ML13029A530

2012-302 Exam Draft Administrative JPMs

ML13029A530
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	01/24/2013
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
50-338/12-302, 50-339/12-302
Download: ML13029A530 (110)

Text

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 tripped from 100% power on 11/30/2012 at 12:00 after operating for 144 consecutive days at 100% power.

Unit 1 is now in Mode 3 preparing for startup with RCS Tavg at 547°F and stable.

INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to perform 1

-OP-1C, Estimated Critical Position Calculation, Attachment 1 ONLY, based on criticality occurring on 12/17/2012 at 18:00 with a critical rod height of 100 Steps on D Bank.

Previous Critical Conditions from the Reactor Data Book are: C Bank Position

- 230 Steps D Bank Position

- 230 Steps Boron Concentration

- 1353 ppm Core Burnup

- 5650 MWD/MTU Rx Engineering has provided the following information

RXMAN and XEMOD are unavailable Boron Diff at Prev Crit is 53 ppm Ref B-10/B-11 Ratio is 0.2 B-10/B-11 Ratio at time of ECP is 0.1959 Chemistry has provided the following information

RCS Boron Concentration for criticality, First measurement

- 1901 ppm @ time 19:48 RCS Boron Concentration for criticality, Last measurement

- 1901 ppm @ time 19:58 PZR Boron Concentration for criticality, First measurement

- 1919 ppm @ time 20:20

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 2 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT TASK Calculate Estimated Critical Conditions.

TASK STANDARDS Given a copy of 1

-OP-1C and a copy of the Plant Curve Book, the candidate will correctly calculate Estimated Critical Conditions IAW Attachment 1 of the procedure.

K/A

REFERENCE:

G2.1.43, Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant system temperature, secondary plant, fuel depletion, etc.

(RO 4.1 / SRO 4.3)

ALTERNATE PATH:

N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time =

5 0 minutes Start Time = __________

Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)

Evaluator (Print)

Evaluator's Signature / Date

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 3 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE

Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

Instructions for In

-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 tripped from 100% power on 11/30/2012 at 12:00 after operating for 144 consecutive days at 100% power. Unit 1 is now in Mode 3 preparing for startup with RCS Tavg at 547°F and stable.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 4 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to perform 1

-OP-1C, Estimated Critical Position Calculation, Attachment 1 ONLY, based on criticality occurring on 12/17/2012 at 18:00 with a critical rod height of 100 Steps on D Bank.

Previous Critical Conditions from the Reactor Data Book are

C Bank Position

- 230 Steps D Bank Position

- 230 Steps Boron Concentration

- 1353 ppm Core Burnup

- 5650 MWD/MTU Rx Engineering has provided the following information

RXMAN and XEMOD are unavailable Boron Diff at Prev Crit is 53 ppm Ref B-10/B-11 Ratio is 0.2 B-10/B-11 Ratio at time of ECP is 0.1959 Chemistry has provided the following information

RCS Boron Concentration for criticality, First measurement

- 1901 ppm @ time 19:48 RCS Boron Concentration for criticality, Last measurement

- 1901 ppm @ time 19:58 PZR Boron Concentration for criticality, First measurement

- 1919 ppm @ time 20:20

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 5 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT EVALUATION METHOD

Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues) Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERBAL

-VISUAL cues)

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Copy of 1-OP-1C, Attachment 1 Copy of 1-OP-1C, Estimated Critical Position Calculation (complete procedure in case candidate desires to reference it while performing the task)

Copy of Plant Curve Book Evaluators Note:

Additional copies of 1

-OP-1C should be available in the event the candidate wishes to perform the attachment more than once prior to submitting it for evaluation.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 6 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT Start Time:

__________

Evaluators Note:

Not all items on the key have acceptance criteria listed since some items are provided in the initial conditions and some items are values or calculations that are carried forward from previous steps of the attachment.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Enter data in Attachment 1 based on information provided on the IC sheet Procedure Step Att. 1, items 1

-9 SAT [ ] UNSAT [

] Standards Candidate completes items 1

-9 of attachment 1 IAW the attached key.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Determine Boron Coefficient Procedure Step Att. 1, item 10 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Boron Coefficient IAW the attached KEY.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 7 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Determine Integral Rod Worth Procedure Step Att. 1, item 11 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Integral Rod Worth IAW the attached KEY. Step / Action Notes / Comments 4 Determine Xenon Worth Procedure Step Att. 1, item 12 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Xenon Worth IAW the attached KEY.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 8 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 5 Determine Power Defect Procedure Step Att. 1, item 13 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Power Defect IAW the attached KEY.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 6 Determine Reactivity Change Procedure Step Att. 1, item 14 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Reactivity Change IAW the attached KEY.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 9 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 7 Determine First Estimated ECP Boron Concentration Procedure Step Att. 1, item 15 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines First Estimated ECP Boron Concentration IAW the attached KEY. Step / Action Notes / Comments 8 Determine Temperature Defect Procedure Step Att. 1, item 16 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Temperature Defect IAW the attached KEY.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 10 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 9 Determine Net Isotopic Decay Reactivity Procedure Step Att. 1, item 17 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT

[ ] Standards Candidate determines Net Isotopic Decay Reactivity IAW the attached KEY.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 10 Determine Estimated Critical Boron concentration Procedure Step Att. 1, item 18 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Estimated Critical Boron concentration IAW the attached KEY.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 11 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 11 Adjust Estimated Critical Boron concentration for B

-10 depletion Procedure Step Att. 1, item 19 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Note: Values needed to perform calculation are provided in the Initiating Cue.

Standards Candidate determines B-10 depletion ECP Boron IAW the attached KEY.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 12 Record Measured Boron concentration for Criticality Procedure Step Att. 1, item 20 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Note: Values needed to complete table are provided in the Initiating Cue.

Standards Candidate completes items 20 of attachment 1 IAW the attached key.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 12 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 13 Determine Boron Concentration Change Procedure Step Att. 1, item 21 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Boron Concentration Change is IAW the attached KEY.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 14 Determine Equivalent Reactivity Change Procedure Step Att. 1, item 22 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Equivalent Reactivity Change IAW the attached KEY.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 13 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 15 Determine Adjusted HZP Rod Worth Procedure Step Att. 1, item 23 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Adjusted HZP Rod Worth IAW the attached KEY.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 16 Determine Administrative Worth Limits Procedure Step Att. 1, item 24 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Administrative Worth Limits IAW the attached KEY.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 14 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 17 Record First Applicable Time Interval Procedure Step Att. 1, item 25 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate records N/A for First Applicable Time Interval

Step / Action Notes / Comments 18 Record Control Rod positions Procedure Step Att. 1, item 26 Critical Step SAT [ ]

UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate completes item 26 IAW the attached key END OF EVALUATION Stop Time:

__________

DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation

• KEY (Page1of 4)Attachment 1 1-0P-1CRevision28Page26of37 Calculation of Estimated Critical ConditionsI.Dat e: 2.Time: 3.Time Since Shutdown (hours): 4.Power Before Shutdown (%RTP): l 0%*5.Core Bumup (MWDIMTU): Sb5D**6.C Bank Position (step s): 2-30*7.D Bank Po s ition (step s): "2...30*8.RCST e mperature (O F): N/A 9.Bor o n Concentration (ppm):10.Boron Coefficient (pem/ppm):*II.1 Integral Rod Worth (pem): (I-SC-3.5)(At-Power or[-2.""12D 1-0-Ll60]as Appropr i ate)1 2.-"Z (***Xen o n Worth (pem): (l-SC-3.9 , XEMOD or (Se e Step 4.2)RXMAN)[-ll5'S-to-\'"1 C\S-J 13.Power Defect (pem):-'-")*(U s e Previous Critica l Conditions Boron Cone.)(l-SC-3.8)Estimated Conditions t£.\"\\L L\t..\*N/A N/A**SYi N/A...,-b iJ b.bs*-\-0.(l-SC-!0.1)-113*(HZP Worth)(l-SC-3.11, l-SC-3.12, XEMOD or RXMAN)o[1*>3 to-l C\3J , t.-LO+"-l-"Z.C J 14.Reactivity Change (pem):-i..-\5 is (-"l""3)=-7>1 4 L pcm[-4415to-lll;r;s]c:()t.+0-578'i]**Valucs supplicd by Rcactor Enginccr OR NAFifan Initial Cycle Criticality or during a temperature coastdown.

• • MarkN/Aif an Initial Cycle Criticality or dataforECPis directly supplied by NAF.***Actual Xenon reactivity worthmustbeused.The value will normally NOTbezero,butwillbe some value of ncgative reactivity.

Admin1a-KEY o\*'.A-

+v--c.c r'.kif"!L J

• • • DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-0P-1CRevision28Page27of37(Page2 of 4)Attachment 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions 15.First Estimated ECP Boron Concentration:

l3S3 ppm Item 9+16.Temperature Defect (pcm): (I-SC-3.7, See Step 5.2.5)-3!Lt L..p e mItem14_I.63----=0=----..::::...-_

pem/ppmItem10 17.Net Isotopic Decay Reactivity using RCS Boron Concentration calculated in Item 15: (l-SC-8.6, See Steps4.3and 5.2.5)18.Estimated Critical Boron Concentration (ppm):= pcm I c: '5'5 i:>-1 l q\1ppm-{(t/pcm+-<:, S pem)-7-.3 pem/ppm}=,<q 0..ppm'JItemISItem16Item17Item10 f\1 ClI o to'\-\-0\\\19.Adjust the Estimated Critical Boron Concentration (ppm)forB-10 depletion (refer to Step 5.2.8):B-1OIB-IIRatio (1,0 7 ppm_5 Sppm)XItem18Diffat

'\"\5,B-1O/B-IIRatioatECP Prey Crit A-c...L e.p}-tLVLC-e So-vu V\.'\V\.Admin1a-KEY c CJ=I B-IO DepletionAdjustedECP Boron E8 133\-0\C(03J

• • • DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-0P-1CRevision28Page28of37 (Page 3of4)Attachment 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions 20.Dothe following for measured Boron Concentrations for Criticality (ppm): (See Step4.9and 4.13.)First Last Measurement Mea s urement Mea suredRCSBoron ConcentrationsforCritic ality(ppm): I1901 Tim e:

I qMea suredPZRB oronConc e ntration s for Criticality(ppm): Time: "2.0 2-0 2 I.Boron Concentration Change: 22.Equivalent Reactivity Change:Item21 23.Adjusted HZP Rod Worth-113 pcm+ItemII Est.Conds.24.Administrative Worth Limits: LOW LIMIT=HIGH LIMIT=Admin 1a-KEYItem20 First Meas.53pcm=Item22==l33[-IS 1--,7....pcm[-1<i{6--(LO Item 23-\7.'20 pcm-500pcm=pcm]

-\0-1151.\-770Item23-z.-z.Opcm+500pcm=pcm 0 r 2<[G 1-0-rj;lI

• • • DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY(Page4of4)

Attachment 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions 1-0P-1CRevision28Page29of37 F multiple ECP calculations on Attachment 2, Adjustment of Estimated Critical Conditions for Changing Xenon Worth, will NOT be performed, THEN mark the Applicable Time IntervalasN/A.25.First APPlica::me Interval:i 4-CS""""--(See Step 4.12).26.Control Rod Positions for ECP at Time (<2>00 (Item 2, Estimated Conditions)

N o-t-eControl Rod Worth (pcm): ECP-,20Item23 f\;", e.()\<....-e.Bank C Position (steps): n...........

r(see Note below)'""2...3>0+-e-v-i'CA....Bank D Position (steps)">V-\7..(see Note below)\DS t-e.-p s'Q..'X c-e.'+LOW LIMIT-\7.?O Item 24 50 Is ECP greater than La-La Insertion Limit of I-SC-l.7?HIGH LIMIT-7..-20 Item 24 L O-LO L\Y\A.-l'\-5C.-\*1\,()tot ((.., t\Is ECPlessthantheFully Withdrawn Position for D Bank?YW-\S Y-'2."i"iYp 5IsLow Administrative Limit greater than La-La Insertion Limit of I-SC-1.7?NO NO N The ECP, Low Limit,andHigh Limit BankCand Bank D positions are obtained from I-SC-3.5ontheHZP Integral Worth tables using the current cycleburnup range.Admin1a-KEY North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS Today, during rounds, the Auxiliary Building Operator discovered inboard seal leakage on the in-service Charging Pump, 1

-CH-P-1A. Previously, there was no seal leakage on any of the Unit 1 Charging Pumps.

The inboard seal leakage on 1-CH-P-1A has been quantified at 30 drops per minute.

WO# 1115733

-2 was generated for the leak and a CR has been written.

INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to perform 1

-LOG-20, ECCS Leakage.

The Electronic ECCS Leakage Computer Program is not available and the STA has obtained the following data from the latest hard copy printout, page 1 of 1 (Line #100)

Unit 1 ECCS Leakage, Unfiltered Total = 100 cc/hr Unit 1 ECCS Leakage, Filtered Total = 120 cc/hr

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 2 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b

- DRAFT TASK Perform 1-LOG-20, ECCS Leakage Log.

TASK STANDARDS Given a copy of 1

-LOG-20, the candidate will accurately update the ECCS leakage based on the given newly discovered leakage.

K/A

REFERENCE:

G2.1.18, Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports. (RO 3.6 / SRO 3.8)

ALTERNATE PATH:

N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time =

25 minutes Start Time = __________

Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)

Evaluator (Print)

Evaluator's Signature / Date EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 3 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b

- DRAFT READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE

Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

Instructions for In

-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS Today, during rounds, the Auxiliary Building Operator discovered inboard seal leakage on the in-service Charging Pump, 1

-CH-P-1A. Previously, there was no seal leakage on any of the Unit 1 Charging Pumps.

The inboard seal leakage on 1

-CH-P-1A has been quantified at 30 drops per minute.

WO# 1115733

-2 was generated for the leak and a CR has been written.

INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to perform 1

-LOG-20, ECCS Leakage.

The Electronic ECCS Leakage Computer Program is not available and the STA has obtained the following data from the latest hard copy printout, page 1 of 1 (Line #100)

Unit 1 ECCS Leakage, Unfiltered Total = 100 cc/hr Unit 1 ECCS Leakage, Filtered Total = 120 cc/hr

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 4 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b

- DRAFT EVALUATION METHOD

Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues) Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERBAL

-VISUAL cues)

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Copy of 1-LOG-20, ECCS Leakage Log

Calculator

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 5 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b

- DRAFT Start Time:

Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Verify ICs and review P&Ls.

Procedure Step 5.1 & 5.2 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ] Standards Candidate reviews Section 3.0 & 4.0 Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Print previous year's log & forward to records. Procedure Step 5.3 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate N/As this substep since TODAY is NOT the first entry of a new calendar year.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 6 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Determine the appropriate subsection to be performed.

Procedure Step

5.4 Critical

Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines Subsection 5.5 applies (first bullet) and N/As remaining bullets.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 4 Initiate Attachment 2.

Procedure Step

5.5.1 Critical

Step*

SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

• ONLY those items that are circled on the Attachment 2 KEY (for unfiltered leakage) are critical

. Standards Candidate enters data on Attachment 2 per the Attached Key.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 7 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 5 Measure and convert leakage rate.

Procedure Step

5.5.2 Critical

Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate calculates leakage rate at 180 cc/hr and records the leakage on Attachment 2.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 6 Determine accident leakage.

Procedure Step

5.5.3 Critical

Step*

SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Note: Substep 4.4 provides guidance for rounding up accident leakage to the next whole number, so either value (439.2 or 440) is acceptable.

Standards Candidate calculates accident leakage at 439.2 (440) cc/hr and records the accident leakage on Attachment 2.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 8 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 7 Record Line Leakage.

Procedure Step

5.5.4 Critical

Step*

SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Note: Substep 4.4 provides guidance for rounding up accident leakage to the next whole number, so either value (439.2 or 440) is acceptable.

Standards Candidate records line leakage at +439.2 (+440) cc/hr on Attachment 2.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 8 Calculate Filtered leakage.

Procedure Step

5.5.5 Critical

Step*

SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Note: Substep 4.4 provides guidance for rounding up accident leakage to the next whole number, so either value (559.2 or 560) is acceptable.

Standards Candidate calculates Filtered leakage at 559.2 (560) cc/hr and records the line leakage on Attachment 2.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 9 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 9 Calculate Total Leakage.

Procedure Step

5.5.6 Critical

Step*

SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Note: Substep 4.4 provides guidance for rounding up accident leakage to the next whole number, so either value (659.2 or 660) is acceptable.

Standards Candidate calculates Total leakage at 659.2 (660) cc/hr and records the line leakage on Attachment 2.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 10 Calculate Filtered leakage.

Procedure Step

5.5.7 Critical

Step*

SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate calculates total percentage of Allowed Leakage as shown on attached key

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 10 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 11 Plot point on Attachment 3.

Procedure Step 5.5.8 Note: Because of scaling and small amount of leakage the plot itself is not critical. The relative location of the candidates plot adequately demonstrates the candidate's ability to use the attachment. If desired by the evaluator, a follow

-up question on how the data is plotted may be used. SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate plots point on Attachment 3 as per attached key.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 12 Complete administrative requirements.

Procedure Step 5.5.9 - 5.5.11 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Cue: Inform candidate that you will perform steps 5.5.9 through 5.5.11 after they have completed all of the previous substeps and are ready to submit the procedure to you.

Standards N/A END OF EVALUATION Stop Time:

__________

PROCEDURE NO: , KEY A**1-LOG-20 Dominion'N ORTH ANNA POWER STATIONREVISIONNO

11 PROCEDURE TYPE:UNITNO: L O G 1 PR OCEDURETITLE:

E CCS L EAKAGELOGREVISION

SUMMARY

Arevisionorchangetothis procedure requires a notificationoftheECCSLeakage Computer Program Administratortoeffectany necessary changestothe computer programpriorto posting,AND,upon approvalandpostingofthis procedure,toupdatetheRevision NumberintheECCSLeakage Computer Program.(DONOT DELETE THIS STATEMENT)

IncorporatedTSCRN-061A

, ECCS PREACS.*Added Reference s 2.3.5 , 2.3.6 ,and2.4.3.*AddedInitialCondition BullettoStep3.1toaddre ssTS3.7.12verifi cationand walkdown.*Updated condition in Synop sispage4.*AddedStep5.4Bullettoaddre ssSection5.10 performance

.*Added ConditiontoStep5.8.1and5.8.2toaddre ss limit s exceeded durin gSection5.10 perf o rmance.*ChangedStep 5.8.l.dtoremove conditionfromTS3.7.12andaddre ss a s applic a ble.*AddednewSect ion5.10 ,TechSpecECCSLeakage verificationtoen surerequiredaction sofTechSp e c 3.7.12aremet.*Changed Synop s i spage4toaddressapplyand removed applicabl eactionforTechSpec5

.5.16 addingnounname.ChangedStep5.8.1

.etoremove applicableactionforTechSpec5.5

.16andaddednounname.Th erei snoactiona ssociatedwith MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

DNO DYES Note:IfYES ,noteproblemsinremarks

.REMAR KS: I,..I i*i I I ,'\.--(Usebackforadditionalremarks

.)SR O: DATE: CONTINUOUS USE admin 1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY TABLEOFCONTENTS Section 1.0 PURPOSE

2.0 REFERENCES

3.0 INITIAL

CONDITIONS

4.0 PRECAUTIONS

AND LIMITATIONS

5.0 INSTRUCTIONS

1-LOG-20Revision11Page2of40 Page 3 5 7 7 9 5.5 Collecting DataforNewand Unrecorded Leakage 10 5.6 Collecting Data for Increased Leakage Or Reduced Leakageonan Already Recorded Leak Location 14 5.7 Collecting Data When a Leak Has Been Repaired and Stopped 18 5.8 Actions If Leakage Limit Is Exceeded 21 5.9 Quarterly Walkdown of Previously Recorded Leakage 23 5.10 Tech Spec 3.7.12 ECCS Leakage Verification 24 ATTACHMENTS Sample ECCS Leakage Log Entries 2 ECCS Leakage Log 3 Allowable ECCS Leakageadmin1b KEY 26 39 40 DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page3of401.0PURPOSE This procedure provides instructionsformakingentriesintheECCS Leakage Computer Program or completion of Attachment2,ECCS Leakage Log.TheECCS LeakageLogisameansof collecting leakagedataintheECCS recirculation path components and pipingoutsideof Containment.

The leakageduringnormal operation should remainwithinthe Acceptableregionof Attachment 3, Allowable ECCS Leakage, which representsthedesignbasisleakage limit.The leakagelimitmustbe specifiedbelowasother proceduresobtainthevaluesfromthis paragraph.TheNormal Operationalleakagelimitsare described below: (Reference 2.3.4)LeakageLimitsareasfollows:

• Unfiltered Leakage limit:1,700 cc/hr*Filtered Leakage limit:17,200 cc/hr*Total Leakage limit:(%of Filtered LeakageLimit+%of Unfiltered LeakageLimit)limit:100%Filtered LeakageisdefinedasECCS leakageinthe SafeguardsAreaandthe Charging Pump Cubicles.Unfiltered LeakageisdefinedasECCSleakageinthe Quench Spray Pumphouse or otherareasofthe Auxiliary Building.admin 1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page4of40IFa leakagelimitis exceeded, THEN the followingTechSpecsandTRMActions apply:*ActionBof TechSpecs3.7.10*ActionDofTechSpec3.7.12is conservatively enteredonthe affectedUnitsince the PREACSSystemmaynotbeableto perform its intendedfunctionoflimitingdosetotheControlRoom Operators.TheBasesfor3.7.12notesthisoneaspectofthe Applicable Safety Analysesforlarge breakLOCA.The conditionofECCS leakagelimitis judgedtobe similartohavingan inoperable boundaryintermsof consequence and appropriate actions.Therefore,theabove referenced Actionshouldbeentered.*TechSpec5.5.16,MCRJESGR Envelope Habitability ProgramTheDesignBasis LeakageLimits(the amountofleakagethatcanbe tolerated to maintain Control Room dose<5RemTEDE)containsanNRC mandated safetyfactorof2thatcanbeusedtoJustify Continued Operationofa degraded but operable PREACSaspartofa pre-staged operability determination:

• Maximum Unfiltered Leakage Limit:3,400 cc/hr(ifallleakageis unfiltered)

• Maximum Filtered Leakage Limit:34,400cc/hr(ifall leakageisfiltered)

• Total Leakage (%of Filtered Leakage Limit+%of Unfiltered Leakage Limit)Limit:200%IFaDesignBasis Leakage Limit is exceeded, THEN the PREACS is inoperable and an evaluation is performed to determineifaonehour reporttotheNRCisrequired.

This evaluation will consider"non-heroic"actionsthatcanbetakento isolate theleak.An exampleofthiswouldbetheabilityto isolate Charging Pump leakage by closingthesuctionand dischargeMOVsand verifyingtherecircMOVopenfromtheControlRoom.

Another considerationwouldbe compensatoryactionsinplacethatcouldbe completedwithin29 minutestoisolatetheleakage.(Reference 2.4.2)admin 1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page5of40 The following synopsis is designedasanaidto understanding this procedureandis not intendedtoalterortaketheplaceoftheactual purpose, instructions,ortextof the procedure itself.Ventilation exhaustfromthe Charging Pump Cubiclesandfromthe Safeguards Area provide a safety-relatedflowpaththatwillbe alignedtothe Charcoal Filter Banks.Ventilation exhaustfromotherareas(i.e.,QuenchSpray Pumphouseorotherareasofthe Auxiliary Building)couldbe released unfiltered.

Therefore,theECCS Leakagelogwilltrack Filtered Leakage (leakagewithinthe Charging Pump Cubicles and SafeguardsArea)and Unfiltered Leakage (leakagefromthe Quench Spray Pumphouseandareasofthe Auxiliary Building outside the Charging Pump Cubicles).TheECCS LeakagelogwillalsotrackTotal Leakage (Filtered Leakage plus Unfiltered Leakage).Four conditionsthatwouldrequireanECCS Leakage Computer Programentryor initiation of Attachment2,ECCS LeakageLog,for eitherofthetwotypesofAreas,arenew leakage, increased leakage, reduced leakage, and stopped leakage.Separate subsections are providedtoaddresseachsituation.

Increasedleakageand reduced leakage will requiretwoline entries;onetonegatetheoriginalentry,andoneto enterthenewdata.

Attachment I, Sample Eccs LeakageLogEntries, provides definitions, descriptions,andsamplesformakingentriesintheECCS Leakage Computer Programoron Attachment2,ECCS Leakage Log.Additional confirmation that leakageiswithin acceptablelimitsis obtained when leakage is plotted on Attachment 3, Allowable ECCS Leakage.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Source

Documents 2.1.1 UFSARCh6.3.3.6;Table6.2-42and6.3-6 2.1.2 UFSARCh15.4;Figure 15.4-67 2.2 Technical Specifications2.2.1TechSpec3.7.10admin1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page6of402.2.2TechSpec3.7.122.2.3TechSpec5.5.16 2.3TechnicalReferences2.3.1ET SE-99-030,Rev.0,RevisedECCS Leakage Limits2.3.2ETN00-075,Rev.0,ECCS LeakageLimitsNorthAnnaPowerStation,Units1&22.3.3PA-0207Rev.0, Radiological ConsequencesofaLOCAatNorthAnnaBasedonthe AlternateSourceTerm2.3.4TechSpecChangeN-011, ImplementationofAlternateSourceTerm 2.3.5 l-LOG-6D, Auxiliary Building Log 2.3.6 l-LOG-6F, Safeguard Log 2.4CommitmentDocuments2.4.1PlantIssue N-2003-0145, l-CH-MOV-1289A,NormalChargingHeader IsolationValve,PackingLeak 2.4.2 LicensingActionLA000951requiresFSRCapprovalpriortoremovingthe administrativecontrolof29minutesstaytimefor maintenanceandtestingactivitiesfollowingan accident 2.4.3 TSCRN-061A,ECCSPREACS admin 1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page7of40InitVerif3.0INITIALCONDITIONS

3.1 Leakage

identifiedasbeingfromECCS recirculation path componentsandpiping external to Containmentmeetsoneofthefollowingcriteria:*The leakageisNewand Unrecorded Leakagethatcanbe collected and measured.*Theleakageonanalready recorded leak location has increased.

• Theleakageonanalready recorded leak locationhasbeenreduced.

• The leakageonanalready recorded leak locationhasbeen repairedandstopped.

• A quarterly walkdownofthe previously recordedleakageis scheduled.*TechSpec3.7.12(ECCS PREACS ConditionB,CorD)verificationandfield walkdown is requiredtoverifyECCSleakageislessthanthe maximum allowable unfiltered leakage.3.2ECCS Leakage Computer Programisavailable.IFtheECCS Leakage Computer ProgramisNOT available, THEN Attachment2,ECCS LeakageLog,mustbeused.

+4.0PRECAUTIONSANDLIMITATIONS 4.1 4.2 Complywiththe following guidelineswhenmarkingsteps Nt A:*IFthe conditional requirementsofastepdonotrequiretheactiontobe performed, THENmarkthestep Nt A.*IFanyotherstepismarked NtA, THENhavetheSRO(or designee)approvethe NtAand submit a Procedure Action Request (PAR).IF uncertainthattheleakageisfromECCS recirculation path components and piping, THENtheSROortheECCS(SI)

Engineer should be contacted for resolution.

admin 1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page8of 404.3The existenceofwetnessorBoron accumulation,withouta countabledriprateisNOTactiveleakage.

4.4"Accident Leakage"istheleakagethatcouldbe expectediftheECCSsystemwereinthe recirculationmodefollowingaDBA.Somesections of the systemsseea greater pressure during post-LOCAtimethanduringnormalplantoperations.Forleaksinthoseareas,thenumberenteredinthe"Leakage" columnmustbe increasedbyafactorthataccountsforthehigher pressureduringECCS recirculation.

ThefactoristhesquarerootoftheratioofLHSIsystem pressure during recirculation to normal operating pressureattheleakagepoint.Thehighest expected pressureintheLHSIsystemisabout160psig.Duringnormal operations LHSI pressureisabout30psig,thatis,RWSTstatichead.Duringnormal operations,themost conservative pressureseenbythesealsofthe chargingpumpsisduetolowestallowedVCT pressure and weightofwaterduetoheight.This conservativelyequatestothesquarerootof160.8(LHSIsystem pressure during recirculation)dividedby27(lowestnormal operating pressureatthesuctionofthe ChargingPumpsduetoVCT pressureandweightofwaterduetoheight)which provides a conversionfactorof2.44.OnlythoseleaksintheLHSIsystemfromthe dischargeofthepumpstothe LHSI containment penetrationsandtothesuctionsofthe Charging Pumps,includingChargingPumpseal leakagelrequirethis correctionfactorandan"accident leakage"entry.AllotherleaksintheECCSnetworkshouldhave"N/A"inthe"accident leakage"column.Roundallresultsuptothenextwholenumberof cclhr.4.5Seal leakagefromLHSIandORSpumpsisnotECCSleakageduetothesealsupplyandthetandemsealsystem.Thisisnot appropriatetoenterintotheECCSleakage log.4.6WHENtheECCS Leakage Computer ProgramisNOTavailable,THEN Attachment2,ECCS LeakageLog,mustbeused.Additionalcopiesof Attachment2maybemadeasnecessary.4.7Externalleakagefrom l-CH-MOV-1289A, l-CH-MOV-1289B, and l-CH-FCV-1122isECCSleakagesinceseatleakagethrough eitherMOVis unknown.(Reference 2.4.1)admin 1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page9of40 5.0 INSTRUCTIONS5.1VerifyInitial Conditionsaresatisfied.5.2Review Precautions and Limitations.5.3IFthisisthefirstentryofanew calendaryear,THENprintthe previous year's logandforwardtoStationRecords.

5.4 Determine

the appropriatesubsectiontobeperformed:

• IFtheleakageisnewand unrecordedLeakagethatcanbe collected and measured, THEN perform Subsection 5.5, CollectingDataforNewand

-

Unrecorded Leakage.*IFtheleakageis increasedleakageorreducedleakageonanalready recordedleaklocation, THEN perform Subsection 5.6, CollectingDatafor IncreasedLeakageOr Reduced LeakageonanAlreadyRecordedLeakLocation.

• IFtheleakhasbeen repairedandstopped,THEN perform Subsection 5.7, CollectingDataWhenaLeakHasBeen RepairedandStopped.

• IFa quarterlywalkdownofthe previously recordedleakageis scheduled, THEN perform Subsection 5.9, Quarterly Walkdown of Previously Recorded Leakage.*IFTechSpec3.7.12(ECCS PREACS)condition B, CorDhasbeenentered, THEN performSection5.10,TechSpec3.7.12ECCS Leakage Verification.

admin 1b KEY

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DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page10of405.5Collecting DataforNew and Unrecorded Leakage 5.5.1 Perform the followinginthe ECCS Leakage Computer Programoron Attachment 2, ECCS Leakage Log:a.IFthe leakage is"Unfiltered Leakage," THEN enterthevaluefor Carried Forward Filtered Leakage AND mark all remaining"Filtered Leakage" spaces Nt A.b.IFthe leakage is"Filtered Leakage," THEN enterthevaluefor Carried Forward Unfiltered Leakage AND mark all remaining"Unfiltered Leakage" spaces Nt A.c.IF performing Attachment 2, THEN recordthenext sequential line number.d.IF performing Attachment 2, THEN recordthedate leakage found.b eakage from multiple pointsmustnotbe combined.Thisallowsfor tracking of the reduction t repair oftheleak.e.Record a description-leak location with equipment mark number.1 f.Enter a Condition Report.

.-3"_o co--J7-h tN'S¥g.Record the Work Request Number/Work Order Number.admin1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation 0_IV KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page11of 40 eakage drop count should continueforatleastone minute OR timing should continueforat least20drops.Stream leaks should be measured using a graduated cylinder./*Onedrop=0.1ccor0.1ml

/*3785cc=I gallon i)b)5.5.2 Measure the leakagerateas follows: a.Time the leakage.b.Convert the leakageratetocc/hr,as applicable.Roundthe resultuptothenext whole number of cc/hr: 3600(Sec)(hr)x 3 cc/hr c.Record the Leakage.NOTE: Measured leakage must be extrapolatedtothe design accident conditions dependingonthe location oftheleak.The origin ofthe2.44 conversion factor is explained on Attachment I, Sample Eccs Leakage Log Entries, Item 7.Leakage from piping containing Charging Pumpflowand pressure is conservatively assumedtobeat design accident conditions.IFStep5.5.3is not performed, THEN the Accident Leakage blockmaybe markedN/A.IFthe leakageisfromany point between the discharge oftheLHSI Pumpsandthe suction of the Charging Pumps, THENdothe following:

a.Convert the Measured Leakage to Accident Leakage,asfollows:

Accident leakage=t B cc/hrx2.44=4 Lot D cc/hr (measured leakage)rt b.Record the Accident Leakage.(l..\"3 q.'2-I.{0*V)

')admin 1b KEY DOMINION KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11NorthAnnaPowerStationPage 12of405.4Record Line Leakageusingthe algebraic plus (+)signandthe appropriateentryas determined below:IFonly Leakage was recorded AND Accident LeakagewasmarkedN/A, THENrecordthe Leakaevalueas positive (+)Line Leakage.*IF Accident Leakage was recorded , THENrecordthe Accident Leaka g evalueas positive (+)Line Leakage.Dooneofthefollowing:

MarkotherchoiceN/

A.*IFthe leakage is"Unfiltered Leakage," THEN calculate Unfiltered IV Leakage by algebraically adding Line Leakage to Carried Forward Unfiltered Leakage.Recordthe Unfiltered Leakageinthespace provided.c;!*IFthe leakage is"Filtered Leakage," THEN calculate Filtered Leakage IV by algebraically adding Line Leakage to Carried Forward Filtered Leakage.Recordthe Filtered Leakageinthespaceprovided.

d 5.5.6 Calculate Total Leakage by algebraically adding Unfiltered Leakage to IV Filtered Leakage.RecordtheTotal Leakageinthespace provided.5.5.7 CalculatetheTotal Percentage of Allowed Leakage: (a)Unfiltered Leakage: I DO cc/hr X (10011,700)

=%(b)Filtered Leakage: 5 faD cclhr X (100117,200)

=%(c)Total Percentage of AllowedLeakage:(a)

+(b)=admin 1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation KEY 1-LOG-20Revision11Page13of405.5.8Plotthe pointwheretheFilteredLeakageand Unfiltered Leakage intersect on Attachment 3, AllowableECCSLeakage.5.5.9IFtheECCSLeakage Computer ProgramisNOTavailable, THENdothe following:a.Startanewpageof Attachment2by enteringthefollowing informationinthe applicable space:*YEAR:the current year*PAGE:nextsequentialnumber

• UNFILTERED LEAKAGE: enter"Unfiltered Leakage"fromthe previouspagein"Carried Forward Unfiltered Leakage"*FILTERED LEAKAGE: enter"Filtered Leakage"fromthe previouspagein"Carried Forward Filtered Leakage"b.NotifytheCode AdministratorfortheECCSLeakage ComputerProgram.Emailorvoicemailisacceptable.5.5.10RecordtotalECCS leakageintheNarrativeLog.5.5.11IFatleastoneofthe conditionslistedbelowexists,THEN complete Subsection5.8,Actions If LeakageLimitIs Exceeded:*Unfiltered Leakage>1,700cc/hr(ifallleakageisunfiltered)

• Filtered Leakage>17,200cc/hr(ifallleakageisfiltered)

• TheTotal PercentageofAllowed Leakage recordedinStep5.5.7>100%

• ThepointplottedinStep5.5.8isinthe Unacceptable Leakageregionof Attachment 3, Allowable ECCS Leakage.Completed by:_Date:_admin1b KEY DOMINIONNorthAnnaPowerStation (all Leakageincc/hr)Iii Line Number Line Number Date Date Description Carried Forward Unfiltered Leakage (enter0iffirstentry ofnewyear)Unfiltered Leakage Description Carried Forward Filtered Leakage (enter0iffirstentry ofnewyear)I-c..H-r-(p,.\'" b c3.:b..vJ S'*. (k Filtered Leakage Description Total Leakage (Unfiltered Leakage+Filtered Leakage)admin 1b KEY (Page1of1)Attachment 2 ECCS Leakage Log YEAR Z 0 i'"t.1-LOG-20Revision11Page39of40 PAGE'2.UNFILTERED LEAKAGE iii iii i:>r?5*1.b Carried Forward Work Request!I I Accident I Line I Filtered I Filtered Work Order No.LeakageLeakageLeakageLeakage Leakage I Initial TOTAL LEAKAGE Total Leakage I InitialI*1'" i L__L j J__

__.

---]LJKEY¥See-3""P\'-"

C>¢a-a:.e{)

a.

DOMINION North Anna Power Station KEY(Page1of1)

Attachment 3 Allowable ECCS Leakage AllowableECCSLeakageFiltered/

Unfiltered CombinedFlowsWhichGenerateA5REMControlRoomDose(Whenaddedtothe Containment,RWSTandfiltershine components) 2000-.::-'5 u-;1500 0)ellell Q)...J (J)()trl1000 500 l°'O-;>o.....Fi ltered/Unf i ltered EGGS Leakagefor250cfm GontrolRoomInl e akage"-Unfilt e red Filtered EGGS U n f i ltered......, I Unacceptable I Gontrol Room Leakage EGGS Le akage............

Leakaqe Inleakage cc/hr cc/h r 1 7, 200 0"250cfm 8 , 600 850............

0 1 , 700............

II Total Leakage II......, (Filtered&Unfilter e d)"1l...I Acceptable I..........

"-"-,"-" ,..-................

\.:/"--1001 o.V 5 b f)-.-J AliowablelFilteredJECCSLeakage(cc/hr)Note:DataextractedfromPA-0207Rev.D, Radiological ConsequencesofaLOCAatNorthAnnabasedonthe AlternateSourceTerm GraphicsNo.CS4381 admin 1b KEY 1-LOG-20 Revision 11 Page 40 of 40 North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS With Unit 1 at 50%, returning to 100% following a refueling outage, the 'A' MFRV has demonstrated erratic operation.

The decision was made to hold power at 50% and notify Senior Management.

In order to attempt to isolate the cau se , Engineering proposes hooking up diagnostic equipment (for the purpose of recording voltages only) to various test points in the racks.

Westinghouse Process Engineering was consulted and concurs with the plan, but cautions that there is a slight risk of the 'A' MFRV failing closed due to loss of controller output in the event that an erroneous connection occurred during setup.

Plans are to maintain the current power level and conduct the proposed troubleshooting.

INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the Risk and Rigor categories in accordance with MA-AA-103, Conduct of Troubleshooting, and based on those results determine the highest level of review/approval required for the proposed troubleshooting.

(Record your results in the space provided)

Risk Level: __________________

Rigor Category: __________________

Highest level of review/approval required: ___________________________

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 2 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2

- DRAFT TASK Evaluate proposed troubleshooting activity and correctly apply the requirements of MA-AA-103. TASK STANDARDS Given a copy of MA

-AA-103, the candidate will evaluate a proposed troubleshooting activity and correctly determine the Risk Level, Rigor Category, and Highest Level of review/approval required.

K/A

REFERENCE:

G2.2.20, Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities (RO 2.6 / SRO 3.8)

ALTERNATE PATH:

N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time =

1 5 minutes Start Time = __________

Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)

Evaluator (Print)

Evaluator's Signature / Date EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 3 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2

- DRAFT READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE

Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

Instructions for In

-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS With Unit 1 at 50%, returning to 100% following a refueling outage, the 'A' MFRV has demonstrated erratic operation.

The decision was made to hold power at 50% and notify Senior Management.

In order to attempt to isolate the cause

, Engineering proposes hooking up diagnostic equipment (for the purpose of recording voltages only) to various test points in the racks.

Westinghouse Process Engineering was consulted and concurs with the plan, but cautions that there is a slight risk of the 'A' MFRV failing closed due to loss of controller output in the event that an erroneous connection occurred during setup.

Plans are to maintain the current power level and conduct the proposed troubleshooting.

INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the Risk and Rigor categories in accordance with MA

-AA-103, Conduct of Troubleshooting, and based on those results determine the highest level of review/approval required for the proposed troubleshooting.

(Record your results in the space provided)

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 4 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2

- DRAFT EVALUATION METHOD

Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues) Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERBAL

-VISUAL cues)

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Copy of MA

-AA-103, Conduct of Troubleshooting

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 5 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2

- DRAFT Start Time:

__________

Evaluators Note:

The possibility the 'A' MFRV failing shut presents the possibility of tripping the plant.

Even at the reduced power level, the Bypass valve is not capable of supplying sufficient feed, thus if the MFRV fails closed the plant will eventually trip (either on SF>FF mismatch w/ Lo SG Level or Lo

-Lo SG Level).

Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Determine Risk Level.

Procedure Step Att. 1, Page 2 of 4 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines the proposed troubleshooting activity qualifies as:

Risk Level

- I. High Risk Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Determine Rigor Category.

Procedure Step Att. 1, Page 3 of 4 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines the proposed troubleshooting activity qualifies as:

Rigor Category

- C North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 6 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Determine highest level of review/approval required.

Procedure Step 3.9 (page 13 of 37)

Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines, (using the Troubleshooting Approval Matrix), the proposed troubleshooting activity requires approval of:

Plant Manager END OF EVALUATION Stop Time:

__________

INFORMATION USENuclear Fleet Administrative ProcedureTitle:Conduct of TroubleshootingDocument NumberMA-AA-103Revision Number 9Effective Date and Approvals On FileRevision SummaryRevision 9 procedure includes the following changes:*Added Purpose 1.2 bullets for methodology*Added 3.2 Note information.

• Added new 3.3.1 DOCUMENT...*Step 3.3.2, Added instruction for Attachment 2*Deleted old Steps 3.3.4 and 3.3.5

• 3.4 added Note information concerning Complex Troubleshooting.*Revised Step 3.4.2, to include questions.*Revised 3.4.4.a concerning troubleshooting training techniques.

• Revised Subsection 3.6 Note, and instructions for using troubleshooting techniques.*Revised 3.10.2.b. Note*Revised 5.2.2, Manager Nuclear Maintenance...

• Added 5.2.4.f, Communicating troubleshooting results and engaging with Engineering,...*Added 5.2.7a. - g. Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) responsibilities...*Added Ref. 5.4.13 CA228865, NOD Troubleshooting Assessment 11-57-M Recommendations.

• revised Attachment 2, Troubleshooting Sheet*Revised Attachment 6, Flowchart to reflect changes in body. (NOTE Graphics working annotations)Functional Area Manager:Manager Nuclear Maintenance INFORMATION USEDOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 2 OF 37TABLE OF CONTENTSSection Page1.0PURPOSE.......................................................................................................................................32.0SCOPE............................................................................................................................................33.0INSTRUCTIONS..............................................................................................................................43.1General...................................................................................................................................43.2Problem Identification..........................................................................................................43.3Initial Problem Statement.....................................................................................................53.4Determine Level of Support.................................................................................................63.5Acquire Information..............................................................................................................83.6Determine Potential Failures and Develop Actions to Confirm True Cause...................83.7Develop Troubleshooting Plan..........................................................................................103.8Develop Instructions...........................................................................................................123.9Approval of Troubleshooting Plan....................................................................................133.10Execute Troubleshooting Plan..........................................................................................143.11Analyze Results...................................................................................................................143.12Failure Identification...........................................................................................................153.13Follow-up Actions...............................................................................................................153.14Post-Job Brief......................................................................................................................163.15Records Retention and Document....................................................................................164.0RECORDS.....................................................................................................................................165.0ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION...............................................................................................165.1Commitments......................................................................................................................165.2Responsibilities...................................................................................................................175.3Definitions............................................................................................................................195.4References...........................................................................................................................21ATTACHMENTS1Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix.........................................................................................222Troubleshooting Sheet - 730600 (July 2012).............................................................................263Data Gathering Checklist - 730601 (Sep 2007)..........................................................................304Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table - 730602 (Feb 2012)...........................315Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Example)...........................................346Troubleshooting Flowchart.........................................................................................................36 DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 3 OF 37INFORMATION USE1.0PURPOSE1.1This procedure:*Establishes a standard systematic approach for plant personnel involved in troubleshooting of power plant systems and equipment.*Decreases the time needed to identify necessary actions and restore the system to operating conditions.*Increases the probability that the complete cause of the problem will be found, so repair activities can be limited to what is actually needed.1.2This procedure provides guidance for a broad spectrum of conditions ranging from simple troubleshooting with a component isolated from service to complex cases that could involve multiple work groups and equipment that remains in operation with potential impact on other equipment.*For complex troubleshooting, use the Attachment 2, Troubleshooting, along with the Attachment 4, Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table, AND/OR Kepner-Tregoe (KT) Problem Analysis process and forms.*Attachment 4, Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table and Kepner-Tregoe (KT) Problem Analysis and decision making provide a more defined and documented process that is necessary on the more complex cases.*Use of the Kepner-Tregoe (KT) Problem Analysis process is left up to the discretion of the Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL).

IF the (KT) process is employed, THEN it shall be performed by personnel trained in the (KT) process.2.0SCOPE2.1The procedure scope includes:*Power Block equipment failures/malfunctions where there is a potential impact on continued plant operation.*Power Block equipment failures/malfunctions where previous corrective actions have NOT successfully prevented recurrence.2.2Actions taken to correct a specific known problem are NOT considered troubleshooting and are NOT within the scope of this procedure.2.3This procedure addresses the physical cause of an equipment failure/malfunction. This procedure is NOT intended to address Human Performance issues or replace a root cause analysis required by the corrective action program. Although there is overlap between root cause and troubleshooting in determining what to fix, in general, troubleshooting is the process applied to determine "What" to fix and the corrective action program is used to determine "Why" it failed.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 4 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.0INSTRUCTIONS3.1General3.1.1During each step of systematic approach to troubleshooting, CONSIDER whether it is still acceptable to continue system or plant operations based on significance of deficient condition.3.1.2During development of trouble shooting plans, REVIEW WM-AA-301 for operational risk assessment. (Ref.5.4.12)3.2Problem IdentificationInitiator3.2.1CONSIDER the following examples of information during troubleshooting activities, and DOCUMENT initial conditions for use by the Troubleshooting Team (TT) in the WR/CR/WO, as appropriate: *Evidence or data preserved during the course of the investigation*Videotape or photographs of the scene as appropriate*Frame of reference for photographic evidence (ruler, etc.)*Identifying labels in photographic evidence

• Labeled component saved for future analysis and reference*Sketches including scale when possible*Initial and final condition and location/state of all items found

• Conditions in the environment such as spray, heat, direct sunlight or unusual odors*Out of ordinary conditions*Description of equipment condition when found including unusual or unexpected conditions of equipment as well as surrounding equipment andarea NOTE:Particular attention is required when troubleshooting has the potential to impact design function of any structures, systems, or components that are being relied upon to support plant operation or achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

NOTE:Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 are typically performed by the Operating crew and those first responding to the concern. After the Troubleshooting Team (TT) has been formed, the TT should ensure Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 satisfactorily completed.

NOTE:The Operating crew and shift personnel may have already completed Subsection 3.2 prior to a Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) or a TT. Therefore, the TTL or TT may confirm Subsection 3.2 completion with the Operating crew and go to Subsection 3.3.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 5 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.2.2CONTROL the area (i.e., isolate or quarantine area, if possible).3.2.3IDENTIFY unusual or unexpected conditions of equipment as well as surrounding equipment and area.3.2.4MAINTAIN parts in the area until location, orientation and condition arenoted.3.3Initial Problem Statement3.3.1DOCUMENT the WR/CR/WO, system, component ID, operating conditions, initial problem statement and the initial Risk Number and Rigor Category on Attachment 2, Troubleshooting Sheet.3.3.2ASSIGN a Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) for both simple or complex troubleshooting activities and document the name on Attachment 2, Troubleshooting.

DETERMINE if a multi-disciplined troubleshooting team needs to be formed. In most cases the troubleshooting may still be led by Maintenance with support from Engineering or other work groups.Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL)3.3.3DEFINE clearly the problem before proceeding with troubleshooting. Understand the scope and nature of the issue, identify the severity of the problem, and establish to what extent the problem has been observed in the plant or system.

NOTE:It is NOT appropriate at this stage to speculate about the source of the problem or offer corrective actions. Experience suggests that defining the problem is the most important step in the process. Problem definition is essential for implementing the troubleshooting process in an efficient manner, following a structured approach, and finding the right solution to the problem the first time. A preliminary evaluation must be performed to gain a clear understanding of the issues. The problem statement is to address: who, what, when, where and NOT why.NOTE:Plant Manager will assign the Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) on a I-High Risk troubleshooting team. The Maintenance Manager will assign the TTL for a II-Medium Risk troubleshooting team.

NOTE:In most cases, the technical or maintenance expert should NOT serve as the TTL. Such experts should be allowed to apply full attention to plan development and implementation rather than be distracted by coordination details and administrative responsibilities.

NOTE:For the large majority of troubleshooting, which involves simple, non-complex problems, the TTL is the Maintenance First Line Supervisor in charge of the task.

NOTE:For simple troubleshooting the WR/CR/WO may suffice as the initial problem statement. The scope of the troubleshooting activity may pose a high risk to plant operation. The more risk significant the troubleshooting, the more rigorous the controls applied.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 6 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.3.4DEVELOP a problem statement that is technically correct and detailed as possible. A face-to-face interview with the personnel communicating the performance issue, especially operators, should be performed.

TTL3.3.5 LIST employees who identified or are knowledgeable of the problem on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).3.4Determine Level of Support TTL3.4.1DETERMINE if a complex troubleshooting plan is needed to perform the troubleshooting activity and DOCUMENT on the Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).3.4.2 IF any of the following questions are answered YES , THEN complex troubleshooting is required or may be deemed complex troubleshooting at management discretion.

• DOES activity require involvement from more than two groups/disciplines?*WILL the activity require numerous attempts in order to resolve?*WILL the same component require multiple condition reports in order to resolve the same/similar issue?*DOES the activity pose a potential operational risk?*DOES the activity of sufficient complexity require specialized personnel (i.e. vendors, corporate engineering,...)?*DOES troubleshooting deem complex troubleshooting at management discretion?3.4.3 IF troubleshooting has been identified as Complex Troubleshooting, THEN OBTAIN manager level approval of the problem statement.

EXAMPLE: Good: "On 6/6/98 at 1500 while in Mode 1, Containment Isolation Valve (V-216), located in the Unit 2 penetration room, failed its IST stroke test by 1 second, during a preplanned surveillance. Its design basis closing stroke time is 10 seconds and its tested stroke time was 11 seconds. Failure of the valve to perform its function puts the station in a 72-hourLCO."

Bad: "Containment Isolation Valve broke/fix."

NOTE:Complex troubleshooting requires gathering data for extensive engineering analysis, or may significantly affect production/safety risk margins. Step3.4.2 provides questions that should be used to aid in determining the need for a complex troubleshooting plan.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 7 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.4.4 IF a troubleshooting team needs to be formed, THEN PERFORM the following to form the team:Operations or Maintenance Manager a.ENSURE the troubleshooting team's composition includes individuals trained and experienced in troubleshooting techniques (e.g., KT problem analysis process, failure mode/cause analysis) b.IF applicable, THEN ESTABLISH a technical lead.

TTL c.IF the plant challenge is an immediate attention item requiring around the clock work, THEN IDENTIFY relief personnel to support coverage.

d.CONSIDER involving resources from Operations, Engineering, Maintenance, other stations, Corporate Engineering, Vendors, O&P, etc., as required.

e.DOCUMENT the troubleshooting team composition on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).

NOTE:A troubleshooting team shall be used for:*Solving higher risk or complex troubleshooting problems.*Troubleshooting activities which pose significant challenges to the plant such as short duration LCOs that would result in a unit shutdown.*Any event which threatens the on-line status of a unit.

• Other significant equipment problems as requested by Engineering, Maintenance, or Operations Managers.The troubleshooting team can vary from a worker and supervisor (with Outage and Planning support) to a multi-department team, depending on complexity of problem. For the large majority of troubleshooting, which involves simple, non-complex problems, the TTL is the Maintenance First Line Supervisor in charge of the task.It is recommended that members be assigned from Maintenance, Engineering, and Operations at a minimum. Other groups may be assigned as required for the task.

NOTE:The technical lead will normally be the system engineer, component engineer, program engineer, or subject matter expert from maintenance. The TTL should NOT be the technicallead.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 8 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.5Acquire Information TT3.5.1COLLECT information pertinent to the problem. REFER to Data Gathering Sheet (Attachment 3) for examples of data from internal sources and external sources.3.5.2 IF desired, THEN CREATE a timeline of the data associated with the failure and VALIDATE information obtained (e.g., second hand, how obtained,etc.).3.6Determine Potential Failures and Develop Actions to Confirm True Cause TT3.6.1 IF NOT complex troubleshooting, THEN GO TO to Section 3.73.6.2 IF employing the use of the KT Problem Analysis, THEN proceed to Step 3.6.11.3.6.3 IF performing Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Attachment 4), THEN DETERMINE ALL possible failure modes and ANALYZE for probable causes. 3.6.4.LIST on Attachment 4, possible failure modes using appropriate terminology when referring to structures, systems, or components.CAUTION:Care should be taken when acquiring information to ensure that evidence is not destroyed in the process. The need to quarantine equipment should be considered per OP-AA-1300,Quarantine.

NOTE:To the extent practical, acquiring information should precede any hands on troubleshooting.

NOTE:Troubleshooting involves use of a systematic approach to find the cause of a problem. The KT Problem Analysis and Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Attachment 4) are tools used with the goal of getting to problem resolution in the quickest and easiest fashion based on the training and experience of the personnel involved. If employing the use of KT Problem Analysis, then Attachment 4, Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table of this procedure is NOT required, however both may be used at the discretion of the TTL.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 9 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.6.5REFER to Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table Example (Attachment 5) for an example.3.6.6RECORD problem statement in top box of failure mode tree (Attachment 4) and OBTAIN approval from the cognizant manager. (Ref.5.4.12)3.6.7 LIST possible failure modes in failure mode tree (Attachment 4).3.6.8REVIEW available information to determine if any failure modes can beeliminated.3.6.9 IF any failure modes can be eliminated, THEN DOCUMENT the reasons on the failure mode tree (Attachment 4).3.6.10DEVELOP a failure mode/cause table (Attachment 4) for each remaining failure mode as follows:

a.GENERATE a list of possible causes.

b.DEVELOP action steps necessary to validate the cause.3.6.11 IF using KT Problem Analysis Process, THEN perform the following:

a.ENSURE personnel leading the KT Problem Analysis have received training in the process.

b.PERFORM KT Problem Analysis and DOCUMENT the analysis using the KT Problem Analysis forms.c.Once actions to confirm true cause have been developed, attach a copy of the KT Problem Analysis form to Attachment 2, Troubleshooting Sheet, Page 1.NOTE:The team should understand the design and operation of the system/components prior to listing possible failure modes. Correct terminology should be used when referring to structures, systems, or components (Slang terms, abbreviations, and acronyms can be used if defined in the document).

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 10 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.7Develop Troubleshooting Plan3.7.1DETERMINE if any alterations (i.e. Temp Mod) made during the troubleshooting process or installation of monitoring (M&TE) equipment require additional reviews (i.e. Modification, 50.59 Applicability Review, etc.). 3.7.2DETERMINE if detailed work instructions already exist for troubleshooting activity in procedures or work order.3.7.3 IF detailed work instructions are needed, THEN PERFORM the following:

a.ENSURE there is adequate instructions and precautions taken when the activity is performed to minimize the risk to the reliability to the plant. b.Based on the level of detail needed to perform the desired troubleshooting activity, INCLUDE detailed work instructions in Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2), page 2.

NOTE:Since troubleshooting plans may require that systems or component remain energized to fully determine the problem, particular attention is required to determine the impact of the troubleshooting on the rest of the plant. Actions necessary to minimize impact on the plant need to be determined to prevent creating an undesired or unanalyzed equipmentconfiguration.These actions could be as simple as closing a valve to prevent undesired flow changes, placing a component in "bypass," or complying with Technical Specification LCOs. The actions could be considerably more complex requiring review of minimum required inputs to a trip channel, identifying interlocks with other components, or assuring that design functions described in the UFSAR are not compromised.

NOTE:Each troubleshooting plan will be different, based on the type of system, the severity of the observed problem, the failure modes identified, and the potential effects of the failure modes on system performance. Level of plan detail and associated approval authority is dependent on risk, the rigor of the troubleshooting activities, and the significance of thefailure. Operational risk is assessed in accordance with WM-AA-301, Operational RiskAssessment.

NOTE:Design functions of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) being relied on to support plant operation or achieve and maintain safe shutdown could be adversely impacted by the troubleshooting activity.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 11 OF 37INFORMATION USE TTL3.7.4ARRANGE desired actions in logical sequence considering the following:*Most probable failure mode/cause*Easiest actions to perform

• Risk and rigor associated with actions.

• Non-intrusive versus intrusive actions (i.e., evaluate impact on the plant)

• ALARA

• Parallel actions

• Use of simulator or mock-ups

• Availability of parts3.7.5DEVELOP troubleshooting plan to the level of detail required to control the complexity of the activity. 3.7.6CONSIDER using a planning tool (e.g., MS Project, P3e).3.7.7ENSURE the initial problem statement is accurate and REVISE as necessary on Attachment 2.3.7.8REFER to Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix (Attachment 1), and DETERMINE risk and rigor.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 12 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.8Develop Instructions TTL3.8.1DEVELOP work instructions that describe the troubleshooting actions or steps for which approval is being requested in the Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).

TTL3.8.2DESCRIBE the equipment configuration limits or desirable boundaries of the troubleshooting (e.g., extent of equipment isolated, removed from service, mode inoperability, in bypass, controller in manual, etc.) to bound the effects of the troubleshooting and prevent creating an undesired or unanalyzed equipment configuration. (Attachment 2)3.8.3IDENTIFY the impact of the troubleshooting on plant equipment (e.g., alarms, lost indication, lost function, system flow changes, affects on adjacent equipment/systems, potential to affect reactivity by isolation of feedwater heating/control rod movement/boron dilution change or other actions, etc.). (Attachment 2)3.8.4DESCRIBE the expected results. (Attachment 2)3.8.5 INCLUDE actions to address possible negative consequences in troubleshooting instructions (i.e., pump auto-starts, valve opens, breaker trips, ESF actuation, Reactor Trip/SCRAM, potential to affect reactivity by isolation of feedwater heating/control rod movement, etc.). (Attachment 2)3.8.6IDENTIFY any decision or stop points to evaluate progress or subsequent actions. (Attachment 2)

NOTE:Detailed work instructions may not require a complex troubleshooting plan. Detailed work instructions are required for activities that pose a specific level of risk to the plant due to the system being worked on and the type of activity. Consider the potential for impact on the design functions of SSCs being relied upon to support plant operations or the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.If detailed specific instructions are required, develop work instructions based on known evidence with guidance from plant engineer, vendor, or other technical experts asappropriate.

NOTE:The very nature of equipment failures creates the possibility that design logic is no longer valid. Consideration should be given to new or unanticipated design logic that could have been created by the failure.

NOTE:Attachment 2, page 1, is a troubleshooting sheet cover page. If the troubleshooting activity results in the necessity for more than one troubleshooting task, then page 1 may be copied and the risk and rigor determination may be revised as applicable for each task.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 13 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.8.7REVIEW the risk and rigor determination documented on the Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2). ENSURE the troubleshooting plan is consistent with the rigor requirements (Attachment 1, page 4).3.8.8DOCUMENT any required equipment restoration actions. (Attachment 2)3.9Approval of Troubleshooting Plan TT3.9.1ENSURE PRA risk impact of the troubleshooting has been assessed and entered into the PRA for the applicable dates by Operations or O&P and DOCUMENT on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).

TTL3.9.2DETERMINE from the troubleshooting approval matrix, the approval required for the troubleshooting plan and DOCUMENT approvals on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).Troubleshooting Approval MatrixRigor CategoryRisk LevelI (High)II (Medium)III (Low)IV (No)

APlant Manager and FSRCMaintenance ManagerMaintenance Manager N/A BPlant Manager and FSRCMaintenance ManagerMaintenance Manager N/ACPlant ManagerShift ManagerShift ManagerShift ManagerDPlant ManagerShift ManagerShift ManagerShift ManagerNote: Matrix to be used to determine the highest level of review/approval required for thetroubleshooting.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 14 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.10Execute Troubleshooting Plan TT3.10.1 IF execution of troubleshooting plan requires removal of plant equipment from service, or places the plant in an alternate plant configuration (APC), THEN ENSURE the effect of execution of the troubleshooting plan upon risk is assessed and managed in accordance with WM-AA-20, Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities.3.10.2EXECUTE the approved troubleshooting plan, as follows:

a.DOCUMENT the following:*Results on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2)*Test equipment used b.IF the need to shift to a complex troubleshooting plan is identified, THENPERFORM the following:

1.STOP fieldwork.

2.PLACE system/plant in a safe configuration.

3.EVALUATE the troubleshooting plan before proceeding.

4.GO TO to Section 3.3.3.11Analyze Results TT3.11.1COLLECT results, data, outcomes, facts, information, etc., obtained from executing the troubleshooting plan.3.11.2COMPARE actual results to the expected results of the plan.3.11.3For simple troubleshooting, ENTER the completed results into the work package information.CAUTION:Care should be taken while gathering evidence not to accidentally destroy other evidence. For example, if a component needs to be disassembled, care should be taken to capture all "as found" conditions. Do NOT clean or de-contaminate fracture surfaces. Measurements, photographs, videotape, or other methods should be used to preserve evidence.

NOTE:The TTL and troubleshooting team members must be familiar with "simple" and "complex" troubleshooting plans in order to identify a need to "shift" from a "simple" to "complex" troubleshooting plan.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 15 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.11.4For Complex Troubleshooting activities, DOCUMENT the completed results and failure mode resolution on Attachment 4, page 3, under each failure mode/cause listed.3.11.5 IF conditions or data that can NOT be explained OR are NOT clearly understood are identified, THEN ENSURE these conditions or data are specifically identified, reviewed, and addressed by the troubleshooting team.3.12Failure Identification TT3.12.1 IF the failure modes and causes are NOT clearly identified AND the problem is NOT corrected, THEN PERFORM the applicable action:

• DISCUSS problem with Operations and Engineering and APPLY requirements of Dominion Operational Decision-Making Procedure and Guidelines, or equivalent per OP-AA-101, Operational Decision Making.

• REVISE troubleshooting plan as necessary and GO TO Section 3.3.3.13Follow-up Actions TT3.13.1 IF a component has failed, THEN initiate any required action(s) to determine failure mechanisms.3.13.2During the troubleshooting process more than one failure mechanism may be identified, ENSURE all other potential failure mechanisms have been investigated and eliminated/identified prior to completion of the process. (Ref. 5.4.11)3.13.3DOCUMENT follow-up actions on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).

NOTE:Follow-up actions may include:*Laboratory analysis of failed components*Root Cause Evaluation (RCE)

• Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE)

• Extent of Condition implications for similar equipment

• Common Mode Failure Evaluation

• Operating or maintenance procedure changes

• Additional training or changes to existing training

• Modification or temporary modification to the plant design

• Operational Decision Making for having operated with the problem

• Vendor notification of manufacturing defects DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 16 OF 37INFORMATION USE3.13.4ENTER the applicable corrective action process and repair equipment per the Dominion Work Management Process.3.13.5SUBMIT Condition Reports for tracking of all unresolved items identified during troubleshooting.3.14Post-Job Brief TTL3.14.1REFER to Dominion Work Management Procedure, and CONSIDER conducting a post-job brief per WM-AA-100, Work Management.3.15Records Retention and Document TT3.15.1RETAIN documentation developed during the troubleshooting process.3.15.2ORGANIZE retained records in a logical manner to facilitate later review anduse.4.0RECORDS4.1The following record(s) completed as a result of this procedure are required to be transmitted to Nuclear Document Management (NDM). The records have been identified and retention requirements established for the Nuclear Records Retention Schedule (NRRS) per RM-AA-101, Record Creation, Transmittal, and Retrieval.4.1.1Quality Assurance Records*Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2)*Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Attachment 4)4.1.2Non-Quality Assurance RecordsNone5.0ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION5.1Commitments None DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 17 OF 37INFORMATION USE5.2Responsibilities5.2.1Plant ManagerThe Plant Manager is responsible for:a.Assigning the TTL for high risk troubleshooting.b.Approving I-High Risk troubleshooting activities.5.2.2Manager Nuclear Maintenancea.Performing as the site owner of the troubleshooting process.b.The Maintenance Manager or designee assigns the Troubleshooting Team Leader (TTL) for Medium risk troubleshooting activities.c.Approving II Medium Risk and III Low Risk Category A or B troubleshooting activities.5.2.3Engineeringa.Providing technical and equipment expertise.b.Maintaining cognizance of troubleshooting and repair activities.c.Supporting the preparation of troubleshooting plans for complex problems. The system/component engineer will most often be the technical lead on multi-discipline teams for complex issues.d.Assessing the risk of proposed complex troubleshooting plans and activities and ensuring the requirements of the plant's design basis are incorporated, including independent collegial/challenge boards, and third party reviewse.Determining whether outside engineering or technical assistance isrequired.f.Maintaining current knowledge of failure mode/cause analysistechniques.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 18 OF 37INFORMATION USE5.2.4Maintenancea.Developing work instructions for field troubleshooting activities, including Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2) as necessary, giving consideration of the ability to isolate or otherwise bound the effects of the troubleshooting from impacting the rest of the plant.b.Assessing the operational risk of proposed troubleshooting plans and activities in accordance with WM-AA-301 and ensuring the requirements of Dominion Work Control Process are incorporated, including pre-job and post-job briefs, Engineering reviews and required approval.c.Developing and executing the majority of the site's troubleshooting plans, led by a Maintenance First Line Supervisor and workers.d.Performing hardware troubleshooting within the skills of the craft.e.Ensuring a reassessment of risk is performed if an emergent troubleshooting condition results in a configuration that has not been previously assessed.f.Communicating troubleshooting results and engaging with Engineering, Operations, or other support groups as required.5.2.5Operationsa.Evaluating equipment problems in accordance with the event responseguidelines.b.Documenting equipment problems and initial conditions (e.g., CR/WR/WO, Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2), etc.).c.Reviewing Attachment 2 to ensure adequate bounds on the troubleshooting activities have been established to limit plant impact and authorizing the field troubleshooting activity.d.Ensuring a reassessment of PRA risk is performed if an emergent troubleshooting condition results in a configuration that has not been previously assessed.e.Ensuring troubleshooting plans adequately address the potential to affect core reactivity.f.Ensuring configuration control in accordance with the plant's design basis.g.Ensuring that PRA risk assessment of planned or emergent troubleshooting isperformed.5.2.6FSRC ChairApproving I-High Risk troubleshooting activities.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 19 OF 37INFORMATION USE5.2.7Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL)a.Communicating troubleshooting results and involving Engineering, Operations, or other Maintenance groups when assistance is required.b.Coordinating the development of the troubleshooting plan and its field execution.c.Ensuring technical and procedural support is provided for the work activity.d.Assures information relating to the equipment problem symptom(s) is obtained and recorded.e.Checks that information on the equipment response and behavior is documented during troubleshooting activities.f.Checks necessary work authorizations.g.Ensures technical human performance rigor requirements including risk assessments, pre-job and post-job briefs, and third party reviews are considered and included as appropriate.5.2.8Technical Lead (TL)a.Supporting development and executing the troubleshooting plan for both simple and complex troubleshooting activities.b.Analyzing results.c.Identifying failure modes and recommending follow-up actions.5.3Definitions5.3.1Complex TroubleshootingTroubleshooting that requires gathering data for extensive engineering analysis, may significantly affect production/safety risk margins, or is deemed complex at management discretion.5.3.2Intrusive TroubleshootingTroubleshooting that requires physical connection to an electrical circuit or direct contact with the system process fluid (e.g., volt/ohm meter, chart recorder, pressure temperature gauges subjected to process fluid).5.3.3Non-intrusive TroubleshootingTroubleshooting that does not require physical connection to an electrical circuit or direct contact with the system process fluid (e.g., vibration diagnostic equipment, thermographic equipment, clamp on ammeter, contact pyrometer, acoustical diagnostic equipment, circuit test points).

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 20 OF 37INFORMATION USE5.3.4Simple TroubleshootingThis category of troubleshooting is the most common and should constitute a large fraction of all plant troubleshooting activities. It will normally be led by a Maintenance First Line Supervisor and Maintenance workers.A troubleshooting plan that requires discovery of information prior to the development of the next step does not constitute a requirement for transition from simple to a complex troubleshooting plan. Simple troubleshooting may address several failure modes or activities due to the type and quantity of information that needs to be obtained to narrow the troubleshooting scope.5.3.5Technical Lead (TL)Individual most knowledgeable or qualified to perform or assist in performance of troubleshooting. The technical lead will normally be the system engineer, component engineer, program engineer, or subject matter expert from maintenance. The TTL should not be the technical lead.5.3.6Troubleshooting Team (TT)Typically a multi-discipline group consisting of personnel from Maintenance, Site Engineering, Design Engineering, and Operations assembled to solve a higher risk or complex troubleshooting problem. A team may also be formed for significant challenges such as a short-duration LCO when initial troubleshooting activities were unsuccessful or at management's discretion. The size and makeup of the team will be driven by the needs of the station and business decisions of station management.5.3.7Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL)Individual responsible for overall condition of the troubleshooting activities and communication to the management team. For lower risk activities, the individual is the first-line supervisor. For higher risk activities where a troubleshooting team is assembled, the individual is an engineering supervisor or a maintenance second line supervisor. The Plant manager assigns the TTL for high risk troubleshooting. The Manager Nuclear Maintenance assigns the TTL for medium risk troubleshooting.5.3.8Kepner-Tregoes (KT) Problem AnalysisA rational process for finding the cause of a negative or positive deviation.

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 21 OF 37INFORMATION USE5.4References5.4.1EPRI Technical Report, 1003093, System and Equipment Troubleshooting Guideline5.4.2Dominion Cause Evaluation Program 5.4.3OP-AA-1300, Quarantine5.4.4OP-AA-101, Operational Decision Making5.4.5WM-AA-20, Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities 5.4.6WM-AA-100, Work Management5.4.7WM-AA-301, Operational Risk Assessment5.4.8DNAP-3004, Dominion Program for 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 - Changes, Tests, and Experiments5.4.9GNP-04.04.01, 50.59 Applicability Review and Pre-Screening5.4.10NAPS CA089553, Add protected train equipment evaluation to troubleshooting sheet (from ACE014023)5.4.11ACE 18636, 2J EDG KW became Erratic during 2-PT-82J5.4.12CACC000871, Operational Risk Assessment5.4.13CA228865, NOD Troubleshooting Assessment 11-57-M Recommendations DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 22 OF 37INFORMATION USEPurposeAttachment 1 provides an additional tool to measure risk and rigor impact during specific troubleshooting activities and is intended for use during plan development. The information contained in Attachment 1 is based on industry experience and is intended to provide a "mental model" for the TTL during action step development. This attachment is not designed to replace or alter any risk assessment through PRA. The TTL can use this reference to provide a level of risk and rigor to support minimizing the impact to plant systems and equipment.Notes1.These are strictly guidelines and cannot capture every troubleshooting activity. The TTL and team will have to exercise judgment to ensure a conservative decision is made during the troubleshooting approval.2.It is acceptable to invoke a different level of rigor based on the plant conditions and other factors.

3.Particular attention is required when the troubleshooting has the potential to impact the design function and/or operational status of any structures, systems, or components that are being relied upon to support plant operation or achieve and maintain safe shutdown.Steps for use of Attachment 1

1.Review troubleshooting scope against guidelines on page 2 to determine troubleshooting risk level.

2.Review activity matrix on page 3 to determine the rigor category if the troubleshooting steps fall within examples provided or similar actions.3.If applicable, utilize the category list on page 4 to include the level of rigor in the plan details and involvement of the personnel to minimize the risk to plant systems and personnel.ATTACHMENT1(Page 1 of 4)Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 23 OF 37INFORMATION USEGuidelines for Level of RISK DeterminationI. HIGH RISK:Equipment is not removed from service. Presents a risk of tripping the plant, actuating a safety system, causing a significant reactivity change, or possible radiation release, either directly or as a result of causing a major plant transient.II. MEDIUM RISK:Equipment is not removed from service. Could result in an undesirable plant transient, affect reactivity, or a reportable event, but not a reactor trip or safety system activation.III. LOW RISK:Equipment is not removed from service. Could have an affect on plant equipment, but should not present a risk of causing an undesirable plant transient, reactivity change, or reportable event. No unusual personnel safety risk.IV. NO RISK:Equipment is removed from service. Troubleshooting activities do not affect the operation or safety of the plant.

EXAMPLE:Removing an instrument loop from service in a high-Risk classification was classified as a Category "A" activity. Once the loop is out of service and the device is in the shop, it can be moved to a lower risk classification. At this time the changes to the plan affecting the shop activity could be performed IAW the lesser requirements of the above table.ATTACHMENT1(Page 2 of 4)Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 24 OF 37INFORMATION USEActivityRigor CategoryI-High RiskII-Medium RiskIII-Low RiskIV-No RiskDiagnostic hookup with signal injection on equipment in service which is not performing its intended function without approved procedures.ABCN/ADiagnostic hookup with signal injection on equipment in service which is performing its intended function without approved procedures.AABN/ADiagnostic hookup for monitoring on equipment in service without test points. AACN/ADiagnostic hookup for monitoring on equipment in service with test points. CCCN/ARemoval from service without approved procedures.AACN/AReturn to service without approved procedures. AACN/AVoltage/current readings on in service equipment without test points.AACN/AVoltage/current readings on in service equipment with test points. CCCDPressure/temperature/level changes without approved procedures.ABCN/AEnergized equipment that is out of service without approved procedures. CCCCVisual inspection with barrier intrusion. CCDDVisual inspection with no barrier intrusion.DDDDCurrent readings on in-service equipment using a clamp-on device.CDDN/AATTACHMENT1(Page 3 of 4)Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 25 OF 37INFORMATION USEGuidelines for Level of RIGOR DeterminationCategory A (Highest degree of rigor; tightest controls)1.Requires a troubleshooting plan with careful attention to risks to plant personnel and plant operation. The troubleshooting plan may be simple or complex depending on the complexity of the issue.2.Determine the level of plant management (point of contact) that will be required to approve plan changes.3.If unexpected results are noted during the process of troubleshooting, notify point of contact and determine if the original plan is acceptable or should the plan be revised.4.If the troubleshooting results in expanded scope of equipment that was not previously considered, the plan requires revision and re-approval through the point of contact. (i.e., The problem was not the transmitter but is suspected to be a multiple end device power supply).5.SRO/management observer recommended being present during troubleshooting activities.

6.Control Room briefing is required.

7.Determine communication requirement with site leadership.Category B1.Same as A1.

2.Same as A2.

3.Same as A4.

4.Same as A5.

5.Same as A6.

6.Same as A7.Category CTypically requires a simple troubleshooting plan.Category D1.Typically requires a simple troubleshooting plan.2.May be performed with very little structured detail.ATTACHMENT1(Page 4 of 4)Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 26 OF 37Troubleshooting Sheet MA-AA-103 - Attachment 2 Page 1 of 4 Form No. 730600 (July 2012) CR Number Risk I-High II-Medium III-Low IV-No Rigor Category A B C D Work Authorization (CR/WO) System Is a Complex Troubleshooting Plan required? Yes NoComponent ID Operating Conditions Initial Problem Statement Name of Personnel Having Knowledge of the Problem Department Phone Number Appointed Troubleshooting Team Leader (TTL): Troubleshooting Team Members [Identify personnel with failure modes/cause analysis training with an asterisk (*).] Engineering Operations Maintenance Vendor Corporate O&P Project Manager Other DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 27 OF 37 Troubleshooting Sheet Form No. 730600 (July 2012) MA-AA-103 - Attachment 2 Page 2 of 4Operations to determine the following: a. Troubleshooting will cause TS Equipment to become inoperable? Yes No b.IF Yes, THEN VERIFY opposite train equipment and associated EDG are operable. Operations (Initials) Describe the troubleshooting actions or steps for which approval is being requested. Include any initial observations and response completed by the Operating crew. Troubleshooting Limits or Boundaries Describe the equipment configuration during the troubleshooting (extent of equipment isolated, removed from service, made operable, in bypass, controller in manual, etc.) to bound the effects of the troubleshooting and prevent creating an undesirable or unanalyzed equipment configuration. (Refer to MA-AA-103 Attachment 1 for additional risk and rigor consideration.)

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 28 OF 37 Troubleshooting Sheet Form No. 730600 (July 2012) MA-AA-103 - Attachment 2 Page 3 of 4Identify the Impact of the Troubleshooting on Plant Equipment (Alarms, Lost Indication, Lost Function, system flow changes, affects on adjacent equipment/systems, potential to affect reactivity by isolation of feedwater heating/control rod movement/boron dilution change or other means, etc. (Refer to MA-AA-103 Attachment 1 for additional risk and rigor consideration.) Describe the expected results. Identify any decision or stop points to evaluate progress or subsequent actions. FSRC review required? Yes No PRA Risk evaluated by Operations or O&P? Yes Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) Approval, if required (Print Name) Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) Approval, if required (Signature) Date Maintenance Manager/Designee Review/Approval (Mark N/A if Rigor Category C or D) (Print Name) Maintenance Manager/Designee Review/Approval (Mark N/A if Rigor Category C or D) (Signature) Date Plant Manager (Nuclear) Approval, if required (Print Name) Plant Manager (Nuclear) Approval, if required (Signature) Date FSRC Chair Approval, if required (Print Name)

FSRC Chair Approval, if required (Signature) Date Shift Manager Approval (Print Name)

Shift Manager Approval (Signature) Date DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 29 OF 37INFORMATION USE Troubleshooting Sheet Form No. 730600 (July 2012) MA-AA-103 - Attachment 2 Page 4 of 4Results Attained Follow-up Action Required Additional sheets attached? Yes No Worker (Print Name)

Worker (Signature) Date DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 30 OF 37Data Gathering ChecklistMA-AA-103 - Attachment 3 Page 1 of 1Data Gathering Checklist (Mark box for data attached) Internal Sources: Documentation Recorded Data Form No. 730601(Sep 2007)InterviewsCorrespondenceInternal SourcesIndustry BulletinsEPIX Records OEProcedures and InstructionsVendor ManualsDrawings and SpecificationsSample Analysis and ResultsDesign Basis InformationPrevious CRsWritten StatementsPRAPart 21 RecordsRecent Mods to SSCOperating LogsMaintenance Work Packages and RecordsInspection ReportsEquipment History RecordsStrip Chart RecordingsTrend Chart RecordingsSequence of Events RecordersRadiological SurveysPlant Parameter ReadingsPost Maintenance/Mod Test Results External Sources:CorrespondenceIndustry BulletinsVendor ContactsNRC DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 31 OF 37Complex TroubleshootingFailure Mode/Cause TableMA-AA-103 - Attachment 4 Page 1 of 3 Suggested Topics/Questions To Support Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode Analysis Form No. 730602(Feb 2012)What is the purpose/function of the system/component?How is the system/component designed to work?How does the system/component really work?What components are potentially involved?How is the system/component supposed to be operated?How is the system/component really operated?Are vendor operation and maintenance recommendations followed?Is there sufficient technical information for operating the component properly?What is the operating history for the system/component?What form of energy (e.g., motive power, control power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc.) caused the first component/subcomponent to fail?Was this energy (e.g., motive power, control power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc. supposed to be present or was it undesirable?What failed first?Could something have failed earlier than the time of the event?Did anything else fail as a result of the first failure?What barriers existed between the energy (e.g., motive power, control power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc.)

and the first failure?When did the failure(s) occur? How did you know for sure?Could the unwanted energy (e.g., motive power, control power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc.) have been deflected or evaded?Have all reasonable failure modes been identified?Were adequate human factors considered in the design of the equipment?Have similar failures occurred before at Dominion stations or the industry?Is the system/component properly labeled for ease of operation?How was the failed component maintained?What is the maintenance history for the system/component?Is there sufficient technical information for maintaining the component properly?Did the environment (e.g., humidity, vibration, etc.) have an effect on the problem?Could this failure affect the opposite train/unit? If not, why?Is the failure also on the opposite train/unit? What is the difference? Why is it different?Could the commercial grade dedication process have contributed to the failure(s)?

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 32 OF 37Complex TroubleshootingFailure Mode/Cause TableMA-AA-103 - Attachment 4 Page 2 of 3Problem Statement Form No. 730602(Feb 2012)FailureMode 1 FailureMode 2 FailureMode 3 FailureMode 4 Mana ger A pproval (Print/Si gn) Date DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 33 OF 37Complex TroubleshootingFailure Mode/Cause TableMA-AA-103 - Attachment 4 Page 3 of 3Failure Mode No.: Form No. 730602(Feb 2012)Descri ption: Cause(s) Refer to MA-AA-103 Attachment 1 for example of risk and rigor determination for blocks below. Validation / Action Steps Expected results are based on operations as designed, NOT as failed. Expected Actual Owner Status Ri gor (A, B, C, D, N/A)

Ri gor (A, B, C, D, N/A)

DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 34 OF 37 Control System Failure Fuel System Failure Starter Failure1B Diesel Generator failed to start during its monthly surveillance on 2/2/98 at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />. Failure to start outs the station in a 7-day LCO. Its design basis is the start and commence loading within 10 seconds.Complex TroubleshootingFailure Mode/Cause Table (Example)MA-AA-103 - Attachment 5 Page 1 of 2Problem Statement Form No. 730602(Feb 2012) - ExampleFailureMode 1 FailureMode 2 FailureMode 3 FailureMode 4 This failure mode was ruled out since it was observed that the starter was adequately cranking the engineSee attached failure/mode cause table.Verified from vendor manual that electronic failure would not preclude engine start.Mana ger A pproval (Print/Si gn) Date DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 35 OF 37INFORMATION USE 0-5 Psig No visual signs of dirt and debris.Run Fuel pump and check pressure drop across filter.Remove filter element and check for cleanliness.

1. Fuel filter pluggedComplex TroubleshootingFailure Mode/Cause Table (Example)MA-AA-103 - Attachment 5 Page 2 of 2Failure Mode No.: Form No. 730602(Feb 20127) - Example Ops: OPEN MM: OPENDescri ption: 2Fuel system failure Cause(s) Refer to MA-AA-103 Attachment 1 for example of risk and rigor determination for blocks below. Validation / Action Steps Expected results are based on operations as designed, NOT as failed. Expected Actual Owner Status 20-30 Psig No visual degradation.Check discharge pressure while cranking engine.Disassemble pump and inspect. 2. Fuel pump brokeSys Eng: OPEN

MM: OPEN Fuel flow at 1.0 gpmDisconnect line before fuel pump and verify fuel flow.3. Plugged supply lineThis cause was ruled out since a visual check of levelin the tank confirmed that adequate fuel level exists.4. Lack of fuel in tankSys Eng: OPEN MM: OPEN DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 36 OF 37INFORMATION USE Subsection 3.2 Problem Identification Step 3.3.3Write Problem Statement onMA-AA-103, Att. 2 Equipment Control Examples:

- Quarrantine - Document Details - Preserve Materials

- Label and Save - Environmental Conditions Step 3.3.1Assign a TTL Step 3.3.4 Determine initial level of Risk and Rigor Step 3.4.1 Determine if a Simple or ComplexTroubleshooting Plan is required Is Plan Complex?Form Team as needed No YesTeam is required for Complex Plan Subsection 3.5 Acquire information Is Plan Complex?

No Yes Subsection 3.6 List Failure Modes per ComplexTroubleshooting activity Approvals obtained?Subsection 3.10 Execute Plan Yes Subsection 3.9 Obtain required approvals for Plan Subsection 3.8Write troubleshooting instructions Subsection 3.7 Develop Plan If NO, THEN GO TO Subsection 3.7 TROUBLESHOOTING FLOWCHART B From Page 2 Graphics No: LP568A A To Page 2ATTACHMENT6(Page 1 of 2)Troubleshooting Flowchart DOMINIONMA-AA-103REVISION9PAGE 37 OF 37INFORMATION USE Graphics No: LP568BSubsection 3.11 Analyze results Need to shift from Simple to Complex Plan identified?

No Failure identified?

Subsection 3.13 Initiate follow-up actionsYes Yes No Operational Decision Making (ODM) required? If YES, THEN GO TO Subsection 3.3 If NO, THEN GO TO Subsection 3.3 TROUBLESHOOTING FLOWCHART B To Page 1 From Page 1 AATTACHMENT6(Page 2 of 2)Troubleshooting Flowchart North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 is at 100% power and Unit 2 is in refueling.

Maintenance has been performed on the actuators of 1

-CH-P-1A and 2-CH-P-1A discharge MOVs.

Prior to releasing, PMT requires each of the four (4) valves to be full stroked electrically for timing and local position indication verifications.

INITIATING CUE You have been assigned to locally observe the stroke of these valves.

Based on this assignment you have been directed to:

1) Identify the correct RWP and task number ___________________________________

2) Identify the applicable dose and rate alarms __________________________________

3) Identify the applicable dosimetry requirements ________________________________

AND 4) Assuming that each valve full stroke observation will take 10 minutes, and that you will be in the general area (1

-2 feet ) of the valves while performing the task, estimate the total dose you will receive while observing the valves __________________

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Page 2 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 3

- DRAFT TASK Perform routine observations in the RCA.

TASK STANDARDS Given a choice of RWPs and applicable survey maps, determine correct RWP, dosimetry and associated dose & rate alarms, and estimate dose received.

K/A

REFERENCE:

G2.3.7, Ability to comply with Radiation Work Permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions. (RO 3.5 / SRO 3.6)

ALTERNATE PATH:

N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time =

15 minutes Start Time = __________

Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)

Evaluator (Print)

Evaluator's Signature / Date EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Page 3 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 3

- DRAFT READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE

Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

Instructions for In

-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 is at 100% power and Unit 2 is in refueling.

Maintenance has been performed on the actuators o f 1-CH-P-1A and 2-CH-P-1A discharge MOVs.

Prior to releasing, PMT requires each of the four (4) valves to be full stroked electrically for timing and local position indication verifications.

INITIATING CUE You have been assigned to locally observe the stroke of these valves.

Based on this assignment you have been directed to:

1) Identify the correct RWP and task number ___________________________________

2) Identify the applicable dose and rate alarms __________________________________

3) Identify the applicable dosimetry requirements ________________________________

AND 4) Assuming that each valve full stroke observation will take 10 minutes, and that you will be in the general area (1

-2 feet ) of the valves while performing the task, estimate the total dose you will receive while observing the valves __________________

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Page 4 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 3

- DRAFT EVALUATION METHOD

Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues) Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERB AL-VISUAL cues)

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Copy of Charging Pump Area Survey Maps

Copy of RWPs Calculator

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Page 5 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 3

- DRAFT Start Time:

Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Select RWP.

Procedure Step N/A Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate selects RWP 12-1207, Task #1 Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Identify the dose and rate alarms

. Procedure Step N/A Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate identifies dose alarm 5, dose rate alarm 90.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Page 6 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 3

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Identify the dosimetry requirements for your task. Procedure Step N/A Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate identifies ED/SRD and TLD. Step / Action Notes / Comments 4 Estimate total dose for the activity.

Procedure Step N/A Critical Step*

SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Using the attached Survey Maps:

1-CH-P-1A: 3mrem/hr X 1hr/60min X 10min/valve X 2 valves = 1 mrem 2-CH-P-1A: 4mrem/hr X 1hr/60min X 10min/valve X 2 valves = 1.33 mrem 1 + 1.33 = 2.33 mrem Standards Candidate estimates total dose 2.33 mrem (acceptance criteria 2.3 - 2.4 based on rounding)

END OF EVALUATION Stop Time:

__________

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS The Station Emergency Manager has declared a General Emergency.

The HP Shift Supervisor reports that a release is occurring from Containment, but does not have any estimate of the magnitude.

Emergency Response Facilities are NOT manned yet.

INITIATING CUE You are directed to perform EPIP

-1.06, Protective Action Recommendations up to and including Step 5 (use real time).

Met Data is as follows:

Average wind direction

- 1 78° Average wind speed

- 8.3 mph Note: Use the highlighter provided to mark the Affected Sectors Map

-- THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL TASK

--

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 2 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 4

- DRAFT TASK Perform EPIP

-1.06, Protective Action Recommendations.

TASK STANDARDS Given a copy of EPIP

-1.06, the candidate will correctly determine the required PAR based on the information provided.

K/A

REFERENCE:

G2.4.44, Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. (3.6/3.8)

ALTERNATE PATH:

N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time =

10 minutes

• Start Time = __________

Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)

Evaluator (Print)

Evaluator's Signature / Date EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS

• for time critical portion; follow

-up requires 2

-5 minutes for a total time of ~15 minutes.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 3 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 4

- DRAFT READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE

Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control roo m steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have

completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

Instructions for In

-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS The Station Emergency Manager has declared a General Emergency.

The HP Shift Supervisor reports that a release is occurring from Containment, but does not have any estimate of the magnitude.

Emergency Response Facilities are NOT manned yet.

INITIATING CUE You are directed to perform EPIP

-1.06, Protective Action Recommendations up to and including Step 5 (use real time).

Met Data is as follows:

Average wind direction

- 1 78° Average wind speed

- 8.3 mph Note: Use the highlighter provided to mark the Affected Sectors Map

-- THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL TASK

--

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 4 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 4

- DRAFT EVALUATION METHOD

Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues) Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERBAL

-VISUAL cues)

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Copy of EPIP

-1.06, Protective Action Recommendations

Highlighter

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 5 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 4

- DRAFT Start Time:

Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Initiate Procedure. Procedure Step 1 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate enters information in step 1. Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Determine Initial PAR.

Procedure Step 2 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Standards Candidate determines PAR B.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 6 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 4

- DRAFT Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Implement Attachment 4.

Procedure Step 3 Critical Step*

SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Note: The specific manner used to "mark affected sectors" on attachment 4 is not critical as long as the candidate has clearly identified the correct sectors Standards Candidate completes attachment 4 per attached key Step / Action Notes / Comments 4 Complete Attachment 3.

Procedure Step 5 Critical Step*

SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Note: Candidate completes Attachment 3 within 15 minutes of start time; Approval signature is NOT critical Standards Candidate enters data on per the Attached Key.

North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation)

- Operator Program Page 7 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam

- RETAKE Admin JPM 4

- DRAFT Evaluators Note:

The follow

-up is NOT intended to have the candidate re

-enter the procedure and complete all of the paperwork; it is intended solely as a question to solicit the candidate's knowledge of the need for an update , and the content of the update. The candidate may re

-enter and perform the steps of the procedure if desired by th em, or briefly explain the requirement as listed below in the standard for this element.

Step / Action Notes / Comments 5 Evaluate a change in wind direction.

Procedure Step 8 4 Follow-up: When candidate completes the task (ready to submit the procedure to you) inform the candidate that this completes the time critical portion of the JPM and that you have a follow-up question.

Ask candidate "assuming 30 minutes have gone by since the PAR was issued and average wind direction has changed and is now from 160°, what if any action would be required?" Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]

Note: Ensure candidate has their procedure to reference when answering/explaining the follow

-up. Standards Candidate explains that the PAR would have to be revised to now include Sectors Q, R, A, B based on the change in wind direction (EPIP

-1.06, Step 8).

END OF EVALUATION Stop Time:

__________

1 of 5 COMMONPURPOSEGive guidance to the Station Emergency Manager or Recovery Manager regarding determination of Protective Action Recommendations.ENTRY CONDITIONSAny one of the following:1)Activation by EPIP-1.05, RESPONSE TO GENERAL EMERGENCY.2)Activation by CPIP-3.1, CERC AND CEOF ACTIVATION.

3)Activation by CPIP-6.0, LEOF RECOVERY MANAGER GUIDANCE.4)As directed by the Station Emergency Manager or Recovery Manager.

REFERENCE USENORTH ANNA POWER STATIONEMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER EPIP-1.06PROCEDURE TITLEPROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS(WITH 6 ATTACHMENTS)REVISION 9 PAGE NUMBEREPIP-1.06PROCEDURE TITLEPROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONSREVISION 9 PAGE2 of 5 STEPACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSERESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ____1INITIATE PROCEDURE:*By: ______________________________ Date: ____________________________ Time: ____________________________ ____2USE ATTACHMENT2, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION MATRIX, TO DETERMINE INITIAL PARNOTE:*ATTACHMENT4, AFFECTED SECTOR(S) MAP, is to be used for all PAR developments. If more than four PARs are developed, consult with Emergency Preparedness Advisor for direction.

ATTACHMENT5, DOWNWIND SECTOR TABLE, may be referenced to determine wind direction compass point and affected downwind sectors. ____3IMPLEMENT ATTACHMENT4, AFFECTED SECTOR(S) MAP:a)Record time wind data acquired a)b)Record average wind direction from, in degrees and compass point b)c)Record average wind direction to, in degrees and compass point c)d)Mark affected sectors on map (use any writing implement available, e.g., pen, pencil, highlighter, etc.)

d)e)GOTO Step5 NUMBEREPIP-1.06PROCEDURE TITLEPROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONSREVISION 9 PAGE3 of 5 STEPACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSERESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ____4UPDATE ATTACHMENT4, AFFECTED SECTOR(S) MAP:a)Record time wind data acquiredb)Record average wind direction from, in degrees and compass pointc)Record average wind direction to, in degrees and compass pointd)Mark new area(s) affected on map (use distinguishable markings from previous markings):Include all downwind sectors from previous PARs for this event ANDAll new downwind sectors for the PAR ANDAny downwind sectors through which the wind shift occurred ____5COMPLETE ATTACHMENT3, PROTECTIVEACTION RECOMMENDATION FORM:a)Fill in Item 1 Protective Action Recommendation:1)Mark appropriate PAR box(s)2)Record Mile radius and Miles downwind3)Record Downwind Sectorsb)Sign and date form NUMBEREPIP-1.06PROCEDURE TITLEPROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONSREVISION 9 PAGE4 of 5 STEPACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSERESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ____6DIRECT EMERGENCY COMMUNICATORS TO NOTIFY OFF-SITE AUTHORITIES OF PAR:State Emergency Operations Center notified IAW EPIP-2.01, NOTIFICATION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTSNRC notified IAW EPIP-2.02, NOTIFICATION OF NRC (notification made from Control Room or TSC, when activated)NRC notified IAW EPIP-4.33, HEALTH PHYSICS NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS (notifications made from TSC or LEOF/CEOF only after NRC requests HPN be established) ____7HAVE RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT DIRECTOR (RAD) IMPLEMENT EPIP-4.07, PROTECTIVE MEASURES [RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT COORDINATOR (RAC) IF IN LEOF/CEOF]

NUMBEREPIP-1.06PROCEDURE TITLEPROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONSREVISION 9 PAGE5 of 5 STEPACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSERESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

• CAUTION:Previously issued Protective Action Recommendations should not be reduced until the threat is fully under control and after consulting with Commonwealth of Virginia emergency response organization.

• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

• ____8CHECK THE FOLLOWING: ____9CHECK EMERGENCY - TERMINATEDIF RAD/RAC recommends a PAR change, THEN RETURNTO Step8. ____10TERMINATE EPIP-1.06:Give completed EPIP-1.06, forms, and other applicable records to TSC Emergency Procedures Coordinator or LEOF Services CoordinatorCompleted by:___________________Date:___________________________Time:___________________________- END - IF:THEN do the following:Protective actions in any new area(s) as recommended by radiological-based PARRETURNTO Step4Average wind direction shifts to any new areas(s)

(refer to ATTACHMENT4, AFFECTED SECTOR(S) MAP)RETURNTO Step4Implementation of (Commonwealth of Virginia)

Potassium Iodide (KI) strategies for the general public as recommended by radiological-based PARRETURNTO Step5PAR in effect - UNCHANGEDGOTO Step9 1 of 1NUMBER EPIP-1.06ATTACHMENT TITLESECTOR MAPATTACHMENT 1REVISION 9 PAGE Graphics No. SV634A 522 522 208 208 208 208 208 651 687 629 629 669 651 612 612 612 612 612 612 606 606 680 606 648 649 Lake Anna State Park 691 656 656 614 738 647 648 601 601 601 601 653 652 652 652 652 651 613 613 613 669 651 651 625 625 628 628 669 669 624 623 623 623 522 700 700 North Anna Power Station 779 720 751 703 719LakeAnnaLakeAnnaLakeAnnaSouthAnnaRiver 605 605 644 646 697 699 640 522 33 33 Louisa Mineral 665 605 618 618 681 208 208 22 208 33 22 689 689 700 522 772 779 656 656 716 774 657 614 689 601 602 721 643 653 659 606 703 608 608 613 648 606 738 738 678 647 605 658 605 605 670 738 738 604 605 622 605 622 658 658 666 738 738 738 614 614 669 669 622 701 715 715 601 601 775 618 618 618 601 704 712 7000 752 712 728 733 667 718 701 650 612 664 652649687 651677630 669 620 612 669 669 629 605 601 612 655 609 601 609 612 609 657 701 654 673 680 729 608 608 608 763 658 658 715 715 738 684 739 603 669 738 671 738 679 671 669 682 680 680 655 646 604 640 767 624 696 208 747 1726 1725 700 652 719 719 652 612 A B C D E F G H J K L M N P Q R 2 Miles 5 Miles 10 Miles 11.25°348.75°326.25°303.75°281.25°258.75°236.25°213.75°191.25°168.75°146.25°123.75°101.25°78.75°56.25°33.75° 1 of 1NUMBER EPIP-1.06ATTACHMENT TITLEPROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION MATRIXNAPSATTACHMENT 2REVISION 9 PAGE1.Start with the first statement at top, left side of table below (Refer to Attachment 6, REFERENCE INFORMATION (NAPS), for additional information as needed).2.Go to the COL # that provides the response to this statement (YES or NO).3.IF no other responses are required in that column, THEN use the PAR at the bottom of the column.

IF another response is required in that column, THEN go to next statement at left side of table below AND RETURN TO Step 2 of this attachment.NOTE:The radiological release related statements below do NOT apply if a radiological release is occurring due to routine, normal plant operations and NOT related to the event.PAR A Shelter-in-place: 2 Mile radius and 5 Miles downwind.PAR B Evacuate: 2 Mile radius and 5 Miles downwind.PAR C Expanded Par: Derive from EPIP-4.07, PROTECTIVE MEASURES.PAR D Evacuate: 2 Mile radius and 5 Miles downwind and recommend implementation of Potassium Iodide (KI) strategies for the general public. The projected dose at the site boundary is >

5 Rem Thyroid CDE.COL 1COL 2COL 3COL 4COL 5COL 6COL 7COL 8Known impediments make evacuation dangerousYESNORadiological release is in progress or has occurred related to the eventNOYESCurrent Dose Assessment results related to the event - AVAILABLENOYESDose at or beyond 2 miles either:> 1 Rem TEDE OR> 5 Rem Thyroid CDEYESNODose at or beyond Site Boundary >

5 Rem Thyroid CDEYESNODose at or beyond Site Boundary >

1 Rem TEDEYESNORelease related to the event controlled or terminatedYESNOPAR APAR BPAR BPAR CPAR DPAR BPAR APAR B 1 of 1NUMBER EPIP-1.06ATTACHMENT TITLEPROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION FORMATTACHMENT 3REVISION 9 PAGE1.PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION:[ ] SHELTER-IN-PLACE: ____ Mile radius (360) and ____ Miles downwind in the following sectors:______________________________________________. [ ] EVACUATE: ____ Mile radius (360) and ____ Miles downwind in the following sectors: ___________________________________________________________. [ ] BEYOND 10 MILE EPZ: (Data obtained from Radiological Assessment Director (RAD) or Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC)[derived from EPIP-4.07, PROTECTIVE MEASURES]) [ ] Evacuate Area: _____ Centerline in degrees; _____Distance in Miles; _____ Width in feet [ ] Shelter-in-place: ____ Centerline in degrees; _____Distance in Miles; _____ Width in feet[ ] POTASSIUM IODIDE:Recommend implementation of Potassium Iodide (KI) strategies for the general public. The projected dose at the site boundary is > 5 Rem Thyroid CDE.2.APPROVED BY: _________

______________

_______________

_ __________/

__________ Station Emergency Manager or Date / Time Recovery Manager 1 of 1NUMBER EPIP-1.06ATTACHMENT TITLEAFFECTED SECTOR(S) MAPATTACHMENT 4REVISION 9 PAGE Average Wind Direction and Average Wind Speed Data

At ___________, wind direction from _______________(_________) into ______________(_________) at ______ mph. (24-hr time) in degrees (compass pt) in degrees (compass pt) At ___________, wind direction from _______________(_________) into ______________(_________) at ______ mph. (24-hr time) in degrees (compass pt) in degrees (compass pt) At ___________, wind direction from _______________(_________) into ______________(_________) at ______ mph. (24-hr time) in degrees (compass pt) in degrees (compass pt) At ___________, wind direction from _______________(_________) into ______________(_________) at ______ mph. (24-hr time) in degrees (compass pt) in degrees (compass pt) A B C D E F G H J K L M N P Q 78.75°258.75°33.75°213.75°236.25°146.25°303.75°R 10 5 2 281.25°168.75°123.75°101.25°56.25°348.75°11.25°326.25°191.25°Graphics No. SB1217E 1 of 1NUMBER EPIP-1.06ATTACHMENT TITLEDOWNWIND SECTOR TABLEATTACHMENT 5REVISION 9 PAGENOTE:Rounding shall be used when determining affected sectors using wind direction.For example: Wind Direction (degrees from) 11.5 to 11.9 shall be rounded up to 12.0. Wind Direction (degrees from) 11.1 to 11.4 shall be rounded down to 11.0.AVERAGE WIND DIRECTION (Degrees)From ToCOMPASS POINTFrom To AFFECTEDSECTORS349 - 11 169 - 191NSH, J, K 12 - 33 192 - 213NNESSW J, K, L 34 - 56 214 - 236NESWK, L, M 57 - 78 237 - 258ENEWSWL, M, N 79 - 101 259 - 281EW M, N, P 102 - 123 282 - 303ESEWNWN, P, Q 124 - 146 304 - 326SENWP, Q, R 147 - 168 327 - 348SSENNWQ, R, A 169 - 191349 - 11SNR, A, B 192 - 213 12 - 33SSWNNEA, B, C 214 - 236 34 - 56SWNEB, C, D 237 - 258 57 - 78WSWENEC, D, E 259 - 281 79 - 101WED, E, F 282 - 303 102 - 123 WNWESE E, F, G 304 - 326 124 - 146 NWSEF, G, H 327 - 348 147 - 168NNWSSEG, H, J 1 of 1NUMBER EPIP-1.06ATTACHMENT TITLEREFERENCE INFORMATION(NAPS)ATTACHMENT 6REVISION 9 PAGEKNOWN EVACUATION IMPEDIMENTS

Refers to already known conditions, for example:Severe weather such as hurricanes, tornados, flooding, or blizzards.Traffic issues such as inadequate roads, major accident(s).An attack on an off-site infrastructure such as water, power lines, transportation, communication systems, public institutions including schools, post offices and prisons. It is not expected that Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) development be delayed by attempting to obtain information from outside resources.PAR NOTIFICATION TIMES:The initial PAR must be included with th e initial notification of a General Emergency, which must be made to the State within 15 minutesfollowing declaration of the General Emergency.Notification of a revised PAR must be made to the State within 15minutes of its development.SECTORS/WIND DIRECTION

Downwind sectors may be determined from Attachment 4, Downwind Sector Table.Wind direction is always given in degrees from.SHELTERING INPLACE:There is no dose threshold for recommending sheltering-in-place.Sheltering-in-place may be recommended as a result of controlled releases, evacuation impediments or other known conditions which make evacuation dangerous.A controlled release is a short-term release, which is a controlledevolution and the release duration can be accurately determined (such as containment venting).PREVIOUSLYISSUED PAR:Previously issued Protective Action Recommendations should not be reduced until the threat is fully under control and after consulting with Commonwealth of Virginia emergency response organization.