ML14204A083

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Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4 - Request for Enforcement Discretion Regarding Technical Specification 3/4.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink
ML14204A083
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/21/2014
From: Kiley M
Florida Power & Light Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14204A082 List:
References
L-2014-231
Download: ML14204A083 (35)
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Security-Related Information Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390(Attachment 3 contains Security-Related information. When Attachment 3 is detached this page is decontrolled.)0F:PL: 10 CFR 2.390L-2014-231July 21, 2014U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001Turkey Point Units 3 and 4Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41

Subject:

Request for Enforcement Discretion Regarding Technical Specification 3/4.7.4, UltimateHeat SinkFlorida Power & Light Company (FPL) requests that the NRC grant discretion from enforcing theshutdown requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. This request wasdiscussed with the NRC staff in a telephone conference call. Enforcement discretion was grantedverbally by the NRC following the conference call. This letter and enclosure fulfills the requirementto submit the written enforcement discretion request.This request concerns an avoidance of a dual unit shutdown of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. Theissue necessitating this notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) request is the elevated temperatureof the water in the cooling canal system, the ultimate heat sink (UHS). The details of this requestare fully explained in the enclosure to this letter.FPL has taken proactive measures to restore the UHS water to a normal condition. As shown in theenclosed justification, FPL maintains that granting of enforcement discretion in this case is in thebest interest of nuclear safety.The enclosure to this letter provides the information required by NRC Inspection Manual Chapter0410, "Notices of Enforcement Discretion."FPL has reviewed NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0410 and has concluded that Section 06.02b issatisfied. Enforcement discretion is required to avoid an unnecessary plant transient, as a result ofcomplying with the requirements of the above TS. Enforcement discretion would minimizepotential safety consequences and operational risks.This NOED request was reviewed and approved by the Turkey Point Plant Nuclear SafetyCommittee on July 20, 2014. It was subsequently verbally granted by the NRC on July 20, 2014 atSecurity-Related Information Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390(Attachment 3 contains Security-Related information. When Attachment 3 is detached this page is decontrolled.)Florida Power & Light Company9760 SW 344th St., Florida City, FL 33035 --__.- _

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 2 of 21800 hours.Attachment 3 contains sensitive information that is being treated as Critical Energy InfrastructureInformation as defined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 18 CFR 388.113. As aresult, confidential treatment is appropriate under 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1).If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Robert Tomonto at305-246-7327.Very truly yours,Michael KileyVice PresidentTurkey Point Nuclear Plant

Enclosure:

Request for Enforcement Discretion Regarding Technical Specification 3/4.7.4, UltimateHeat Sinkcc: USNRC Regional Administrator, Region IIUSNRC Project Manager, Turkey Point Nuclear PlantUSNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 1 of 18EnclosureTurkey Point Nuclear StationRequest for Enforcement DiscretionTechnical Specification 3/4.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sinka. Specifically address what type of NOED is being requested (regular or naturalevent), which of the NOED criteria for appropriate plant conditions specified insubsection 03.03 of this guidance is satisfied, and how the licensee satisfied thosecriteria. (also reference subsection 06.02 of this IMC)A natural event Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) is being requested to avoid anunnecessary transient as a result of compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS).Compliance with TS would involve an unnecessary shutdown of both Turkey Pointnuclear units during a period of high system load demand without a corresponding healthand safety benefit. The operation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 during the summermonths is essential for grid voltage stability.The requested enforcement discretion has been evaluated against the criteria specified inSection 03.03 of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0410. We have determined that therequested actions meet the NOED criteria for an operating plant. This determination isbased on the avoidance of an unnecessary shutdown without a corresponding health andsafety benefit.b. Provide a description of the TS or other license conditions that will be violated, and,if applicable, state that adhering to the license would cause an unnecessarytransient. This description shall include the time remaining before the TS or licensecondition will be violated. When a regular NOED is requested, the licensee mustshow that granting the NOED request would avoid an unnecessary transient.Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) is requesting enforcement discretion for TS3.7.4, "Ultimate Heat Sink," for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. The TS 3.7.4 actionstatement requires that with the ultimate heat sink (UHS) average supply watertemperature greater than 100'F, the units be placed in Hot Standby within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and inCold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The action applies to both unitssimultaneously.The limit on UHS temperature in conjunction with the Surveillance Requirements (SR) ofTS 3/4.7.2, Component Cooling Water, will ensure that sufficient cooling capacity isavailable either: (1) to provide normal cool down of the facility, or (2) to mitigate theeffects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 2 of 18EnclosureThe granting of a natural event NOED request would avoid an unnecessary planttransient since adequate operating margin exists to accommodate higher UHStemperatures than specified in TS 3.7.4.c. Provide a description of the circumstances, including as a minimum: likely causes;the need for prompt action; the action taken to avoid the need for a NOED; and anyrelevant historical events. The historical events must include as a minimum, anyother similar events at the plant, the last maintenance performed on the equipmentor similar equipment, any outstanding amendment or TS change requests related tothe NOED, and the last NOED request from the plant.The thermodynamic performance of the canal system is complex and influenced by manyprocesses including:1. Heat rejected to the canal by operating fossil and nuclear units,2. Solar radiant heating,3. Radiative cooling of the water body at night,4. Conduction and convection of heat from the water body to the atmosphere,5. Heat carried away by evaporation,6. Heat transfer between the water body and the interior of the earth,7. Cooling of the water body via precipitation, and8. Cooling of the water body by ground water seepage.In June 2014, UHS temperatures approached the TS temperature limit of 100°F.Engineering and environmental analysis have determined that the cooling canal systemwater is absorbing unusual amounts of solar energy due to the presence of higher thannormal algae content. For example, the historical nominal algae concentration is on theorder of 50,000 cells per milliliter. The current algae concentration is on the order of 1.8million cells per milliliter. While immediate eradication of the algae is possible, the sideeffects on the canal ecosystem would be unacceptable. Thus, a controlled chemicaltreatment of the canal system has been initiated to gradually restore the normal algaecontent and improve heat transfer efficiency, without adversely affecting the remainingplant and wildlife in the canal system. The treatment program is designed to maintaindissolved oxygen in the canal water body at a level that will continue to provide a goodenvironment for the inhabiting fish species.

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 3 of 18EnclosureA 5% reduction in salinity and a 1.8 million to 1.3 million change in algae concentration(cells/ml) has occurred in the past two weeks. This has the effect of improving heattransfer rejection at night and reduces solar heating during the day.Prompt action is needed because prolonged hot weather in the area has resulted insustained elevated UHS temperatures during the chemical treatment period. Hightemperatures during the daytime with little cloud cover and low precipitation haveresulted in elevated canal water temperatures at the Turkey Point site. The table belowillustrates the current situation.Canal Level Relative to NAVD88Year Rain Fall (inches) (feet)2011 52 Not available.2012 74.2 -0.472013 19.6 -0.652014 4 -0.88The data was taken from a monitoring station in the middle of the Turkey Point coolingcanal system. It shows that rain fall for 2014 has been very low, and that the canal waterlevel is very low. The 10-day weather forecast presented in Section n. below, indicatesthat hot weather conditions will persist unabated. The operation of Turkey Point Units 3and 4 during the hot summer months is essential for grid voltage stability.FPL requested amendments to TS 3/4.7.4 on July 10, 2014 (Reference 1). On July 17,2014, FPL requested in letter L-2014-226 that the subject amendment request beapproved on an emergency basis (Reference 2).A review of plant licensing correspondence reveals that there has not been a request forenforcement discretion submitted for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 within the last ten years.d. Provide information that shows the licensee fully understands the cause of thesituation that has led to the NOED request. The licensee must understand and detailall safety and security concerns when operating outside of its TS or licenseconditions.This NOED request is a direct result of UHS temperatures exceeding the current TS limitof l00°F.Engineering and environmental analyses have determined that cooling water heat transfercapability is diminished and the canal water temperatures are elevated primarily due toenvironmental factors that have caused the normally inconsequential algae population tobloom to unprecedented levels. This high algae content results in significantly higher Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 4 of 18Enclosurewater temperatures, because of solar energy absorption. As indicated in Section c.above, the current algae concentration is almost forty times the normal value. Prolongedhot weather in the area with little cloud cover and low precipitation have resulted inelevated cooling canal system water temperatures at the Turkey Point site.Adequate operating margin exists to accommodate UHS temperatures greater than thecurrent TS limit. Analyses have been performed to confirm that the safety systemssupported by the UHS would still perform their safety functions at UHS temperatures upto 104'F. The Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchanger monitoring programrequired by TS SR 4.7.2.a and 4.7.2.b(2) will ensure that heat exchanger cleanliness ismaintained to support normal cool down operations and post-accident operatingconditions at UHS temperature of up to the enforcement discretion requested value of1030F.There are no physical security concerns associated with the operating Turkey Point Units3 and 4 at UHS temperatures in excess of 1 00°F.e. Detail the proposed course of action to resolve the situation, so enforcementdiscretion is no longer required.As part of the interim solutions, a controlled chemical treatment of the canal system overthe course of several weeks is being implemented to gradually reduce the near-term algaecontent thereby reducing the solar energy absorption. Additionally, ground watermakeup is being provided to the canal from the Turkey Point Unit 5 deep well at a rate of5 million gallons a day. Improved canal performance is expected as the chemicaltreatment program progresses and the freshwater makeup to the canal system from theUnit 5 deep well continues. Additionally, UHS temperatures during hot summer monthsdo not typically stay elevated (>980F) for extended periods of time due to periodic cloudcover and rain.A 5% reduction in salinity and a 1.8 million to 1.3 million change in algae concentration(cells/ml) has occurred in the past two weeks. This has the effect of improving heattransfer rejection at night and reduces solar heating during the day.The requested Enforcement Discretion would end after either: (a) 10 days; or (b) if theUHS temperature exceeds 103'F; or (c) the UHS peak temperature drops below 96°F for3 consecutive days and on a declining trend; or (d) implementation of the requestedlicense amendments; or (e) if the loss of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 will not result in aNERC Emergency Alert Level (EEA) 3 alert.

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 5 of 18Enclosuref. Explain that the resolution itself will not result in a different, unnecessary transient.Based on the increased algae content and seasonal environmental conditions, the coolingcanals' solar energy absorption has increased causing UHS temperatures to increase. IfUHS temperatures were to exceed the current 100°F TS limit during the treatment periodand ensuing summer months, a plant shutdown would have to be initiated in accordancewith the action requirements of TS 3/4.7.4, increasing the possibility of a shutdowntransient.A controlled chemical treatment of the canal system over the course of several weeks isplanned to gradually reduce the near-term algae content and improve heat transferefficiency. The treatment program is designed to maintain dissolved oxygen in the canalwater body at a level that will continue to provide a good environment for the inhabitingfish species.FPL engineering and environmental personnel have determined that there is nodetrimental impact to plant operations resulting from the chemicals that are beingintroduced. The specific chemical regime has been designed to produce the desired algaereduction without any change to Turkey Point water treatment or heat exchanger systems.Further, the introduction of fresh water to the canals is at a point out in the canal systemwhere it will provide mixing flow and dilution prior to entering the Turkey Point intake.Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are currently using the installed hogging jet air ejectors toprovide increased operating margin on condenser vacuum as the UHS (canal coolingsystem) also provides cooling to the Main Condensers and Turbine Plant cooling loads.Adequate margin is maintained above the low condenser vacuum turbine trip setpoint toaccommodate a maximum 4VF increase in condenser and turbine plant cooling watertemperature. In June 2014, UHS temperatures reached 99.7°F and adequate marginexisted to all operating parameters without challenge. A 3°F rise in UHS temperaturewould not substantially impact operating margins. Therefore, the current course of actionwill not introduce the possibility for a different transient.g. Explain that the licensee did not have time to process an emergency licenseamendment, or that a license amendment is not needed.Based on increasing trends in canal water temperatures, FPL initiated several actions toreduce water temperature and to analyze the maximum temperatures that would stillsupport plant safety analyses. A license amendment request (LAR) was submitted byFPL to increase the maximum allowed UHS temperature. Prolonged hot weather in thearea caused UHS temperature to continue to rise such that Reference 2 was submitted onJuly 17, 2014 requesting review of the LAR on an emergency basis.

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 6 of 18EnclosureThe UHS temperatures exceeded the TS temperature limit of 100°F on July 20, 2014 at1454 hours requiring an entry into the action requirements of Technical Specification3/4.7.4. The referenced LAR review is in progress but now UHS temperature is at apoint that a NOED is needed to prevent the unnecessary shutdown of both Turkey Pointnuclear units.h. Describe the condition and operational status of the plant, including safety-relatedequipment out of service or otherwise inoperable, and nonsafety-related equipmentthat is degraded or out of service that may have risk significance and that mayincrease the probability of a plant transient or may complicate the recovery from atransient or may be used to mitigate the condition.Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are currently operating in Mode 1 (Power Operations) withUnit 3 at approximately 100% reactor power and Unit 4 at approximately 95% reactorpower. On-line risk is green. Currently, there is no safety-related equipment out ofservice or otherwise inoperable, and no nonsafety-related equipment that is degraded orout of service that may have risk significance.i. Request a specific time period for the NOED, including a justification for theduration of the noncompliance. The licensee shall include information that shows itsproposed course of action has a high likelihood of being completed within theproposed NOED period. The licensee must show the requested time for the NOED isdirectly related to the time to resolve the situation.The requested enforcement discretion would end either: (a) after 10 days; or (b) if theUHS temperature exceeds 103'F; or (c) the UHS peak temperature drops below 96'F for3 consecutive days and on a declining trend; or (d) implementation of the requestedlicense amendments; or (e) if the loss of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 will not result in aNERC Emergency Alert Level (EEA) 3 alert.The 10-day period in (a) above will commence upon the granting of enforcementdiscretion. Repetitive NOEDs is not a desirable state over the next few days. FPLattempts to reduce algae and salinity have been effective and we expect them to continueto be effective. The 10-day period is supported by our PRA discussion in Section 1.below. We will continue to work with the NRC staff on the emergency licenseamendment request.FPL letter L-2014-216 dated July 10, 2014 submitted LAR No. 231, which requested theNRC to amend TS 3/4.7.4 to allow operation with an UHS temperature of 104'F. TheLAR documented multiple analyses performed that demonstrate the continued operabilityof Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 at cooling canal temperatures as high as 104'F. The Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 7 of 18Enclosureprimary analysis utilized the CCW heat exchanger performance monitoring programrequired by TS 3/4.7.2 (TS SR 4.7.2.a and 4.7.2.b(2)). That program ensures that at alltemperatures the CCW heat exchangers are capable of removing more heat than thelimiting safety analysis. At 1 00°F the CCW heat exchanger performance monitoringprogram ensures the heat exchangers remove more heat than is assumed in the safetyanalysis by requiring a cleaner heat exchanger than assumed in the safety analysis.Continued compliance with these requirements at a UHS temperature of 104'F ensuresthe heat exchangers will remove more heat than is required by the safety analysis with atleast 2.5% margin while maintaining the same CCW temperatures as are assumed in thesafety analysis. Additional analysis concluded other effects such as ICW pump netpositive suction head continue to contain sufficient margin.Instrument uncertainty analysis was performed on the temperature indication that isutilized to compare to the UHS temperature and found a total channel uncertainty of0.86°F. Therefore, this NOED request for a limit of 103'F allowing for instrumentuncertainty to remain below the analytical limit ensures the safety analyses limits aremaintained.Currently, all resources and transmission facilities are available in the Miami-Dade areaand the grid system is in normal operation. All off-site requirements to Turkey Point,including maintenance of required grid voltages at the Turkey Point switchyard, can bereliably served. Additionally, all load in the Miami-Dade area can be served reliably.Turkey Point Nuclear Units 3 and 4 on line are critical to this reliable operation.With conditions (a) or (b) above exceeded, or with condition (e) met, both Turkey Pointnuclear units will be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLDSHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.Enforcement discretion was verbally granted by the NRC on July 20, 2014 at 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />.j. Detail and explain compensatory actions the plant has both taken and will take toreduce the risk associated with the specified configuration. All compensatory actionsmust be completed before the NOED CT begins. Compensatory measures used toreduce plant vulnerabilities shall focus on both event mitigation and initiating eventlikelihood. The objectives are to achieve the following:Turkey Point has performed and will continue to perform the following actions to reducethe risk of the configuration:* Normal operation utilizes an in service spare CCW heat exchanger. Accidentanalysis credits two CCW heat exchangers in operation. A third heat exchanger will Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 8 of 18Enclosurebe kept in service and only removed from service for critical maintenance activities oras part of planned compensatory measures during night time hours. This willminimize the duration of the spare heat exchanger being out of service.* While the NOED is in effect, Turkey Point will increase management oversight toresolve any issues in a timely manner." Performance of surveillance requirements will be minimized to the extent possiblewithout creating a situation of a missed surveillance, and elective maintenanceactivities that are classified as high risk due to generation threat will be minimized.Those activities classified as high risk performed during the NOED duration will beperformed consistent with activities identified as high risk to minimize likelihood ofan initiating event. PRA risk for both Units 3 and 4 will be maintained GREENduring planned maintenance activities." The monthly CCW heat exchanger performance test required by TS SR 4.7.2.b(2) hasbeen increased to weekly and will performed at least twice weekly during the periodof enforcement discretion.* The CCW heat exchanger cleaning frequency has been increased from one per unitbi-weekly to one per unit weekly. The time that the specified CCW heat exchangerwill be out of service will be minimized." TS SR 4.7.2.a requires a comparison of actual temperature to required temperatureonce every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Station procedures perform this surveillance once per shift(nominally 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />). This will be increased to once every hour during the period ofenforcement discretion when the actual temperature is greater than 99°F and willrevert to once per shift when the actual temperature is less than 98°F." Verification of UHS temperature will be performed at least once per hour when UHStemperature exceeds 100°F.* Perform Just in Time Training via tabletop discussion of the following procedures:o 3/4-ONOP-019, Restoration of lCWo 3/4-ONOP-030, Align Service Water to Charging Pumps* Currently, the grid is stable as a result of continued operation of Turkey Point Units 3and 4 to support grid voltage. No challenges to grid stability are currently forecastedas a result of severe weather or other events. Switchyard work that would impact grid Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 9 of 18Enclosurereliability will be restricted during the NOED period. Grid conditions will be verifiedat least once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.* All on-site Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) are operable with no plannedmaintenance. Weekly surveillances are scheduled for the EDG to meet the TS.k. Discuss the status and potential challenges to offsite and onsite power sources,including any current or planned maintenance in the distribution system and anycurrent or planned maintenance to the emergency diesel generators. The licenseemust identify any specific transmission line configurations that must be maintainedto ensure the availability of the grid for safe operation of the plant.Currently, the grid is stable as a result of continued operation of Turkey Point Units 3 and4 to support grid voltage. No challenges to grid stability are currently forecasted as aresult of severe weather or other events. Refer to the weather forecast below in Section n.All on-site EDGs are operable with no planned maintenance. Weekly surveillances arescheduled for the EDG to meet the TS.1. Include the safety basis for the request and an evaluation of the safety significanceand licensee should address the quantitative and qualitative aspects noted below.The numerical guidance for acceptance was established to augment qualitativearguments that continued operation of the plant during the period of enforcementdiscretion will not cause risk to exceed the level determined acceptable duringnormal work controls and, therefore, there is no net increase in radiological risk tothe public. For licensee provided quantitative risk analysis, the licensee shallprovide the effects on LERF. The following information should be provided tosupport this evaluation:1. The safety basis for the request, including an evaluation of the safety significanceand potential consequences of the proposed course of action.The Turkey Point Revision 10 PRA model, using zero test and maintenance, was usedto establish the plants' baseline risk and the estimated risk increase associated withthe period of enforcement discretion. Core Damage Frequency (CDF), Large EarlyRelease Frequency (LERF), Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability(ICCDP), and Incremental Conditional Large Early Release Probability (ICLERP)values are listed below and compared with guidance thresholds discussed above.Quantification of the plant risk for the initial plant condition has two scenarios:failure of 1 of 2 ICW trains and increased ICW initiator frequency.

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 10 of 18Enclosure2. Dominant Risk ContributorsCDF is the limiting risk metric. The dominant sequences for the most limitingscenario include a loss of ICW initiator leading to Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) SealLOCAs of varying sizes. After the loss of ICW (and subsequent loss of CCW), manypaths to RCP Seal LOCA exist including:" Failure to realign Service Water to supply cooling to the Charging Pumps." Failure of the Service Water Crosstie" Failure of RCP Seal Injection" Failure of temperature transmitter TT-3-143The Top 50 cutsets for CDF are provided in Attachment 1.3. Compensatory Risk Management ActionsThe compensatory risk management actions described in Section J are not explicitlycredited in the PRA evaluation. This is considered a source of conservatism.4. Extent of conditionThe UHS is shared by Turkey Point Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 for both Safety and Non-Safety heat loads. There is no secondary heat sink for the Turkey Point units. TheUnits 3 and 4 have separate and distinct ICW and CCW Systems and the NOED willapply to both Turkey Point nuclear units. The extent of condition is limited to thecooling canal system.5. External EventsThe impact of external events on the increase in risk associated with having the UHSdegraded was not explicitly calculated due to the lack of fire and seismic PRA modelsfor Turkey Point. As a rough approximation, the external events' contribution wasassumed to be equal to the internal events' contribution.The weather forecast for the 10-day period during which the NOED is in effect wasobtained from the National Weather Service website. There is no mention of severeweather that is expected to exacerbate the situation for the duration. On the contrary,rainfall would serve to help cool the UHS.

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 11 of 18Enclosurem. Demonstrate that the NOED condition, along with any compensatory measures, willnot result in more than a minimal increase in radiological risk, either in aquantitative assessment that risk will be within the normal work control levels(ICCDP less than or equal to 5E-7 and/or ICLERP less than or equal to 5E-8) or ina defensible qualitative manner.The results meet the criteria of N RC Inspection Manual Chapter 0410 for a 10-day periodof enforcement discretion. Continued operation of the units during the period ofenforcement discretion will not cause risk to exceed the level determined acceptableduring normal work controls and therefore there is not a net increase in the radiologicalrisk to the public. For the additional time period that the UHS will be at elevatedtemperatures, the risk metrics described by the NOED guidance of IncrementalConditional Core Damage Probability (ICCDP) less than or equal to 5.OE-07 andIncremental Conditional Large Early Release Probability (ICLERP) less than or equal to5.OE-08 are not exceeded. The tables below show the increased risk for each of thescenarios considered.

Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionEnclosureL-2014-231Page 12 of 18ICW InitiatorsCDF ICW Trainx2 xl0 xl00Baseline 4.93E-07 4.93E-07 4.93E-07 4.93E-07Sensitivity 5.38E-07 5.09E-07 1.03E-06 8.77E-06Delta CDF 4.44E-08 1.55E-08 5.34E-07 8.28E-06Proposed NOED Duration(Days) 10 10 10 10ICCDP (Internal Events) 1.22E-09 4.23E-10 1.46E-08 2.27E-07ICCDP (Internal and ExternalEvents) 2.44E-09 8.46E-10 2.92E-08 4.54E-07ICW InitiatorsLERF ICW Trainx2 xl0 xl00Baseline 1.44E-08 1.44E-08 1.44E-08 1.44E-08Sensitivity 1.46E-08 1.44E-08 1.60E-08 3.92E-08Delta LERF 2.27E-10 3.60E-1 1 1.60E-09 2.48E-08Proposed NOED Duration(Days) 10 10 10 10ICCLERP (Internal Events) 6.22E-12 9.86E-13 4.38E-1 1 6.79E-10ICCLERP (Internal andExternal Events) 1.24E-11 1.94E-12 8.76E-11 1.36E-09 Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionEnclosureL-2014-231Page 13 of 18n. Discuss forecasted weather and pandemic conditions for the requested NOEDperiod and any plant vulnerabilities related to weather or pandemic conditions.National Weather Service and local weather forecasts have been consulted for the 10-dayperiod of this NOED request. There is no forecast severe weather nor is there a pandemicin progress or forecast for this period. Following is a summary of the 10 day weatherforecast obtained from the Weather Channel:TodayJul 20MonJul 21TueJul 22WedJul 23ThuJul 24FriJul 25SatJul 26SunJul 27MonJul 28TueJul 29/tIsolated T-StormsScattered T-StormsScattered T-StormsScattered T-StormsScattered T-StormsIsolated T-StormsIsolated T-StormsScattered T-StormsHigh /Low (OF)920/760890/76-880/75-880/760890/760890/760890/760890/750900/750880/760Precip.30 %60%60 %50%40 %30 %30 %40%0%10%Mostly SunnyPartly CloudyLast Updated Jul 20 11:08 a.m. ETo. Include the basis for the licensee's conclusion the noncompliance will not createundue risk to public health and safety.The UHS is not failed or unavailable. Analyses have determined that UHS temperaturesup to 104'F can be accommodated with either no impact or an insignificant impact on theLOCA and non-LOCA results. Additionally, component assessments were performedand determined that components served by UHS would continue to perform satisfactorily Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 14 of 18Enclosurewith a 4°F increase in UHS temperature. No adverse influences on risk were identifiedthrough examination of the PRA model for the plant.In addition, the CCW heat exchanger monitoring program will continue to beimplemented and bounds the DBA containment heat loads for a given heat exchangercleanliness despite elevated UHS temperatures. In essence, a cleaner CCW heatexchanger permits higher UHS temperatures. This heat exchanger monitoring program isrequired by TS SR 4.7.2.a and 4.7.2.b(2).p. Include the basis for the licensee's conclusion the noncompliance will not involveadverse consequences to the environment.The attached graph depicts Cooling Canal System (CCS) temperatures at variouslocations in the system. See the map in Attachment 2 showing the sample locations.CCS-3 is the location where most of the crocodiles congregate. As shown on the graphthe temperature will vary seasonally being cooler in the winter and warmer in thesummer. The crocodiles utilize the CCS for courting, nesting and basking. Thus far thisyear, twenty five nests have hatched and almost 400 hatchlings have been tagged. Ourcrocodile expert is watching 3 more potential nests that should hatch out soon. Anincrease in the CCS water temperatures is not expected to affect the remaining 3 nests.This could be a record year for hatching.Prior to the Extended Power Uprate being implemented, FPL along with the University ofFlorida (UF), began conducting capture surveys three times a year to determine growthand survival rates of the crocodiles. We also conduct spotlight surveys every othermonth (2011-2013). In 2014, after approval through the Fish and Wildlife ConservationCommission, we reduced those surveys to quarterly. The data indicate that the crocodilesare distributed in the canals with the most concentrated area in the South end of the canaland SW comer.FPL and UF also capture and tag the crocodiles three times a year: 2011 -117 captures,2012 -93 captures, 2013 -102 captures and 2014 -64 to date.

Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionEnclosureL-2014-231Page 15 of 18u1)1Ig)-~ lU.AI8'5'*518)"It-(cs~311 11110/0~iI"M3XIDrq. Include a statement that the facility organization that normally reviews safety issueshas approved the request (Plant Onsite Review Committee, or its equivalent).This request was approved by the Turkey Point Plant Nuclear Safety Committee on July20, 2014.r. Make a verbal commitment that the licensee will submit the written NOED requestwithin 2 working days and a follow-up license amendment request within 4 workingdays following the staff's verbal granting of the NOED. NRC's granting of a NOEDmeans that exigent circumstances exist. However, the licensee's amendment requestmust describe and justify any exigent circumstances (see 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6)). If thestaff agrees during the conference call that a follow-up amendment request is notrequired, the licensee shall state this in the written NOED request. If the licenseeintends to propose a temporary amendment, the licensee's amendment request shallinclude justification for the temporary nature of the request.FPL Turkey Point will provide a written NOED request on July 21, 2014.FPL submitted an emergency license amendment via References I and 2 which addressedthe basis for this NOED.

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 16 of 18Enclosures. In addition to items a thru r above, the licensee must provide the followinginformation for a natural event NOED:1. List the name, organization, and telephone number of the official in thegovernment or independent entity who made the emergency determination, ifapplicable. If deemed necessary, the staff may contact the appropriate official toindependently verify the information the licensee provided before making aNOED determination.Not applicable to this request.2. Include details of the basis and nature of the emergency including, but notlimited to, its effect on the following:(a.) on-site and off-site emergency preparedness,On-site and off-site emergency preparedness are unaffected and remain available intheir normal standby readiness posture.(b.) plant and site ingress and egress,Plant and site ingress and egress are not affected. The natural event concerns theenvironmental impacts on the UHS causing higher than normal temperatureconditions.(c.) off-site and on-site power sources,Off-site and on-site power sources are currently not impacted. Off-site sources willbe impacted if the Turkey Point nuclear units are forced to shutdown because ofexceeding the UHS TS temperature limit.(d.) plant security,The higher than normal UHS temperature has had no effect on plant physical security.

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 17 of 18Enclosure(e.) grid stability, andCurrent grid condition is stable with the Turkey Point nuclear units assisting withvoltage control.(f.) actions taken to avert or alleviate the emergency situation (e.g., coordinatingwith other utilities and the load dispatcher organization for buying additionalpower or for cycling loads, or shedding interruptible industrial or non-emergency loads).FPL is the registered transmission system operator under the regulations of the NorthAmerican Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Therefore, FPL is responsible forthe FPL transmission system in the State of Florida which is responsible for servingalmost 24000 MW of load and 4.7 million customers. Unavailability of both TurkeyPoint nuclear units challenges maintaining voltage requirements at the Turkey Pointswitchyard and the transmission and substation within ratings. In order to mitigatethese voltage issues, shedding of load will be required. Attached is additionalinformation related to these issues. Attachment 3 contains sensitive information thatis being treated as Critical Energy Infrastructure Information as defined by theFederal Energy Regulatory Commission at 18 CFR 388.113. As a result, confidentialtreatment is appropriate under 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1).3. Identify and discuss the potential consequences of compliance with existinglicense requirements (e.g., plant trip, controlled shutdown).Compliance with TSs would involve an unnecessary shutdown of both Turkey Pointnuclear units during a period of high system load demand.4. Discuss the potential adverse effects on public health and safety from enforcingcompliance with specific license requirements during the emergency.Compliance with TSs would involve an unnecessary shutdown of both Turkey Pointnuclear units during a period of high system load demand. The operation of TurkeyPoint Units 3 and 4 during the summer months is essential for grid voltage stability.

Florida Power & Light Company L-2014-231Request for Enforcement Discretion Page 18 of 18Enclosure5. Discuss the impact of the emergency on plant safety, including any limitations ofthe UHS.The request for enforcement discretion concerns the condition of the UHS. Theeffects on plant safety are discussed in previous sections above.6. For a grid instability NOED, assure the NRC that all reasonable opportunitiesfor purchasing replacement power have been exhausted, and the NOED shallnot last any longer than replacement power becomes available, if applicable.Not applicable to this request.NOED

References:

1. Florida Power & Light Company Letter L-2014-216, "License Amendment RequestNumber 231, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Revise Ultimate HeatSink Temperature Limit," dated July 10, 2014.2. Florida Power & Light Company Letter L-2014-226, "License Amendment RequestNumber 231, Application to Revise Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Limit -Request forEmergency Approval," dated July 17, 2014.

Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 1L-2014-231Page 1 of 14Attachment 1 -Top 50 Cutsets for CDF# Cutset Prob.BE Prob Inputs2.30E-06 1.OOE+O0 %ZZICWU33.OOE-03 QHFPSWCHG6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD2 2.30E-06 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU33.OOE-03 QHFPSWCHG5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD3 5.78E-07 1.00E+O0 %ZZICWU36.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL7.56E-04 TMM3U3SEG1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD4 5.78E-07 1.00E+O0 %ZZICWU35.54E-02 QMM3BSAVILLOSS OF ICWFailure to align service water to cool chargingpump given loss of ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2,3, OR4AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFailure to align service water to cool chargingpump given loss of ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFAILURE OF THE SRVICE WATER X-TIE TO U3FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment I7.56E-04 TMM3U3SEG1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD5 3.31E-07 1.OOE+O0 %ZZICWU34.32E-04 MTTD31436.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD6 3.31E-07 1.OOE+O0 %ZZICWU34.32E-04 MTTD31435.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD7 1.70E-07 I.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.22E-04 MHFPISOLTDWN6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD8 1.70E-07 1.OOE+O0 %ZZICWU32.22E-04 MHFPISOLTDWNL-2014-231Page 2 of 14FAILURE OF THE SRVICE WATER X-TIE TO U3FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTemperature Transmitter TT-3-143 Fails toRespondTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTemperature Transmitter TT-3-143 Fails toRespondTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFailure to isolate letdown given loss of letdowncoolingTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFailure to isolate letdown given loss of letdown Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment IL-2014-231Page 3 of 145.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD9 1.53E-07 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALA6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD10 1.53E-07 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALA5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD11 1.53E-07 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALB6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SDcoolingTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP A SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP A SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP B SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 IN Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 1L-2014-231Page 4 of 14MODE 5 OR 612 1.53E-07 1.OOE+O0 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALB5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD13 1.53E-07 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALC6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD14 1.53E-07 1.00E+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALC5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD15 1.16E-07 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU33.OOE-03 QHFPSWCHG6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVILLOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP B SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP C SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP C SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFailure to align service water to cool chargingpump given loss of ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT OR Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 1L-2014-231Page 5 of 141.00E-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD16 1.16E-07 1.OOE+O0 %ZZICWU33.OOE-03 QHFPSWCHG5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD17 2.93E-08 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU36.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIEPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFailure to align service water to cool chargingpump given loss of ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFAILURE OF THE SRVICE WATER X-TIE TO U3FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2,3, OR4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FAILURE OF THE SRVICE WATER X-TIE TO U3FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFailure to align service water to cool chargingpump given loss of ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT OR5.54E-027.56E-04QMM3BSBVILTMM3U3SEG1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD18 2.93E-08 1.OOE+O0 %ZZICWU35.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-027.56E-04QMM3BSBVIETMM3U3SEG1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD19 2.91E-08 1.OOE+O0%ZZICWU33.OOE-03 QHFPSWCHG6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE Florida Power & Light Company .Request for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment IL-2014-231Page 6 of 145.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL2.50E-03 ZZRCPSL4807.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD20 2.91E-08 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU33.OOE-03 QHFPSWCHG5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02QMMM3BSBVIE2.50E-03 ZZRCPSL4807.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD21 1.67E-08 , 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU34.32E-04 MTTD31436.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD22 1.67E-08 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU34.32E-04 MTTD31435.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL76PLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN480 GPM/P LEAKUNIT3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR4AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFailure to align service water to cool chargingpump given loss of ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN480 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTemperature Transmitter TT-3-143 Fails toRespondTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTemperature Transmitter TT-3-143 Fails toRespondTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 67.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 123 1.65E-08 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU36.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL2.15E-05 TMMODISVLV1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD24 1.65E-08 1.00E+00 %ZZICWU35.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE2.15E-05 TMMODISVLV1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SDL-2014-231Page 7 of 14LOSS OF ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFAILURE OF THE SRW COMMON SEGMENTMODULEFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FAILURE OF THE SRW COMMON SEGMENTMODULEFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF CCWFail to start CCW pump(s) after autostart failsFailure to stop RCPs given loss of CCWMODULE: CCW PUMP TRAIN A FAILURE TO RUN(1 YEAR EXPOSURE)HEP dependency factor forCHFPSTCCW,CHFPSTPRCP,MHFPISOLTDWNPRESSURE SWITCH PC-3-611 FAILS HIGHFailure to isolate letdown given loss of letdowncoolingCCW PUMP 3A IS RUNNINGUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 625 1.63E-08 1.OOE+O01.50E-034.OOE-03%ZZCCWU3CHFPSTCCWCHFPSTPRCP1.66E-02 CMMPAFTRIE1.13E+062.81E-022.22E-043.33E-01COMBINATION_1435CPSH3PC611MHFPISOLTDWNZZCO0017.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD26 1.63E-08 1.OOE+001.50E-034.OOE-03%ZZCCWU3CHFPSTCCWCHFPSTPRCPLOSS OF CCWFail to start CCW pump(s) after autostart failsFailure to stop RCPs given loss of CCWMODULE: CCW PUMP TRAIN B FAILURE TO RUN(1 YEAR EXPOSURE)1435 HEP dependency factor for1.66E-02 CMMPBFTRIE1.13E+06 COMBINATION Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment IL-2014-231Page 8 of 142.81E-02 CPSH3PC6112.22E-04 MHFPISOLTDWN3.33E-01 ZZCO0027.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD27 1.63E-08 1.OOE+001.50E-034.OOE-03%ZZCCWU3CH FPSTCCWCHFPSTPRCP1.66E-02 CMMPCFTRIE1.13E+06 COMBINATION_14352.81E-02 CPSH3PC6112.22E-043.33E-01MHFPISOLTDWNZZC00037.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SDCHFPSTCCW,CHFPSTPRCP,MHFPISOLTDWNPRESSURE SWITCH PC-3-611 FAILS HIGHFailure to isolate letdown given loss of letdowncoolingCCW PUMP 3B IS RUNNINGUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF CCWFail to start CCW pump(s) after autostart failsFailure to stop RCPs given loss of CCWMODULE: CCW PUMP TRAIN 3C FAILURE TORUN (1 YEAR EXPOSURE)HEP dependency factor forCHFPSTCCW,CHFPSTPRCP,MHFPISOLTDWNPRESSURE SWITCH PC-3-611 FAILS HIGHFailure to isolate letdown given loss of letdowncoolingCCW PUMP 3C IS RUNNINGUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF CCWFail to start CCW pump(s) after autostart failsFailure to stop RCPs given loss of CCWFailure to align service water to cool chargingpump given loss of CCWMODULE: CCW PUMP TRAIN A FAILURE TO RUN(1 YEAR EXPOSURE)HEP dependency factor forCH FPSTCCW,CH FPSTPRCP,CHFPSWCHGPRESSURE SWITCH PC-3-611 FAILS HIGHCCW PUMP 3A IS RUNNINGUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF CCWFail to start CCW pump(s) after autostart failsFailure to stop RCPs given loss of CCWFailure to align service water to cool chargingpump given loss of CCWMODULE: CCW PUMP TRAIN B FAILURE TO RUN(1 YEAR EXPOSURE)28 1.63E-08 1.OOE+001.50E-034.OOE-03%ZZCCWU3CH FPSTCCWCHFPSTPRCP1.22E-02 CHFPSWCHG1.66E-02 CMMPAFTRIE2.05E+042.81E-023.33E-01COMBINATION_1424CPSH3PC611ZZCO0017.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD29 1.63E-08 1.OOE+001.50E-034.OOE-03%ZZCCWU3CHFPSTCCWCHFPSTPRCP1.22E-02 CHFPSWCHG1.66E-02 CMMPBFTRIE Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 1L-2014-231Page 9 of 142.05E+042.81E-023.33E-01COMBINATION_1424CPSH3PC611ZZC00027.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD30 1.63E-08 1.OOE+001.50E-034.OOE-03%ZZCCWU3CHFPSTCCWCHFPSTPRCP1.22E-02 CHFPSWCHG1.66E-02 CMMPCFTRIE2.05E+042.81E-02COMBINATION_1424CPSH3PC6113.33E-01 ZZC00037.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD31 1.39E-08 5.04E-04 %ZZSIU33.23E-05 GMMFCCHHSIALL8.58E-01 ZZU3PWRU4PWR32 1.37E-08 4.45E-04 %ZZS2U33.60E-05 GHFA31NJALL8.58E-01 ZZU3PWRU4PWR33 1.34E-08 1.17E-01 %ZZT3AU3HEP dependency factor forCH FPSTCCW,CHFPSTPRCP,CH FPSWCHGPRESSURE SWITCH PC-3-611 FAILS HIGHCCW PUMP 3B IS RUNNINGUNIT3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF CCWFail to start CCW pump(s) after autostart failsFailure to stop RCPs given loss of CCWFailure to align service water to cool chargingpump given loss of CCWMODULE: CCW PUMP TRAIN 3C FAILURE TORUN (1 YEAR EXPOSURE)HEP dependency factor forCHFPSTCCW,CHFPSTPRCP,CHFPSWCHGPRESSURE SWITCH PC-3-611 FAILS HIGHCCW PUMP 3C IS RUNNINGUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6SMALL-SMALL LOCA S1COMMON CAUSE(4/4) FAILURE OF HHSI PUMPS3A, 3B, 4A, 4B TO RUNUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, OR 3 AND UNIT 4 IN MODE1, 2, OR 3SMALL LOCAFAILURE TO RESTORE MOV 843A/B FROMMAINTENANCEUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, OR 3 AND UNIT4 IN MODE1, 2, OR 3LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER -RECOVERABLEFAILURE OF CONTROL RODS TO INSERT WITHPOWER REMOVEDATWS FLAGPLANT IN OPERATING CYCLE INTERVAL 1UNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, OR 3 AND UNIT 4 IN MODE1, 2, OR 3SMALL LOCACOMMON CAUSE(4/4) FAILURE OF HHSI PUMPS1.21E-061.OOE+001.10E-01NRDFPHYSICALZZATWSZZPRCI18.58E-01 ZZU3PWRU4PWR34 1.23E-08 4.45E-04 %ZZS2U33.23E-05 GMMFCCHHSIALL Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 1L-2014-231Page 10 of 148.58E-01 ZZU3PWRU4PWR35 9.93E-09 4.45E-04 %ZZS2U39.28E+02 COMBINATION_52195.40E-055.19E-04GHFPOPPSIGHFPS2RCRC8.58E-01 ZZU3PWRU4PWR36 9.37E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZIAU38.21E-02 HADF33T911.21E-06 NRDFPHYSICAL1.OOE+00 ZZATWS1.10E-01 ZZPRCl18.58E-01 ZZU3PWRU4PWR37 8.60E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.22E-04 MHFPISOLTDWN6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD38 8.60E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.22E-04 MHFPISOLTDWN5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE3A, 3B, 4A, 4B TO RUNUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, OR 3 AND UNIT 4 IN MODE1, 2, OR 3SMALL LOCAHEP dependency factor forGHFPS2RCRC,GHFPOPPSIFailure to initiate HHSI using opposite unitRWST(suction source)Fail to switch over to HHCL recirc follow S2 LOCAUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, OR 3 AND UNIT 4 IN MODE1, 2, OR 3UNIT 3 LOSS OF IAAIR DRYER 3T9 FAILS TO DELIVER FLOW (1 YREXPOSURE)FAILURE OF CONTROL RODS TO INSERT WITHPOWER REMOVEDATWS FLAGPLANT IN OPERATING CYCLE INTERVAL 1UNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, OR 3 AND UNIT4 IN MODE1, 2, OR 3LOSS OF ICWFailure to isolate letdown given loss of letdowncoolingTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFailure to isolate letdown given loss of letdowncoolingTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAK1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL76 Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 1L-2014-231Page 11 of 147.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD39 8.34E-09 9.72E-09 %ZZVESRUPU38.58E-01 ZZU3PWRU4PWR40 8.16E-09 1.OOE+0O %ZZICWU31.07E-05 MMM3PATHB6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD41 8.16E-09 1.OOE+001.07E-05%ZZICWU3MMM3PATHB5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.98E-01 ZZRCPSL1827.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD42 8.02E-09 4.45E-04 %ZZS2U32.99E+05 COMBINATION_53135.40E-05 GHFPOPPSI3.99E-04 JHFPISOPMP3.26E-03 MHFPREFILLS28.58E-01 ZZU3PWRU4PWR43 7.76E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU3UNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6UNIT 3 VESSEL RUPTUREUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, OR 3 AND UNIT 4 IN MODE1, 2, OR 3LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF SEAL INJECTION FILTER PATH BTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF SEAL INJECTION FILTER PATH BTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN182 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6SMALL LOCAHEP dependency factor forJHFPISOPM P,MHFPREFILLS2,GHFPOPPSIFailure to initiate HHSI using opposite unitRWST(suction source)Fail to secure 1 of RHR pumps in injection phase(sml LOCA)Fail to makeup to RWST to sustain inject srcfollow S2LOCAUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, OR 3 AND UNIT 4 IN MODE1, 2, OR 3LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP A SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTS2.OOE-04 MMM3SEALA Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 1L-2014-231Page 12 of 146.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD44 7.76E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALA5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD45 7.76E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALB6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD46 7.76E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALB5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.00E-02 ZZRCPSL76TRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP A SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP B SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP B SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2,3, OR4AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 67.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 1L-2014-231Page 13 of 1447 7.76E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALC6.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIE5.54E-02 QMM3BSBVIL1.OOE-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD48 7.76E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU32.OOE-04 MMM3SEALC5.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-02 QMM3BSBVIE1.00E-02 ZZRCPSL767.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD49 7.32E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU36.52E-02 QMM3BSAVIELOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP C SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWFAILURE OF RCP C SEAL INJECTIONCOMPONENTSTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN76 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)TRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSUREFAILURE OF THE SRVICE WATER X-TIE TO U3FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN480 GPM/P LEAKUNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT 4 INMODE 5 OR 6LOSS OF ICWTRAIN A BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (72 HR EXPOSURETRAIN B BASKET STRAINER/VALVES SHUT ORPLUGGED <MODULE> UNIT 3 (1 YR EXPOSURE)FAILURE OF THE SRVICE WATER X-TIE TO U3FRACTION OF TIME RCP SEAL LOCA RESULTS IN480 GPM/P LEAK5.54E-027.56E-04QM MM3BSBVILTMM3U3SEG2.50E-03 ZZRCPSL4807.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD50 7.32E-09 1.OOE+00 %ZZICWU35.54E-02 QMM3BSAVIL6.52E-027.56E-04QMM3BSBVIETMM3U3SEG2.50E-03 ZZRCPSL480 Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment IL-2014-231Page 14 of 14UNIT 3 IN MODE 1, 2, 3, OR 4 AND UNIT4 INMODE 5 OR 67.OOE-02 ZZU3PWRU4SD Florida Power & Light CompanyRequest for Enforcement DiscretionAttachment 2L-2014-231Page 1 of 1Attachment 2 -Turkey Point Cooling Canal Sample LocationsGoogle earthMflesjkml 7A

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