ML13246A350
| ML13246A350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/2013 |
| From: | Gallucci R NRC/NRR/DRA/APLA |
| To: | |
| Gallucci R | |
| References | |
| Download: ML13246A350 (9) | |
Text
FINDING/SUGGESTION (F&O) ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) RAI Response InEv Fire ID Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x AS-5 A x SY-2 See PRA-RAI-04-A x DA-2 A x DA-3 See PRA-RAI-04-B. Acceptable to staff because requested revision to cite inclusion of specific basic events and completion of sensitivity analyses for the Fire PRA has been completed. For these events, new probabilities were calculated, e.g., for the strainer via plant-specific data in a Bayesian update.
x LE-1 A x LE-3 C x LE-2 B x IE-3 A x IE-4 A x IE-6 A x IE-7 B x IE-8 See PRA-RAI-04-C. Acceptable to staff because requested additional justification for exclusion of "recovery" terms from Internal Events PRA in Fire PRA due to inapplicability has been provided. Inapplicability is based on the Fire PRA not modeling "recovery" actions such as restoration for operability via maintenance, replacement or repair.
x IE-10 A x IE-12 A FINDING/SUGGESTION (F&O) ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) RAI Response InEv Fire ID Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x IE-13 See PRA-RAI-04-D. Acceptable to staff because explanation as to the extent to which ISLOCAs were reviewed specifically for the Fire PRA to ensure none were erroneously excluded has been provided. All internal events PRA potential ISLOCA pathways were reconsidered as well as potential ISLOCA pathways based on generic or plant-specific multiple spurious operations.
x IE-14 C x AS-2 A x AS-1 A x AS-3 A x AS-7 A x AS-4 A x SC-2 C x SC-1 C x SY-1 A x DA-1 A x IE-8 A x IF-5 See PRA-RAI-04-E. Acceptable to staff because requested explanation that potential internal floods due to fire-induced failures were considered in the Fire PRA has been provided. Explanation included discussion of three possible mechanistic scenarios and justification that any risk from flooding would be insignificant compared to
corresponding fire risk.
x IF-3 C x IF-1 See PRA-RAI-04-E. Same basis for acceptability as for F&O IF-5 above.
FINDING/SUGGESTION (F&O) ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) RAI Response InEv Fire ID Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x IF-2 C x IF-4 C x IF-6 C x HR-1 C x HR-2 C x HR-3 C x QU-1 A x QU-2 A x QU-5 A x QU-8 A x QU-9 A x QU-10 A x QU-12 A x QU-11 A x 1-1* A x 1-2* A x 1-4* A x 1-7* A x 1-8* A x 1-9* A x 1-14* A x 1-20* C x 1-25* A x 2-6* A x 3-1* A x 3-6* A x 1-3* C x 1-5* C FINDING/SUGGESTION (F&O) ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) RAI Response InEv Fire ID Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x 1-6* C x 1-12* C x 1-13* See PRA-RAI-01-C x 1-15* C x 1-16* C x 1-18* C x 1-19* C x 1-23* C x 1-26* C x 2-1* C x 2-2* C x 2-3* C x 2-4* C x 2-5* C x 2-8* C x 3-2* C x 3-5* C x 3-8* C x 3-9* C x 3-10* C x 4-1* C x 4-2* C x 4-3* C x 4-4* C x 4-5* C FINDING/SUGGESTION (F&O) ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) RAI Response InEv Fire ID Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x ES-A1-1 See PRA-RAI-06-A. Acceptable to staff because requested confirmation that "updated generic list of multiple MSOs" was considered has been provided. This update utilized WCAP-16933-NP, Rev. 1, the generic list of multiple spurious operations for PWRs.
x ES-A2-1 C x ES-B1-1 See PRA-RAI-06-B. Acceptable to staff because F&O was clarified as a Suggestion and because "deficiency" cited therein merely referred to cl arification of references, which was completed. The Safe Shutdown Equipment List components included in the FIRE PRA has now been referenced in multiple reports supporting the Fire PRA
tasks. x ES-B2-1 See PRA-RAI-06-C. Acceptable to staff because description of how potential flow diversion pathways, some of which may have been eliminated from consideration due to low likelihood in the Internal Events PRA, are considered prior to any screening out in Fire PRA has been provided. Also, this F&O has been clarified to be "only" a Suggestion.
x ES-C1-1 See PRA-RAI-06-D. Acceptable to staff because F&O was clarified as a Suggestion to document instrumentation tracing for operator actions, which was completed subsequent to the peer review and used in the Fire PRA for transition. The tracing is now documented in the Fire PRA HRA Report.
x ES-D1-1 A FINDING/SUGGESTION (F&O) ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) RAI Response InEv Fire ID Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x CS-B1-1 See PRA-RAI-06-E. Acceptable to staff because additional analysis was performed to assu re that all electrical busses required to operate PRA components have been identified for over-current coordination and protection. This analysis did not identify an y model or other analytical changes needed as a result of the additional review of breaker/fuse coordination.
x PRM-A4-1 A x PRM-A4-2 A x PRM-B2-1 A x PRM-B4-1 See PRA-RAI-21. Acceptable to staff because the bases required by the PRA Standard to justify its non-applicability have been provided for all three applicable
HLRs. x PRM-B6-1 A x PRM-B7-1 A x PRM-B9-1 A x PRM-C1-1 A x FSS-B01-1 A x FSS-B01-2 See PRA-RAI-06-F. Acceptable to staff because (1) the MCR fire analysis has been updated to consider fires originating in the HVAC control cabinet and result in a higher evacuation probability (lower probability for failure to evacuate); and (2) all cabinets in the ECA have been assessed for fire-induced spurious safety injection actuation, loss of offsite power and loss of MCR HVAC (including a CFAST run).
x FSS-B01-3 See PRA-RAI-07-B and 35 x FSS-B02-1 See PRA-RAI-10 FINDING/SUGGESTION (F&O) ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) RAI Response InEv Fire ID Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x FSS-C07-1 A x FSS-C07-2 A x FSS-D01-1 A x FSS-D03-1 A x FSS-E03-1 See PRA-RAI-22. Acceptable to staff because, in lieu of parametric uncertainty evaluation, seven focused sensitivity analyses involving key parameters have been performed, with results combined concurrently (a conservative approach), as a surrogate to justify attainment of CC-II. For all relevant risk metrics, even the combined sensitivities are satisfactorily below accepted thresholds.
x FSS-G03-1 A x FSS-H01-1 A x FSS-H01-2 A x FSS-H04-1 A x FSS-H08-1 C x IGN-A4-1 A x IGN-A5-1 A x IGN-A7-1 See PRA-RAI-08-B x IGN-A7-2 A x IGN-A7-3 A x IGN-B3-1 See PRA-RAI-08-A x IGN-B5-1 A x CF-A1-1 See PRA-RAI-09-A x CF-A1-2 A x CF-B1-1 A x HRA-A2-1 A x HRA-A4-1 A FINDING/SUGGESTION (F&O) ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) RAI Response InEv Fire ID Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE x HRA-D2-1 A x HRA-E1-1 See PRA-RAI-07-A. Acceptable to staff because the requested confirmation that all credited instruments for the Fire HRA were cable-traced and expected to be available when needed has been provided. Additional information included the basis for HEP assignment as a function of instrumentation availability.
x FQ-A4-1 A x FQ-C1-1 See PRA-RAI-07-D and 07-E x FQ-E1-1 A x FQ-F1-1 A x FQ-F01-2 A x SF-A2-1 A x SF-A3-1 B x UNC-A1-1 B x UNC-A1-2 See PRA-RAI-22. Same basis for acceptability as for F&O HRA-E1-1 above.
x MU-A1-1 A
- See July 17, 2012, RAI Responses (PRA-RAI-01-Table 1)
A: The staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. B: The staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR and further clarified during the audit provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application.
FINDING/SUGGESTION (F&O) ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) RAI Response InEv Fire ID Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE C: The staff finds that the resolution of the F&O would have a negligible effect on the evaluations relied upon to support fire risk evaluations and has no impact on the conclusions of the risk assessment and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. C:The staff finds that the resolution of the F&O would have a negligible effect on the evaluations relied upon to support fire risk evaluations and has no impact on the conclusions of the risk assessment and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. Examples of such F&Os may be suggestions, as well as those F&Os that don't affect the fire PRA. Documentation issues may fall into this category as well.