05000285/FIN-2009007-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling System, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray System |
| Description | The team identified an unresolved item concerning the licensees program to identify and manage gas accumulation in emergency core cooling, decay heat removal, and containment spray systems. Specifically, on April 30, 2009, the licensee identified that a section of piping was inappropriately excluded from the scope of its Gas Management Program. Based on this, the licensee was reviewing the program to determine if additional piping was excluded that could cause voided piping, thereby resulting in the inoperability of a safety-related system. In response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-08, Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems, dated January 11, 2008 (ML072910759), the licensee developed a program to manage gas accumulation in the identified systems. By letter, dated October 14, 2008, Omaha Public Power District described the results of its analyses and concluded that gas accumulation in safety systems was unlikely to create conditions adverse to safety at the Fort Calhoun Station. However, on April 30, 2009, while performing ultrasonic examination of system piping under Work Order QC-ST-HPSI-0001, the licensee identified a gas void on the suction line to high pressure safety injection Pump SI-2B, downstream of Valve HCV-349. In its review, Omaha Public Power District found that it had inappropriately omitted this section of piping from the scope of the Gas Management Program. The team noted that the Updated Safety Analysis Report, section 6.2, page 11 of 35, revision 34, stated, in part, that this section of piping was not necessary to meet the core cooling requirements. However, opening Valve HCV-349 is in the Emergency Operating Procedures, and could introduce the void into the suction piping of high pressure safety injection Pump SI-2B.When discovered, the licensee conservatively declared that section of high pressure safety injection suction piping inoperable and entered Technical Specifications 2.3(2)(e), a 24-hour Limiting Condition for Operation. The licensee took actions to immediately vent and fill that section of piping and declared the system operable. The licensee initiated Condition Report 2009-2069 to determine the cause of the event and to evaluate whether other sections of piping were inappropriately excluded from the scope of its analyses that could render safety-related systems inoperable. At the conclusion of this inspection, the licensee had not completed its reviews. This issue is unresolved pending further NRC review of the licensees Gas Management Program Basis to determine if similar sections of piping were inappropriately excluded such that gas voids could render safety-related systems inoperable (Unresolved Item05000285/2009007-03) |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
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| Report | IR 05000285/2009007 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Kirkland G Werner M Vasquez P Goldbergi Anchando J Wingebach J Kirkland D Stearns G George J Clark J Mateychick B Larso |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2009007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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