ML13246A350
| ML13246A350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/2013 |
| From: | Gallucci R NRC/NRR/DRA/APLA |
| To: | |
| Gallucci R | |
| References | |
| Download: ML13246A350 (9) | |
Text
FINDING/SUGGESTION ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA (F&O) Review of Plant RAI Response InEv Fire ID Disposition (A/B/C) Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x AS-5 A x SY-2 See PRA-RAI-04-A x DA-2 A See PRA-RAI-04-B. Acceptable to staff because requested revision to cite inclusion of specific basic events and completion of sensitivity analyses for the Fire PRA has x DA-3 been completed. For these events, new probabilities were calculated, e.g., for the strainer via plant-specific data in a Bayesian update.
x LE-1 A x LE-3 C x LE-2 B x IE-3 A x IE-4 A x IE-6 A x IE-7 B See PRA-RAI-04-C. Acceptable to staff because requested additional justification for exclusion of "recovery" terms from Internal Events PRA in Fire PRA due to inapplicability x IE-8 has been provided. Inapplicability is based on the Fire PRA not modeling "recovery" actions such as restoration for operability via maintenance, replacement or repair.
x IE-10 A x IE-12 A
FINDING/SUGGESTION ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA (F&O) Review of Plant RAI Response InEv Fire ID Disposition (A/B/C) Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE See PRA-RAI-04-D. Acceptable to staff because explanation as to the extent to which ISLOCAs were reviewed specifically for the Fire PRA to ensure none were x IE-13 erroneously excluded has been provided. All internal events PRA potential ISLOCA pathways were reconsidered as well as potential ISLOCA pathways based on generic or plant-specific multiple spurious operations.
x IE-14 C x AS-2 A x AS-1 A x AS-3 A x AS-7 A x AS-4 A x SC-2 C x SC-1 C x SY-1 A x DA-1 A x IE-8 A See PRA-RAI-04-E. Acceptable to staff because requested explanation that potential internal floods due to fire-induced failures were considered in the Fire PRA has been x IF-5 provided. Explanation included discussion of three possible mechanistic scenarios and justification that any risk from flooding would be insignificant compared to corresponding fire risk.
x IF-3 C See PRA-RAI-04-E. Same basis for acceptability as for F&O x IF-1 IF-5 above.
FINDING/SUGGESTION ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA (F&O) Review of Plant RAI Response InEv Fire ID Disposition (A/B/C) Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x IF-2 C x IF-4 C x IF-6 C x HR-1 C x HR-2 C x HR-3 C x QU-1 A x QU-2 A x QU-5 A x QU-8 A x QU-9 A x QU-10 A x QU-12 A x QU-11 A x 1-1* A x 1-2* A x 1-4* A x 1-7* A x 1-8* A x 1-9* A x 1-14* A x 1-20* C x 1-25* A x 2-6* A x 3-1* A x 3-6* A x 1-3* C x 1-5* C
FINDING/SUGGESTION ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA (F&O) Review of Plant RAI Response InEv Fire ID Disposition (A/B/C) Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x 1-6* C x 1-12* C x 1-13* See PRA-RAI-01-C x 1-15* C x 1-16* C x 1-18* C x 1-19* C x 1-23* C x 1-26* C x 2-1* C x 2-2* C x 2-3* C x 2-4* C x 2-5* C x 2-8* C x 3-2* C x 3-5* C x 3-8* C x 3-9* C x 3-10* C x 4-1* C x 4-2* C x 4-3* C x 4-4* C x 4-5* C
FINDING/SUGGESTION ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA (F&O) Review of Plant RAI Response InEv Fire ID Disposition (A/B/C) Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE See PRA-RAI-06-A. Acceptable to staff because requested confirmation that "updated generic list of multiple MSOs" x ES-A1-1 was considered has been provided. This update utilized WCAP-16933-NP, Rev. 1, the generic list of multiple spurious operations for PWRs.
x ES-A2-1 C See PRA-RAI-06-B. Acceptable to staff because F&O was clarified as a Suggestion and because "deficiency" cited therein merely referred to clarification of references, x ES-B1-1 which was completed. The Safe Shutdown Equipment List components included in the FIRE PRA has now been referenced in multiple reports supporting the Fire PRA tasks.
See PRA-RAI-06-C. Acceptable to staff because description of how potential flow diversion pathways, some of which may have been eliminated from consideration due to low x ES-B2-1 likelihood in the Internal Events PRA, are considered prior to any screening out in Fire PRA has been provided. Also, this F&O has been clarified to be "only" a Suggestion.
See PRA-RAI-06-D. Acceptable to staff because F&O was clarified as a Suggestion to document instrumentation tracing for operator actions, which was completed x ES-C1-1 subsequent to the peer review and used in the Fire PRA for transition. The tracing is now documented in the Fire PRA HRA Report.
x ES-D1-1 A
FINDING/SUGGESTION ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA (F&O) Review of Plant RAI Response InEv Fire ID Disposition (A/B/C) Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE See PRA-RAI-06-E. Acceptable to staff because additional analysis was performed to assure that all electrical busses required to operate PRA components have been identified x CS-B1-1 for over-current coordination and protection. This analysis did not identify any model or other analytical changes needed as a result of the additional review of breaker/fuse coordination.
x PRM-A4-1 A x PRM-A4-2 A x PRM-B2-1 A See PRA-RAI-21. Acceptable to staff because the bases required by the PRA Standard to justify its non-x PRM-B4-1 applicability have been provided for all three applicable HLRs.
x PRM-B6-1 A x PRM-B7-1 A x PRM-B9-1 A x PRM-C1-1 A x FSS-B01-1 A See PRA-RAI-06-F. Acceptable to staff because (1) the MCR fire analysis has been updated to consider fires originating in the HVAC control cabinet and result in a higher evacuation probability (lower probability for failure x FSS-B01-2 to evacuate); and (2) all cabinets in the ECA have been assessed for fire-induced spurious safety injection actuation, loss of offsite power and loss of MCR HVAC (including a CFAST run).
x FSS-B01-3 See PRA-RAI-07-B and 35 x FSS-B02-1 See PRA-RAI-10
FINDING/SUGGESTION ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA (F&O) Review of Plant RAI Response InEv Fire ID Disposition (A/B/C) Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x FSS-C07-1 A x FSS-C07-2 A x FSS-D01-1 A x FSS-D03-1 A See PRA-RAI-22. Acceptable to staff because, in lieu of parametric uncertainty evaluation, seven focused sensitivity analyses involving key parameters have been performed, with results combined concurrently (a x FSS-E03-1 conservative approach), as a surrogate to justify attainment of CC-II. For all relevant risk metrics, even the combined sensitivities are satisfactorily below accepted thresholds.
x FSS-G03-1 A x FSS-H01-1 A x FSS-H01-2 A x FSS-H04-1 A x FSS-H08-1 C x IGN-A4-1 A x IGN-A5-1 A x IGN-A7-1 See PRA-RAI-08-B x IGN-A7-2 A x IGN-A7-3 A x IGN-B3-1 See PRA-RAI-08-A x IGN-B5-1 A x CF-A1-1 See PRA-RAI-09-A x CF-A1-2 A x CF-B1-1 A x HRA-A2-1 A x HRA-A4-1 A
FINDING/SUGGESTION ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA (F&O) Review of Plant RAI Response InEv Fire ID Disposition (A/B/C) Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x HRA-D2-1 A See PRA-RAI-07-A. Acceptable to staff because the requested confirmation that all credited instruments for the Fire HRA were cable-traced and expected to be x HRA-E1-1 available when needed has been provided. Additional information included the basis for HEP assignment as a function of instrumentation availability.
x FQ-A4-1 A x FQ-C1-1 See PRA-RAI-07-D and 07-E x FQ-E1-1 A x FQ-F1-1 A x FQ-F01-2 A x SF-A2-1 A x SF-A3-1 B x UNC-A1-1 B See PRA-RAI-22. Same basis for acceptability as for F&O x UNC-A1-2 HRA-E1-1 above.
x MU-A1-1 A
- See July 17, 2012, RAI Responses (PRA-RAI-01-Table 1)
A: The staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application.
B: The staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR and further clarified during the audit provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application.
FINDING/SUGGESTION ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA (F&O) Review of Plant RAI Response InEv Fire ID Disposition (A/B/C) Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE C: The staff finds that the resolution of the F&O would have a negligible effect on the evaluations relied upon to support fire risk evaluations and has no impact on the conclusions of the risk assessment and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. C:The staff finds that the resolution of the F&O would have a negligible effect on the evaluations relied upon to support fire risk evaluations and has no impact on the conclusions of the risk assessment and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. Examples of such F&Os may be suggestions, as well as those F&Os that don't affect the fire PRA. Documentation issues may fall into this category as well.