ML17285A753

LER 89-037-00:on 890830,differential Pressure Indicating Switch RHR-DPIS-12B Discovered Isolated & Equalized.Cause Not Determined.Instrumentation & Control Work Practices Manual Developed & Training provided.W/890928 Ltr

ML17285A753
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	09/28/1989
From:	ARBUCKLE J D, POWERS C M WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-037, LER-89-37, NUDOCS 8910030560
Download: ML17285A753 (6)

Text

ACCELERAYED D~BU~ON DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8910030560 DOC.DATE: 89/09/28 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D.

Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M..

Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-037-00:on 890830,RHR sys differential pressure indicating switch discovered to be isolated&equalized.

W/8 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL i SIZE: 5 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA SAMWORTH,R INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DS P/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10 RPB 10 REG FI 02 LE 01 EXTERNAL EGGG WI LLIAMS I S LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DS P NRR/DEST/CEB 8H-NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES/DSIR/EIB L ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOIR K)ALL'RIES" RECIPIENTS PIZASE HELP US XO REDUCE%ASTE!CXNZACT'IHE DOCUMERX'ONGEAL DESK, RXN Pl-37 (EXT.20079)KO ELBGHREB KXK SAME PKR DISTRIBOTZCII LISTS PCR DOC@KRIS KU DON'T NEED)FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 39 ENCL 39 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No.50-397 September 28, 1989 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO.2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.89-037

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.89-037 for the WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours, C.M.Powers (M/D 927M)WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP: 1 r

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.89-037 cc: Mr.John B.Martin, NRC-Region V Mr.C.J.Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)INPO Records Center-Atlanta;GA Ms.Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr.D.L.Williams, BPA (hl/D 399)er~i 0030~i&0 N" 092), PDR ADOCK 05000=~97 PDC NRC Forr4 366 (9-83 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)U.S, l(UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO, 3150-010(EXPIRES', S/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I)Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER I2)PAG(.(3I o 5 o o o3 971OF0"'L'(" Residual Heat Remova System Different)a Pressure Indscat ng Sw>tch (RHR-DPIS-12B)

Discovered to be Isolated and Equalized-Cause Unknown EVENT DATE IS)DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH LER NUMBER (6)cR+>>sEOUENTIAL 88 W'y NVMSER REVISION NUMBER REPORT DATE (7)YEAR MONTH DAY F AC ILI T Y NAMES DOCKET NVMBERISI 0 5 0 0 0 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)0.8 30 898 9 3 7 0 0 0 9 8 8 9 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE (8)POWE R LEYEL 0 7 0 20.402(b)20.405(~)l1((il 20 A05 (~)(1)(ill 20.405 I~l(1((Iill 20,405(~I(1)Bvl 20,405 I~I(1)Ivl~20.405(cl 50.36(c)II I 50.38(c)(2)50.73(e)(2)lll 50.73(el(2)(iil 50.7 3 (4)(2 I (iil I 60,73(~)l2)livl 60,73(~)(2)(vl 50.73(~I(2)(vill 50,73(~l(2l(viill(AI 50.7 3 (e I (2)(v lii I I 8 I 60.73(~)(2)(x I THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ((I (Cnectr one or more of the foiiowinpi (11 73.71(b)73.71(cl OTHER ISpeciry in Abstrert beiOWend in Text, NRC fbrm 366AI NAME LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I 3.D.Arbuckle Com liance En ineer AREA CODE 5 0 TELEPHONE NUMBER COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT NIANUFAC.TURER.TO NPROS r+yggggjPJCngg CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TURER REPORTABI.E TO NPRDS QSr.'>>.ol.%>r:r rr:..".:: NL SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES fif yeA comprere EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATEi NO ABSTRACT (Lrmit ro (400 soetet, i,e., epprovimetery frfNen sinpre.specs typewnnrn iinesi (16l EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15I MONTH OAY YEAR On August 30, 1989, at 0214 hours0.00248 days <br />0.0594 hours <br />3.53836e-4 weeks <br />8.1427e-5 months <br />, during the performance of a surveillance, Plant Instrument and Control (I&C)Technicians discovered Differential Pressure Indicating Switch RHR-DPIS-12B to be isolated and equalized.

The function of RHR-DPIS-12B is to provide an auto-close signal to RHR-V-9 (Residual Heat Removal System shutdown cooling inboard isolation valve)upon receipt of a high flow (differential pressure)indication in the shutdown cooling line.Because RHR-DPIS-12B was inoperable, i t was incapable of performing its intended function.Following discovery, the problem was brought to the attention of the shift manager and the decision was made to complete the procedure.

Immediate corrective action consisted of successfully completing the surveillance and restoring RHR-,DPIS-12B to service.The root cause of this event is indeterminate.

A review of previous surveillances and work history associated with the instrument did not reveal a reason for RHR-DPIS-1,2B to be isolated.Further corrective action consists of 1)developing an I8C Work Practices Manual which describes the independent verification process and 2)providing training to Plant I&C Technicians on that process.This event did not affect the, health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.

NRI'nrm 346 NRC Form 366A)64)3)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME 11)TEXT llf more spese is required, use eddr)r'one/NRC Form 366A'sl)17)DOCKET NUMBER 12)0 5 0 0 0 LER NUMBER 16)8@<SEOVENTIAI.

Ro4I NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PACE 13)OF Plant Conditions a)Power Level-70%b).Plant Mode-1 (Power Operation)

=Event Descri tion On August 30, 1989, at 0214 hours0.00248 days <br />0.0594 hours <br />3.53836e-4 weeks <br />8.1427e-5 months <br />, Differential Pressure Indicating Switch RHR-DPIS-128 was found to be isolated and equalized.

This condition was discovered by Plant Instrument and Control (I&C).Technicians during the performance of Plant Procedure (PPM)7.4.3.2.1.63,"Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Mode High Flow Isolation-CFT/CC.U The function of RHR-DPIS-128 is to provide an auto-close

-signal to RHR-V-9 (Residual Heat Removal System Shutdown Cooling inboard isolation valve)upon receipt of a high flow (differential pressure)indication in the shut-down cooling line.On August 29, 1969 at 2324 hours0.0269 days <br />0.646 hours <br />0.00384 weeks <br />8.84282e-4 months <br />, the shift manager had authorized performance of the procedure and Plant I&C Technicians proceeded to the appropriate instrument rack ana successfully completed the required surveillance on RHR-DPIS-12A.

Upon initia-tion of Section UB" (RHR-DPIS-128

)of the procedure, the technicians discovered both the high and low pressure isolation valves closed, and the equalizing valve open.This configuration rendered RHR-DPIS-128 inoperable and;therefore, incapable of providing an RHR inboard isolation signal on shutdown cooling line excess flow..Following discovery, the problem was brought to the attention of the shift manager and the decision was made to complete the procedure.

Immediate Corrective Action r Plant I&C Technicians successully completed the surveillance and returned RHR-DPIS-128 to service.Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A.Further Evaluation 1.This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2

)(i)(B),"Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." 2.The root cause of this ev'ent is indeterminate.

An analysis of the event was performed and it was determined that the procedure (which is performed monthly)was last performed on July 31, 1989.At that time, the appli-cable procedural step was signed off as complete.The procedural step also requires that Ua second I8C Technician verify that RHR-DPIS-128 is properly valved back into service." NRC FORM SBBA h iV.S~CEO'888 520 588 00010 NRC Farm 366A (94)3)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT'(LER)

TEXT CONTINUATIOI'I U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3150&104~EXPIRES: 6/31/BB FACILITY NAME (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)SEOUFNTIAI.

NUMBER Pkc: REVrSION<Ai'NUMBER PAGE (3)TEXT/lf mart 4/rtst ss/tqrrirtd.

ast tdditiont///RC Farm 366A'4/(17)0 5 0 0 0 OF A review of Maintenance Work Requests, Clearance Orders, Radiation Work ,Permits and Control Room Logs was also performed and concluded that no identified maintenance activity had occurred between July 31, 1989 and August 30, 1989 whicn would have required RHR-DPIS-128 to be valved out of service.Although the root cause of this event is indeterminate, a contributing factor could be work practices less than adequate in that 1)requirements for application of, the independent verification process are inconsistent, and 2)the independent verification process is not fully understood by personnel performing tasks where independent verification is implied.8.Further Corrective Action l.An I&C Work Practices Manual will be developed which specifically describes the independent verification process.2.Training on the independent verification process will be provided to all Plant I&C Technicians.

Safety Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event.The other channel (outboard RHR-DPIS-12A) was available to provide an auto-close signal to RHR Shut-down Cooling (SDC)Outboard Isolation Valve RHR-V-8.In addition, had an SDC line break occurred, the Reactor Pressure Vessel Low Level (Level 3)isolation signal was operable during the event period and serves as a backup to the high flow (RHR-DPIS-12A/128) isolation signal.Furthermore, an RHR System isolation would also occur from a Leak Detection System initiated RHR Area High Temperature signal.Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.

Similar Events LER 89-020~U.s.CP0s)966-S10-$

69r00070 f(NRC Form 866A (Nl3)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCI EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO, 3150 0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)OOCKET NUM8ER (2I LER NUMBER (6)YEAR SW SEOUENTIAL Pr((: REVISION NUMBER 8~NUMBBR PAGE (3)TEXT///more sgutoe/8 rer/o/ied.

ore eddi5orre/NRC

%%drm 35'8/(17)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 0 0 OF 0 4 EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component.RHR-DPIS-128 RHR-V-9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)System RHR-DP I S-1 2A RHR-V-8 Reactor Pressure Vessel Leak Detection System 80 80 80 80 80 NH IJ PDI S I SV PDI S ISV RPV NRC rrORM 3854~V.S.CPOr)888-S10-S89/00070