05000275/FIN-2012005-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = G Guerra, P Elkmann, L Willoughby, N O,' | | Inspector = G Guerra, P Elkmann, L Willoughby, N O, 'Keefet Hipschman, G Warnick, N Hernandez, L Micewski, D You | ||
| CCA = P.2 | | CCA = P.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = PI.2 | | INPO aspect = PI.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, after personnel failed to adequately assess the impact of an unanalyzed condition on control room envelope operability. Specifically, personnel performed a problem screening for a nonconforming condition that impacted operability of the control room ventilation system operability and incorrectly determined that a review by the Shift Foreman, work control Shift Foreman, or Shift Manager was not required. After the inspectors raised this concern, the licensee determined that a reasonable expectation of control room ventilation system operability could not be provided, and declared the control room envelope inoperable, entered the applicable Technical Specification 3.7.10 action statements, and implemented compensatory measures. The licensee entered the condition into the corrective action program as Notification 50497774. The failure to adequately assess the impact of an unanalyzed, non-conservative condition on control room habitability system operability was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective design control attribute to provide reasonable assurance for the control room physical design to protect operators from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the corrective action program component, because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the impact of non-conservative control room atmospheric dispersion factor methodology on control room habitability system operability. | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, after personnel failed to adequately assess the impact of an unanalyzed condition on control room envelope operability. Specifically, personnel performed a problem screening for a nonconforming condition that impacted operability of the control room ventilation system operability and incorrectly determined that a review by the Shift Foreman, work control Shift Foreman, or Shift Manager was not required. After the inspectors raised this concern, the licensee determined that a reasonable expectation of control room ventilation system operability could not be provided, and declared the control room envelope inoperable, entered the applicable Technical Specification 3.7.10 action statements, and implemented compensatory measures. The licensee entered the condition into the corrective action program as Notification 50497774. The failure to adequately assess the impact of an unanalyzed, non-conservative condition on control room habitability system operability was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective design control attribute to provide reasonable assurance for the control room physical design to protect operators from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the corrective action program component, because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the impact of non-conservative control room atmospheric dispersion factor methodology on control room habitability system operability. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2012005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra P Elkmann L Willoughby N O 'Keefet Hipschman G Warnick N Hernandez L Micewski D You |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
| ' | |