ML17292A377

LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr

ML17292A377
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	07/24/1996
From:	BEMIS P R, FOLEY C J WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GO2-96-145, LER-96-005, LER-96-5, NUDOCS 9607300145
Download: ML17292A377 (7)

Text

~CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9607300145 DOC.DATE: 96/07/24 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FOLEYgC.J,.

Washington Public Power Supply System BEMISgP.R.

Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined missed surveillance test re channel check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by inadequate procedures.

Revised surveillance procedure re when APRM checks must be performed.W/960724 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: A T E RECIP"ENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHYgG.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME COLBURNgT D B FILE CE E E B NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN4 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCEgJ H NOAC POOREgW..NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2~1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 R Y D 0 U M E N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EXT.415-2083)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LiSTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 4 ti WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George 1Vashington 1Vay~Richland, 1Vashington 99352 July 24, 1996 G02-96-145 Docket No.50-397 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.96-005-00 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.96-005-00 for the WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Should you have any questions or desire additional information, please call me or L.C.Fernandez at (509)377-4147.full, P.R.mis ice President, Nuclear Operations (Mail Drop PE23)PRB:CJF:lr Enclosure cc: LJ Callan, NRC-RIV KE Perkins, Jr"., NRC-RIV, Walnut Creek Field Office NS Reynolds, Winston&Strawn TG Colburn, NRR NRC Sr.Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 927N, 2 Copies)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA DL Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)9607300i45 960724 PDR ADOCK 05000397 S PDR f 1 I I u

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i~LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAHE (1)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUHBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 LER NUHBER (8)ear umber ev.No.AGE (3)6 05 0 ITLE (4)Failure to Comply With Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement Due to Inade uate Procedures 2 F 3 PI ni'n Prir h Evn: At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 1 with the reactor approximately at the 24%thermal power level.The plant was starting up after an unplanned reactor scram.At approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> on June 24, 1996, an operator reviewing completed procedures governing activities being performed as part of restarting the plant, determined that a surveillance test had not been consistently performed within the period required by the Technical Specifications.

The required surveillance test was to perform a channel check of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)PG]flow signal to verify operability of the APRM flow biased simulated thermal power high range trip channels.The test is required to be performed on a daily basis when in Mode 1, which had been entered at 0914 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.47777e-4 months <br /> on June 20, 1996.The required test had been completed on June 22, 1996, and again on June 24, 1996.However, the test had not been performed on June 21 or 23, resulting in a violation of Technical Specification 3.3.1.m i n: The required surveillance test had been completed approximately 7.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> earlier, at 0139 hours0.00161 days <br />0.0386 hours <br />2.29828e-4 weeks <br />5.28895e-5 months <br /> on June 24, 1996, demonstrating that flow rate data was being correctly received and utilized by the APRM system.Consequently, no immediate corrective action was necessary.

mRa&nm: The root cause of this event was reactor plant startup and surveillance procedures that were incorrect or omitted relevant information.

The surveillance procedure being used contains three separate parts covering three different surveillance requirements:

jet pump tP]operability, RRC loop flow balance, and the Average Power Range Monitor flow channel check.The"Purpose" section of this surveillance procedure included the statement,"This surveillance is performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of thermal power exceeding 25%of rated thermal power, in LE tless than or equal to]4 hours after an idle recirculation loop is returned to operation, and daily thereafter when the reactor is in operational conditions 1 or 2.That is an incorrect statement since it does not reflect the requirement of Technical Specification 3.3.1 to perform the APRM fiow signal channel check on a daily basis when in Mode 1.The procedure governing reactor plant startup stated that the particular surveillance procedure was required after reaching 25%reactor power, and therefore also did not address the Technical Specification requirement to perform the APRM flow signal channel check on a daily basis in Mode 1.The surveillance procedure governing shift and daily instrument checks did not identify the APRM flow signal channel check as being a required action during Mode 1~

I AGILITY NAHE (i)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NWBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 ear LER NONBER (8)umber ev.No.6 05 0 AGE (3)3 F 3 1TLE (4)Failure to Comply With Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement Due to Inade uate Procedures These procedural deficiencies required the operating staff to rely on past experience and acquired knowledge to assure that all Technical Specification requirements were met for the proper conditions.

This led to the inconsistent performance of the surveillance test.Consequently, the root cause of this event was reactor plant startup and surveillance procedures that were incorrect or omitted relevant information.

h r.Corrective actions were implemented to preclude recurrence.

The implementing surveillance procedure was changed to clearly identify the purposes and conditions under which it is applicable.

The procedure governing reactor plant startup was changed to clearly identify when the APRM flow signal channel checks must be performed per Technical Specification 3.3.1.The surveillance procedure governing shift and daily instrument checks during Modes 1, 2, and 3 was revised to require specific verification that the APRM flow signal channel check was completed as required by the Technical Specifications.

The event had no safety significance.

The required surveillances had been performed on June 22 and 24 verifying operability of the APRM flow signal input, and were performed as required by Technical Specifications after June 24.The APRM high neutron trip function was functional during this entire period, assuring that the Reactor Protection System[JC]would scram the reactor in the" event of an unexpected neutron spike.Licensee Event Report 96-003-00 identified an event involving a surveillance test inadvertently omitted due to the same inadequate procedures during a plant startup.This event had occurred on June 15, 1996.If corrective actions for this previous event had been completed prior to the LER 96-005-00 event, they could have afforded the opportunity to identify and correct the procedural deficiencies that led to LER 96-005-00.