05000285/FIN-2008005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Redundant Trains of Auxiliary Feedwater Inoperable Concurrently |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation for failure to comply with Technical Specification 2.0.1.(2), which required that a system, subsystem, or train must be considered inoperable if its associated emergency power source is inoperable and either (1) its normal power source is inoperable, or (2) any redundant systems, subsystems, trains or components are inoperable. On March 21, 2008, the licensee had Emergency Diesel Generator 1 inoperable and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, concurrently. This failure resulted in a condition where neither safety-related auxiliary feedwater pump was operable or available. This condition existed for approximately 18 minutes. This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was similar to anon-minor example 2.g in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E; Examples of Minor Issues in that all required equipment was not operable. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, Phase 1 screening. The inspectors determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) since it did not result in (1) a loss of operability; (2) loss of system safety function (the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump remained operable during this time period); (3) actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time; (4) actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65 for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and (5) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, specifically the decision-making crosscutting aspect H.1(a) because there was no systematic process to prohibit the concurrent removal of opposite trains of equipment. (Section 1R15 |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2008005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Hanna J Clark C Osterholtz J Kirkland C Graves |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2008005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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