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Category:Letter type:L
MONTHYEARL-23-260, Corrections to the 2022 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station2023-12-0707 December 2023 Corrections to the 2022 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station L-23-243, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-12-0606 December 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation L-23-215, Changes to Emergency Plan2023-10-19019 October 2023 Changes to Emergency Plan L-23-205, Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-09-12012 September 2023 Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments L-23-172, Quality Assurance Program Manual2023-08-31031 August 2023 Quality Assurance Program Manual L-23-188, Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-08-0707 August 2023 Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments L-23-175, Submittal of Fifth Ten Year Inservice Testing Program2023-08-0101 August 2023 Submittal of Fifth Ten Year Inservice Testing Program L-23-034, 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2023-06-13013 June 2023 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models L-23-135, Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-05-31031 May 2023 Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations L-23-065, Annual Financial Report2023-05-22022 May 2023 Annual Financial Report L-23-131, Readiness for Resumption of NRC Supplemental Inspection2023-05-12012 May 2023 Readiness for Resumption of NRC Supplemental Inspection L-23-101, Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - 20222023-05-12012 May 2023 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - 2022 L-23-092, Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 20222023-04-27027 April 2023 Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 2022 L-23-061, Submittal of the Decommissioning Funding Status Reports2023-03-31031 March 2023 Submittal of the Decommissioning Funding Status Reports L-23-037, and Perry Nuclear Power Plant - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests, and Experiments2023-03-29029 March 2023 and Perry Nuclear Power Plant - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests, and Experiments L-23-066, Annual Notification of Property Insurance Coverage2023-03-21021 March 2023 Annual Notification of Property Insurance Coverage L-23-059, Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2022091; EA 23-0022023-03-0909 March 2023 Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2022091; EA 23-002 L-22-212, CFR 50.55a Request RP-5 Regarding Inservice Pump Testing2023-03-0606 March 2023 CFR 50.55a Request RP-5 Regarding Inservice Pump Testing L-23-048, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Technical Specification 5.6.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 180-Day Report2023-03-0101 March 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Technical Specification 5.6.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 180-Day Report L-23-057, Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp Retrospective Premium Guarantee2023-02-20020 February 2023 Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp Retrospective Premium Guarantee L-22-253, Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 52023-01-10010 January 2023 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 5 L-22-284, Request for Notice of Enforcement Discretion for Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)2022-12-28028 December 2022 Request for Notice of Enforcement Discretion for Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) L-22-211, Technical Specification 5.6.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 180-Day Report2022-09-29029 September 2022 Technical Specification 5.6.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 180-Day Report L-22-216, Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 42022-09-27027 September 2022 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 4 L-22-213, Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 2021 - Correction2022-09-23023 September 2022 Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 2021 - Correction L-22-129, Submittal of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 342022-09-20020 September 2022 Submittal of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 34 L-22-194, Submittal of Supplemental Information for the Reanalysis for Protection Against Low Temperature Reactor Coolant System Overpressure Events2022-09-19019 September 2022 Submittal of Supplemental Information for the Reanalysis for Protection Against Low Temperature Reactor Coolant System Overpressure Events L-22-203, Submittal of Evacuation Time Estimates2022-09-12012 September 2022 Submittal of Evacuation Time Estimates L-22-050, Summary of Changes to the Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. Quality Assurance Program Manual2022-08-0909 August 2022 Summary of Changes to the Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. Quality Assurance Program Manual L-22-152, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding a License Amendment Request That Revises the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan2022-07-0505 July 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding a License Amendment Request That Revises the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan L-22-068, Cycle 22 and Refueling Outage 22 Inservice Inspection Summary Report2022-06-30030 June 2022 Cycle 22 and Refueling Outage 22 Inservice Inspection Summary Report L-22-037, 2021 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2022-06-30030 June 2022 2021 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models L-22-149, Post Accident Monitoring Report2022-06-23023 June 2022 Post Accident Monitoring Report L-22-153, Readiness for NRC Supplemental Inspection Required for a White Finding2022-06-22022 June 2022 Readiness for NRC Supplemental Inspection Required for a White Finding L-22-098, Withdrawal of Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative RR-A22022-06-22022 June 2022 Withdrawal of Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative RR-A2 L-22-136, Steam Generator Tube Circumferential Crack Report - Spring 2022 Refueling Outage2022-06-0707 June 2022 Steam Generator Tube Circumferential Crack Report - Spring 2022 Refueling Outage L-22-102, Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments2022-05-16016 May 2022 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments L-22-092, Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radiological Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - 20212022-05-16016 May 2022 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radiological Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - 2021 L-22-124, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Design Basis for the Shield Building2022-05-12012 May 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Design Basis for the Shield Building L-22-047, Unit No.1 - Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 23, Revision O and Revision 12022-05-10010 May 2022 Unit No.1 - Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 23, Revision O and Revision 1 L-22-127, Readiness for NRC Supplemental Inspection Required for a Greater than Green Finding2022-05-0606 May 2022 Readiness for NRC Supplemental Inspection Required for a Greater than Green Finding L-22-089, Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 20212022-04-12012 April 2022 Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 2021 L-22-056, Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Annual Notification of Property Insurance Coverage2022-03-22022 March 2022 Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Annual Notification of Property Insurance Coverage L-22-059, Response to Request for Additional Information on Proposed Inservice Test Alternative RP-32022-03-21021 March 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information on Proposed Inservice Test Alternative RP-3 L-22-074, Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2022-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2022-03-15015 March 2022 Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2022-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations L-22-061, Ile Post Exam Letter L-22-0612022-02-24024 February 2022 Ile Post Exam Letter L-22-061 L-22-023, Retrospective Premium Guarantee2022-02-17017 February 2022 Retrospective Premium Guarantee L-21-266, Response to Request for Additional Information on Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative RR-A22022-01-27027 January 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information on Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative RR-A2 L-20-289, Emergency Plan Amendment Request2022-01-19019 January 2022 Emergency Plan Amendment Request L-21-290, Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2021091, EA-21-1762021-12-21021 December 2021 Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2021091, EA-21-176 2023-09-12
[Table view] Category:Licensee Response to Notice of Violation
MONTHYEARL-23-059, Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2022091; EA 23-0022023-03-0909 March 2023 Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2022091; EA 23-002 L-21-255, Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2021401, EA-21-1052021-10-18018 October 2021 Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2021401, EA-21-105 L-18-093, Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2018010, EA-18-0082018-03-16016 March 2018 Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2018010, EA-18-008 L-17-191, Submittal of Response to Notice of Violation from Inspection Report 05000346/2017001-01, Dated May 12, 2017, Which Included Results of the Triennial Heat Sink Performance Inspection2017-06-12012 June 2017 Submittal of Response to Notice of Violation from Inspection Report 05000346/2017001-01, Dated May 12, 2017, Which Included Results of the Triennial Heat Sink Performance Inspection L-10-088, Reply to a Notice of Violation: EA-09-2832010-03-29029 March 2010 Reply to a Notice of Violation: EA-09-283 L-10-087, Response to Enforcement Action EA-09-332 from Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Notice of Violation, Inspection Report No. 05000346-09-0072010-03-22022 March 2010 Response to Enforcement Action EA-09-332 from Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Notice of Violation, Inspection Report No. 05000346-09-007 ML0603901872006-01-23023 January 2006 EA-03-025; EA-05-066; EA-05-067; EA-05-068; EA-05-069; EA-05-070; EA-05-071, and EA-05-072, Supplemental Reply to a Notice of Violation, FENOC ML0526301492005-09-14014 September 2005 First Energy Nuclear Operating Co., Reply to a Notice of Violation: EA-03-025, EA-05-066, EA-05-067, EA-05-068, EA-05-069, EA-05-070, EA-05-071, EA-05-072 ML0409804942004-04-0505 April 2004 Reply to Notice of Violation from Davis-Besse NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/03-010 (EA-04-049 and EA-04-050) ML0409804882004-04-0505 April 2004 Reply to a Notice of Violation from Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/04-05; EA-03-0172 ML0406204562004-02-27027 February 2004 Response to Apparent Violation in Inspection Report No. 05000346/2003-19; EA-03-0209 ML0308502082003-03-21021 March 2003 Reply to NRC Notice of Violations (EA-02-117 & EA-02-257) 2023-03-09
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FENOC FEIJOC 5501 North State Route 2 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449 Barry S. Allen 419-321-7676 Vice President
-Nuclear Fax. 419-321-7582 March 29, 2010 L-10-088 ATTN: Document Control Desk United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Docket Number 50-346, License Number NPF-3 Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-09-283 This letter provides the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's (FENOC) response to the notice of violation contained in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 2010-502, dated February 25, 2010, for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS).A special inspection, conducted on-site August 4 through 6, 2009, reviewed activities surrounding a June 25, 2009, Coupling Capacitor Potential Device (CCPD) failure in the switchyard at the DBNPS. Specifically, this inspection was performed to review the event and FENOC's actions in response to the CCPD failure and subsequent transitory Alert declaration in accordance with the DBNPS Emergency Plan. NRC Inspection Report 2010-502 identified a violation categorized as having low to moderate safety significance.
FENOC's reply to this violation is attached.This event was entered into the DBNPS Corrective Action Program. The investigation has been completed and corrective actions have been developed.
The DBNPS hereby notifies the NRC that the event evaluation and corrective actions are ready for NRC follow-up inspection.
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 L-1 0-088 Page 2 of 2 There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Dale R. Wuokko, Site Regulatory Compliance Manager, at (419) 321-7120.Sincerely, Barry S. Allen JCS
Attachment:
Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-09-283 cc: Regional Administrator, NRC Region III DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector DB-1 NRC/NRR Project Manager Utility Radiological Safety Board Attachment L-1 0-088 Page 1 of 4 Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-09-283 Restatement of Violation During a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on August 4 through 6, 2009, with additional review through November 23, 2009, a violation of NRC requirements was identified.
In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below: Title 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license under this part shall follow emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b).Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) requires, in part, that the nuclear facility licensee have a standard emergency classification and action level scheme in use, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan, Section 2.6.1, states, in part,"Detailed actions to be taken by individuals in response to onsite emergency conditions are described in the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures." Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure, RA-EP-01 500, "Emergency Classification," Revision 10, Section 6.1.1 requires, in part, that when indications of abnormal occurrences are received by the Control Room staff, the Shift Manager shall verify the indications of the off normal event or reported sighting, assess the information available from valid indications or reports, and classify the situation.
Davis-Besse Emergency Plan Table of Emergency Action Level Conditions for'Explosion' under the 'Hazards to Station Operations' category requires, in part the declaration of an Alert for an onsite explosion affecting plant operations in all modes with the: (1) control room being informed by station personnel who have made a visual sighting; and (2) instrumentation readings on plant systems indicating equipment problems.Contrary to the above, on June 25, 2009, from 00:50 to 01:47 hours, the Shift Manager failed to verify the indications of the off-normal event or reported sighting, assess the information available from valid indications or reports of an explosion, and classify the situation as an Alert in accordance with the Davis-Besse Emergency Plan Table of Emergency Action Level Conditions during an actual event. Specifically, the valid indications and reports included:
(1) the control room being informed by security personnel of a visual sighting of an explosion in the switchyard; (2) instrumentation readings and annunciators in the control room that indicated the loss of the 'J' bus; and (3) onsite field reports from the equipment Attachment L-1 0-088 Page 2 of 4 operator and from the Fire Brigade Captain of catastrophic failure of a transformer and debris.This violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding.Reason for the Violation The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) root cause evaluation determined the direct cause of this event was due to site personnel not considering the event resulting from the electrical fault in the switchyard as an Explosion, as defined in site procedure RA-EP-02840, "Explosion," Revision 3 (in effect at the time). Interviews conducted with those involved determined that they were not familiar with the recently revised procedure, in which the new definition of Explosion included the "catastrophic failure of pressurized/energized equipment." The prior definition in RA-EP-2840, "Explosion," Revision 2 describes, "Explosion" as "an uncontrolled violent expansion or bursting that is accompanied by loud noise and equipment damage. An explosion is typically caused by a sudden release of energy from a very rapid chemical reaction, or from an escape of gases or vapors under pressure." The DBNPS root cause evaluation determined the root cause(s) of this event to be:* Inadequate change management and inadequate self-checking by Site Emergency Response when revising the "Explosion" definition in procedure RA-EP-02840.
The procedure change was not provided for training to be completed since the individuals involved with the procedure change were under the impression that the new and old definitions of "Explosion" were essentially the same.* Inadequate communications in that assumptions were made and a questioning attitude was not displayed by Site Security and Operations personnel.
FENOC has been unable to confirm through voice recordings that Site Security personnel who witnessed the switchyard explosion did communicate to the Control Room that an explosion had occurred.
Had it been specifically stated that an explosion had occurred, Operations would have reviewed procedure RA-EP-02840, and the Initiating Conditions would have applied. It is reasonable to believe that the Explosiondefinition would have been reviewed as applicable to this event and an Alert would have been declared.FENOC does not disagree with the NRC's conclusion, as stated in the Final Significance Determination for the White Finding, dated February 25, 2010, that equivalent descriptive information was provided to the control room that should have led the operators to the conclusion that an explosion had occurred.
However, FENOC believes this conclusion is based on the recently revised Explosion definition in procedure RA-EP-02840, that the operators were not familiar with. Therefore, when the Attachment L-1 0-088 Page 3 of 4 information was provided to the control room staff regarding the Coupling Capacitor Potential Device (CCPD) failure and the switchyard conditions, they considered the event an electrical fault and did not relate the event to the new Explosion definition.
As discussed in the DBNPS root cause evaluation and above, the operators were not familiar with recently revised procedure RA-EP-02840 "Explosion" definition.
Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved A lessons learned case study was provided to Operations personnel, Site Security personnel, and Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members to stress the importance of clear, concise and complete reporting of emergency information to allow decision makers to assess Emergency Action Level (EAL) entry conditions timely and accurately.
A communication card was developed and instituted to be used by Operations and Site Security when communicating important information during emergencies.
Required reading was developed and completed for the Operators concerning what constitutes an explosion, which requires entry into EALs.Lessons learned information was developed and presented to Site Emergency Response Section personnel on the issues that contributed towards the missed classification of this event, including a discussion of how maintaining a questioning attitude and applying rigor when completing procedure changes could have resulted in an understanding of the changes in the definition of Explosion and how this change impacted the procedure end-user during an event. The lessons learned also emphasized the need to be aware that when processing technical changes to procedures, or changes which involve new or revised actions by the user, the changes should be submitted for cross-comment review or training/required reading provided, as applicable.
Site Security training was conducted to address the following areas: " Security/station Emergency Action Levels and Site Security and Operations interface, and the impact these action levels have on Site Security, Operations and the station as a whole.* The importance of giving precise communications when Site Security and Operations interface during an incident/event, which will serve to improve understanding to those individuals required to make significant decisions.
Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken An Effectiveness Review will be completed by June 30, 2011, following implementation of the corrective actions and to provide sufficient time following implementation of the corrective actions to determine if they have appropriately addressed the issues.
Attachment L-10-088 Page 4 of 4 Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved Full compliance was achieved on March 10, 2010, with the completion of training of the operators on what constitutes an explosion for entry into the EALs, training of Site Security on the importance of precise communications with Operations during events, and implementation of the communication card tool for Operations and Site Security.