TwoECCS PREACS trainsinoperabledueto inoperable filtration capability"?DominionResponse:Since2002,whenNorthAnnaconvertedtoImprovedTechnical Specifications, NorthAnnaenteredTS3.0.3twotimes.Ineachcase,thecausewasinoperablefiltrationcapabilityduetoaleakageissueassociatedwith dampersandnot specifically attributedtocharcoal.Correctiveactionshavebeentakentoincreasethereliabilityofthesedampersandtheassociatedactuatorsaswellasheightened awarenessoftheactivitiesthatcouldimpactthecharcoal(painting,cleaning,etc).
However,duetothesystemconfigurationthereisstillapotentialforaninoperable dampertocauseentryintoTS SerialNO.10-207 Docket Nos.50-338/339EGGSPREAGS-RAIPage8of83.0.3ortheproposedConditionC.Asdiscussedabove,theCompletionTimesproposedweretopermitaplannedcompletionoftherepairactivitieswhileprovidingthestationtheflexibilitytomanageplantriskandfocusstationresourcesontheexistingplantconditionsorother inoperable risk/safety significant SSCs.B.TechnicalSpecificationBranches,DivisionofInspectionandRegionalSupport,NRR RAI1SB-1: The regulatory analysisfoundon pages 14 and 15 of Attachment 1 of the LAR does not discuss the regulatory requirements of 10CFR50.36.State how the proposed TS meet regulatory requirements of 10CFR50.36.DominionResponse:1()CFR50.36,"Technical Specifications,"paragraph(c)(2)(ii)(C)specifiesthatastructure,system,or componentthatispartoftheprimarysuccesspathandwhichfunctionsoractuatestomitigateadesignbasis accidentortransientthateitherassumesthefailureoforpresentsachallengetothe integrityofafissionproductbarrierbeincludedintoTechnical Specifications.Thissystemisrequiredby Specification3.7.12"ECCSPREACS."TheEGCSPREACSsystemisassumedtooperatetomitigatethedose consequenceassociatedwithadesignbasesaccidentortransient that eitherassumesthefailureoforpresentsa challengetotheintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.Althoughassumedtobeoperable,duringadesignbasis accident ortransient,filtrationisnot necessarytomeettheanalyzed accident dose consequencewhenECCSleakageisbelowtheassumedvalue.1()CFR50.36,"Technical Specifications,"paragraph(c)(2)(ii)requiresthatTechnical SpecificationsincludeLimitingConditionsforOperation(LCD),whicharethelowestfunctionalcapabilityor performancelevelsof equipmentrequiredforsafeoperationofthefacility.WhenaLCDisnotmet,thelicenseeshallshutdownthereactororfollowanyremedialactionpermittedbythetechnical specificationsuntiltheconditioncanbemet.Thenew ConditionsandRequiredActionsdonotconflictwiththisrequirement.Theproposedchangesdonot adverselyimpacttheabilityoftheECCSPREACStofunctionasdesignedanddonotimpactthe system's conformancetotheGOCs.Therefore,theproposedchangesare consistentwithallapplicableregulatoryrequirementsorcriteria.