05000266/FIN-2011002-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.06 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.06 | ||
| Inspector = M Kunowski, M Phalen, M Thorpe | | Inspector = M Kunowski, M Phalen, M Thorpe-Kavanaugh, P Cardona-Morales, R Ruiz, R Winter, S Burton, T Bilik, A Dahbur, J Bozga, J Jandovitz, K Carrington | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the inspectors for the failure of the licensee from 1995 through January 20, 2011, to correctly translate the applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis into specifications, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee modified the control cabinets of emergency diesel generators G-01 and G-02 in 1995 without the appropriate internal flood protection design features. The licensee initiated condition report AR01610979, took immediate corrective actions to correct the deficient conditions, and performed an apparent cause evaluation. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee continued to implement planned corrective actions that included establishment of preventive maintenance activities to perform flooding seal inspections and extent of condition evaluations to ensure all potential design and licensing basis flooding issues were identified and resolved. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that internal flood protection features used to mitigate a design basis accident were maintained. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality. The inspectors determined that this finding did not reflect current performance since the error was introduced in a design change that was greater than three years old; therefore, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the inspectors for the failure of the licensee from 1995 through January 20, 2011, to correctly translate the applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis into specifications, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee modified the control cabinets of emergency diesel generators G-01 and G-02 in 1995 without the appropriate internal flood protection design features. The licensee initiated condition report AR01610979, took immediate corrective actions to correct the deficient conditions, and performed an apparent cause evaluation. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee continued to implement planned corrective actions that included establishment of preventive maintenance activities to perform flooding seal inspections and extent of condition evaluations to ensure all potential design and licensing basis flooding issues were identified and resolved. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that internal flood protection features used to mitigate a design basis accident were maintained. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality. The inspectors determined that this finding did not reflect current performance since the error was introduced in a design change that was greater than three years old; therefore, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2011002 Section 1R06 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Kunowski M Phalen M Thorpe-Kavanaugh P Cardona-Morales R Ruiz R Winter S Burton T Bilik A Dahbur J Bozga J Jandovitz K Carrington |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |