ML17244A555

Application for Amend to License DPR-18 to Delete Pressurizer Low Level Coincidence from Low Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injection Signal.Supporting Documentation Encl

ML17244A555
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/07/1979
From:	WHITE L D ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17244A554	List: ML17244A553 ML17244A555
References
NUDOCS 7906130198
Download: ML17244A555 (17)

Text

UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION IntheMatterof.Rochester GasandElectricCorporation (R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,UnitNo.1)DocketNo.50-244APPLICATION FORAMENDMENT TOOPERATING LICENSEPursuanttoSection50.90oftheregulations oftheU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission (the"Commission"

),Rochester Gas1andElectricCorporation

("RG&E"),

holderofProvisional Operating LicenseNo.DPR-18,herebyrequeststhattheTechnical Specifica-tionTable3.5-2setforthinAppendixAtothatlicensebeamendedinaccordance withNRCBulletin79-06A,todeletethepressurizer lowlevelcoincidence fromlowpressurizer pressureSafetyInjection signal.Theproposedtechnical'pecification changeissetforthinAttachment AtothisApplication.

Asafetyevaluation issetforthinAttachment B.Thisevaluation alsodemonstrates thattheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant, changeinthetypesorasignificant.

increaseintheamountsofeffluents oranychangeintheauthorized powerlevelofthe'facility.

Justi-ficationforclassification oftheamendment pursuantto10CFRSection170.22isincludedas.Attachment C.Acheckfortheappropriate feeaccompanies thisApplication.

CYIld teWHEREFORE, Applicant respectfully requeststhatAppendixAtoProvisional Operating LicenseNo.DPR-18beamendedintheformattachedheretoasAttachment A.Rochester GasandElectricCorporation ByL.D.Wxt,Jr.VicePresident,,

ElectricandSteamProduction Subscribed andsworntobeforemeonthis7~dayofJune,1979.GARYI:sREISSIIOTARYPUBLIC,StateofII.Y.MonroeCo,/MCommission ExpiresMarch30,19.g/Ir

~~1Attachment AReplaceTechnical Specification page3.5-5withtherevisedpage3.5-5.

TABIE3.5-2EMERGENCY COOIINGNO.FUNCTIONAL UNITNO.ofMIN.MIN.PERMISSIBIE NO.ofCHANNELSOPERABLEDEGREEOF.BYPASSCHANNEISTOTRIP"'"'"'""

CHANNEISREDUNDANCY CONDITIONS 6OPERATORACTIONIFCONDITIONS OFCOLR1N3OR5CANNOTBEMET1.SAFETYINJECTION a.Manualb.HighContainment Pressurec.SteamGenerator LowSteamPressure/Loop d.Pressurizer IowPressure2.CONTAINMENT SPRAYa.Manualb.Hi-HiContainment Pressure(Containment Spray)2setsof32of3inea.set2per1/setsetPrimarypressurelessHotShutdown"='"

than2000psigHotShutdown:

'HotShutdown:

-'='otShutdown-'='-

HotShutdown='='otShutdown-

"J~t~t+Mustactuate2switchessimultaneously.

Ifminimumconditions arenotmetwithn24hours,stepsshallbetakenontheaffectedunittoplacetheunitincoldshutdownconditions.

4Ifafunctional unitisoperating withtheminimumoperablechannelsthenumberofchannelstotripthereactorwillbecolumn3lesscolumn4.

Attachment BThedesignmodification willremovetherequirement forpressurizer lowlevelcoincident withpressurizer (primarysystem)lowpressurehforautomatic SafetyInjection (SI)initiation.

Theexistinglogicprovidesthreechannelswithseriespressureandlevelcontacts(logicalAND)asshowninFigurel.AnyoneofthesethreechannelswillinitiateS.I.oncoincident lowlevelandlowpressureinthepressurizer.

Becausesteamvoidscanformduringadepressurization event,sufficient primarycoolantmaybedisplaced inthereactorvesseltopreventpressurizer levelfromfallingbelowthelowlevelsetpoint, thusblockingautomatic initiation ofSafetyInjection.

Inaccordance withNRCBulletin79-06A,thisdesignmodification deletesthepressurizer lowlevelcoincidence fromlowpressurizer pressureSafetyInjection.

Themodifieddesignwillinitiatesafetyinjection whenanytwoout.ofthreepressurizer lowpressuresignalsarereceivedasshowninFigure2.Thedesignmodification shallconformwithallapplicable require-mentsofIEEEStd.279-1971.

Inparticular Section4.7.3statesthat,"whereasinglerandomfailurecancauseacontrolsystemactionthat,resultsinacondition requiring protective actionandcanalsopreventproperactionofaprotection systemchanneldesignedtoprotectagainstthecondition, theremaining redundant, protection channelsshallbecapableofproviding theprotective actionevenwhendegradedbyasecondrandomfailure."

The protective channelsusedinthisdesignarealsoutilizedto;openthepressurizer power-operated reliefvalvesonhighprimarypressure.

Inordertoassurethatnosinglechannelfailure(failhigh)cancausespuriousopen'ingofthePORV,acoincident 1(logicalAND)highpressuresignalfromanindependent channelshallberequiredforPORVactuation.

Thepermissive highpressuresetpoint,.shall besetabovetheoperating rangesothat,thesystemdoesnotnormallyoperatewithapermissive signalpresent.ThecontrollogicisshowninFigures3(a)and3(b)forexistingandproposedsetpoints.

Pressurizer sprayisactuatedbyeitherchannel429or431.Analyseshavebeenperformed todetermine ifafailure(failhigh)ofoneofthesechannels, causingspuriousoperation ofthepressurizer spray,canresultinaplantcondition requiring SafetyInjection.

Thisanalysisshowsthat'hesafetyinjection setpointisreachedinapproximately threeminutes.Eitherapressurechannelindependent oftheSIsystemshallbeusedforsprayactuation, ortheinputtotheSIsystem,nowfromachannelalsoactuating pressurizer spray(431),shallbeinsteadsuppliedbyachannelindependent ofthepressurizer spraysystem(449).Whenanychannelgoesintoalarm,itshallbeannunciated intheMainControlRoominamannerconsistent withtheexistingSafe-guardsSystems.TheSafetyInjection actuation shallbeannunciated, intheMainControlRoomandtransmitted totheplantcomputerinamannerconsistent withtheexistingSafeguards Systems.

.rl Test,switchesshallbeprovidedtoprovidecapability fortestingduringpoweroperation inaccordance withSection4.10ofIEEE279-1971andIEEE338-,1977.

ThepurposeofthisTechnical Specification ChangeistoreviseTable3.5-2toreflectthedeletionoflowpressurizer levelcoincidence fromlowpressurizer pressureSI.Thedeletionofthelowlevelcoincidence fromthelowpressurizer pressureSIhasnegligible effectonthePlantTransient AnalysisortheECCSAnalysisforR.E.Ginna.TheanalysiswasdonewithSIinitiated oncoincidence oflowpressurizer pressure.andlevelsignals.Theeffectofchangingtoapressureonlysignalwillresultineitheranearlierinitiation ofSI,ornochangeinthetimeofSIinitiation.

Therefore, currentPlantTransient andsmallbreakanalysisassumptions concerning SIinitiation timeareappropriate.

04

~'0eROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORA~PlLlP2L2P3L3SXFigure1P2P3SXFigure2

~$

ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATPressurizer ReliefValveOperation 4294314304492185Ps3.g2335Ps3.g2335Ps3.g2185Ps3.gPCV430(Press.Relief:Valve)

PCV431(Press.ReliefValve)Figure3(a)'Existing Setpoints 429431430449.P)3.g2335Ps3.g2335Ps3.g?335Ps3.gPCV430(Press.ReliefValves)PCV431(Press.ReliefValve)Figure3(b)ModifiedSetpoints Attachment BAsaresultoftheThreeNileNileIslandaccidenttheNRCissuedIEBulletinNo.79-06Awhichrequiredchangestothelowpressurizer;.

pressureSafetyInjection (SI)logic.PriortotheBulletinonemethodofgenerating aSIsignalwasalowpressurizer pressureincoincidence withlowpressurizer level.TheBulletinpostulated thatpressurizer levelmaynotrepresent thelevelinthereactorcoolantsystemundercertaintransient conditions.

Therefore, pressurizer lowlevelcoincidence shouldbedeletedfromlowpressurizer pressureSI.ThepurposeofthisTechnical Specification ChangeistoreviseTable3.5-2toreflectthedeletionoflowpressurizer levelcoincidence fromlowpressurizer pressureSI.Thedeletionofthelowlevelcoincidence fromthelowpressurizer pressureSIhasnegligible effect.onthePlantTransient AnalysisortheECCSAnalysisforR.E.Ginna.TheanalysiswasdonewithSIinitiated oncoincidence oflowpressurizer pressureandlevelsignals.Theeffectofchangingtoapressureonlysignalwillresultineitheranearlierinitiation ofSI,ornochangeinthetimeofSIinitiation.

Therefore, currentPlantTransient andsmallbreakanalysisassumptions concerning SIinitiation timeareappropriate.

p-,s~Attachment CTheproposedAmendment, totheProvisional Operating Licensehasbeenevaluated anddetermined tofallwithinthedefinition ofClass1IIIof10CFRSection170.22therebyrequiring afeeof$4,000.Theproposedamendment simplyrevisesTable3.5-2forthedeletionoflowpressurizer levelcoincidence fromlowpressurizer pressureSafetyInjection asrequiredbyIEBulletinNo.79-06A.

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