05000423/LER-1992-001, :on 920113,leaking Monitoring Connection Containment Isolation Valves Were Not Locked Closed.Caused by Program failure-procedure Deficiency & Administrative Error.Valves Were Locked Closed
:on 920113,leaking Monitoring Connection Containment Isolation Valves Were Not Locked Closed.Caused by Program failure-procedure Deficiency & Administrative Error.Valves Were Locked Closed
05000336/LER-1999-012, :on 990917,unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Noted.Caused by Grounded Coil Wire for Lower Gripper Assembly.Leads Leading to Lower Gripper Coil Were Insulated
B17804, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 2.With
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05000336/LER-1999-012, :on 990917,unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Noted.Caused by Grounded Coil Wire for Lower Gripper Assembly.Leads Leading to Lower Gripper Coil Were Insulated
This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 92-001-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's 'lechnical Specification.
Very truly yours.
NORTilEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COhll'ANY
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/ Stephen E. Sefice LIirector, hlillstone Station SESTfGhl:ljs Attachment: LER 92-001-00 cc:
T. T. h1artin, Region 1 Administrator W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident inspector, hIillstone Unit Nos.1, 2 and 3 V. L. Rooney, NRC Project hlanager, hiillstone Unit No. 3 f ((R8V73S51 rGap 9202190340 920212
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.e l ahrenheit and approximately 40 pua (Niuoren Hoat), m sahe, were identihed winch were nmsmp lockmr devnes. The vahes were found timed but not loc ked as icquited. These sahes aie leakare rootutonny connecuon (LMC) sent sahes uluch are used to test the contauirnent isolouon vahes associated with the RilR cold lep m soon hues.
'Ibe f oot catne of the esent k Program f ailure-procedure dehcieno. adminstrause error. The ustem hneu}w did not inchade the subjet.t sahes arnong those reqmred to be lot hed closed.
As unmediate correstne action the sahes were locked tio<ed and the penetranon sunedlances base been updated to include these sah ts.
A change will be subnourd to update the i SAR ConUunment Penetration Table.
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i on knuary 13,1992, at 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> with the plant at 09 power in Mode 5 (Cold shutdownh 93 degrees l'ahlenheit and approximately 40 psia (Nntogen floath a non-hcensed operator (pf:0) performing a salve kneup observed that vahes 3Sil'Yu2b,930,931,937.938, and 9M had no lockmg devices while similarly conhgured salves did.
4 The aforementioned sahes are leakage momtonnp connection (LMC) test valves which are used to perform local haktate iesung of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cold leg injection line contamnient isolation vahes. A management renew of the mconshtency concluded that the subject salves are considered cotitainment isolation vahes and should be locked closed to cinure containment integnty.
The teuew aho concluded that the required ution of Technical Specihc.ition 4 A1.1, " primary j
Containment-Containment Integnty? had not been satished since the vahes were not locked closed and i
properly conuolled under the administrative program, As att immediate correctise acuon following the discovery of tins discrepancy, the sahes were locked closed All of the Lh!C vahes were widked-down and compared to the p&lDS. All sahes redeved were found closed but not all in their required locked closed position. Of the 136 vahen idenuhed, 37 were found not locked closed including the six idenuffed, 11.
Causc_ulhtnt The root cause of the event is program failure-procedure dehcienc3, adtnmistrative error. The sptern i
Imeups did not include the identihed LMC vahes among those teamred to be locked clowd.
The LMC sahes were not originally r.lasufied as containnient bolation vidves. The ongmal containment penetradon table in the Techmcal Specihcations did not indude tbne valves. This table was deleted from the Technical Specifications; the FSAR Conounment penetrauon Table, wluch then fornied the basis for maimaining containtnent integray, aho did not include the LMC valves as containmem isolation vah n, As part of the redeu in response to this esent. the LMC salves have been reclassihtd as containment isolation valves.
A thorough invesuration of the position and suncillance seguirements for LMC vahes had never been completed because the LMC sahes had not been identified as containment isolation valvet Consequently the Technical Specihcation suneillance requirements of 4.6.1.1 had neser been applied.
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This esent is bemp reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ih as an operauon or condaion prohibited by the Technical Specthcations.
Final Safety Analysis Report Section 6.2.4.1.4
Design Requirements for Containment Isolanon llatriers,"
states that containment isolauon valves under " administrative control" are required to be locked closed.
American National Standard ANSI $6.8 " Containment Sptem Leakage Testing Requuements" E
Section 6.2 descnbes these test connections as pan of the containment system barrier under.
administrathe controh Conudering these vahes as containment isolanon vahes n consistent with
primary Containment isolation" which aho allows " administrative control" on valves of this type. The surveillance requirements for containment i olanon vahes are specified m Technical Spectheation Section 4 Al.1. ~This section states that all " penetrations" not capable of being closed by automatic sptenu or operator actions are suneilled every 31 days except those that are locked, scaled or otherwhe secured in the closed position. These,ahn were not locked, and smce they were not suncilled on a 31 day frequency, the Technical Specification was uolated.
There were no signihcant safety consequences due to this event. All of the vahes are 3/4 inch test vahes and were found closed. The LMC valves are either arranged as two vahes in series or a single i
sahe with a threaded cap downstream. These vahes are mdependently venhed closed on a valve hneup during each refueling outage following the LLRT of the contamment solation vahes.
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se valves. A change will be r".mitted to update the FS AR Cont.nment 4nril 30,1992.
on 920113,leaking Monitoring Connection Containment Isolation Valves Were Not Locked Closed.Caused by Program failure-procedure Deficiency & Administrative Error.Valves Were Locked Closed
on 920124,smoke Detectors Inadvertently Deleted from Semiannual Surveillance Procedure 2618C.Caused by Administrative Error.Reinforced Need to Verify Assumptions Valid Before Changes
on 920127,discovered That Opening SBGT Circuit Breaker Would Defeat Isolation Signal to Reactor Bldg Ventilation Dampers.Caused by Inadequate Design.Sbgt Sys Operating Procedure Sp 646.6 Revised
on 920207,determined That Unit Was Not in Compliance W/Ts Surveillance 4.1.3.1.4a During Previous Startups.Caused by Inadequate Procedure (Sp 2620C).CEA Motion Inhibit Surveillance Sp 2620C Revised
on 920207,discovered Potential Barrier Breach Via Direct Openings Around Main Feedwater Bypass Line Penetrations.On 920130,plant Entered Mode 4 W/O Encl Bldg Integrity.Erosion/Corrosion Exam Procedure Modified
on 920214,spent Fuel Pool Analysis Error Noted.Caused by Using Transport cross-sections as Approximation for Total cross-sections.Util Evaluating Spent Storage Rack Design Changes
on 920211,HPSI Train Header Isolation Valve 2-SI-656 Was Discovered to Be Closed.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Valve 2-SI-656 Opened & HPSI Sys Flow Path Restored
on 920224,B Train CR Pressurization Bottles Were Found Isolated by Two Manual Valves.Probably Caused by Personnel Error Associated W/Improper self-verification. Commitment Opened to Discuss self-verification
Discusses Omission of RCS Depressurization Function from TS Requirements for Remote Shutdown Capability,Per LER 92-005 Submitted Via .Caused by Administrative Oversight.Ts Change Will Be Processed & Valves Tested
on 920302,design Deficiency Discovered for Letdown Isolation Valves Possibly Causing Failure of 24-volt Dc Bus.Caused by Design Error During Initial Plant Layout. Valves Added to Local Leak Rate Test Program
on 920306,discovered That Intermediate power- Range Power Above Permissibe (P6) Bistable Calibr Lower than TS Trip Setpoint.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Bistable Recalibrated to More Conservative Value
on 920302,design Deficiency Discovered for Letdown Isolation Valves 2-CH-089 & 2-CH-516.Caused by Design Error in Initial Layout of Plant.Llrt Program Updated & TS Change Request Submitted
on 920305,nonlicensed Operator Failed to Perform Firewatch Tour of 45 ft,6-inch Elevation of West Motor Control Ctr Area Prior to Surveillance Test.Caused by Miscommunication.Hourly Firewatch Reinstated
on 920219,concluded That Reactor Coolant Gross Activity Surveillances Completed Prior to 920103 Failed to Meet Tss.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Surveillance Sp 2831 Was Changed
on 920317,plant Personnel Verified That Eight Valves Not Included in Svc Water Sys TS Valve Lineup.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Change to Valve Lineup Procedure Written & Valves Verified in Correct Position
on 920403,mounting & Bushings for Control Room Air Conditioning Compressors F-22 & A&B Determined to Be Nonseismic.Caused by Error in Original Seismic Analysis. Seismic Mounting Restraints Installed
on 920325,CR Operators Discovered That Required Channel Checks for full-range Containment Pressure Indication Not Deleted from CR Rounds.Caused by Personnel Error.Event Reviewed & Procedure Changed
on 920612,auxiliary Bldg Elevation Sprinkler Sys Isolated for Approx Eight H Due to Personnel Error.Hose Stations & Sprinkler Sys Restored to Operable State & Continuous Fire Watch Stationed
on 920325,discovered That Required Channel Checks for full-range Containment Pressure Indication Deleted from Control Room Rounds.Caused by Personnel Error. Channel Checks Incorporated Into Logs
on 920401,discovered That Surveillance Requirements Not Met Re Testing of Atmosphere Cleanup Filter Units.Caused by Failure to Identify Proper Surveillance Test Requirements.Procedures Revised
on 920710,leakage Rate Test of Containment Hydrogen Purge Piping Isolation Valves Exceeded SR 3.6.1.2b.Caused by Failure of Key Connecting Air Operator to Valve Shaft.Damaged Keys Replaced
on 920405,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Loss of Operating Condensate Pumps,Causing Hotwell Level to Fluctuate.Caused by Design Deficiency.Traveling Water Screens A,B,C & F Replaced
on 920706,inadvertent ESAS Actuation Occurred Resulting in Partial Loss of Normal Power & Undervoltage Actuation of Facility Z1.Caused by Deenergizing ESAS Sensor Cabinet.Power Restored to Vital 4,160-volt Bus
on 920407,inadvertent Feedwater Isolation Signal Generated Due to Reactor Trip Breaker Testing.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedure Changed to Require Performing Steps in Sequence
on 920706,inadvertent ESAS Actuation Occurred on 4160 Volt Vital Ac Bus.Caused by Deenergizing 2 of 4 Sensor Cabinets.Independent Review Committee Formed to Investigate Event
on 920411,determined That Temporary Sampling for Turbine Bldg Stack Monitor Improperly Connected.Caused by Inlet & Discharge Sample Lines Inadvertently Crossed. Sample Pump Procedures to Be Revised
on 920713,pressurizer Safety Valve 2-RC-200 (S/N Bn 7128) Failed Lift Set Testing Due to Unknown Cause. Valve S/N Bn 7128 Being Refurbished,Retested & Set to 2485 Psig +/- 1%
on 920507,determined That Static Pressure Effect Not Accounted for in Setpoints of Veritrak Dp Transmitters.Caused by Incorrect Assumptions.Setpoints Methodology for Transmitters Will Be Reviewed
on 920821,determined That Spec 200 Cabinets Mfg by Foxboro Co May Not Be Seismically Qualified as Result of Missing Bumpers.Caused by Lack of Vendor Instruction.Seismic Bumpers Ordered
on 920821,determined That Spec 200 Cabinets May Not Be Qualified as Result of Missing Bumpers.Caused by Lack of Adequate Vendor Instruction to Install Seismic Bumpers.Equipment Insp & Bumpers Installed
on 920704,both Trains of Auxiliary Bldg Filters Declared Inoperable After Discovering Access Door on Common Intake Plenum for Abfs Open.Caused by Improper Design.Door Has Been Locked Wired Shut
on 920704,both Trains of Auxiliary Bldg Filters Declared Inoperable When Access Door on Common Intake Plenum for Subj Bldg Found Open.Caused by Impoper Design.Door Locked Wired Shut
on 920717,determined That One Train of Pressurizer Steam Space Vent Path Was Inoperable & Action Statement Not Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Changes to TS Will Be Submitted to Clarify Actions
on 920722,both RHR Trains Rendered Inoperable Due to Procedure Deficiency.Both Trains of RHR Restored to Operable Condition & Surveillance Procedures for Both Trains Revised
on 920818,determined That Trains a & B of Hydrogen Recombiner Sys Had Been Inoperable Between 920812 & 17 & Train a Positive Displacement Blower Motor Found W/ Lifted Lead Due to Personnel Error
on 920824,Auxiliary Bldg Filter Sys Fans Tripped W/Vivs Set at 100%.Caused by Failure to Perform Adequate Technical & Safety Evaluation of Auxiliary Bldg Filter Sys.Event Will Be Reviewed W/Engineers
on 921124,discovered That During 1992 Snubber Exams,Three Snubbers Not Included in List of safety-related Snubbers.Caused by Failure to Maintain Snubber Insp Lists Up to Date.Three Snubbers Added to List
on 920831,discovered That Testing for Loop Stop Valve Not Adequate.Caused by Incomplete Review When Preparing Containment Electrical Penetration Protection Drawing.Backup Breakers for Valves Verified
on 920929,determined That Train B of Supplemental Leak Collection & Release Sys Inoperable & Operability of Train a Could Not Be Verified.Caused by Incomplete Sys Design.Test Procedure Revised
on 921102,LCO 3.4.9.2.a Not Initiated for Pressurizer Heatup.Caused by Lack of Detailed Procedural Guidance & Licensed Operator Error.Procedure Change Re Insurge During Plant Heatup Implemented
on 921103,CR Staff Determined That Performing Check Valve Testing Per Surveillance Procedure Would Align Train B of HPSI to Both Hot & Cold Leg Injection Path.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Mod Program Changed
on 921029,determined That Certain Historical Conditions Involving Open/Unsealed Fire Barrier Not Reported to Nrc.Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of Requirements. Reporting Requirements Discussed at Meeting