The following finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy,
NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation. License Condition 2.C (14), Fire Protection, requires the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved
fire protection program. The approved
fire protection program requires the licensee to meet the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3, which requires that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration, should be provided where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shut-down does not satisfy the requirement of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Contrary to the above, from original installation in 1981 to June 8, 2011, the licensee failed to provide an alternative shutdown capability that was independent of cables, systems, or components in alternative shutdown areas. Specifically, the licensee mis-wired a switch needed for fire isolation for the Unit 3 train A charging pump motor control circuitry. In this condition, a
hot short on the indication portion of the Unit 3 Train A charging pump motor control circuitry would energize the trip function causing a loss of control to the credited charging pump. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance by a senior reactor analyst because of the low probability of an Anticipated
Transient Without
Scram (
ATWS) and fire-induced Loss of Coolant Accident (
LOCA) event, the limited accident mitigating function of credited charging pumps, and the availability of High Pressure Safety Injection (
HPSI) to mitigate a small loss of coolant accident. This issue was identified in the licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notification NN 201456724.
