ENS 44453: Difference between revisions
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StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
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| event date = 08/30/2008 15:03 EDT | | event date = 08/30/2008 15:03 EDT | ||
| last update date = 08/30/2008 | | last update date = 08/30/2008 | ||
| title = Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control Malfunction Leads | | title = Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control Malfunction Leads to Reactor Scram | ||
| event text = At 1503 hours EDT, an Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system malfunction caused the Unit 2 Main Turbine bypass valves (BPV) to start cycling. Initially, BPV 1 partially opened and closed followed shortly thereafter by four BPVs going full open. At that time the order was given to insert a manual scram. An automatic scram signal occurred just as the operator was beginning to insert the manual scram. | | event text = At 1503 hours EDT, an Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system malfunction caused the Unit 2 Main Turbine bypass valves (BPV) to start cycling. Initially, BPV 1 partially opened and closed followed shortly thereafter by four BPVs going full open. At that time the order was given to insert a manual scram. An automatic scram signal occurred just as the operator was beginning to insert the manual scram. | ||
Preliminary investigation of the automatic scram signal indicates that it was initiated by low Relay Emergency Trip Supply (RETS) pressure to the main turbine control valves due to the EHC malfunction. Reactor water level momentarily dropped below Low Level during the response. This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 and Group 6 isolations, as expected. | Preliminary investigation of the automatic scram signal indicates that it was initiated by low Relay Emergency Trip Supply (RETS) pressure to the main turbine control valves due to the EHC malfunction. Reactor water level momentarily dropped below Low Level during the response. This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 and Group 6 isolations, as expected. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:13, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Brunswick  North Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |
| LER: | 05000324/LER-2008-001 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-1.27 h-0.0529 days <br />-0.00756 weeks <br />-0.00174 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Curtis Dunsmore 17:47 Aug 30, 2008 |
| NRC Officer: | Pete Snyder |
| Last Updated: | Aug 30, 2008 |
| 44453 - NRC Website
| |
Brunswick with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |