|
|
| Line 1: |
Line 1: |
| #REDIRECT [[05000423/LER-1997-031]] | | {{Adams |
| | | number = ML20140G601 |
| | | issue date = 06/05/1997 |
| | | title = :on 970507,RHR Valve Low Pressure Open Permissive Bistable Setting Was Set non-conservatively. Caused by Implementation of Incorrect Calibration Info. Re-evaluated RHR Suction/Isolation Valve LPI Calibrations |
| | | author name = Smith D |
| | | author affiliation = NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| | | addressee name = |
| | | addressee affiliation = |
| | | docket = 05000423 |
| | | license number = |
| | | contact person = |
| | | document report number = LER-97-031, LER-97-31, NUDOCS 9706160365 |
| | | package number = ML20140G594 |
| | | document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT |
| | | page count = 3 |
| | }} |
| | {{LER |
| | | Title = :on 970507,RHR Valve Low Pressure Open Permissive Bistable Setting Was Set non-conservatively. Caused by Implementation of Incorrect Calibration Info. Re-evaluated RHR Suction/Isolation Valve LPI Calibrations |
| | | Plant = |
| | | Reporting criterion = 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) |
| | | Power level = |
| | | Mode = |
| | | Docket = 05000423 |
| | | LER year = 1997 |
| | | LER number = 31 |
| | | LER revision = 0 |
| | | Event date = |
| | | Report date = |
| | | ENS = |
| | | abstract = |
| | }} |
| | |
| | =text= |
| | {{#Wiki_filter:- |
| | ~. |
| | ~-- - - - _ - |
| | NRC FORM 366 U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISsloN APPROVED BY CpMS NO.3160-0104 (4-96) |
| | EXPIRES 04/30/98 |
| | [ |
| | ff!Fo C$LLEETION ATIO RQ S o |
| | S E RY D S |
| | n'a"'?o'LMn"F"'!!?ERo 4&Ja"Sa",Vo"ffa$ ^ |
| | o LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 15;g"U ? 'Nic;g",^,'oaga'gga$,,vo"P',"!," Tag" gc o |
| | o7fEEA'N'foEIIA'toTuME"f, "!fs%IST"oI"oE37$** |
| | (See reverse fOr required number of digits /charactersfor each block) |
| | FACILITY NAME (1) |
| | DOCKET NUMSER (2) |
| | PAGE (3) |
| | Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1 of 3 TITLE M) |
| | RHR Valve Low Pressure Open Permissive Bistable Setting Set Non-Conservatively EVENT DATE (5) |
| | LER NUMBER (6) |
| | REPORT DATE (7) |
| | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) |
| | MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVisloN MONTH DAY YEAR FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER f |
| | 05 07 97 97 031 00 06 05 97 OPERATING 5 |
| | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTSoF 10 CFR 1: (Check one or more) (11) |
| | MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) |
| | X so 73(a)(2)(ii So.73(a)(2)(viii) |
| | POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73!$(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| | LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(si) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 |
| | ~ |
| | 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) oTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(V) |
| | Specify in Abstract tylow l |
| | ~ |
| | 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) |
| | LICENSEE CONTACT FoR THIS LER (12) |
| | NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER tinclude Area Codel David A. Smith, MP3 Nuclear Licensing Manager (860)437-5840 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) |
| | |
| | ==CAUSE== |
| | SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE |
| | |
| | ==CAUSE== |
| | SYSTEM COMPONENT M A NUF ACTURE R REPORTABLE J |
| | TO NPRDS TO NPROS q |
| | SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) |
| | EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR No SUBMISSloN |
| | { |
| | YES DATE (15) |
| | (if yes, complete EXPECTED sUBMtssioN DATE). |
| | ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces,i.e., approximately15 single-spacedtypewnttenlines) (16) |
| | At 1330 on May 7,1997, with the Unit in Mode 5, a system engineering review of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) l wide range pressure channel calibration procedures concluded that the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Low Pressure Interlock (LPI) setpoint did not comply with Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.d.1. |
| | The existing LPl setting allows the RHR isolation valves to be opened at RCS pressures higher than those presented in ths TS. Consequently, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition or operation prohibited by the plant's TS. |
| | l-l This condition was caused by the implementation of incorrect calibration information supplied during unit initial startup. |
| | However, there were no adverse consequences as a result of the event since the RHR pressures did not exceed the RHR suction header relief valve limits. |
| | 4 No immediate corrective action is required, however, prior to entry into Mode 4, the RHR suction / isolation valve LPI bistable calibrations will be re-evaluated and the LPl bistables will be recalibrated to comply with the TS. |
| | 9706160365 970605 PDR ADOCK 05000423 S |
| | PDR NRC FORM 366 (4 05) l |
| | |
| | I l |
| | lU.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission l |
| | (4 95) i UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION l |
| | FACILITY NAME (1) |
| | DOCKET NUMBER (2) |
| | LER NUMBER (6) |
| | PAGE (3) |
| | YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVislON Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBER NUMBER 2 of 3 97 031 00 TEXT (if rnore space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Forrn 366A) t17) l l |
| | l l. |
| | |
| | ==Description of Event== |
| | At 1330 on May 7,1997, with the Unit in Mode 5, a system engineering review of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) |
| | I wids range pressure channel calibration procedures concluded that the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Low l |
| | Pressure Interlock (LPI) setpoint did not comply with Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.d.1. |
| | TS 4.5.2 states that *Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: d) At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by: 1) Verifying automatic interlock action of the RHR System from the actual Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by ensuring that with a simulated or actual RCS pressure signal greater than or equal to 390 psia the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened." The unit procedure functionally tests the LPls once every refueling interval by simulating a 500 psia high pressure signal and calibrates the bistables between 390 and 403 psia. |
| | Th3 existing LPI bistables were first calibrated in March 1985 dunng preoperational testing of the RCS instrumentation using calibration information supplied in Loop Calibration Reports and in accordance with approved plant procedures. |
| | B:cause of incorrect information, the bistable was configured to trip on decreasing pressure instead of increasing pressure as required by the TS. |
| | As a result of the incorrect calibration, the LPIs prematurely trip on decreasing pressure (403 psia) and reset on increasing pressure such that the RHR isolation valves can be opened with RCS pressure as high as 433 psia. This is above the 390 psia TS limit and is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition or operation prohibited by the plant's technical specifications. |
| | II. |
| | |
| | ==Cause of Event== |
| | This condition was caused by the implementation of incorrect calibration information supplied during unit startup. |
| | Ill. Analysis of Event Th3 present LPI setpoint would potentially allow opening of the RHR suction / isolation valves at pressures as high as 433 psia. However, a review of the equipment history for the RHR suction line relief valves (3RHR*RV8708A&B) has shown that the RHR header relief valves have not lifted (requiring reset) which would indicate that pressures on the suction side of the RHR system have remained below the 440 psig [455 psia](ref. LER 96-034-00) lifting setpoint and 600 psig [615 psia) design limits. In addition, RHR system overpressure prevention is administratively controlled in the cp; rations RCS cool-down procedure which requires that RCS pressure be less than 390 psia before placing RHR in operation. Consequently, even though the violation of the TS surveillance requirement occurred, there were no cdverse consequences as a result of this event. |
| | |
| | ==IV. Corrective Action== |
| | j No immediate corrective action is required, however, prior to entry into Mode 4: |
| | 1. |
| | The Residual Heat Removal System suction / isolation valve Low Pressure Interlock bistable calibration will be re-evaluated and the low pressure permissive bistable will be recalibrated to comply with the TS. |
| | l l |
| | l |
| | .U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission 84 95) |
| | UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) |
| | DOCKET NUMBER (2) |
| | LER NUMBER (6) |
| | PAGE (3) |
| | YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBER NUMBER 3 of 3 97 031 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17) |
| | V. |
| | |
| | ==Additional Information== |
| | None |
| | |
| | ==Similar Events== |
| | LER 96-034-00 Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Pump Suction Relief Valve Setooint Not in Accordance With |
| | :- Technical Specifications (TS) |
| | The TS require that the RHR pump suction relief valves be set.450 psig to provide adequate over pressure protection when the temperature of any Reactor Cools nt System cold leg is less then 350 degrees Fahrenheit. By recommendation of the A/E and contrary to the TS requirement, the actuallift pressure for the RHR pump suction relief was revised to 440 psig without issuing a TS change. |
| | Manufacturer Data Ells System Code Residual Heat Removal.. |
| | ..BP Ells Component Code Vel v e, I s o l a t i o n.................................................................. l S LV |
| | }} |
| | |
| | {{LER-Nav}} |
:on 970507,RHR Valve Low Pressure Open Permissive Bistable Setting Was Set non-conservatively. Caused by Implementation of Incorrect Calibration Info. Re-evaluated RHR Suction/Isolation Valve LPI Calibrations| ML20140G601 |
| Person / Time |
|---|
| Site: |
Millstone  |
|---|
| Issue date: |
06/05/1997 |
|---|
| From: |
Danni Smith NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
|---|
| To: |
|
|---|
| Shared Package |
|---|
| ML20140G594 |
List: |
|---|
| References |
|---|
| LER-97-031, LER-97-31, NUDOCS 9706160365 |
| Download: ML20140G601 (3) |
|
text
-
~.
~-- - - - _ -
NRC FORM 366 U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISsloN APPROVED BY CpMS NO.3160-0104 (4-96)
EXPIRES 04/30/98
[
ff!Fo C$LLEETION ATIO RQ S o
S E RY D S
n'a"'?o'LMn"F"'!!?ERo 4&Ja"Sa",Vo"ffa$ ^
o LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 15;g"U ? 'Nic;g",^,'oaga'gga$,,vo"P',"!," Tag" gc o
o7fEEA'N'foEIIA'toTuME"f, "!fs%IST"oI"oE37$**
(See reverse fOr required number of digits /charactersfor each block)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMSER (2)
PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1 of 3 TITLE M)
RHR Valve Low Pressure Open Permissive Bistable Setting Set Non-Conservatively EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVisloN MONTH DAY YEAR FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER f
05 07 97 97 031 00 06 05 97 OPERATING 5
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTSoF 10 CFR 1: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
X so 73(a)(2)(ii So.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73!$(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(si) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71
~
20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) oTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(V)
Specify in Abstract tylow l
~
20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FoR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER tinclude Area Codel David A. Smith, MP3 Nuclear Licensing Manager (860)437-5840 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT M A NUF ACTURE R REPORTABLE J
TO NPRDS TO NPROS q
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR No SUBMISSloN
{
YES DATE (15)
(if yes, complete EXPECTED sUBMtssioN DATE).
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces,i.e., approximately15 single-spacedtypewnttenlines) (16)
At 1330 on May 7,1997, with the Unit in Mode 5, a system engineering review of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) l wide range pressure channel calibration procedures concluded that the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Low Pressure Interlock (LPI) setpoint did not comply with Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.d.1.
The existing LPl setting allows the RHR isolation valves to be opened at RCS pressures higher than those presented in ths TS. Consequently, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition or operation prohibited by the plant's TS.
l-l This condition was caused by the implementation of incorrect calibration information supplied during unit initial startup.
However, there were no adverse consequences as a result of the event since the RHR pressures did not exceed the RHR suction header relief valve limits.
4 No immediate corrective action is required, however, prior to entry into Mode 4, the RHR suction / isolation valve LPI bistable calibrations will be re-evaluated and the LPl bistables will be recalibrated to comply with the TS.
9706160365 970605 PDR ADOCK 05000423 S
PDR NRC FORM 366 (4 05) l
I l
lU.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission l
(4 95) i UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION l
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVislON Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBER NUMBER 2 of 3 97 031 00 TEXT (if rnore space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Forrn 366A) t17) l l
l l.
Description of Event
At 1330 on May 7,1997, with the Unit in Mode 5, a system engineering review of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
I wids range pressure channel calibration procedures concluded that the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Low l
Pressure Interlock (LPI) setpoint did not comply with Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.d.1.
TS 4.5.2 states that *Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: d) At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by: 1) Verifying automatic interlock action of the RHR System from the actual Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by ensuring that with a simulated or actual RCS pressure signal greater than or equal to 390 psia the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened." The unit procedure functionally tests the LPls once every refueling interval by simulating a 500 psia high pressure signal and calibrates the bistables between 390 and 403 psia.
Th3 existing LPI bistables were first calibrated in March 1985 dunng preoperational testing of the RCS instrumentation using calibration information supplied in Loop Calibration Reports and in accordance with approved plant procedures.
B:cause of incorrect information, the bistable was configured to trip on decreasing pressure instead of increasing pressure as required by the TS.
As a result of the incorrect calibration, the LPIs prematurely trip on decreasing pressure (403 psia) and reset on increasing pressure such that the RHR isolation valves can be opened with RCS pressure as high as 433 psia. This is above the 390 psia TS limit and is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition or operation prohibited by the plant's technical specifications.
II.
Cause of Event
This condition was caused by the implementation of incorrect calibration information supplied during unit startup.
Ill. Analysis of Event Th3 present LPI setpoint would potentially allow opening of the RHR suction / isolation valves at pressures as high as 433 psia. However, a review of the equipment history for the RHR suction line relief valves (3RHR*RV8708A&B) has shown that the RHR header relief valves have not lifted (requiring reset) which would indicate that pressures on the suction side of the RHR system have remained below the 440 psig [455 psia](ref. LER 96-034-00) lifting setpoint and 600 psig [615 psia) design limits. In addition, RHR system overpressure prevention is administratively controlled in the cp; rations RCS cool-down procedure which requires that RCS pressure be less than 390 psia before placing RHR in operation. Consequently, even though the violation of the TS surveillance requirement occurred, there were no cdverse consequences as a result of this event.
IV. Corrective Action
j No immediate corrective action is required, however, prior to entry into Mode 4:
1.
The Residual Heat Removal System suction / isolation valve Low Pressure Interlock bistable calibration will be re-evaluated and the low pressure permissive bistable will be recalibrated to comply with the TS.
l l
l
.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission 84 95)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBER NUMBER 3 of 3 97 031 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
V.
Additional Information
None
Similar Events
LER 96-034-00 Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Pump Suction Relief Valve Setooint Not in Accordance With
- - Technical Specifications (TS)
The TS require that the RHR pump suction relief valves be set.450 psig to provide adequate over pressure protection when the temperature of any Reactor Cools nt System cold leg is less then 350 degrees Fahrenheit. By recommendation of the A/E and contrary to the TS requirement, the actuallift pressure for the RHR pump suction relief was revised to 440 psig without issuing a TS change.
Manufacturer Data Ells System Code Residual Heat Removal..
..BP Ells Component Code Vel v e, I s o l a t i o n.................................................................. l S LV
|
|---|
|
|
| | | Reporting criterion |
|---|
| 05000245/LER-1997-001-02, :on 970110,liquid Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable Due to Leaking Automatic Isolation Valves.Valves Repaired |
- on 970110,liquid Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable Due to Leaking Automatic Isolation Valves.Valves Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-001, Forwards LER 97-001-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970110.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-001-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970110.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-001, Submits Commitments Re LER 97-001-00,documenting Condition Determined at Plant on 970104 | Submits Commitments Re LER 97-001-00,documenting Condition Determined at Plant on 970104 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-001-01, :on 970104,discovered Lack of Verbatim Compliance W/Ts SRs for 125 Volt Batteries & Battery Chargers.Caused by Misconception That Performing Surveillances Was Acceptable.Revised Procedures |
- on 970104,discovered Lack of Verbatim Compliance W/Ts SRs for 125 Volt Batteries & Battery Chargers.Caused by Misconception That Performing Surveillances Was Acceptable.Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-002, :on 970108,torquing of Battery Connections Not Performed as Part of Connection Tightness Checks Occurred. Caused by Lack of Effective Verification & Validation of Maint Procedure.Procedure Revised |
- on 970108,torquing of Battery Connections Not Performed as Part of Connection Tightness Checks Occurred. Caused by Lack of Effective Verification & Validation of Maint Procedure.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970114,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). Commitments Made,Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970114,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). Commitments Made,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000245/LER-1997-002-02, :on 970114,inadvertent Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred During Sys Removal from Svc for Maint. Caused by Inadequacy in Preparation of Clearance Required to Perform Maint.Individuals Involved Have Been Counseled |
- on 970114,inadvertent Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred During Sys Removal from Svc for Maint. Caused by Inadequacy in Preparation of Clearance Required to Perform Maint.Individuals Involved Have Been Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970108,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970108,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970108,damper 2-HV-210 Could Not Be Manually Operated within Ten Minutes as Required in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Mechanical Binding.Damper Was Placed in Fail Open Position |
- on 970108,damper 2-HV-210 Could Not Be Manually Operated within Ten Minutes as Required in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Mechanical Binding.Damper Was Placed in Fail Open Position
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents Condition That Was Determined at Mnps,Unit 3 on 970113,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) (B).List of Commitments,Encl | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents Condition That Was Determined at Mnps,Unit 3 on 970113,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) (B).List of Commitments,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1997-003-01, :on 970113,potential for Recirculation Spray Sys Piping Failure Occurred Due to RSS Pump Stopping & Restarting During Accident Conditions.Performed Evaluation of RSS Water Column Separation Issue |
- on 970113,potential for Recirculation Spray Sys Piping Failure Occurred Due to RSS Pump Stopping & Restarting During Accident Conditions.Performed Evaluation of RSS Water Column Separation Issue
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000336/LER-1997-003-01, Corrected Page One to LER 97-003-01:on 961216,discovered Discrepancy in Plant Procedure Utilized to Perform Periodic Insp of Fire Protection Sys Smoke Detectors.Caused by Failure to Properly Incorporate Ts.Ts Partially Revis | Corrected Page One to LER 97-003-01:on 961216,discovered Discrepancy in Plant Procedure Utilized to Perform Periodic Insp of Fire Protection Sys Smoke Detectors.Caused by Failure to Properly Incorporate Ts.Ts Partially Revised | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970306,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970306,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-003-02, :on 970306,svc Water Effluent Was Not Monitored Per Requirements of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Procedures to Ensure That SW Effluent from Reactor Bldg Operated within Design Basis Revised |
- on 970306,svc Water Effluent Was Not Monitored Per Requirements of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Procedures to Ensure That SW Effluent from Reactor Bldg Operated within Design Basis Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-004-01, :on 970123,violation of TS 3.1.2.3 Requirement for Number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Capable of Injecting Into RCS Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. HPSI Pumps Have Been Revised |
- on 970123,violation of TS 3.1.2.3 Requirement for Number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Capable of Injecting Into RCS Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. HPSI Pumps Have Been Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-004-01, Forwards LER 97-004-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16213-1.Includes Commitments Made within This Ltr | Forwards LER 97-004-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16213-1.Includes Commitments Made within This Ltr | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-004-02, :on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Sys Single Failure Vulnerability Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.No Immediate CA Are Required |
- on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Sys Single Failure Vulnerability Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.No Immediate CA Are Required
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-004, :on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Valve May Not Close within Specified Time.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.Plant Is in Cold Shutdown W/Reactor Defueled |
- on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Valve May Not Close within Specified Time.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.Plant Is in Cold Shutdown W/Reactor Defueled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-004, :on 970114,lack of Verbatim Compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Occurred.Caused by Addl Lack of Verbatim Compliance. Corrected 18 Month Surveillances Will Be Performed |
- on 970114,lack of Verbatim Compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Occurred.Caused by Addl Lack of Verbatim Compliance. Corrected 18 Month Surveillances Will Be Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-005-01, Forwards LER 97-005-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16236-2 & B16236-3,including Commitments Made within Ltr | Forwards LER 97-005-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16236-2 & B16236-3,including Commitments Made within Ltr | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-005, :on 970115,discovered That Radwaste Storage Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Discharges Directly to Atmosphere.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Operation of Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Was Prevented Immediately |
- on 970115,discovered That Radwaste Storage Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Discharges Directly to Atmosphere.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Operation of Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Was Prevented Immediately
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1997-005-02, :on 970204,inservice Test Instrumentation Did Not Meet Ansi/Asme Chapter XI Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Structure for IST Program. Procedure to Administer IST Program Was Implemented |
- on 970204,inservice Test Instrumentation Did Not Meet Ansi/Asme Chapter XI Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Structure for IST Program. Procedure to Administer IST Program Was Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000336/LER-1997-005, Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 2 on 970204.Commitments Made,Listed | Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 2 on 970204.Commitments Made,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-005, Corrects Numbering Inconsistency in Commitments Addressing LER 97-005-00 | Corrects Numbering Inconsistency in Commitments Addressing LER 97-005-00 | | | 05000245/LER-1997-006-01, :on 970131,failure to Exert Best Efforts to Restore Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor to Operable Status Occurred.Caused by Failure to Provide Clear Management Expectations.Management Will Be Provided |
- on 970131,failure to Exert Best Efforts to Restore Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor to Operable Status Occurred.Caused by Failure to Provide Clear Management Expectations.Management Will Be Provided
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1997-006, :on 970117,RHR Suction Isolation Valves Open But Not Under Administrative Control as Required in Mode 4 by TS SR 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Failure to Identify Conflict Between Requirements.Rhr Required Position Determined |
- on 970117,RHR Suction Isolation Valves Open But Not Under Administrative Control as Required in Mode 4 by TS SR 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Failure to Identify Conflict Between Requirements.Rhr Required Position Determined
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-006-01, Forwards LER 97-006-01 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments in Response to 970117 Event Contained within Attachment 1 | Forwards LER 97-006-01 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments in Response to 970117 Event Contained within Attachment 1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-006-02, :on 970211,main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Event Could Result in Exceeding Design Pressure of Primary Containment During Certain Scenarios.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation.Ca Will Be Implemented |
- on 970211,main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Event Could Result in Exceeding Design Pressure of Primary Containment During Certain Scenarios.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation.Ca Will Be Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Station,Unit 1 on 970131, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments Made within Ltr, Listed | Forwards LER 97-006-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Station,Unit 1 on 970131, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments Made within Ltr, Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970211.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-006-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970211.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-007, Forwards LER 97-007-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970131,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-007-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970131,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-007-02, :on 970308,inadequate Surveillance Procedure Used for Verifying Operability of RCS Vents.Caused by Failure to Incorporate TS SRs Into Plant Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure |
- on 970308,inadequate Surveillance Procedure Used for Verifying Operability of RCS Vents.Caused by Failure to Incorporate TS SRs Into Plant Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-007, Provides List of Commitments for LER 97-007-00 Re Event That Occurred on 970308 | Provides List of Commitments for LER 97-007-00 Re Event That Occurred on 970308 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1997-007, :on 970123,non-conservative Assumptions Used in TSs Shutdown Margin Curve Identified.Caused by Lack of Procedures for Generation & Documentation of Reactor Operational Info.Engineering Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 970123,non-conservative Assumptions Used in TSs Shutdown Margin Curve Identified.Caused by Lack of Procedures for Generation & Documentation of Reactor Operational Info.Engineering Procedure Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970203,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970203,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1997-008, :on 970124,TS 3.0.3 Action Statement for MSIV Closure Was Entered Due to TS Being Inconsistent W/Msiv Safety Function & Design.Submitted Proposed License Amend Request Ptscr 3-13-95 |
- on 970124,TS 3.0.3 Action Statement for MSIV Closure Was Entered Due to TS Being Inconsistent W/Msiv Safety Function & Design.Submitted Proposed License Amend Request Ptscr 3-13-95
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970310.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed as Submitted | Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970310.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed as Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-008-02, :on 970310,repts Review Facility Compliance W/ GL 96-01 for Reactor Protective Sys Received.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Revised |
- on 970310,repts Review Facility Compliance W/ GL 96-01 for Reactor Protective Sys Received.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-008-01, :on 970203,discovered Starting Air Sys Operating Outside Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Properly Identify & Verify Design Basis.Design Basis Established & Documented in FSAR |
- on 970203,discovered Starting Air Sys Operating Outside Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Properly Identify & Verify Design Basis.Design Basis Established & Documented in FSAR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970325.Commitments Made within Ltr,Submitted | Forwards LER 97-009-00,which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970325.Commitments Made within Ltr,Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-009-02, :on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01 Review Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01 Review Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970212,reactor low-low Level ECCS & Primary Containment Initiation Setpoints Were Not Conservative. Caused by Deficient Setpoint Methodology.Calculations Will Be Revised & TS Change Initiated |
- on 970212,reactor low-low Level ECCS & Primary Containment Initiation Setpoints Were Not Conservative. Caused by Deficient Setpoint Methodology.Calculations Will Be Revised & TS Change Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970212.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-009-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970212.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01,noted.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Sps Fully Implement TS Requirements.Operational Surveillances Will Be Revised |
- on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01,noted.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Sps Fully Implement TS Requirements.Operational Surveillances Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-009-01, Forwards LER 97-009-01,documenting Condition Originally Determined Reportable at Unit 3 on 970123.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | Forwards LER 97-009-01,documenting Condition Originally Determined Reportable at Unit 3 on 970123.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-010, Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970112.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed | Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970112.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1997-010, :on 970129,electrical Calculation Discrepancies Identified in Min Voltage Analysis for Class 1E Electrical Sys.Caused by Lack of Configuration Mgt for Comprehensive Calculation Program.Program Being Revised |
- on 970129,electrical Calculation Discrepancies Identified in Min Voltage Analysis for Class 1E Electrical Sys.Caused by Lack of Configuration Mgt for Comprehensive Calculation Program.Program Being Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-010-01, :on 970214,determined LLRT Pressure Being Used May Be Less than Accident Pressure.Caused by Weakness in Mgt Commitment to App J Program.Llrts Modified |
- on 970214,determined LLRT Pressure Being Used May Be Less than Accident Pressure.Caused by Weakness in Mgt Commitment to App J Program.Llrts Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-010, Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 1 on 970214.Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted as Listed | Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 1 on 970214.Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted as Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-010-02, :on 970112,heavy Dummy Fuel Assembly & Handling Tool Weight Exceeded TS Limit Occurred.Caused by Weight of Handling Tool Never Considered to Be Part of Load.Temporary Measure & Appropriate Procedures Revised |
- on 970112,heavy Dummy Fuel Assembly & Handling Tool Weight Exceeded TS Limit Occurred.Caused by Weight of Handling Tool Never Considered to Be Part of Load.Temporary Measure & Appropriate Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
|