The inspectors identified a
NCV of
TS 6.8.1.a Procedures and Programs, because
PSEG failed to properly control and store
transient material within seismic class I buildings such that the equipment did not pose a hazard to safe plant operation. Specifically, two large tool gang boxes were stored unrestrained in the vicinity of the
sodium hydroxide storage tank and associated
containment spray (
CS) valves and two full 55 gallon
SW maintenance drums were stored unrestrained next to the 11, 12, and 15 containment fan cooler unit (CFCU)
SW flow transmitters. This issue was entered into
PSEGs CAP as notification 20559092.
PSEGs immediate corrective actions were to restrain the subject material in accordance with the
PSEG procedure
CC-AA-320-011,
Transient Loads. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The issue was also similar to
IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, example 4.a which stated the issue was more than minor if the licensee routinely failed to follow their procedure and safety-related equipment was adversely impacted. Specifically,
PSEG was not following the requirements of procedure
CC-AA-320-011,
Transient Loads, and equipment had been stowed in close vicinity of safety-related equipment. The finding was evaluated under
IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve loss or degradation of equipment specifically designed to mitigate a seismic event, and did not involve total loss of a safety function that contributes to external event initiated core damage sequences. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, in that
PSEG did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel did not follow procedures. Specifically, station personnel did not follow procedures for the storage of
transient loads in the auxiliary building.
