05000266/FIN-2012004-04: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Weld Design Deficiency | | title = Weld Design Deficiency in Emergency Diesel Generator Missle Protection Barriers | ||
| docket = 05000266, 05000301 | | docket = 05000266, 05000301 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000266/2012004 | | inspection report = IR 05000266/2012004 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.18 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.18 | ||
| Inspector = C Zoia, J Jandovitz, M Kunowski, S Burton, R Krsek, V Meghani, M Learn, M Thorpe | | Inspector = C Zoia, J Jandovitz, M Kunowski, S Burton, R Krsek, V Meghani, M Learn, M Thorpe-Kavanaugh, P Cardona-Morales, K Carrington | ||
| CCA = H.2 | | CCA = H.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.2 | | INPO aspect = LA.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for a deficiency in weld evaluations in the licensee design calculation of the new missile protection steel barriers. These barriers were installed for protection of the emergency diesel generators G-01 and G-02 exhaust pipes from a tornado missile strike. Specifically, the inspectors identified two examples where critical welds were not adequately addressed in the calculation. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as action requests AR01771762 and AR01772431 for evaluation and development of corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and Appendix E, Example of Minor Issues, dated August 11, 2009, and found that it was similar to Example 3a and it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Tables 2 and 3, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1 for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered Yes to Exhibit 2, Question A.1 in Appendix A for mitigating structures, systems, and components, and functionality. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory oversight of the contractor activities to support nuclear safety. Specifically, in the examples noted, the licensee failed to adequately review the calculation performed by the contractor to verify that the assumptions and engineering judgments were adequately justified and consistent with the installation | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for a deficiency in weld evaluations in the licensee design calculation of the new missile protection steel barriers. These barriers were installed for protection of the emergency diesel generators G-01 and G-02 exhaust pipes from a tornado missile strike. Specifically, the inspectors identified two examples where critical welds were not adequately addressed in the calculation. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as action requests AR01771762 and AR01772431 for evaluation and development of corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and Appendix E, Example of Minor Issues, dated August 11, 2009, and found that it was similar to Example 3a and it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Tables 2 and 3, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1 for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered Yes to Exhibit 2, Question A.1 in Appendix A for mitigating structures, systems, and components, and functionality. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory oversight of the contractor activities to support nuclear safety. Specifically, in the examples noted, the licensee failed to adequately review the calculation performed by the contractor to verify that the assumptions and engineering judgments were adequately justified and consistent with the installation | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2012004 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Zoia J Jandovitz M Kunowski S Burton R Krsek V Meghani M Learn M Thorpe-Kavanaugh P Cardona-Morales K Carrington |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
| ' | |