Information Notice 2003-01, Failure of a Boiling Water Reactor Target Rock Main Steam Safety/Relief Valve: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | ||
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ===NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION=== | ||
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION | |||
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 | |||
===January 15, 2003=== | |||
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2003-01: | |||
===FAILURE OF A BOILING WATER REACTOR=== | |||
TARGET ROCK MAIN STEAM SAFETY/RELIEF | TARGET ROCK MAIN STEAM SAFETY/RELIEF | ||
| Line 39: | Line 42: | ||
addressees to a recent failure of a main steam safety/relief valve on a boiling water reactor | addressees to a recent failure of a main steam safety/relief valve on a boiling water reactor | ||
(BWR). The NRC anticipates that recipients will review the information for applicability to their | (BWR). The NRC anticipates that recipients will review the information for applicability to their | ||
facilities and consider taking appropriate actions. However, suggestions contained in this | facilities and consider taking appropriate actions. However, suggestions contained in this | ||
information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response | information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response | ||
| Line 50: | Line 53: | ||
In April 2002, following a Unit 1 refueling outage at the Hatch Nuclear Plant, the safety/relief | In April 2002, following a Unit 1 refueling outage at the Hatch Nuclear Plant, the safety/relief | ||
valve (S/RV) in the 1J location began leaking. In an effort to stop the assumed pilot valve | valve (S/RV) in the 1J location began leaking. In an effort to stop the assumed pilot valve | ||
leakage, the licensee cycled the S/RV at rated pressure and temperature. The valve failed to | leakage, the licensee cycled the S/RV at rated pressure and temperature. The valve failed to | ||
fully open and then failed to reseat. The licensee continued the startup to allow identification of | fully open and then failed to reseat. The licensee continued the startup to allow identification of | ||
potential balance-of-plant leakage. During the balance-of-plant startup, the associated S/RV | potential balance-of-plant leakage. During the balance-of-plant startup, the associated S/RV | ||
vacuum breaker failed due to repeated cycling, resulting in high unidentified drywell leakage. | vacuum breaker failed due to repeated cycling, resulting in high unidentified drywell leakage. | ||
| Line 64: | Line 67: | ||
leakage (reference LER 50-321/2002-002). | leakage (reference LER 50-321/2002-002). | ||
The S/RVs installed in Unit 1 are Target Rock two-stage S/RVs. The main stage valve internals | The S/RVs installed in Unit 1 are Target Rock two-stage S/RVs. The main stage valve internals | ||
(shown in attached Figure 1) are assembled by screwing the main piston onto the main stem so | (shown in attached Figure 1) are assembled by screwing the main piston onto the main stem so | ||
| Line 70: | Line 73: | ||
that the piston moves inside the guide, installing a locking tab washer, and installing the stem | that the piston moves inside the guide, installing a locking tab washer, and installing the stem | ||
nut against the washers locking tab. The piston is torqued to 100 ft-lbs, the stem nut is torqued | nut against the washers locking tab. The piston is torqued to 100 ft-lbs, the stem nut is torqued | ||
to 50 ft-lbs, and the locking tab is bent to capture the stem nut. During the S/RV inspection | to 50 ft-lbs, and the locking tab is bent to capture the stem nut. During the S/RV inspection | ||
after the April 2002 shutdown, the failed valve was found to have a .003-inch clearance | after the April 2002 shutdown, the failed valve was found to have a .003-inch clearance | ||
between the main disc and its seat. When the valve was disassembled, the stem nut and the | between the main disc and its seat. When the valve was disassembled, the stem nut and the | ||
piston were found to be loose. The stem nut was removed by hand and the piston was also | piston were found to be loose. The stem nut was removed by hand and the piston was also | ||
unthreaded by hand from the stem. However, the threads on the stem were severely damaged. | unthreaded by hand from the stem. However, the threads on the stem were severely damaged. | ||
The piston was unthreaded by working it up to the good threads under the stem nut and | The piston was unthreaded by working it up to the good threads under the stem nut and | ||
threading it onto this portion of the stem. The inside of the guide was heavily grooved and was | threading it onto this portion of the stem. The inside of the guide was heavily grooved and was | ||
also worn by the piston edge wearing on the guide. The piston was visibly cocked on the valve | also worn by the piston edge wearing on the guide. The piston was visibly cocked on the valve | ||
stem. | stem. | ||
In an earlier event in 1999, the licensee had a different S/RV fail on the test stand. This failure | In an earlier event in 1999, the licensee had a different S/RV fail on the test stand. This failure | ||
occurred during the fourth valve actuation when the stem nut fell off the stem and jammed in | occurred during the fourth valve actuation when the stem nut fell off the stem and jammed in | ||
the preload spring coils. The resulting uneven force caused the piston to cock in the guide. | the preload spring coils. The resulting uneven force caused the piston to cock in the guide. | ||
The stem nut had lost torque and came unscrewed from the stem threads in spite of the locking | The stem nut had lost torque and came unscrewed from the stem threads in spite of the locking | ||
tab. Following this failure, the licensee instituted a program to check the torque on both the | tab. Following this failure, the licensee instituted a program to check the torque on both the | ||
stem nut and the piston. The licensee found in most cases, both the stem nut and the piston | stem nut and the piston. The licensee found in most cases, both the stem nut and the piston | ||
had lost torque. | had lost torque. | ||
| Line 106: | Line 109: | ||
Following the failure of the 1J S/RV, the licensee closely examined three valves which had been | Following the failure of the 1J S/RV, the licensee closely examined three valves which had been | ||
removed during the April 2002 refueling outage. The stem nuts and pistons of all three valves | removed during the April 2002 refueling outage. The stem nuts and pistons of all three valves | ||
had lost torque, the stems of two of the valves showed significant wear on the valve threads, and one valve exhibited some thread wear. All three valves showed signs of damage on the | had lost torque, the stems of two of the valves showed significant wear on the valve threads, and one valve exhibited some thread wear. All three valves showed signs of damage on the | ||
stem shoulder, which is designed to contact the piston. In October 2002, the licensee removed | stem shoulder, which is designed to contact the piston. In October 2002, the licensee removed | ||
three additional S/RVs from Unit 1 for testing, disassembly, and inspection. All three valves | three additional S/RVs from Unit 1 for testing, disassembly, and inspection. All three valves | ||
successfully stroked with steam pressure but when disassembled and inspected, were found to | successfully stroked with steam pressure but when disassembled and inspected, were found to | ||
have lost torque on both the stem nut and the piston. Two valves had fairly good threads and | have lost torque on both the stem nut and the piston. Two valves had fairly good threads and | ||
the final valve (1F) had significant thread damage and a visibly cocked piston. All three valve | the final valve (1F) had significant thread damage and a visibly cocked piston. All three valve | ||
stems showed varying degrees of damage in the shoulder area. | stems showed varying degrees of damage in the shoulder area. | ||
| Line 126: | Line 129: | ||
the manufacturing tolerances of the valve stem and piston and to the lengthy service time | the manufacturing tolerances of the valve stem and piston and to the lengthy service time | ||
without adequate inspection and maintenance. The valve is designed so the valve stem screws | without adequate inspection and maintenance. The valve is designed so the valve stem screws | ||
into the piston. The stem has a shoulder that seats against the piston shoulder. For the valves | into the piston. The stem has a shoulder that seats against the piston shoulder. For the valves | ||
that show little to no thread damage, the stem apparently seats properly against the piston and | that show little to no thread damage, the stem apparently seats properly against the piston and | ||
most of the valve actuation force is carried by the stem and piston shoulders. For the valves | most of the valve actuation force is carried by the stem and piston shoulders. For the valves | ||
with thread damage, the licensee believes that the end of the lead thread of the piston contacts | with thread damage, the licensee believes that the end of the lead thread of the piston contacts | ||
the fillet that is machined into the shoulder of the valve stem. As shown in Figure 1, when this | the fillet that is machined into the shoulder of the valve stem. As shown in Figure 1, when this | ||
occurs, the shoulder of the stem does not properly seat against the shoulder of the piston. | occurs, the shoulder of the stem does not properly seat against the shoulder of the piston. | ||
| Line 144: | Line 147: | ||
Over time, vibration from normal plant operations causes fretting and wear of the valve stem | Over time, vibration from normal plant operations causes fretting and wear of the valve stem | ||
shoulder and threads. The piston rocks in the guide and wears grooves where the piston rings | shoulder and threads. The piston rocks in the guide and wears grooves where the piston rings | ||
contact the guide. Eventually the piston could significantly cock on the stem and wedge in the | contact the guide. Eventually the piston could significantly cock on the stem and wedge in the | ||
guide during valve actuation, which would prevent proper opening or closing of the valve. The | guide during valve actuation, which would prevent proper opening or closing of the valve. The | ||
licensee has not been able to determine the time in operation required to damage a valve to the | licensee has not been able to determine the time in operation required to damage a valve to the | ||
point of failure. The licensee believes the failed 1J valve and the damaged 1F valve were in | point of failure. The licensee believes the failed 1J valve and the damaged 1F valve were in | ||
service for approximately 20 years without maintenance. The licensee is currently removing | service for approximately 20 years without maintenance. The licensee is currently removing | ||
several S/RVs during each plant outage to ensure that all installed S/RVs are inspected and | several S/RVs during each plant outage to ensure that all installed S/RVs are inspected and | ||
maintained at least every 6 years. There are 11 S/RVs installed in each unit. Discussion | maintained at least every 6 years. There are 11 S/RVs installed in each unit. Discussion | ||
As the result of the 1J valve failure, the licensee performed a root cause analysis following the | As the result of the 1J valve failure, the licensee performed a root cause analysis following the | ||
| Line 164: | Line 167: | ||
event and contracted an independent engineering firm to perform a separate root cause | event and contracted an independent engineering firm to perform a separate root cause | ||
analysis. The licensee believes that the failure of the S/RV is related to the manufacturing | analysis. The licensee believes that the failure of the S/RV is related to the manufacturing | ||
tolerances of the valve stem and piston assembly and to the lengthy service time without | tolerances of the valve stem and piston assembly and to the lengthy service time without | ||
adequate inspection and maintenance. The independent root cause analysis determined that | adequate inspection and maintenance. The independent root cause analysis determined that | ||
the lead thread of the piston was contacting the fillet of the shoulder, preventing shoulder-to- shoulder contact. Since the piston was not adequately attached to the stem, operational | the lead thread of the piston was contacting the fillet of the shoulder, preventing shoulder-to- shoulder contact. Since the piston was not adequately attached to the stem, operational | ||
vibration and valve actuation caused thread damage and eventual valve failure. The valve | vibration and valve actuation caused thread damage and eventual valve failure. The valve | ||
vendor (Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corporation) has developed changes to the inspection and | vendor (Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corporation) has developed changes to the inspection and | ||
| Line 178: | Line 181: | ||
refurbishment procedures to ensure proper shoulder-to-shoulder contact during valve | refurbishment procedures to ensure proper shoulder-to-shoulder contact during valve | ||
assembly. The BWR vendor (GE Nuclear Energy) is issuing a Service Information Letter (SIL) | assembly. The BWR vendor (GE Nuclear Energy) is issuing a Service Information Letter (SIL) | ||
to address the degradation found in the Hatch S/RVs. | to address the degradation found in the Hatch S/RVs. | ||
The above-described circumstances emphasize the importance of periodic inspection of S/RV | The above-described circumstances emphasize the importance of periodic inspection of S/RV | ||
main stage components to identify deficiencies and necessary corrective actions. All Target | main stage components to identify deficiencies and necessary corrective actions. All Target | ||
Rock two-stage and three-stage S/RVs have similarly designed main stage components. | Rock two-stage and three-stage S/RVs have similarly designed main stage components. | ||
| Line 195: | Line 198: | ||
Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-12, Resolution of Generic Safety Issue B-55. | Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-12, Resolution of Generic Safety Issue B-55. | ||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | ||
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | ||
| Line 202: | Line 205: | ||
/RA/ | /RA/ | ||
===William D. Beckner, Program Director=== | |||
Operating Reactor Improvements Program | Operating Reactor Improvements Program | ||
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs | ===Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs=== | ||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
Technical Contacts: | |||
===Norman Garrett, Region II=== | |||
Charles G. Hammer, NRR | |||
(912) 367-9881 | (912) 367-9881 | ||
(301) 415-2791 Email: nxg@nrc.gov | |||
Email: cgh@nrc.gov | |||
===Danny Billings, NRR=== | |||
(301) 415-1175 Email: deb1@nrc.gov | (301) 415-1175 Email: deb1@nrc.gov | ||
Attachments: 1. Figure 1 - Target Rock Safety/Relief Valve | Attachments: 1. Figure 1 - Target Rock Safety/Relief Valve | ||
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices As the result of the 1J valve failure, the licensee performed a root cause analysis following the | 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices As the result of the 1J valve failure, the licensee performed a root cause analysis following the | ||
event and contracted an independent engineering firm to perform a separate root cause | event and contracted an independent engineering firm to perform a separate root cause | ||
analysis. The licensee believes that the failure of the S/RV is related to the manufacturing | analysis. The licensee believes that the failure of the S/RV is related to the manufacturing | ||
tolerances of the valve stem and piston assembly and to the lengthy service time without | tolerances of the valve stem and piston assembly and to the lengthy service time without | ||
adequate inspection and maintenance. The independent root cause analysis determined that | adequate inspection and maintenance. The independent root cause analysis determined that | ||
the lead thread of the piston was contacting the fillet of the shoulder, preventing shoulder-to- shoulder contact. Since the piston was not adequately attached to the stem, operational | the lead thread of the piston was contacting the fillet of the shoulder, preventing shoulder-to- shoulder contact. Since the piston was not adequately attached to the stem, operational | ||
vibration and valve actuation caused thread damage and eventual valve failure. The valve | vibration and valve actuation caused thread damage and eventual valve failure. The valve | ||
vendor (Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corporation) has developed changes to the inspection and | vendor (Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corporation) has developed changes to the inspection and | ||
| Line 238: | Line 245: | ||
refurbishment procedures to ensure proper shoulder-to-shoulder contact during valve | refurbishment procedures to ensure proper shoulder-to-shoulder contact during valve | ||
assembly. The BWR vendor (GE Nuclear Energy) is issuing a Service Information Letter (SIL) | assembly. The BWR vendor (GE Nuclear Energy) is issuing a Service Information Letter (SIL) | ||
to address the degradation found in the Hatch S/RVs. | to address the degradation found in the Hatch S/RVs. | ||
The above-described circumstances emphasize the importance of periodic inspection of S/RV | The above-described circumstances emphasize the importance of periodic inspection of S/RV | ||
main stage components to identify deficiencies and necessary corrective actions. All Target | main stage components to identify deficiencies and necessary corrective actions. All Target | ||
Rock two-stage and three-stage S/RVs have similarly designed main stage components. | Rock two-stage and three-stage S/RVs have similarly designed main stage components. | ||
| Line 255: | Line 262: | ||
Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-12, Resolution of Generic Safety Issue B-55. | Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-12, Resolution of Generic Safety Issue B-55. | ||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | ||
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | ||
| Line 262: | Line 269: | ||
/RA/ | /RA/ | ||
===William D. Beckner, Program Director=== | |||
Operating Reactor Improvements Program | Operating Reactor Improvements Program | ||
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs | ===Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs=== | ||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
Technical Contacts: | |||
===Norman Garrett, Region II=== | |||
Charles G. Hammer, NRR | |||
(912) 367-9881 | (912) 367-9881 | ||
(301) 415-2791 Email: nxg@nrc.gov | |||
Email: cgh@nrc.gov | |||
===Danny Billings, NRR=== | |||
(301) 415-1175 Email: deb1@nrc.gov | (301) 415-1175 Email: deb1@nrc.gov | ||
Attachments: 1. Figure 1 - Target Rock Safety/Relief Valve | Attachments: 1. Figure 1 - Target Rock Safety/Relief Valve | ||
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | ||
DISTRIBUTION: | DISTRIBUTION: | ||
| Line 287: | Line 298: | ||
IN File | IN File | ||
ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML030140543 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\RORP\OES\Staff Folders\Info\Hatch SRV\Billings\Hatch SRV\Hatch SRV | ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML030140543 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\RORP\\OES\\Staff Folders\\Info\\Hatch SRV\\Billings\\Hatch SRV\\Hatch SRV | ||
IN.rev2.wpd | IN.rev2.wpd | ||
OFFICE OES:RORP:DRIP | OFFICE OES:RORP:DRIP | ||
Tech Editor | |||
EMEB:DE | |||
EMEB:DE | |||
NAME | |||
DBillings | |||
PKleene | |||
BRBonser | |||
CGHammer | |||
DATE | |||
12/12/2002 | |||
12/04/2002 | |||
01/09/2003 | |||
12/18/2002 | |||
===OFFICE Region II=== | |||
Region II | |||
SC:OES:RORP:DRIP | |||
PD:RORP:DRIP | |||
NAME | |||
NPGarrett | |||
BRBonser | |||
TReis | |||
WDBeckner | |||
DATE | |||
12/20/2002 | |||
/ /2002 | |||
01/13/2003 | |||
01/15/2003 | |||
===OFFICIAL RECORD COPY=== | |||
Attachment 1 ______________________________________________________________________________________ | |||
OL = Operating License | |||
CP = Construction Permit | |||
=== | ===Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED=== | ||
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES | |||
_____________________________________________________________________________________ | _____________________________________________________________________________________ | ||
Information | Information | ||
Date of | |||
Notice No. | |||
Subject | |||
Issuance | |||
Issued to | |||
_____________________________________________________________________________________ | _____________________________________________________________________________________ | ||
2002-35 | 2002-35 | ||
===Changes to 10 CFR Parts 71=== | |||
and 72 Quality Assurance | |||
Programs | |||
12/20/2002 | |||
===All holders of 10 CFR Part 71=== | |||
quality assurance program | |||
approvals and all 10 CFR Part 72 licensees and certificate holders. | |||
2002-34 | 2002-34 Failure of Safety-Related | ||
Circuit Breaker External | ===Circuit Breaker External=== | ||
Auxiliary Switches at Columbia | |||
===Generating Station=== | |||
11/25/2002 | |||
===All holders of operating licenses=== | |||
or construction permits for | |||
nuclear power reactors. | |||
2002-33 | |||
===Notification of Permanent=== | |||
Injunction Against Neutron | |||
===Products Incorporated of=== | |||
Dickerson, Maryland | Dickerson, Maryland | ||
2002-29 | 11/21/2002 | ||
===All teletherapy and radiation=== | |||
processing licensees. | |||
2002-29 (Errata) | |||
Recent Design Problems in | |||
===Safety Functions of Pneumatic=== | |||
Systems | |||
11/06/2002 | |||
===All holders of operating licenses=== | |||
or construction permits for | |||
nuclear power reactors. | |||
2002-32 | |||
===Electromigration on=== | |||
Semiconductor Integrated | |||
Circuits | |||
10/31/2002 | |||
===All holders of operating licenses=== | |||
for nuclear power reactors except | |||
those who have ceased | |||
operations and have certified that | operations and have certified that | ||
| Line 348: | Line 448: | ||
removed from the reactor vessel. | removed from the reactor vessel. | ||
2002-31 | 2002-31 | ||
===Potentially Defective UF6=== | |||
Cylinder Valves (1-inch) | |||
10/31/2002 | |||
===All licensees authorized to=== | |||
possess and use source material | |||
and/or special nuclear material for | and/or special nuclear material for | ||
| Line 360: | Line 465: | ||
(UF6) in 30- and 48-inch cylinders. | (UF6) in 30- and 48-inch cylinders. | ||
2002-30 | 2002-30 | ||
===Control and Surveillance of=== | |||
Portable Gauges During Field | |||
Operations | |||
10/30/2002 | |||
===All NRC licensees authorized to=== | |||
possess, use, transport, and store | |||
portable gauges. | |||
Note: | Note: | ||
NRC generic communications may be received in electronic format shortly after they are | |||
issued by subscribing to the NRC listserver as follows: | issued by subscribing to the NRC listserver as follows: | ||
To subscribe send an e-mail to <listproc@nrc.gov >, no subject, and the following | |||
command in the message portion: | command in the message portion: | ||
subscribe gc-nrr firstname lastname}} | |||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} | ||
Latest revision as of 13:17, 16 January 2025
| ML030140543 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/15/2003 |
| From: | Beckner W NRC/NRR/DRIP/RORP |
| To: | |
| Billings, Danny, NRR/OES/ROR, 415-1175 | |
| References | |
| TAC M6480 IN-03-001 | |
| Download: ML030140543 (8) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001
January 15, 2003
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2003-01:
FAILURE OF A BOILING WATER REACTOR
TARGET ROCK MAIN STEAM SAFETY/RELIEF
VALVE
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors, except
those that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been
permanently removed from the reactor.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert
addressees to a recent failure of a main steam safety/relief valve on a boiling water reactor
(BWR). The NRC anticipates that recipients will review the information for applicability to their
facilities and consider taking appropriate actions. However, suggestions contained in this
information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response
is required.
Description of Circumstances
In April 2002, following a Unit 1 refueling outage at the Hatch Nuclear Plant, the safety/relief
valve (S/RV) in the 1J location began leaking. In an effort to stop the assumed pilot valve
leakage, the licensee cycled the S/RV at rated pressure and temperature. The valve failed to
fully open and then failed to reseat. The licensee continued the startup to allow identification of
potential balance-of-plant leakage. During the balance-of-plant startup, the associated S/RV
vacuum breaker failed due to repeated cycling, resulting in high unidentified drywell leakage.
The plant was shut down when the leakage exceeded the technical specification allowable
leakage (reference LER 50-321/2002-002).
The S/RVs installed in Unit 1 are Target Rock two-stage S/RVs. The main stage valve internals
(shown in attached Figure 1) are assembled by screwing the main piston onto the main stem so
that the piston moves inside the guide, installing a locking tab washer, and installing the stem
nut against the washers locking tab. The piston is torqued to 100 ft-lbs, the stem nut is torqued
to 50 ft-lbs, and the locking tab is bent to capture the stem nut. During the S/RV inspection
after the April 2002 shutdown, the failed valve was found to have a .003-inch clearance
between the main disc and its seat. When the valve was disassembled, the stem nut and the
piston were found to be loose. The stem nut was removed by hand and the piston was also
unthreaded by hand from the stem. However, the threads on the stem were severely damaged.
The piston was unthreaded by working it up to the good threads under the stem nut and
threading it onto this portion of the stem. The inside of the guide was heavily grooved and was
also worn by the piston edge wearing on the guide. The piston was visibly cocked on the valve
stem.
In an earlier event in 1999, the licensee had a different S/RV fail on the test stand. This failure
occurred during the fourth valve actuation when the stem nut fell off the stem and jammed in
the preload spring coils. The resulting uneven force caused the piston to cock in the guide.
The stem nut had lost torque and came unscrewed from the stem threads in spite of the locking
tab. Following this failure, the licensee instituted a program to check the torque on both the
stem nut and the piston. The licensee found in most cases, both the stem nut and the piston
had lost torque.
Following the failure of the 1J S/RV, the licensee closely examined three valves which had been
removed during the April 2002 refueling outage. The stem nuts and pistons of all three valves
had lost torque, the stems of two of the valves showed significant wear on the valve threads, and one valve exhibited some thread wear. All three valves showed signs of damage on the
stem shoulder, which is designed to contact the piston. In October 2002, the licensee removed
three additional S/RVs from Unit 1 for testing, disassembly, and inspection. All three valves
successfully stroked with steam pressure but when disassembled and inspected, were found to
have lost torque on both the stem nut and the piston. Two valves had fairly good threads and
the final valve (1F) had significant thread damage and a visibly cocked piston. All three valve
stems showed varying degrees of damage in the shoulder area.
The licensee believes the loss of torque and damage of the valve internals can be attributed to
the manufacturing tolerances of the valve stem and piston and to the lengthy service time
without adequate inspection and maintenance. The valve is designed so the valve stem screws
into the piston. The stem has a shoulder that seats against the piston shoulder. For the valves
that show little to no thread damage, the stem apparently seats properly against the piston and
most of the valve actuation force is carried by the stem and piston shoulders. For the valves
with thread damage, the licensee believes that the end of the lead thread of the piston contacts
the fillet that is machined into the shoulder of the valve stem. As shown in Figure 1, when this
occurs, the shoulder of the stem does not properly seat against the shoulder of the piston.
Thread damage starts with the first actuation on the test stand, resulting in a loss of torque.
Over time, vibration from normal plant operations causes fretting and wear of the valve stem
shoulder and threads. The piston rocks in the guide and wears grooves where the piston rings
contact the guide. Eventually the piston could significantly cock on the stem and wedge in the
guide during valve actuation, which would prevent proper opening or closing of the valve. The
licensee has not been able to determine the time in operation required to damage a valve to the
point of failure. The licensee believes the failed 1J valve and the damaged 1F valve were in
service for approximately 20 years without maintenance. The licensee is currently removing
several S/RVs during each plant outage to ensure that all installed S/RVs are inspected and
maintained at least every 6 years. There are 11 S/RVs installed in each unit. Discussion
As the result of the 1J valve failure, the licensee performed a root cause analysis following the
event and contracted an independent engineering firm to perform a separate root cause
analysis. The licensee believes that the failure of the S/RV is related to the manufacturing
tolerances of the valve stem and piston assembly and to the lengthy service time without
adequate inspection and maintenance. The independent root cause analysis determined that
the lead thread of the piston was contacting the fillet of the shoulder, preventing shoulder-to- shoulder contact. Since the piston was not adequately attached to the stem, operational
vibration and valve actuation caused thread damage and eventual valve failure. The valve
vendor (Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corporation) has developed changes to the inspection and
refurbishment procedures to ensure proper shoulder-to-shoulder contact during valve
assembly. The BWR vendor (GE Nuclear Energy) is issuing a Service Information Letter (SIL)
to address the degradation found in the Hatch S/RVs.
The above-described circumstances emphasize the importance of periodic inspection of S/RV
main stage components to identify deficiencies and necessary corrective actions. All Target
Rock two-stage and three-stage S/RVs have similarly designed main stage components.
Currently 11 BWR plants in the U.S. have two-stage S/RVs, and 11 BWR plants have three- stage S/RVs.
The above described problems found in the main stages of Target Rock S/RVs are not related
to the problems found previously in the pilot stages of the S/RVs that were discussed in
Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-12, Resolution of Generic Safety Issue B-55.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
/RA/
William D. Beckner, Program Director
Operating Reactor Improvements Program
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts:
Norman Garrett, Region II
Charles G. Hammer, NRR
(912) 367-9881
(301) 415-2791 Email: nxg@nrc.gov
Email: cgh@nrc.gov
Danny Billings, NRR
(301) 415-1175 Email: deb1@nrc.gov
Attachments: 1. Figure 1 - Target Rock Safety/Relief Valve
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices As the result of the 1J valve failure, the licensee performed a root cause analysis following the
event and contracted an independent engineering firm to perform a separate root cause
analysis. The licensee believes that the failure of the S/RV is related to the manufacturing
tolerances of the valve stem and piston assembly and to the lengthy service time without
adequate inspection and maintenance. The independent root cause analysis determined that
the lead thread of the piston was contacting the fillet of the shoulder, preventing shoulder-to- shoulder contact. Since the piston was not adequately attached to the stem, operational
vibration and valve actuation caused thread damage and eventual valve failure. The valve
vendor (Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corporation) has developed changes to the inspection and
refurbishment procedures to ensure proper shoulder-to-shoulder contact during valve
assembly. The BWR vendor (GE Nuclear Energy) is issuing a Service Information Letter (SIL)
to address the degradation found in the Hatch S/RVs.
The above-described circumstances emphasize the importance of periodic inspection of S/RV
main stage components to identify deficiencies and necessary corrective actions. All Target
Rock two-stage and three-stage S/RVs have similarly designed main stage components.
Currently 11 BWR plants in the U.S. have two-stage S/RVs, and 11 BWR plants have three- stage S/RVs.
The above described problems found in the main stages of Target Rock S/RVs are not related
to the problems found previously in the pilot stages of the S/RVs that were discussed in
Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-12, Resolution of Generic Safety Issue B-55.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
/RA/
William D. Beckner, Program Director
Operating Reactor Improvements Program
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts:
Norman Garrett, Region II
Charles G. Hammer, NRR
(912) 367-9881
(301) 415-2791 Email: nxg@nrc.gov
Email: cgh@nrc.gov
Danny Billings, NRR
(301) 415-1175 Email: deb1@nrc.gov
Attachments: 1. Figure 1 - Target Rock Safety/Relief Valve
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DISTRIBUTION:
IN File
ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML030140543 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\RORP\\OES\\Staff Folders\\Info\\Hatch SRV\\Billings\\Hatch SRV\\Hatch SRV
IN.rev2.wpd
OFFICE OES:RORP:DRIP
Tech Editor
EMEB:DE
EMEB:DE
NAME
DBillings
PKleene
BRBonser
CGHammer
DATE
12/12/2002
12/04/2002
01/09/2003
12/18/2002
OFFICE Region II
Region II
SC:OES:RORP:DRIP
PD:RORP:DRIP
NAME
NPGarrett
BRBonser
TReis
WDBeckner
DATE
12/20/2002
/ /2002
01/13/2003
01/15/2003
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Attachment 1 ______________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2002-35
Changes to 10 CFR Parts 71
and 72 Quality Assurance
Programs
12/20/2002
All holders of 10 CFR Part 71
quality assurance program
approvals and all 10 CFR Part 72 licensees and certificate holders.
2002-34 Failure of Safety-Related
Circuit Breaker External
Auxiliary Switches at Columbia
Generating Station
11/25/2002
All holders of operating licenses
or construction permits for
nuclear power reactors.
2002-33
Notification of Permanent
Injunction Against Neutron
Products Incorporated of
Dickerson, Maryland
11/21/2002
All teletherapy and radiation
processing licensees.
2002-29 (Errata)
Recent Design Problems in
Safety Functions of Pneumatic
Systems
11/06/2002
All holders of operating licenses
or construction permits for
nuclear power reactors.
2002-32
Electromigration on
Semiconductor Integrated
Circuits
10/31/2002
All holders of operating licenses
for nuclear power reactors except
those who have ceased
operations and have certified that
fuel has been permanently
removed from the reactor vessel.
2002-31
Potentially Defective UF6
Cylinder Valves (1-inch)
10/31/2002
All licensees authorized to
possess and use source material
and/or special nuclear material for
the heating, emptying, filling, or
shipping of uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) in 30- and 48-inch cylinders.
2002-30
Control and Surveillance of
Portable Gauges During Field
Operations
10/30/2002
All NRC licensees authorized to
possess, use, transport, and store
portable gauges.
Note:
NRC generic communications may be received in electronic format shortly after they are
issued by subscribing to the NRC listserver as follows:
To subscribe send an e-mail to <listproc@nrc.gov >, no subject, and the following
command in the message portion:
subscribe gc-nrr firstname lastname