05000443/FIN-2013008-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Condensate Storage Tank Water Level Above Limits of Seismic Qualification |
Description | The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that NextEra did not assure the seismic design requirements for the condensate storage tank (CST) were translated into specifications and procedures. Specifically, the team found that NextEras seismic design calculations for the CST was based, in part, on a maximum tank level. The maximum tank level was used to ensure that the floating cover inside the CST would not strike the top of the tank. NextEra engineers had concluded that this impact could cause a failure of the CST or cover during a seismic event. However, the team identified that the high level alarm and operating procedure limits for the tank were above the level credited in the calculation. Additionally, the team determined that NextEra routinely operated the CST tank above the maximum level assumed in the calculation. Following identification NextEra entered the issue into their corrective action program and proceduralized a lower maximum allowable water level for the CST to prevent a seismically induced impact of the floating cover on the tank. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors (seismic event) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding involved the loss or degradation of equipment so a detailed risk evaluation (DRE) was performed. Based upon the DRE, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the underlying cause was not indicative of current performance. |
Site: | Seabrook |
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Report | IR 05000443/2013008 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Richmond K Mangan S Pindale W Sherbin J Schoppy S Kobylarz P Krohn |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Seabrook - IR 05000443/2013008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Seabrook) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Seabrook)
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